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Abstract —National and regional governments are responsible for the 
development of public policy for volcanic risk reduction (VRR) within their 
territories. However, practices vary significantly between jurisdictions. A 
priority of the international volcanological community is the identification 
and promotion of improved VRR through collaborative knowledge exchange. 
This project investigates the role of knowledge exchange in the development 
of VRR. The theories and methods of policy mobility studies are used to 
identify and explore how, why, where and with what effects international 
exchanges of knowledge have shaped this area of public policy. Analyses have 
been performed through the construction of narrative histories. This project 
details the development of social apparatus for VRR worldwide, depicted as a 
global policy field on three levels - the global (macro) level; the national 
(meso) level; and at individual volcanoes (the micro level). The narratives 
track the transition from a historical absence of VRR policy through the 
global proliferation of a reactive 'emergency management' approach, to the 
emergence  of an alternative based on long-term planning and community 
empowerment that has circulated at the macro level, but struggled to 
translate into practice. This is explored using five case volcanoes: Merapi, 
Indonesia; Nevado del Ruiz, Colombia; Mount Rainier, USA; Popocatépetl 
and Volcán de Colima, México. These cases demonstrate that policymakers at 
active volcanoes do not always deliberately access knowledge curated at the 
'core' of the global policy field and use it to rationally develop 'best practice' 
VRR policies. More frequently, the transient topologies that carry knowledge 
between volcanoes, the assemblages of mobile knowledge with evolving local 
politics, culture and volcanic activity, and resulting mutations have produced 
unique and unpredictable results at each volcano. Mobile policies may 
encounter local resistance, ideas may go unused for decades and evolution 
over time does not automatically entail 'progression' towards an ideal. This 
work carries lessons for those seeking 'improved' VRR through knowledge 
exchange, including the development of the policy field across time and 
strata; current understanding of 'best practices' in VRR; challenges 
encountered when mobilising VRR policy into different volcanic settings; and 
examples of efforts to overcome those challenges. 
Keywords — Volcanic Risk Governance, Policy Mobility Studies, Applied 
Volcanology, Critical Policy Studies, Disaster Risk Reduction,  Volcán de Colima, 
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On 3rd September, 2018, at the opening plenary session of the International 
Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth's Interior's 'Cities on 
Volcanoes 10' conference, the Operational Director of Emergency Co-ordination for 
Italy's Dipartamento della Protezione Civile (Department for Civil Protection) 
outlined the operational plan designed to prevent disaster during future eruptions at 
Mount Vesuvius to the assembled delegates. This was a conference focussed on 
volcanic risk, attracting participants from around the world. Naples, Italy had been 
chosen as the setting due to the recognition of high volcanic risk posed to hundreds of 
thousands of inhabitants by two volcanoes - the large caldera, Campi Flegrei, and the 
stratovolcano, Vesuvius. Among the features of the plan described were the eruption 
scenario on which it was based (an explosive eruption of the same scale as a prior 
eruption in 1631); the parts of the community involved (a 'red zone' comprising 18 
municipalities closest the volcano, to be completely evacuated, and a more distant 
'yellow zone' and 'blue zone' with no pre-existing provision for evacuation); the four 
levels of public alert; the anticipated timescale of operation (72 hours, based on 
logistics rather than scientific prognoses of the timescale of an eruption) and the 
operational procedures (red zone residents to be brought to 'gathering areas' and sent 
by train, bus or ship to a region of Italy with which their municipality is 'twinned'). In 
the audience, I was able to note little to no change from when I had researched 
volcanic risk governance at Mount Vesuvius for my undergraduate dissertation at the 
University of Glasgow in 2011.  
 
The subsequent speaker in the same plenary session, one of Italy's most senior 
volcanologists, Franco Barberi, voiced 'grave concerns' regarding many aspects of the 
Protezione Civile plan outlined by the previous speaker. He criticised the plan's basis 
in one eruptive scenario, noting that Vesuvius would be capable of a variety of 
eruptive styles, from a low-magnitude effusion of lava to an explosive eruption an 
order of magnitude larger than that of 1631. He stated that even once scientists had 
begun to detect changes in the activity of the volcano, it may be very difficult to 
identify which of these might ultimately manifest. As such, inflexibly planning for 
one scenario may be foolhardy. Barberi proceeded to criticise other aspects of the plan 
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(e.g. the alert levels), at one point asking rhetorically whom in Protezione Civile 
would have the 'courage' to challenge these conventions. 
 
I had become familiar with many of these criticisms of the Vesuvius plan through my 
undergraduate research project. The plan's inflexible basis in one eruption scenario; 
the use of municipal boundaries rather than the projected range of volcanic hazards to 
demarcate the evacuation zone; the logistical process of extricating hundreds of 
thousands from a densely populated urban area within a fixed 72-hour timeframe 
despite no guarantee that volcanic activity would align with this; and redistributing 
evacuees throughout Italy based on which local authority they live in - had all been 
criticised by Italian academics by the time that I was learning about the situation in 
2011 (e.g. Dobran, 2006; Carlino et al. 2009).  
 
At the time of the 2018 Cities on Volcanoes conference, I was in the latter stages of 
this PhD project - examining the complexities of turning knowledge in volcanic risk 
governance into policy and practice. I had seen much evidence that these processes 
were seldom clear-cut and straightforward. Despite this, a part of me could not help 
but be surprised that knowledge of the apparent inadequacies of this plan had reached 
my 21-year-old self in Glasgow a full seven years prior, and yet had seemingly not 
made a tangible impact on policy reform at its point of origin. This observation 
encapsulates a recurring theme throughout this thesis - that knowledge pertaining to 
'improving' practices in the governance of volcanic risk can (and does) travel around 
the modern world virtually instantaneously, for reasons as random as a curious 
undergraduate student performing an internet search, and yet there is no guarantee that 
just because this information is available and 'mobile', that it automatically will 'go' 
where it is most needed and make the transition into practice. 
 
This PhD project can be seen as a 'follow up' to a thesis completed at Lancaster 
University as part of my MSc Volcanology and Geological Hazards degree in 2013 
(Sinclair, 2013). In seeking a research project related to volcanic risk reduction, I 
made a basic observation that there were some similarities between Volcán Nevado 
del Ruiz, Colombia and Mount Rainier, USA (i.e. both predominantly posed a risk to 
surrounding communities through volcanic mudflows generated by the impact of 
eruptions on summit glaciers). Contemporary disaster risk reduction is predominantly 
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conducted through governance, or the development and implementation of public 
policy (UNISDR, 2015; Howes et al. 2013). Therefore, the project sought to examine 
and compare the policies for volcanic risk reduction at both volcanoes. Mackay and 
Shaxton (2007) define policy as "...a distinct path of action which is suitable for the 
pursuit of desired goals within a particular context, directing the decision making of 
an organisation or individual" embodied in written regulations and guidelines, enacted 
procedures and standards. The MSc project evolved through discussions of the 
potential practical applications of such a comparison, suggesting that exchange of 
information between the two volcanoes via some sort of 'twinning' initiative could 
perhaps improve policy at both. 
 
At this stage, one of my MSc project supervisors, Professor Nigel Clark (now a 
supervisor of this PhD project) introduced me to critical geography studies of 'twin 
towns' (e.g. Clarke, 2009; 2011) which analysed social exchanges between 'twinned' 
communities in different countries. As the project unfolded, this provided a gateway 
to a broader body of social science literature regarding the international exchange of 
knowledge in policymaking. A key finding of the MSc thesis was that processes of 
knowledge exchange were a long-present, and arguably understudied feature of the 
development of volcanic risk governance and that there was a growing academic field 
with the lexicon to describe and explain how and why these processes had influenced 
social responses to volcanic risk and may do so in the future - policy mobility studies: 
 
The field of policy mobilities studies how, why, where and with what 
effects policies are mobilized, circulated, learned reformulated and 
reassembled (McCann and Ward, 2012).  
 
After completion of my MSc, I undertook a voluntary volcanology work placement at 
Volcán de Colima, México (January-June 2014). Whilst there, I witnessed that ideas 
from 'elsewhere' had also played a fundamental role in shaping the governance of 
volcanic risk at that volcano, and yet the practical reality seemed far from the 
theoretical ideals of risk governance. The potential for employing the theories and 
methods of policy mobility studies in order to understand the parallels and differences 
between Volcán de Colima and the cases I had previously examined became 
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increasingly apparent. Moreover, there appeared to be an opportunity to study 
mobility in volcanic risk governance as a global phenomenon. 
 
This PhD project brings together the theories and methodologies of policy mobility 
studies and the branch of applied volcanology dedicated to the governance of volcanic 
risk in an interdisciplinary study. The aim is to understand how, why, where and with 
what effects policies and practices designed to reduce risk from volcanic activity are 
developed and mobilised globally and the extent to which these factors contribute to 
contemporary understandings of 'best practice' in volcanic risk governance. The 
investigation is therefore concerned with the movement of information across scales: 
around the globe (the 'macro' level); through different national polities (the 'meso' 
level); and into the surroundings of individual volcanoes (the 'micro' level) (Section 
3.2.1). Furthermore, it seeks to understand the impacts and interactions of this mobile 
knowledge with the specific social and volcanic aspects of its destinations.  
 
Firstly, a review of the existing literature (Chapter 2) and the methods employed in 
this investigation (Chapter 3) are presented. The following objectives reflect the 
structure of the main body of the thesis: 
 
(1) Trace and map the development of volcanic risk reduction policy through space 
and time at the global (macro) level (Chapter 4). 
 
(2) Identify case studies within different national (meso) level policy contexts which 
exemplify diverse policy approaches to volcanic risks then trace and map the 
development and effect of volcanic risk reduction policies for each (Chapter 5).  
 
(3) Present a field-based, ethnographic narrative policy analysis for volcanic risk 
reduction policies and practices at Volcán de Colima, with insights at the 
institutional/interpersonal (micro) level (Chapter 6). 
 
(4) Use cross-case comparisons to postulate processes of mobilising policies which 
may improve  practices in volcanic risk reduction in the context of global disaster risk 




Finally, Chapter 8 presents the conclusions of this research and the potential for 



















































An Assemblage of Literatures: Applied Volcanology, Disaster Risk Science and 
Policy Mobility Studies 
 
This chapter presents a review of literature relevant to contemporary understanding of 
volcanic risk governance. Volcanic risk is a product of the interaction of natural and 
social phenomena. This chapter therefore must synthesise prior work in both the 
natural and social sciences. Firstly, a summary of contemporary understanding of 
volcanic activity is offered with specific focus on the range of volcanic phenomena 
and their potential impact on human communities and infrastructure, drawing on 
volcanological literature (Sections 2.1 and 2.2). Secondly, this chapter discusses the 
state of volcanic disaster risk governance in theory and practice, using the existing 
bodies of work in disaster risk science, political science and applied volcanology to 
highlight developments and policy problems (Section 2.3). Finally, the chapter 
introduces the literature on policy mobility studies as the new 'lens' through which this 
study seeks to view volcanic risk governance in the pursuit of fresh perspectives and 
lessons. 
 
2.1. Volcanic Activity 
Volcanism is the process by which magma, a mixture of partially molten rock (with 
liquid and, potentially, suspended crystals) and volatile components, (in the form of 
dissolved gases or gas bubbles) is transferred from the Earth's interior onto its surface 
through ruptures in the crust (volcanic vents). This may occur through volcanic 
eruptions (Sigurdsson, 1999). Volcanoes are typically located at the boundaries of 
Earth's tectonic plates, and sometimes in other settings (Francis and Oppenheimer, 
2004). 
 
At volcanoes, both during and between eruptions, the emission of gases (e.g. H2O, 
CO2, SO2, HCl, HF, H2S, S2, H2, CO, SiF4 and Rn) to the atmosphere occurs. The 
release of high-temperature (>350ºC), generally acidic  gases or the diffusion of low-
temperature (<350ºC) gases through soil on the flanks of a volcano may take place 
(Oppenheimer et al., 1998; Sigurdsson, 1999; Hansell and Oppenheimer, 2004).  
 
During effusive eruptions, magma is extruded from a vent as a coherent fluid (i.e. 
lava), forming a lava flow. The conditions under which effusive eruptions may occur 
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include when most of the gas content of magma is released prior to its eruption, or in 
submarine conditions where the pressure exerted by the ocean is too great to permit 
significant exsolution of gas. Explosive eruptions occur when the rapid exsolution and 
expansion of gases from the liquid, or rapid quenching and granulation, tears the 
magma apart; the resulting fragments are called pyroclasts (Sigurdsson, 1999; Parfitt 
and Wilson, 2008). In general terms, the most important controls on eruption style are 
the physical properties of the magma, in turn derived from its chemical composition: 
hot, low-volatile content (mafic) magmas such as basalt (typically associated with 
divergent plate boundaries) tend to be less viscous and allow gases to separate from 
the melt more efficiently. Cooler more volatile-rich (silicic) magmas such as andesite, 
dacite and rhyolite (commonly associated with convergent plate boundaries) generally 
have a higher viscosity and are more prone to explosivity (Francis and Oppenheimer, 
2004). 
 
Volcanic eruptions range from being highly localised, to those with global 
consequences. Some eruptions deposit volcanic products over much of a continental 
landmass or perturb global climate through the injection of volcanic gases and fine-
grained pyroclasts into the atmosphere (Sigurdsson, 1999). A widely used scale for 
the quantification of volcanic eruptions is the Volcanic Explosivity Index, or VEI 
(Figure 1.1). Although, influential, the VEI has limitations. In particular it has been 
argued that the  classification of small explosive eruptions within the VEI '0' and '1' 
categories does not reflect the violence with which these events can occur. One 
example given to support this assertion is a May 2013 VEI 0 eruption at Mayon 






Figure 2.1. Graphic representation of the Volcanic Explosivity Index (GVM, 
2014). This is a semi-quantitative logarithmic scale whereby the volume of erupted 
pyroclastic material, the height of the eruption column, or a combination of the two 
may be used to assign a 'VEI number' denoting a tenfold increase in magnitude and 
intensity from the previous VEI number (Newhall and Self,1982; GVM, 2014). 
Although the figure appears to indicate that the frequency of eruptive activity peaks 
at VEI 2, the frequency of volcanic activity is actually inversely proportional to 
both magnitude and intensity. Smaller eruptions are poorly represented because 
many leave little material to preserve their place in the geological record (Caricchi 
et al. 2014; Klemetti, 2013). 
Volcanic activity has the capacity to impact significantly on the biosphere - as noted 
in Section 2.2.9, volcanic activity offers many long-term benefits to humans and other 
living things. However, eruptions frequently prove lethal to exposed organisms (Marti 
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and Ernst, 2005). Volcanic activity thus represents a continual challenge to human 
communities due to its unpredictability and the range of potentially destructive 
phenomena generated (Bryant, 2005). Volcanoes can be understood as a 'hazard': "(a) 
potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity that may cause 
the loss of life or injury, property damage, social or economic disruption or 
environmental degradation" (Baas et al., 2008).  
 
The historical record documents an approximate 278,880 human fatalities caused by 
volcanic activity to date. 58% of these fatalities (162,928) stem from only five 
eruptions: Tambora, Indonesia, 1815 (60,000); Krakatau, Indonesia, 1883 (36,417); 
Mont Pelée, Martinique, 1902 (28,800); Nevado del Ruiz, Colombia, 1985 (23,187); 
Mount Unzen, Japan, 1792 (14,524) (Auker et al., 2013; Chapter 4; Chapter 5). These 
figures demonstrate that individual volcanic events have the capacity to cause loss of 
life on a scale which meets the United Nations' definition of disaster:  
 
A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or society causing 
widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses which 
exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its 
own resources. A disaster is a function of the risk process. It results from 
the combination of hazards, conditions of vulnerability and insufficient 
capacity or measures to reduce the potential negative consequences of 
risk (Baas et al., 2008). 
 
'Conditions of vulnerability' may be understood in two categories: 'physical 
vulnerability' is the exposure of humans, property and infrastructure to hazards, 'social 
vulnerability' is the capacity for exposed systems to respond to those events (Kunzler 
et al., 2012). Risk can thus be expressed through the following function: 
 
Risk = Hazard x Vulnerability (e.g. Kumpulainen, 2006) 
 
Herein, risk is understood to comprise the potential magnitude of hazardous natural 
events and the susceptibility of human systems (in terms of physical situation and 




2.2. Volcanic Hazards and Risk: An Overview 
Hansell et al. (2006) suggest that the range of eruptive scales and styles may make 
volcanoes the most diverse single source of disaster risk in the natural world. Papale 
(2015) and Bryant (2005) both suggest that volcanic activity is the natural 
phenomenon with the highest destructive potential, discounting a large bolide impact. 
The following presents a review of the range of volcanic hazards (Figure 2.2) and the 
general implications of these for 21st century human societies.  
 
 
Figure 2.2. Distribution across volcanic fatalities for all fatality causes on record 
(Auker et al. 2013). Column (a) comprises fatalities from all known eruptions, 
column (b) removes the five eruptions with the largest death tolls (Tambora, 1815; 
Krakatau, 1888; Mont Pelée, 1902; and Nevado del Ruiz, 1985).  
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2.2.1. Volcanic Gas Hazards  
The emission of volcanic gases, both syn-eruptive and between eruptions, may have 
detrimental impacts upon human infrastructure and health (including direct mortality 
and increased morbidity). For example, the release of volcanic CO2, including from 
volcanic lakes in events known as 'limnic eruptions', may cause substantial 
atmospheric concentrations (between 10 to 30%) to collect temporarily in low-lying 
areas around the source (Hansell and Oppenheimer, 2004; Halbwachs et al., 2004). 
The principal health hazard from large-scale CO2 emissions is anoxic asphyxia, which 
can result from atmospheric concentrations of >5% if exposure is sufficiently 
prolonged; examples include the 1984 and 1986 limnic eruptions of Lake Monoun 
and Lake Nyos in Cameroon, which resulted in the fatal asphyxiation of 37 and 
~1,700 people respectively (Hansell and Oppenheimer, 2004; Section 4.2).  
  
The full range of gas species outlined in section 2.1 are released from vents in varying 
concentrations as a volcanic smog, sometimes known by the Hawaiian term 'vog' 
(Longo et al., 2010). The immediate effects of exposure may include headaches, eye 
and throat irritation, coughing, tightness of the chest and shortness of breath. In high 
concentrations certain species such as H2S can cause loss of consciousness and death 
(Hansell and Oppenheimer, 2004). Gas emission may be localised to areas proximal 
to the vent (Longo et al. 2010). However, during larger eruptions, the impacts may be 
further-reaching. The 1783-84 Icelandic Laki fissure eruption distributed vog over 
much of continental Europe (Oppenheimer, 2011). Computer simulations of a 
hypothetical similar eruption in the modern day suggest that 100,000 deaths across 
Europe could be caused by the detrimental health impacts (Papale, 2015). The 
documented 2,151 fatalities from volcanic gas emissions account for 0.78% of the 
total volcanic fatalities record (Figure 2.2). However, Hansell and Oppenheimer 
(2004) suggest that any effort to quantify the human health impact of volcanic gas is 
likely to be an underestimate as inter-eruptive degassing may be overlooked, the 
extent of dispersion of volcanic gases may not yet be fully understood and the impacts 
on long-term morbidity may be difficult to constrain. 
 
2.2.2. Lava Flow Hazards   
Lava flows consist of molten rock which pours onto the Earth's surface during 
effusive eruptions or may be formed by the aggregation of partially molten pyroclasts 
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during explosive eruptions. 'Lava flow' may refer to both the moving lava and to the 
resulting solidified deposits (USGS, 2015a; Parfitt and Wilson, 2008). The extreme 
heat of flowing lava, combined with its capacity to surround and bury most obstacles 
mean that any vegetation or human constructions in its path will be severely damaged 
or destroyed (Papale, 2015; GVM, 2014). Buildings brought into contact with an 
active lava flow may be subject to any combination of the following: wall collapse; 
burial; ignition; inundation; uplift and transport within the flow; foundational failure 
and damage from pyroclasts which detach from the main flow (Blong, 1984).  
  
Lava flows generally move sufficiently slowly for humans and animals to evacuate 
before direct exposure. They account for only 0.32% (887) of the total recorded 
fatalities from volcanic activity (Figure 2.2), thus the greatest risk from lava flow 
hazards is economic loss from the destruction of businesses and property (GVM, 
2014). Exceptions to this rule include the 1977 and 2002 eruptions of Mount 
Nyiragongo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo which produced lava flows of 
exceptionally high velocities (between 10-60 km/h) and reportedly killed 70 and 147 
people respectively; the 2002 eruption also inundated and destroyed ~20% of the city 
of Goma, including the airport (Favalli et al., 2008; Allard et al., 2002). Many of the 
casualties from the 2002 eruption were caused by explosions when lava subsumed a 
petrol station causing fuel to ignite (Papale, 2015). More viscous, silicic composition 
(e.g. andesite, dacite and rhyolite) magma may form vertically-sustained structures 
called lava domes if they lose sufficient gas to prevent significant fragmentation prior 
to extrusion (Melnik and Sparks, 1999; Parfitt and Wilson, 2008). 
 
2.2.3. Tephra Hazards 
Pyroclasts expelled during explosive eruptions are collectively named tephra. 
Fragments >64 mm in diameter are known as blocks (if solid) or bombs (if partially 
molten), fragments 2-64 mm in diameter are known as lapilli, and ash is the collective 
name for pyroclasts <2 mm wide (Papale, 2015; Hansell et al. 2006). Blocks and 
bombs follow ballistic trajectories and may cause death or severe injuries through 
blunt trauma or burns (e.g. Bruce, 2002) but typically do not travel >5 km from the 
vent and thus do not feature significantly on the global fatalities record (Blong, 1984; 




Ash and lapilli are expelled in a jet of gas at speeds of up to 400 m/s during explosive 
eruptions (Sigurdsson, 1999). Convection driven by heat permits explosive eruptions 
to form volcanic columns, clouds which may extend >40 km above the vent in large 
magnitude explosive eruptions (Oppenheimer, 2011; Bonnadonna and Costa, 2013). 
These columns are subsequently dispersed by wind to form volcanic plumes, allowing 
deposition of ash and lapilli ('airfall tephra') on the ground over a wide area. 
Typically, lapilli as well as large and dense ash particles are deposited close to the 
vent whereas the finest grade ash may remain suspended in the atmosphere 
sufficiently long to circle the globe (Oppenheimer et al. 2003; Papale, 2015). Deposit 
thickness generally decreases with distance from the vent although secondary maxima 
do occur due to aggregation of particles while in transit (Costa et al., 2010; Tajima et 
al., 2013). 
  
Airfall tephra may be deposited in volumes significant enough to supplant existing 
topsoil on an order of centimetres to hundreds of metres (IVHHN, 2006). Tephra fall 
(or 'ashfall') may impact on: buildings (loading may lead to structural damage or roof 
collapse), critical infrastructure (structural damage to power, transport and 
communications networks, contamination of water), agriculture, forestry and fishing 
(rendering land inert, increasing mortality and morbidity in livestock), human health 
and psychology. 
  
The aerial dispersal of volcanic ash also presents hazards to aviation; the ingestion of 
glassy ash particles by jet engines may cause damage and engine failure; fuselages 
and windscreens may be subject to abrasion such that visibility is reduced and critical 
instruments cease to function (Hansell et al., 2006; Papale, 2015). No losses of life are 
known from volcanic ash impacts on aviation to date. However, there have been 
multiple instances of engine failure and closure of airspace (Sigurdsson, 1999).  
  
There is substantial evidence for airfall tephra impacting human health (e.g. causing 
asthma attacks and bronchitis, coughs, breathlessness, chest tightness and wheezing) 
which can be fatal to elderly people or those with pre-existing medical conditions. No 
conclusive evidence for ash causing long-term illness such as silicosis or chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease is found, although this may be attributed to lack of 
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study (Horwell and Baxter, 2006). 8,126 (3%) of the historical fatalities record is 
attributed to tephra (Figure 2.2). 
 
2.2.4. Pyroclastic Density Current Hazards 
Pyroclastic density currents (PDCs) are fast-moving (up to 700 km/h) gravity-driven 
avalanches of fragmented volcanic rock and gas (USGS, 1997; Burgisser and 
Bergantz, 2002). PDCs may originate through the collapse of an eruption column 
when insufficient air is entrained to support buoyant propagation; due to an explosion 
that takes pace on the flanks of a volcano (i.e. a lateral blast); or from the gravitational 
collapse of a lava dome (Branney and Kokelaar, 2002). There are two types of PDC: 
pyroclastic flows are concentrations of hot rock, and gas which are typically 
gravitationally confined to valley floors due to density; pyroclastic surges are dilute, 
turbulent clouds of gas and ash which may separate from a pyroclastic flow and 
spread rapidly, surmounting topographical barriers and even crossing water (GVM, 
2014). PDCs may occur during explosive eruptions of all magnitudes, with volumes 
ranging from <1,000 m3 to tens/hundreds of cubic kilometres (Papale, 2015). 
  
PDCs have caused more human casualties than any other volcanic phenomenon - 33% 
of the historical fatalities record (91,484 deaths) (Figure 2.2). The speed and 
temperatures of PDCs combined with pyroclastic missiles within the flow enable them 
to kill or destroy any organism or structure in their path (Ongaro et al., 2002; Wright 
and Pierson, 1992). The 1902 eruption of Mont Pelée, Martinique (Section 4.1.4), 
demonstrated the fullest extent of PDC impact on a population centre to date, the 
near-total destruction of all structures in the city of St. Pierre and the deaths of all 
~28,800 directly-exposed inhabitants (McKie, 2002; Auker et al., 2013; Hansell et al., 
2006). 
 
2.2.5. Lahar and Flood Hazards 
Lahars are the result of volcanic material mixing with water to create debris flows that 
range in consistency from that of muddy water to wet cement depending on the ratio 
of sediment to water (USGS, 2015b). Lahars fall into two categories. Primary lahars 
originate syn-eruptively when freshly erupted hot material is brought into contact with 
sufficient water, either through groundwater, freshwater reserves (e.g. crater lakes) or 
glacial meltwater from a volcano's ice-cap. These lahars tend to have volumes of 107-
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109 m3 and travel at speeds exceeding 20 m/s to distances tens-to-hundreds of 
kilometres from their source (Papale, 2015). Secondary lahars occur when water 
mobilises existing pyroclastic debris, independent of volcanic activity. The water 
which feeds these lahars may come from precipitation ('rain lahars') or during 
'breakouts' from freshwater reserves. The poor consolidation of pyroclastic deposits 
on many volcanoes permit this material to be easily eroded. Secondary lahars tend to 
have volumes of 104-106 m3 and runoff distances of <10 km (Kunzler et al. 2012; 
Papale, 2015).  
  
Lahar deposits may be metres to tens-of metres thick and subsume entire settlements 
(GVM, 2014). Primary lahars are responsible for 14% of recorded historical fatalities 
(37,451 deaths); secondary lahars for 3% (6,801) (Figure 2.2). The 1985 eruption of 
Nevado del Ruiz in Colombia (Section 5.2.3) generated primary lahars with a volume 
of 11-12 million m3 (Thouret, 1990) leaving deposits on average 1.5 m thick (Pierson 
et al. 1990) and killing approximately 23,000 people (Voight, 1990; Parra and 
Cepeda, 1990). 
  
Floods initiated by volcanic melting of glaciers may not necessarily entrain sufficient 
volcanic material to become lahars, such floods comprise 0.42% of the total fatalities 
record (1,163) (Figure 2.2). 
 
2.2.6. Debris Avalanche Hazards 
Debris avalanches are caused by the partial collapse of a volcanic edifice and may be 
syn-eruptive or non-eruptive (Siebert, 1984; Hoblitt et al., 1995).  Debris avalanches 
may be triggered by the intrusion of new magma, phreatic (steam-driven) explosions, 
precipitation or earthquakes (Sigurdsson, 1999). Debris avalanches accompanied by 
magmatic activity may lead to lateral blasts and extensive PDCs, a prominent example 
being the 1980 VEI 5 eruption of Mount Saint Helens, USA (Section 4.2). The 1998 
landslide on Volcán Casita, Nicaragua, triggered by heavy rainfall during Hurricane 
Mitch was a non-eruptive sector collapse that killed ~3,800 people (GVM, 2014; 
Macias and Aguirre, 2006). 
  
The risks from 'hot' debris avalanches may therefore not be easily distinguished from 
those of large-volume PDCs, likewise with the impact of 'cold' debris avalanches and 
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lahars. Avalanches constitute 2% (5,230) of the historical fatalities record (Figure 
2.2). If debris avalanches enter the ocean or a lake then they may cause tsunami, a 
series of waves triggered by displacement (Hansell et al. 2006; Intergovernmental 
Oceanographic Commission, 2013). Volcanogenic tsunami are responsible for 20% of 
the historical fatalities record (55,277 deaths) (Figure 2.2). 
 
2.2.7. Volcanoseismic Hazards 
0.28% of the historical fatalities record (765 deaths) are documented as resulting 
specifically from volcanic seismicity (Figure 2.2). Seismic activity is a near-constant 
feature of active volcanism and may result from various processes including high-
frequency 'A-type' events caused by the fragmentation of rock, low-frequency 'B-type' 
events generated by the pressurisation of fluid within a volcano and 'tremor', sustained 
low-frequency signals thought to be caused by unsteady fluid flow. Seismicity is also 
generated by other volcanic processes including explosions, lahars and rockfalls 
(Sigurdsson, 1999; McNutt, 1992). 
  
Volcanic seismicity is generally of low magnitude (2-3 on the Modified Mercalli 
scale) relative to tectonic seismicity; although larger earthquakes (magnitude >7) have 
occasionally been known to accompany volcanic eruptions (Zobin, 2001). Deaths and 
injuries from seismicity are predominantly caused by blunt trauma triggered by the 
collapse of buildings, or by fire (Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011; 
Scrawthorn, 1997). 
 
2.2.8. Volcanic Lightning Hazards 
0.05% of historical fatalities (142 deaths) are documented as resulting from volcanic 
lightning (Figure 2.2). Volcanic lightning is described as "fairly common yet 
relatively understudied" by McNutt and Williams (2010). The study of electrical 
discharge due to volcanism has mostly focussed on the fragmentation of silicic 
viscous magma, where it is suggested that fractoemission (the release of electrons and 
ions from fresh fractures) is the key mechanism of particle electrification (Gilbert et  
al. 1991; James et al. 2008; Cimarelli et al. 2013). The occurrence and distribution of 





The remainder of the Auker et al. (2013) record (Figure 2.2) is composed of indirect 
fatalities from disease, drought and starvation after volcanic eruptions, comprising 
24% (65,024) of deaths.  
 
2.2.9. Globalised Volcanic Risk 
Approximately 800 million people live in close proximity to active volcanoes (Papale, 
2015). Traditionally, volcanic regions have been inhabited because soils derived from 
volcanic ejecta may (with careful management) become highly fertile and 
agriculturally productive (Sparks, 2004; GVM, 2014). The Campania region in 
Southern Italy is an example whereby agriculturally productive land formed by 
activity at the volcanic centres Vesuvius and Campi Flegrei, has fed one of the longest 
continually inhabited areas in Europe (Dobran, 2006).  
  
Modernity has brought other benefits to living near volcanoes: the heat they generate 
can be harnessed and turned into geothermal electricity; a ‘clean’, renewable fuel 
source (World Bank, 2011). The income volcanoes can generate as tourist attractions 
is another advantage. This is the case in many volcanic regions, with an expanding 
geotourism sector bringing visitors to places as diverse as Indonesia and Iceland; 
ongoing volcanic activity can be a significant draw for tourists and active volcanoes 
such as Etna and Stromboli in Italy attract large numbers of visitors every year. The 
early effusive stage of the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruption was known as the 'tourist 
eruption' (Jenkins, 2010; Erfurt-Cooper and Cooper, 2010). As such, the likelihood of 
tourists and tourist infrastructure being brought into contact with volcanic hazards 
may be increasing. 
 
Volcanic eruptions, both effusive and explosive are hazardous. The risk is greater in 
the present day than at any point in the past because of the current extent of human 
society. Due to significant population growth, more of the Earth's surface (and 
atmosphere) than ever before is occupied by human settlements and infrastructure 
(UN, 2019). This expansion of humanity across the planet has been accompanied by 
increasing interdependence between social systems, part of the phenomenon known in 
the social sciences as 'globalisation'. This concept emerged in studies of late 20th 
Century socioeconomic processes, specifically the worldwide spread of neoliberalism, 
the political paradigm characterised by an unregulated market economy with minimal 
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state intervention (Kotz, 2002). "The concept of globalization refers to the growing 
interdependence of countries, resulting from the increasing integration of trade, 
finance, investments, labour markets and ideas in one global marketplace" (Frunza et 
al. 2009). During the most recent four decades, human societies across the surface of 
the earth have come to rely upon one another to an unprecedented extent, with 
neoliberalism providing the framework for these exchanges.  
 
However, some scholars have suggested that to conceive of globalisation as, at its 
core, an economic phenomenon that only emerged during the last three decades of the 
20th century is to ignore the technological, biological, cultural and historical aspects 
of a millennia-long, complex, multi-faceted process (Bordo et al. 2003). Northrup 
(2005) argues: 
 
Forces for convergence had long operated in parts of the ancient world: 
regional empires consolidated disparate peoples and overlaid their 
traditions with a common culture, world religions spread universalistic 
beliefs, and long-distance traders spread ideas and technologies as well 
as goods. Irregularly at first and then with increasing force and speed 
after 1000 ce., historical forces drew people closer and closer 
economically, culturally, and politically. This "Great Convergence," as I 
shall call it, provides a useful framework for understanding the past 
thousand years of world history and the  phenomena that in recent years 
have come to be called globalisation. 
 
It may thus be understood that the value of vulnerability in the risk equation has been 
increasing gradually for at least the last millennium as humans and the activities 
required to support their communities have spread across the Earth, including into 
volcanic areas. However, the exponential acceleration of both population growth and 
globalisation in recent decades has seen this exposure to volcanic hazards reach levels 
far greater than at any previous time in history, and there are currently no signs of this 
process slowing (Chapter 4). 
  
2.3. Volcanic Risk Governance 
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The above text reflects current understanding of hazardous volcanic phenomena and 
the risk incurred by human occupation of volcanic areas. Volcanic risk is certain to 
affect human society for the foreseeable future. Attention is now turned to the current 
understanding of processes for reducing volcanic disaster risk. 
 
2.3.1. Disaster Risk Reduction and Public Policy 
Work towards the reduction of environmental risks is necessary because humans 
continue to live in areas where they are exposed to the vicissitudes of natural events 
(Tobin and Montz, 1997). Disaster risk reduction has become a growing priority as 
population growth, environmental degradation and the advent of anthropogenic 
climate change have seen the frequency and severity of disasters increase (UNISDR-
STAG, 2015).  
  
As noted in Chapter 1, contemporary disaster risk reduction is mainly conducted 
through the development and implementation of public policy. Mackay and Shaxton 
(2007) classify written policies, subject to consultation and review, as formal policy. 
Ad hoc, unwritten, but generally accepted practices may be recognised as informal 
policy. These authors define public policy as "...a decision made by government to 
either act, or not to act in order to resolve a problem." Governments are those who 
have a legitimate mandate to instate normative guidelines according to the law of the 
jurisdiction in question. 
 
'Policymaking' is the process by which paths of action are decided and implemented. 
Mackay and Shaxton (2007) argue that all policies share three elements: a problem 
definition, goals to be achieved and the 'policy instrumentation' to fulfil those goals, 
including economic tools (e.g. taxes, financial incentives) or regulations (e.g. laws 
incentivising or prohibiting certain practices) (Cairney, 2013).  
 
'Policy cycles' have been an influential heuristic for portraying policymaking as a 
logical process comprised of discrete stages (Hallsworth et al. 2011). There are 
multiple models in use, however the oldest and most influential is the 'classic' 5-step 





Figure 2.3. The 'classic' 5-step policy cycle model (Soer, 2013), adapted from 
Harold Lasswell's 1951 work The Problem Orientation, arguably the foundation of 
modern political science (Turnbull, 2008; Freeman, 2013). This model portrays 
policy development as a stepwise, iterative process conducted by a single 
policymaking body, beginning with the articulation of a 'problem' to be 'solved' 
through subsequent phases. Finally, the performance of the policy is evaluated and 
any unresolved issues feed into the start of the next cycle (Mackay and Shaxton, 
2007; Howes et al. 2013). 
Critics of the policy cycle "...argue that policymaking is not as logical or clear cut and 
point out that even proponents of this model have admitted that it is more of an ideal 
than a definitive explanation of practice" (Howes et al. 2013). Hallsworth et al. (2011) 
provide four reasons for this: 
 
(1) Policy making does not take place in distinct phases: "The 'stages' of policy 
making do not just often overlap, they are often inseparable. In the real world, policy 
problems and policy solutions frequently emerge together, rather than one after 
another." 
 
(2) Policies need to be designed, not just conceived: "Current processes greatly 
underestimate the value of policy design. A greater emphasis on policy design helps to 





(3) Policymaking is often determined by events: "Policy making does not take place 
in a vacuum, where the government is in total control of its agenda. The result can be 
sharp discontinuities and apparently illogical decisions, as the government's coherent 
position can get overwhelmed by events." 
 
(4) The effects of policies are often indirect, diffuse and take time to appear: "Current 
guidance presents policies as discrete interventions to tackle specific problems, whose 
effects can then be reliably measured and evaluated. But there is plenty of evidence 
that the effects of these interventions may be complex, wide-ranging and unintended." 
 
Howes et al. (2013) believe that the stepwise-cyclical approach has also been 
dominant in disaster risk policymaking, embodied in the disaster management cycle 
(Warfield, 2004). Coetzee and Van Niekerk, (2012) argue that, similar to other policy 
cycle models, the disaster management cycle has undergone multiple interpretations: 
"...on perusal of the various permutations of this cycle it becomes apparent that a 
bewildering array of variations has emerged over time, leading to much confusion 
among scholars and practitioners alike." According to Coetzee and Van Niekerk, 
these variations mainly concern the number of phases, with some models possessing 
eight (pre-disaster, warning, threat, impact, inventory, rescue, remedy, recovery) and 
some incorporating just two (pre and post-disaster). The review states that until 1968, 
phase-based models of disaster were predominantly scientific exercises. However, in 
the 1970s, the first disaster management cycles intended as guidelines for 





Figure 2.4. The disaster management cycle (Baird et al. 1975). 
Crondstedt (2002) suggests that the disaster management cycle emerged in 1978 as 
the US State Governors' Association's  'Comprehensive Emergency Management' 
strategy. This version incorporated four phases: Mitigation, Preparedness, Response 
and Recovery. Mitigation was subsequently incorporated into a broader 'Prevention' 
category and the subsequent Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery 
(PPRR) paradigm has become highly influential, having been adopted from its 
original US context to various other countries (Crondstedt, 2002; Warfield, 2004). 
The different phases of the PPRR model aim to reflect the unfolding stages of an 
emergency, providing policymakers with actions to implement at each juncture 
(Warfield, 2004). 
 
Much as the policy cycle has been subject to criticism, the PPRR approach has also 
been challenged. Crondstedt (2002) reviews PPRR-cycle-based policymaking and 
implementation in Australia. Crondstedt argues that while PPRR continues to 
influence contemporary disaster risk governance, "the 'fit' is not neat and has inherent 




(1)  This approach creates artificial partitions between the four stages; the challenge of 
identifying where these partitions should be made often requires time and effort, 
categorising actions instead of carrying them out. 
 
(2) Each 'stage' is seen as a unit of equal weight to the others. This approach does not 
acknowledge that certain strategies may skip a stage, or have uneven emphasis on 
certain actions. 
 
(3) PPRR assumes that the same steps must always be implemented in the same order, 
rather than deciding the most appropriate action based on the circumstances.  
 
(4) It is assumed that adopting an affirmative course of action according to PPRR is 
always the correct thing to do and will always produce the 'appropriate' solution. This 
is a reactive approach to disaster risk. It does not account for, nor attempt to change 
the underlying factors that frequently permit natural events to become disasters. 
Crondstedt argues that many factors related to vulnerability do not fall into the 
discrete categories of PPRR. 
 
It can thus be understood that, despite its unique challenges, disaster risk governance 
has parallels with general policymaking. 'Problems' are identified and incorporated 
into the agenda of a policymaking body. The pursuit of 'solutions' is a policymaking 
process, distinguished by its chronological-stepwise approach. Despite the 
conclusions of academic studies that efforts to divide the process into equal, 
sequential stages are unrepresentative of the real world and render policymaking less 
effective, old models die hard. Cairney (2013) suggests that the policy cycle has fallen 
out of favour in academia; however, in practice, this approach continues to be 
influential. Likewise, thirteen years after Crondstedt's (2002) critique of the PPRR 
model in Australia, Queensland state government's disaster management plan was still 
explicitly based on PPRR (Queensland Disaster Management Committee, 2015). 
 
Christie et al. (2015) argue that while the social science related to disaster risk has 
evolved rapidly, 'policy communities' have responded slowly. The disconnection 
between these two discourses is emphasised by the continued dominance of the 
disaster management cycle for policymakers, despite the opinions of academics. In 
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order to understand how disaster risk policymaking works currently, and may evolve 
in the future, it is therefore essential to understand, not just the policymaking process, 
but the relationships between the individuals, communities and institutions involved. 
Mackay and Shaxton (2007) outline a range of organisations, institutions, roles and 
responsibilities involved in policymaking:  
 
Government does have the ultimate decision making and funding 
power, but there are many other actors that contribute to public 
policy, often in a network on which government relies for the 
delivery of complex policy goals.  
 Government: social control of behaviour, power of coercion  
 Cabinet: monopoly over supply of legislation, locus of power 
- few people make decisions  
 Public Servants: technical knowledge and policy advice, 
service providers  
 Political Parties: develop relationships in exchange for 
political support  
 Media: report information to the public, generate interest, 
shape public opinion  
 Interest Groups: seek to advance interests of members, can 
have a major influence - can force policy network to react  
 Legal system: interpret laws, acts independently  
 Public: elects government, forms opinions, joins interest 
groups and coalitions, relies on the media for information 
  
Policymaking may thus be understood, not just as a linear series of steps taken by a 
single-minded government, but as a complex process, comprised of interactions and 
relations between a myriad of institutions and individuals. Mackay and Shaxton 
(2007) choose to describe these individuals and institutions as actors and the 
relationships that bind them as a network. This terminology evokes Actor-Network 




...a disparate family of material-semiotic tools, sensibilities and methods 
of analysis that treat everything in the social and natural worlds as a 
continuously generated effect of the webs of relations within which they 
are located. It assumes that nothing has reality or form outside the 
enactment of those relations. Its studies explore and characterise the 
webs and practices that carry them. 
  
According to Law, ANT is not a singular social theory, but a way of conceiving of 
reality that lends itself to multiple disciplines and methodologies. The crux of this 
framework is that the connections between individual components that comprise a 
network are the determinants of that component's existence; nothing exists in 
isolation, everything is connected, and those connections provide meaning and 
agency. According to Latour (1996), actor-networks are collections of related, yet 
separable, heterogeneous elements (e.g. humans, microscopic organisms or subatomic 
particles), wherein each element possesses agency (i.e. human and non-human 
'actants' are viewed as capable of shaping outcomes and relations). This avoids 
compartmentalising networks into 'social', 'technological' or 'natural' brackets. ANT 
places emphasis on the arrangements in which actants are embedded, rather than the 
intrinsic qualities of those actants; networks are transient, and may drastically alter or 
cease to exist through time as the connections go through multiple mutations and 
reconfigurations (Clegg and Haugaard, 2009; Angeluci and Cacavallo, 2016). 
 
Polk (2015) outlines several strands of argument that have emerged to contest ANT: 
there are those who believe that assigning equal agency to all actants ignores human 
intentionality, a factor that distinguishes humans from objects that lack self-
awareness. It is also argued that an approach which assigns equal importance to all 
actors within the network does not accurately explain the influence of pre-existing 
power relations. 
 
Irrespective of the validity of ANT as a model of reality, Hannigan (2012) argues 
global disaster risk governance cannot be accurately described as a network, since 
there are not always organisational links between different activities (e.g. post-disaster 
relief and aid may have little-to-no interaction with pre-disaster preparedness and 
mitigation policymaking processes). Nor can it be portrayed as a system since it lacks 
  
33 
structural interdependence (wherein a change in one unit will unequivocally have 
repercussions for all other connected units). Instead, Hannigan elects to depict the 
political structures related to disasters and risk as a global policy field, where disasters 
constitute the 'central issue' around which multiple competing 'field constituents' 
contest and shape actions and behaviours at an organisational scale. Hannigan 
identifies nine main categories of field constituent that form the 'architecture' of the 
global policy field of disaster risk:  
 
(1) National states and local governments 
(2) Regional organisations (e.g. the Centre for National Disaster Prevention in Central 
America) 
(3) International finance institutions (IFIs) (e.g. the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund) 
(4) United Nations disaster agencies and other international governmental 
organisations (IGOs) (e.g. UNDRO, UNISDR, UNICEF) 
(5) Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (e.g. OXFAM, IFRC) 
(6) Multi-actor initiatives and partnerships (e.g. the World Bank's GFDRR) 
(7) Scientific, technical and academic communities 
(8) Private actors 
(9) The mass media 
 
It is observed that relationships between field constituents are characterised by 'soft 
law'. Hannigan (2012) shows that, although the global disaster policy field is 
extensive, national sovereignty has always been paramount, with the ultimate 
responsibility for formal policymaking falling to national governments and their local 
subdivisions. This is still the case under the UN's Sendai Framework for Action, 
which reiterates support for national sovereignty as a priority (UNISDR, 2015). 
Although the dominant neoliberal socioeconomic paradigm stresses the benefits of 
minimal state intervention, it has been argued that in disaster risk governance the 
national public sector remains dominant, even in very neoliberal economies such as 
the USA (Collier, 2014).  
 
Hannigan (2012) argues that the emphasis on national sovereignty has often made 
nation-states look inwards, at the expense of international collaboration. Whilst 
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international field constituents associated with relief and recovery have thrived, 
Hannigan believes that support for international policymaking coalitions, and 
particularly UN institutions has been 'anaemic' at best. Although this has resulted in 
diverse frameworks for disaster risk governance emerging in different national 
contexts. there are some general trends. Smith and Petley (2009) identify three 
approaches to disaster risk policy: 
  
(1) The earliest policy approach to disaster risk is the Behavioural paradigm: the 
dominant theory in disaster risk governance throughout the 20th Century. Behavioural 
thought emphasises disasters as 'extremes' that unpredictably encroach upon the 
'normal', and prioritises physical science, modelling, structural engineering and 
prediction, with limited reference to human behaviour and perception (Prowse, 2003; 
Van Niekerk, 2012). The 'emergency management' approach to disaster risk, 
exemplified in the PPRR model, is a standard Behavioural policy response to disaster 
risk. Calhoun (2004) argues that the term 'emergency' suggests that a well-oiled, 
functional system is disrupted by a disaster and that 'management' must be employed 
to restore the pre-existing equilibrium. 
  
Smith and Petley (2009) state that this paradigm is still favoured by many 
governments. However, they argue that emergency management policies provide only 
short-term solutions due to an managerialist and technical approach which views the 
populations at risk as passive participants to whom disasters 'happen' rather than 
active participants in the construction of risk.  
 
(2) In response to the ineffectiveness of Behavioural approaches in less economically 
developed countries, social scientists (e.g. Wisner et al., 2004) advanced the 
Development paradigm, also known as the 'structural paradigm' (Hannigan, 2012; Van 
Niekerk, 2012): 
 
In summary, the development view is based on the theory that disasters 
spring from under-development arising from political dependency and 
unequal trading arrangements between rich and poor nations... 
Specifically, rural overpopulation, landlessness and migration to 
unplanned, hazard-prone cities are the inevitable outcome of capitalism, 
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which is the root cause of environmental disaster. (Smith and Petley, 
2009). 
 
The Development paradigm has been influential academically, establishing 
vulnerability and marginalisation as factors which may equal or outweigh hazards in 
determining the severity of a disaster. However, it has had a comparatively limited 
impact on policymaking. It has introduced considerations of vulnerability as a 
standard in the disaster risk process, leading to the proliferation of 'disaster risk 
management' (a form of the Behavioural paradigm with additional efforts at pre-event 
mitigation and post-event adaptation) (Smith and Petley, 2009; Van Niekerk, 2012; 
UNISDR, 2015). The UNISDR (2015) Global Assessment Report (GAR) concludes 
that 'disaster risk management' has become the dominant approach to disaster risk 
worldwide.  
 
(3) The most recent scientific paradigm to emerge has been Complexity, an approach 
which views disasters as a result of the mutual interaction of natural and social 
systems (Smith and Petley, 2009). Smith and Petley identify the 2003 earthquake in 
Bam, Iran as an example of how complex interplay between hazardous physical 
processes and human circumstances may create a 'disaster'. Scientists argue from the 
perspective of Complexity, that public policy, business, agriculture, anthropology and 
sociology should be considered in the development of long-term integrated strategies 
for disaster risk reduction (Dynes, 1999; Macias and Aguirre, 2006).  
 
The sciences, both physical and social, have been a continual catalyst for the 
development of disaster risk governance as governments have recognised the 
importance of informed decision-making (UNISDR-STAG, 2015). It is argued in the 
2015 GAR that the transition from disaster risk management to a holistic framework 
for reducing risks remains the greatest challenge in disaster risk policymaking 
(UNISDR, 2015).  Hannigan (2012) believes that developments in disaster risk have 
not followed Kuhn's (1962) model of scientific and political change, in which an 





In an ideal world, a new policy discourse would be widely and 
immediately recognised as sensible and worthwhile, and would be 
instantly embraced. The real world, of course, operates differently and 
new ways of thinking and acting are normally contested, or even ignored. 
The discourse of disaster risk reduction is no different. Since it emerged 
in the 1980s, DRR has moved onto centre stage in the global field of 
disaster management, but it is not universally accepted. Hannigan 
(2012). 
 
Epistemic communities have not bound policymakers to approach disaster risk in new 
ways through international treaties as has been the case in other environmental policy 
arenas (e.g. climate change) and as such, these three paradigms remain coexistent and 
in ongoing competition.  
 
2.3.2. Volcanic Risk Reduction Policy and Practice 
Volcanic risk governance represents a unique set of challenges to human societies. 
Volcanology has been the scientific discipline at the heart of the effort to understand 
and lessen the impact from volcanic activity. Volcanologists, like most other natural 
scientists, investigate processes to advance understanding of natural phenomena. 
However, volcanology is "...a science which differs from most others in one crucial 
respect: crises may arise from time to time which require volcanologists to make 
immediate recommendations that affect public safety" (Aspinall et al. 2003). The 
traditional remit of volcanologists has been academic research into volcanic processes 
and operational short-term volcano monitoring, whereby various phenomena 
including seismicity, gas emissions, ground deformation or the composition of spring-
water at volcanic sites may be used to prognosticate the near-future activity of a 
volcano. This information is subsequently presented to decision-makers (Sigurdsson, 
1999; Papale, 2015). However, volcanologists have frequently found themselves at a 
confluence between the science/technology and governance/decision making 
elements of the process. Donovan et al. (2011) argue that in volcanic crises a 
volcanologist's responsibilities may surpass risk assessment and become risk 
management. This area of the discipline is known as 'applied volcanology': "...a key 
realm of volcanology that occupies the front line between academic research and 
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governmental organizations that are responsible for decision-making and policy 
processes that reduce the impact of volcanic hazards on society" (Calder et al. 2015). 
 
In addition to volcano monitoring, applied volcanology has also encompassed long-
term academic and operational initiatives. The 'Decade Volcano' project (Chapters 4-
6) was the International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth's 
Interior's contribution to the UN International Decade of Natural Disaster Reduction. 
IAVCEI have subsequently established multiple applied volcanology initiatives 
including the Subcommittee for Crisis Protocols, the Tephra Working Group and the 
Commission on Volcanic Hazards and Risk (Newhall, 1999; Calder et al. 2015).  
  
Other prominent projects in applied volcanology have included the Smithsonian 
Institution's Global Volcanism Program (GVP) (Smithsonian Institution, 2013) 
creation of the Volcano Population Index (VPI) (Ewert and Harpel, 2004) which 
quantifies the number of people within a certain radius of an active vent - 
subsequently applied to all known Holocene active volcanoes (Siebert et al., 2010). 
Aspinall et al. (2011) created the Population Exposure Index, which builds upon the 
VPI by weighting the likelihood of fatalities within 10 and 30 km radii. The emergent 
international collaborations; Global Volcano Model, VHub, the Asociacion 
Latinoamericana de Vulcanología, and the Volcanic Unrest in Europe and Latin 
America (VUELCO) project, demonstrate that applied volcanology is continually 
expanding (Palma et al. 2014; Papale, 2015). The Journal of Applied Volcanology 
was established in 2012 to provide a forum for multi-disciplinary research regarding 
volcanic risk (Johnston, 2012). It has since carried articles on topics including: 
operational volcano forecasting (Selva et al., 2012); volcano alert levels (Winson et 
al., 2014; Potter et al., 2014); community-based disaster risk reduction (Stone et al., 
2014); the statistical analysis of the volcanic fatalities record (Auker et al., 2013) and 
indigenous knowledge (Hicks et al. 2014). Barclay et al. (2008) argue that there is an 
"urgent need" for interdisciplinary studies contextualising volcanic risk within the 
global movement for disaster risk reduction, providing examples of 'best practice' in 




In 2015, the UNISDR GAR included information about volcanic risk for the first time 
(UNISDR, 2015; GVM, 2014). However, it has been argued that policy paradigms 
are comparatively understudied within applied volcanology: 
 
This absence is particularly noticeable in the literature on volcanic 
disasters and disaster risks, where the focus has traditionally been on the 
individual and collective actions of stakeholders living in close proximity 
to the hazard and less on the prevailing governance regimes (Wilkinson, 
2015). 
 
Work Package 4 of the Strengthening Resilience in Volcanic Areas programme 
(STREVA) is an applied volcanology project dedicated to assessing and analysing 
institutional capacity for volcanic risk reduction using a multiple-loop learning 
framework based on political economy studies on four 'forensic' volcanoes 
(Wilkinson, 2015).  
  
Some critical literature on volcanic risk reduction policy exists. The publication of 
Volcanic Emergency Management by the United Nations Disaster Relief Organisation 
(UNDRO, 1985) saw this manual become a widely-used blueprint for volcanic risk 
reduction policies (Macias and Aguirre, 2006). However, given their global 
distribution, volcanoes impact on societies with varying degrees of socioeconomic 
development. Therefore, even within these guidelines protocols vary widely in terms 
of structure and available resources (Sigurdsson, 1999; Dunkley, 1999).  
  
Macias and Aguirre (2006) use a case-study approach to review UNDRO-based 
volcanic risk reduction at Popocatépetl and Volcán de Colima, México, and at 
Tungurahua, Ecuador. They conclude that the UNDRO system possesses attributes 
typical of the Behavioural paradigm. Poor communication of risks/alert 
levels/emergency plans and failed evacuation attempts were common to all case 
studies. In Ecuador, a rapid, military-led evacuation led to insurgency, kidnappings, 
injuries and deaths. Undermining the trust between these citizens and the 
infrastructure intended to protect them demonstrates that failure to implement long-
term disaster risk reduction renders reactive 'emergency management' inadequate. 
This has also been apparent at multiple volcanoes under UNDRO-based governance 
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post publication of Macias and Aguirre's 2006 paper (e.g. Colombia Reports, 2007; 
Colombia Reports, 2012). It can be appreciated that the broader issues with 
transitioning to a long term disaster risk reduction strategy are relevant within applied 
volcanology. 
  
Macias and Aguirre (2006) cite San Cristobal, Nicaragua as a volcano where the 
UNDRO (1985) system was not adopted in favour of combining scientific input with 
local participation, developing plans and an alert system congruent with the perceived 
needs of local people. The 'MIA-VITA Handbook for Volcanic Risk Management' 
(Bignami et al. 2012) is a 'best practice guide', similar in intent and purpose to the 
UNDRO manual, published by the European Commission and informed by more 
recent risk reduction science and applied volcanology than its UN predecessor. 
  
The range of volcanic risk reduction systems reflects the diversity of the problem, 
both in terms of hazard and coping capacity. Nonetheless, the pursuit of 'best 
practices' is a long-established priority of those working in applied volcanology 
(Sigurdsson, 1999; Barclay et al., 2008). To that end, there has been an increasing 
emphasis on 'knowledge transfer' in the field, reflected in the recent establishment of 
numerous international interdisciplinary projects. Multiple applied volcanology 
studies have postulated 'knowledge transfer' as a tool for volcanic risk reduction (e.g. 
Aspinall et al. 2011; GVM, 2014). However, transfer of knowledge does not 
inherently yield solutions. The problems associated with the UNDRO (1985) volcanic 
emergency management system are described by Macias and Aguirre (2006) as an 
example of the difficulties associated with international policy transfer, whereby a 
policy system designed within a particular context is mobilised through international 
networks and brought into another.  
  
It is in the interest of those working in applied volcanology to ensure that future 
knowledge transfers live up to their expectations. There exists a growing body of 
academic work analysing the processes of mobility in public policy which has 
scarcely begun to turn its attention to disaster risk; it may be that by incorporating the 
knowledge generated in this arena of social science, the capacity of applied 




2.4. Policy Mobilities 
Although learning from one another's experience has doubtless been an integral 
component of human life for millennia, the academic study of how governments learn 
from one another in terms of policymaking originates in the early 1990s when 
literature on 'lesson-drawing' emerged (Rose, 1991; Wolman and Page, 2003; Clarke, 
2009). By the mid-1990s this had developed into the study of 'policy transfer', a field 
of political science wherein the key question was: "Who learns what from whom?" 
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). Policy transfer research came to encompass multiple 
concepts, including policy convergence (the process whereby structures and functions 
are homogenised across multiple jurisdictions through the enacting of a universal 
socioeconomic paradigm, e.g neoliberalism) and policy diffusion (the process 
whereby policy development in one context influences changes in others) (Evans and 
Davies, 1999; Holzinger and Knill, 2005; Braun et al., 2007). Policy transfer studies 
recognise three broad techniques: emulation (adoption of a whole policy system), 
hybridisation (combining elements from multiple policies), and inspiration 
(experience elsewhere acting as a spur for new ideas) (Rose, 2005). 
  
However, 'importing' a policy model does not always produce the desired or intended 
effect. Swainson and de Loe (2011) identify three possible causes of 'failure' in the 
movement of policy systems: uninformed transfer occurs when the receiving 
jurisdiction has insufficient information about the original policy; incomplete transfer 
occurs when key operational elements are neglected and inappropriate transfer occurs 
when variations in context between locations are not sufficiently considered. 
  
McCann (2011) critiques the policy transfer literature, suggesting that its tendency to 
employ typologies when categorising policy actors and processes (such as the 
mobility techniques and failure mechanisms outlined above), its focus on interaction 
between national (rather than local or regional) governments and its general 
assumption that policies move as complete packages and remain unaltered throughout 
the process of moving, limit the utility of this approach. Prince (2015) states: 
"Sometimes policy travels in unpredictable and capricious ways, such as because of 
an idea from a half-remembered conversation, or an experience on an overseas trip." 
McCann (2011) suggests that instead of conceiving of 'complete' policies being 
exchanged between nation-states (from a perspective concerned with 'success' or 
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'failure'), that tracing the path of a policy and exploring the spheres of influence it 
interacts with as it moves is the appropriate approach for understanding the obscure 
and irrational social processes which shape mobile policy. 
 
Policy mobility studies may be understood as a branch of critical policy studies, a 
post-positivist discipline, concerned with interpreting the complex processes which 
cause certain policy ideas to be adopted in certain ways, in certain settings, rather 
than quantifying these as 'successes' or 'failures' (Peck and Theodore, 2012). 
Although the study of policy mobilities is concerned with notions of 'best practice', 
these are not reified but observed from a critical perspective which acknowledges that 
'best practice' is subjective (Temenos and McCann, 2013).  
 
Policy mobility studies 'follow' mobile policy by tracing its movement through space 
and time, a technique designed to answer how, policy projects work, and not whether, 
but how, success is or is not achieved, and for whom (Peck and Theodore, 2012). 
Kennedy (2015) contests that the ethnographic methods used to 'follow' policies have 
tended to focus on the movement of policy actors, models and documents as objects, 
explaining how policies move inasmuch as those within the international technocracy 
(see below), who are already convinced of their worth, guide them from place to 
place. However, Kennedy believes that a researcher's understanding of these 
processes may only be completed by understanding the way in which local actors are 
'convinced' of the worth of these policy models through argumentative discourse. In 
Kennedy's  view, arguments are constructed from 'stories'. Kennedy believes that 
even greater emphasis should be placed upon discursive analysis of these mobile 
arguments and the stories that comprise them, which accompany policy ideas into 
new settings, basing his examples on historical policy mobility studies which he calls 
"an under-researched area".  
 
Policy mobility studies support the notion that policies are more than just isolated 
documents, but are formed through the continual coming-together of strategies, 
practices, institutions, individuals, social backdrops, resources, and crucially, 
knowledge (both local and mobile) (see also Section 2.3.1). Thus, policies themselves 
are understood by policy mobilities researchers as assemblages (e.g. McCann and 
Ward, 2012; Prince 2015; Kennedy, 2015; Savage, 2019). Assemblages are transient-
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but-tangible 'arrangements' of heterogeneous components, each bounded, but 
frequently fluctuating, overlapping, and interconnected among other assemblages 
(Savage, 2019). Donovan (2017) applies assemblage theory to disaster risk reduction, 
noting that disasters themselves (and even volcanoes) can be viewed  as assemblages. 
Prince, (2015) draws on the 'policy worlds' theory from anthropology to explore the 
idea that a policy is always more than a document, but there is a specific sphere of 
influence which certain policies occupy, encompassing individuals, institutions and 
sections of societies, not always bounded by geographical location, further 
contributing to the construction of a unique topology. Assemblage theory is closely 
linked to this concept of topology, the idea that connections between certain 
components can bring them 'closer' to one another than they are to topographically 
proximal objects: 
 
To understand how policy mobility is implicated in the assemblage of 
territories, we need to, in a sense, look backwards from the moment of 
transfer to consider how different policy territories were produced as 
spaces between which policy could be mobilised. It is the topological 
ordering of space that makes policy mobility possible, not through the 
attachment of the policy to a topographically moving object, but through 
the production of separate territories with parallel but provincialised 
responsibilities (Prince, 2016). 
 
Prince (2015) outlines the importance of technocracies in the development of mobile 
policy, the practices of a relatively small group of 'experts' are frequently responsible 
for shaping the infrastructure through which policy travels, and creating unique 
topologies. The distinct disaster risk sector referred to in UNISDR (2015) may be 
construed as an example of such a technocracy, the international 'expert community' 
of volcanology is arguably another, although their political 'clout' may be more 
limited. The concept of mutation reflects the fact that policies frequently change 'in 
transit' and may continue to evolve upon 'arrival' in their new setting depending on 
the way in which they interact with the other parts of the local policy assemblage over 
time. Thus, a policy which served one purpose in its original setting may come to 
function completely differently elsewhere due to its interactions with other parts of 




The movement of ideas has been intrinsic in the development of volcanic and disaster 
risk governance. UNDRO (1985) is just one example of a policy model created in a 
particular set of circumstances which has moved and mutated in new settings. Policy 
mobility studies have now encompassed social welfare, crime, education, 
environmental issues and urban studies (Benson and Jordan, 2011; Temenos and 
McCann, 2013). However, literature examining policy mobilities in disaster risk is 
scarce: Webber (2015) uses the perspective and methods of policy mobility studies to 
critically assess the World Bank's financing of climate change resilience projects in 
Kiribati and the Solomon Islands. It is found that policies portrayed as 'best practices' 
to be mobilised from the Kiribati Adaptation Project did not achieve the intended 
outcomes in their initial implementation, but when work began on a resilience 
program for the Solomon Islands, prior experience in Kiribati became the reference 
point and internal perception of the Project changed. Sharma and Paudel (2015) 
provide a short review of the manner in which the arrival of humanitarian aid and 
international disaster risk experts after the 2015 Nepal earthquake impacted the 
fragile political climate and saw disaster response practices from other jurisdictions 
enacted very rapidly and chaotically without the rational deliberation believed to 
accompany traditional policy transfer. 
  
Applying the theories and techniques of policy mobility studies to applied 
volcanology may therefore yield valuable insights into the diverse state of volcanic 
disaster risk reduction policy and the reasons for this. Given the urgency with which 
applied volcanology pursues the ideal of 'best practices', a critical investigation, based 
around deconstructing that concept may contribute a unique understanding which 












Mobile Methodologies in the Study of Volcanic Risk Governance 
 
3.1. Policy Mobility Studies: Analytical Framework and Methods 
Policy mobility studies (PMS) is a part of the wider interdisciplinary field of critical 
policy studies (Peck and Theodore, 2012). Arguably, all forms of policy analysis fall 
into one of two categories: analysis for policy refers to research conducted for the 
purposes of policy development, generally commissioned by policymakers (functional 
framework); analysis of policy is more typically an academic exercise, seeking 
independent understanding of policy problems and processes without a policy goal 
(critical framework) (Bell and Stevenson, 2006; Taskoh, 2014).  
 
McCann and Ward (2012) clarify that PMS has generally endeavoured to critically 
observe, record and analyse the movement of policy knowledge. They outline the 
following 'mobile methodologies' tailored to tracing the creation, circulation and 
impact of mobile policy: "content analysis, analysis of citation reports, discourse 
analysis, oral histories, mapping knowledge domains and networks, ethnography, 
interviews, direct and participant observation, questionnaires (and) field notes." 
McCann and Ward (2014) further justify the application of these approaches (both in 
their own field of urban studies and more broadly): 
 
We contend that qualitative empirical investigations of case studies are a 
necessary element in any conceptualization of mobile policy. In doing so, 
we pay close attention to: 1) how urban policies are set “in motion” 
globally and how geographically-extensive circuits of policy knowledge 
and the transfer of policy models influence the governance of specific 
cities; 2) how the “making up” of policy [Ward 2006] is a fundamentally 
territorialized and political process, contingent on specific historical-
geographical circumstances, and 3) how this case study says something 
about instances of sameness and of difference in a world in which 
instances of serial policy reproduction seem all too common, but that 




Drawing on McCann and Ward's 'mobile methodologies', Sharma and Paudel (2015) 
propose the following methods for researching mobilities in disaster response policy 
at local, national and international level: case studies, cross-case comparisons and 
policy narrative/discourse analysis. Kennedy (2015) also argues that future PMS 
research should place greater focus on the importance of 'stories' in the movement of 
policies. 
 
This is an academic investigation, therefore the critical framework of PMS is 
employed. However, because this is an interdisciplinary project incorporating the 
disciplines of applied volcanology and disaster risk science, we also aim to suggest 
how these critical reflections may 'improve' future volcanic risk reduction (VRR) 
policy. These factors provide this project with several considerations for applying 
PMS research methods to the development of volcanic risk governance:  
 
(1) The project must consider the importance of temporal and geospatial factors in the 
development and movement of VRR ideas from one site to another. Employing a 
hybrid of historical and geographical methods to investigate these 'specific historical-
geographical circumstances' is intrinsic to this approach.  
 
(2) Networks of knowledge exchange or 'technocracies' (Prince, 2015) are a prolific 
means of facilitating the movement of policy models between sites. These arguably 
form the framework that holds together the global policy field across scales. Therefore, 
this project should assess how 'expert' networks have shaped the movement of volcanic 
risk policies and practices over time.  
 
(3) Multiple case studies should be compared in order to evaluate and contextualise 
policies at particular volcanoes (the sites at which VRR policy manifests) with respect 
to others. Case studies are a standard unit of investigation throughout the policy 
mobilities literature (e.g. Clarke, 2009, 2011;  Peck and Theodore, 2010, 2012; 
McCann, 2011; McCann and Ward, 2012, 2014, Kennedy, 2015). 
 
3.2. Narrative Case Study Methodologies 





1. The type of research questions: typically to answer questions like 'how' 
and 'why'? 
 
2. Extent of control over behavioural events: when researcher has 
little/no possibility to control the events. 
 
3. General circumstances of the phenomenon to be studied: 
contemporary phenomenon in a real-life context. 
 
This investigation is concerned with 'how' and 'why' knowledge about volcanic risk 
circulates around the world in the effort to derive 'best practice' volcanic risk reduction. 
The degree of control this project has had over these processes is minimal. These are 
real-life phenomena which cannot be effectively reproduced under artificial 
circumstances.  
 
McCann and Ward's (2014) contention that PMS case studies should "say something 
about instances of sameness and of difference" suggests that the project should 
compare cases. We therefore employ multiple case studies to demonstrate the role of 
mobile policy on the development of volcanic risk governance at geographically 
diverse volcanoes and in the construction of the global policy field that links them. 
 
3.2.1. Narrative Analysis Methods 
The first part of the process is to outline the development and makeup of the global 
policy field. Chapter 4 constructs a history of volcanic risk governance to date with a 
focus on the role of the exchange of information across space and time in shaping 
policy and practice. This is presented in the form of a chronological narrative in order 
to capture the 'specific historical-geographical circumstances' of mobile policy in VRR. 
 
Historical enquiry "...inevitably uses the process of narrative linkage if history is 
understood as portraying past events with the coherence, logical consistency and 
significance demanded by the concept of history since the 18th Century" (Fulda, 
2014). Narratives are arguably fundamental to how humans experience existence, as a 
sequence of events, through causes and effects (Jones and McBeth, 2010). Narrative 
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policy analyses view the construction of public policy as a composite of sequences of 
events and perspectives which can be compiled, compared and contrasted in order to 
derive a representative 'meta-narrative' from a range of available sources, or 'small 
stories' (Baynham and Georgakopolou, 2006). Jones and McBeth (2010) note that 
narrative policy analyses can focus on multiple levels, which they name the macro 
(global), meso (institutional), or micro (personal). Given this project's focus on the 
impact of globe-spanning processes of knowledge exchange, documenting their 
impact at specific geographic sites (volcanoes), our narrative analyses aim to 
encompass these three levels. The term 'macro' is used to describe processes and 
assemblages on the global policy field which span or link more than one national 
jurisdiction, 'meso' to describe the distinct national-level context where decision-
making power tends to lie, and 'micro' for the local-level policy fields that manifest 
around distinct volcanoes, and their constituent assemblages. 
 
Meta-narratives are central to the post-positivist school of critical policy studies, 
which contends that reality can never be depicted completely accurately by one 
observer due to each observer's own prejudices and circumstances, ergo the 'truth' 
must be aggregated by drawing together (sometimes conflicting) accounts (Jones and 
McBeth, 2010; Hampton, 2011; Sharma and Paudel, 2015). No narrative can seek to 
provide a literal transcription of everything that has occurred during the time span it 
covers. In the construction of any meta-narrative, certain events and periods elicit 
greater focus than others. As such, this study's meta-narratives are 'kairotic', or 'event-
driven' (Czarniawska, 2010). We first create a chronological timeline of events 
pertaining to volcanic risk governance to provide the 'bones' for the meta-narrative. 
Hollis (2014) provides an example of how this may be achieved in the context of 
general disaster risk governance (Table 3.1).  
Table 3.1 Key moments in the history of disaster risk governance according to 
Hollis (2014). It is worth noting that, as mentioned above, sequential qualitative 
studies are generally not all-encompassing/holistic and Hollis' timeline does not 
include every significant historical development in the history of DRR; omitting, 
for example, the mid-20th Century role of the 'Chicago School' (e.g. Gilbert F. 
White and Robert Kates) in the development of a post-positivist understanding of 
disaster risk that acknowledged the role of subjective social factors in governing the 
behaviour of communities exposed to disaster risk - contrary to prior work which 
had sought the 'solution' to disasters through purely engineering-based or economic 





Siebert et al. (2010) provide the most extensive chronology of Holocene volcanism to 
date. This is a database covering thousands of eruptions from 1,448 volcanoes. In 
creating our timeline, we identify relevant entries from this list along with those from 
Hollis (2014) and other documentary sources such as Witham's (2005) database of 
volcanic disasters and incidents in the 20th Century, Auker's et al. (2013) analysis of 
the historical volcanic fatalities record and both editions of the Encyclopaedia of 
Volcanoes (Sigurdsson, 1999; 2015). Such a chronological list becomes a narrative 
once imbued with meaning through linguistic description of the causal relations 
between entries (Feldman et al. 2004). In order to derive the meaning of each entry, we 
identify sources of data or 'small stories' regarding each event in the timeline and 
'stitch' these together. The data for this process have been derived from primary and 
secondary documentary sources, including policy documents and government reports, 
peer-reviewed articles, media articles textbooks, reports from conferences or 
documentation relating to projects/organisations within volcanology and disaster risk 




Narrative analysis methods may focus on content, structure or context (Roe, 1994; 
Stone, 2002; Frost and Oullette, 2011). Feldman et al. (2004) contend that: "The use of 
any analytical tool must be related to the question being asked of the data. The ways 
scholars use this analysis will vary by the content of their research questions and the 
kinds of data they have." As we seek to analyse the substance of VRR policies rather 
than prioritising the stories' semantics or the circumstances of their narration, 'content 
analysis' is prioritised. Exemplary 'themes of analysis' for the meta-narrative stem from 
McCann and Ward's (2012) 'follow the policy' questions, which include:  
 
How are policies made mobile? What calculative technologies and 
political contexts facilitate mobile policy? What situations, transit points 
and 'sites of persuasion' do policies travel through? How do policies 
mutate as they travel? What are the consequences for the places through 
which the policies are moved? How do mobile policies impact the 
character and politics of places? 
 
In satisfying the geospatial element of McCann and Ward's  (2012) 'follow the policy' 
process, we seek to understand VRR policy assemblages, their components and the 
topologies of knowledge exchange that have contributed to their construction. These 
may include organisations and policy apparatus (legally constituted and informal) at 
the macro, meso, and micro levels - projects which belong to/link these organisations - 
and individual actors. In satisfying the temporal element, we seek to 'follow' the 
evolution of these assemblages (and their consequences) over the course of the event-
driven narrative, wherever possible starting at the historical inception of risk 
governance at a particular volcano. Frequent analytical commentary pertaining to these 
themes of investigation is woven throughout the narratives and key 'findings' are 
highlighted and summarised. 
 
The global-level narrative in Chapter 4 compiles 'small stories' from volcanoes around 
the world to illustrate the changing state of volcanic risk governance throughout human 
history and the role of the global policy field in its evolution. Seawright and Gerring 
(2008) state that case-based studies frequently derive knowledge from 'background 
cases', examples which are not examined to the same extent as the 'main' case studies 
but nonetheless play a key role in informing the investigation overall. Chapter 4 is a 
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rich tapestry of 'background cases', providing a contextual backdrop for the subsequent 
(Chapters 5 and 6), more in-depth case studies. 
 
3.2.2 Selection of Case Studies 
From the global-level history presented in Chapter 4, we identify five case study 
volcanoes with volcanic or policy characteristics that exemplify interesting parallels 
and differences in volcanic risk governance. These volcanoes have been, in turn, 
subjected to the narrative analysis methods detailed above, extending the investigation 
to the meso (Chapter 5) and micro (Chapter 6) levels.  
 
Volcán de Colima, México is the central case study (Chapter 6) for this investigation. 
This volcano was one of the examples which most prominently displayed the flaws of 
the Behavioural model of emergency management, mobilised through the UNDRO 
(1985) manual (Macías and Aguirre, 2006). Volcanic risk governance at Volcán de 
Colima has not undergone significant subsequent reform at the time of writing, despite 
frequent potentially hazardous activity at the volcano. In 1990, Volcán de Colima was 
designated a 'Decade Volcano' of special scientific interest by IAVCEI because it 
satisfied the following criteria: it is representative of one or more hazards, it is active, 
it is in a populated area and there are local organisations dedicated to its study (Barberi 
et al. 1990). These aspects and many more exposed in Chapter 6 have made this 
volcano an ideal example of the role of policy mobilities, mutations and assemblages 
in the idiosyncratic development of volcanic risk governance. An ethnographic field 
study has been undertaken at this volcano, which forms the core 'micro level' 
component of this research. 
 
A suite of four case study volcanoes have been juxtaposed with Volcán de Colima. A 
major reason that the field of policy mobilities emerged and distinguished itself from 
the earlier policy transfer research was due to an acknowledgement that the movement 
of policies is seldom rational (Peck and Theodore, 2010). As such, rather than 
establishing a set of rigid criteria to identify case studies, we have instead identified 
volcanoes with differing (volcanological and socio-political) characteristics which 
suggest that comparison with Colima may be interesting from a PMS perspective. 




Gunung Merapi, Indonesia (Section 5.1) is  a highly active 'Decade Volcano' which 
was part of a 'twin volcanoes' exchange programme with Volcán de Colima due to 
perceived similarities, although this was later abandoned due to lack of funds 
(IAVCEI, 1999; Gavilanes, pers. comm. 2016; Newhall, pers. comm. 2017). Merapi 
provides an excellent example of a long-existing, slowly evolving volcanic risk 
governance framework in a less economically developed context that has been 
confronted with multiple small-to-medium scale disaster events and subject to very 
different processes of knowledge exchange through time. 
 
Volcán Nevado del Ruiz, Colombia (Section 5.2), is a glaciated stratovolcano, and the 
site of the second-highest volcanic death toll of the 20th century. Resultantly Colombia 
developed a national disaster risk reduction sector which provided the blueprint for 
global reform during the IDNDR (Bruce, 2002; UNISDR, 2015). Like Volcán de 
Colima, Nevado del Ruiz straddles two semi-autonomous authority areas. An exchange 
program between Nevado del Ruiz and Mount Rainier based on similar volcanic 
hazards was initiated in 2012 (Ciudad Region, 2012). 
 
Mount Rainier, United States of America (Section 5.3), a glaciated stratovolcano and 
part of the 'Decade Volcano' project which, unlike Volcán de Colima and Merapi, has 
not erupted significantly in modern human history. Nonetheless, at this volcano, a 
volcanic risk reduction system designed via consultation with local communities, 
businesses, scientists and politicians has resulted in a strategy which arguably more 
closely resembles the 'disaster risk reduction' paradigm (PCDEM, 2008). This example 
allows for comparison with a volcano in a more economically developed setting and 
without the immediate political pressure of impending volcanic activity. 
 
Popocatépetl, México (Section 5.4) is a highly active stratovolcano located within the 
same national context as Volcán de Colima. Despite this fact, and although some of the 
components mobilised from 'elsewhere' and used in the development of VRR policy at 
both volcanoes are the same (e.g. the UNDRO [1985] Volcanic Emergency 
Management manual), there are significant differences at each with respect to the 
timelines for policy development, the topological connections formed with sites and 
actors 'elsewhere' on the global policy field of VRR, and the resulting VRR policy 
frameworks. Popocatépetl is an ideal example for illustrating the unpredictability and 
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complexity of mobile policy due to these parallels and divergences with the central 
case study.  
 
The narrative policy analysis of each of these volcanoes repeats the methods used for 
Chapter 4, constructing event-based chronologies and tracing the development of 
policy assemblages through these.  
 
3.2.3. Ethnographic Field Research 
Field research at Volcán de Colima has utilised the full range of 'mobile 
methodologies' outlined by McCann and Ward (2012) (Section 3.1). During two field 
seasons between 5th February 2017 until 2nd July 2018 and 24th January 2018 until 
9th May 2019, I conducted an ethnographic study based at the Universidad de Colima, 
the institution currently responsible for the bulk of official monitoring at Volcán de 
Colima. With kind permission and co-operation of Dr Nick Varley, I was able to work 
in the offices of the Colima Intercambio e Investigación en Vulcanología (Colima 
Exchange and Research in Volcanology, or CIIV), an exchange programme of the 
Faculty of Sciences that offers foreign students voluntary internships to assist in 
volcano monitoring. The core findings are presented in Chapter 6. 
 
Ethnography is an umbrella term for detailed qualitative assessment of every day life 
and practice in a particular setting; encompassing interviews/questionnaires and 
observations (Hoey, 2014; Fetterman, 2010). When combined with the narrative case 
study approach (Section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.), the full suite of available methods intersects 
well with Yin's (1994) six sources of data in the case study protocol: documentation, 
archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation, and physical 
artefacts. Marrero et al. (2015) consider research at the personal level necessary in 
order to understand the internal workings of disaster risk reduction systems. Peck and 
Theodore (2010) state that ethnographic methods are "...in many ways well-suited to 
the challenges of studying embodied policy knowledges and mutating technologies of 
government", but argue that these methods intrinsically pay less attention to 
macroinstitutional frameworks. By combining this micro-level research (Chapter 6) 
with the meso (Chapter 5) and macro-level (Chapter 4) research, this project has 
sought to create as comprehensive an understanding of the mobilities within volcanic 
risk reduction as possible with the time and resources available. The blend of 
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ethnography, historical enquiry, human geography and applied volcanology used in 
this study of policy mobility can be regarded as a form of methodological bricolage 
(Lévi-Strauss, 1966) - a 'multimethodological approach to qualitative enquiry' which 
allows the researcher a dual role of engaging directly with the situational specifics of 
the data encountered at their field site(s) whilst retaining a connection with the broader 
scholastic/theoretical implications of those data (O'Regan, 2015). This study's unique 
bricolage has drawn upon Lorimer's (2009) notion of 'making-do' - bringing together 
information derived via archival and field-based research that evolves through the 
doing of the investigation rather than adhering rigidly to one pre-existing, purist 
methodological framework:  
 
Amidst any cross-disciplinary traffic of ideas and techniques concerning 
the fragmentary past, the specifics of method can still be hard to pre-
plan. More likely, they are fallen upon ,or opportunistically designed. To 
do so requires that faith be kept in immediate surroundings and our 
human abilities to perceive them. With exploratory mapwork, educated 
guesswork and direct observation, things from the past issue forth, and 
begin to connect up. In places, they abound: to saturation point, or 
standing proud. In others, they remain concealed, squirreled away, 
needing to be chiseled out... What yet can be grubbed up and snuffled 
out? With whom can conversations be struck? What living memories 
remain? What kinds of return can be made?... 
  
Making-do might usefully be thought of as collagist and chthonic, in 
character and, being of earthly making, considered portable to all 
manner of other places… As such, making-do can be understood as an 
adaptive mode of inquiry. (Lorimer, 2009) 
 
During my time at CIIV, I kept a diary of observations based on my experiences 
working every day in the institution monitoring Volcán de Colima, and identified 
individuals from across the local (and national) VRR policy field whose stories and 
perspectives would be used to construct a detailed historical narrative of the 
development of volcanic risk governance. I conducted 26 formal interviews with 22 
individuals, including university volcanologists, state and national civil protection 
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authorities - as well as many informal conversations during my time at CIIV and 
attendance of three international volcanology conferences (CoV 9, Puerto Varas, Chile, 
November 2016; IAVCEI Scientific Assembly, Portland, Oregon, USA, August 2017; 
and CoV 10, Naples, Italy, September 2018). 
 
Formal interviews were conducted in English and Spanish, recorded using the "voice 
recorder" application on my HTC One mobile phone (password protected according to 
Lancaster University ethics standards). These data were subsequently transferred to my 
password-protected Hewlitt-Packard Pavilion 15 notebook PC. All formal interviewees 
received Participant Information Sheets and completed Consent Forms in accordance 
with ethics standards. I fully transcribed all formal interviews in English (translating 
those conducted in Spanish). Because I was interested in using the interview data to 
construct a chronological meta-narrative, I obtained narratives from my interviewees 
by asking the open question "tell me the story of your involvement in risk governance 
at Volcán de Colima" (or variants thereof) and encouraging interviewees to recount 
their experiences from the beginning to the present (or the end, if they were no longer 
involved). These narratives were complimented by unstructured questions, generally 
dictated by the content of the preceding information. 
 
Interview data have been incorporated into the chronology for the Volcán de Colima 
case study (and additionally the Popocatépetl case study), arranged thematically and 
according to the timeline. Where permission has been given, interviewees are 
identified by name (except in situations where the information or opinions given is 
judged as potentially harmful to relationships on the policy field and may ultimately do 
more damage than help to 'improve' volcanic risk governance if the identity of the 
interviewee is revealed, in which case the interviewee is referred to by the number of 
the interview). Otherwise, interviewees are referred to by the number of the interview. 
Complementing the secondary-research led narrative analysis with these ethnographic 
data provides the meta-narrative for the Volcán de Colima case study with a broader 
range of sources and permits analysis at a depth which would not be achievable 
otherwise.  
 
3.2.4 Cross-Case Analyses 
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Analysis according to the theoretical framework of PMS is conducted throughout the 
construction of the case histories and woven through the narratives. This includes 
comparison between 'background' cases in Chapter 4, and between the 'main' cases in 
Chapters 5-6. In Chapter 7, a discursive analysis of the findings from Chapters 4-6 is 
presented. Khan and VanWynsberghe (2008) consider cross-case analysis an ideal 
methodology for exploring the mobilisation of knowledge between cases: 
 
"Cross-case analysis enables case study researchers to delineate the 
combination of factors that may have contributed to the outcomes of the 
case, seek or construct an explanation as to why one case is different or 
the same as others, make sense of puzzling or unique findings, or further 
articulate the concepts, hypotheses, or theories discovered or constructed 
from the original case. Cross-case analysis enhances researchers' 
capacities to understand how relationships may exist among discrete 
cases, accumulate knowledge from the original case, refine and develop 
concepts (RAGIN, 1997), and build or test theory (ECKSTEIN, 2002). 
Furthermore, cross-case analysis allows the researcher to compare cases 
from one or more settings, communities, or groups." 
 
Khan and VanWynsberghe (2008) outline various methodologies for conducting cross-
case analysis. This project takes inspiration from two of these - the 'multi-case' method 
and the 'process tracing' method - throughout Chapters 4-7. In the 'multi-case' method, 
a common problem (in this case an active volcano with an exposed population) is 
identified across a suite of case studies which also contain unique issues, and a series 
of research questions (in this case how, why, where and with what effects have 
processes of mobile policy influenced the development of volcanic risk governance) is 
applied across cases. In the 'process tracing' method, the course of a common process 
(in this case the development of a volcanic risk governance system) shared by multiple 
case studies, is charted, and the similarities and differences are highlighted. Process-
tracing usually takes the form of a detailed narrative. 
 
In Chapter 7, the  general findings from the case narratives of Chapters 4-6 are 
summarised and thematic analyses are conducted, based on the following three 
concepts: the aspirations of those on the global policy field seeking to identify, 
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promote and share 'best practices' in volcanic risk governance; the complications 
encountered in the process of circulating ideas pertaining to volcanic risk governance 
in particular volcanic settings; and the considerations suggested by the findings of this 
research in terms of overcoming those complications and reducing volcanic risk to a 

































Volcanic Risk Governance Through Space and Time 
 
This chapter presents an historical account of the development of volcanic risk 
governance with focus on the global mobility of knowledge and policy. Volcanic 
eruptions have impacted human societies since the origins of our species, but the 
historical record of volcanic eruptions is far from complete (Oppenheimer, 2011). 
Siebert et al. (2010) provide the most extensive chronology of Holocene volcanism to 
date, a database covering thousands of eruptions from 1,448 volcanoes. This chapter 
does not seek to exhaustively catalogue all policy responses to these, but to select 
examples to depict and explain the development of the global policy field of VRR and 
the mobilities therein. 
 
4.1. Pre-Civil Defence Volcanic Risk Governance 
4.1.1. Volcanic Risk Governance in Ancient Rome 
The VEI 5 Plinian eruption of Mount Etna in 122 BCE was a rare event for a volcano 
that typically produces "quasipersistent Strombolian activity and frequent lava flows" 
(Coltelli et al. 1998). After this eruption the Sicilian city of Catania was exempted 
from paying 10 years' taxes to Rome following damages sustained through fire and 
roof collapse (Coltelli et al. 1998). The decision to grant the city a tax exemption 
illustrates that the impact of the eruption was sufficiently severe that the Roman 
Republic was willing to give up ten years' revenue from the most prosperous city in 
contemporary Sicily (Zappala, 2016) in order to aid its recovery.  
 
Coltelli et al. (1998) identify another significant Etnaean eruption in 44 BCE. In a 
study of contemporary literature, Stothers and Rampino (1983) present no evidence of 
related policy decisions from Rome. Because the eruption occurred concurrently with 
the assassination of Julius Caesar, the ensuing vacuum of power may have precluded 
any attention being paid to a crisis in a relatively distant province and nullified the 
political capacity to respond, especially since the atmospheric impacts of the eruption 
were attributed to divine retribution for Caesar's assassination.  
 
The 79 AD eruption of Mount Vesuvius was another VEI 5 eruption (and the origin of 
the nomenclature 'Plinian') in the area known at the time as Italia, the heartland of 
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Roman territory. The cities of Pompeii and Herculaneum were destroyed by a 
combination of airfall tephra, PDCs and lahars. By 79 AD, the Roman Republic had 
become the Roman Empire, governed by an autocratic Emperor. Rome's response to 
the eruption of Vesuvius was thus at the discretion of the incumbent premier, Titus. 
Titus made several policy responses. He authorised post-disaster relief from Imperial 
funds; Dobran (2006) states that Titus was: "instrumental in providing aid to the 
survivors". He appointed two ex-consuls to supervise restoration work and to deal 
with legalities. He also visited Sorrento, a relatively unscathed community south of 
the Bay of Naples where he dedicated a sundial to the disaster and minted 
commemorative coinage (Scandone et al. 1993; Oppenheimer, 2011). 
 
This suggests that Titus treated his responsibility as seriously, if not more so than the 
Senate of the Republic had done nearly 200 years' prior. However, there is no 
evidence that 'lessons' from the former crisis had any bearing on the latter; the 
decisions and the political apparatus for taking them varied substantially. 
Oppenheimer (2011) states that after Titus' death (two years after the eruption): 
 
...the devastation sent barely a ripple through the Roman world... there is 
virtually no further reference to the disaster in the extant literature of the 
day. The Campanian region lost its prestige as Rome's favourite 
playground but there was very little dent in its exports of agricultural 
products. Before long the fate of Pompeii and Herculaneum was just a 
vague memory in folklore. 
 
Both Dobran (2006) and Oppenheimer (2011) conclude that the area was 
uninhabitable for between two and three centuries; however, the eruption was largely 
forgotten afterwards, achieving its modern fame after excavations in the 1700s 
(Scandone et al. 1993). 
 
These examples illustrate that governance decisions regarding volcanic eruptions are 
not a new phenomenon. They show that policy responses to volcanic crises may vary 
depending on eruptive and socio-political circumstances; sometimes personalities of 
decision-makers have a strong influence. They also suggest that it is possible for a 
volcanic crisis to have a significant societal impact at the time, to be recorded and 
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archived, and for that information to have little to no application in the governance of 
future crises. Arguably, the majority of volcanic crises throughout human history have 
been of this 'discrete' variety, where VRR policy, formal or informal, is enacted 
without significant retention of knowledge. Although this has understandably been the 
case between geographically disparate volcanoes and societies, the above examples 
illustrate that this is also entirely possible at the same volcano, or within the same 
political jurisdiction. Indeed, although part of Campania was rendered uninhabitable 
following the 79 AD eruption of Vesuvius, it was populated again by the time of 
Vesuvius' VEI 4 eruption in 472 and again, by the time of the VEI 4 event in 1631, 
which was preceded by ~500 years of inactivity and which claimed ~6000 lives 
(Rolandi et al. 1993; Mastrolorenzo et al. 2002). If the 79 AD eruption did not re-
enter the public consciousness until a century after the latter of these eruptions, it can 
be reasonably concluded that its 'lessons' did not prevent loss of life in either instance. 
 
4.1.2. The Origin of International Disaster Relief 
In Hollis' (2014) historical review of DRR policy, humanitarian aid is identified as the 
oldest form of governance response to disaster. Hollis states that: 
 
Humanitarian aid has a long and well-documented history that, in terms 
of disaster relief, can be traced back to at least 1755 when King George 
II of England [sic] and the city of Hamburg sent relief aid to Lisbon in 
the aftermath of a great earthquake and a tsunami that destroyed most of 
the city. Reflecting emerging sentiments two years after the Lisbon 
earthquake, Emmer de Vattel wrote: “all governments with an abundance 
of provisions should come to the assistance of those countries which have 
been smitten by disaster."  
 
The instances from ancient Rome in examined Section 4.1.1 provide examples that 
post-disaster relief as a policy response is far older than 1755: "As long as there have 
been disasters, individuals and communities have tried to do something about them" 
(Haddow et al. 2007). However, the co-operation between sovereign states (i.e. 
macro-scale mobility) renders this event significant. Hollis argues that although this 
was an important precedent, the emerging 'humanitarian sensibility' did not become 
institutionalised until more than a century later (Section 4.1.3). This has parallels with 
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Northrup's (2005) assessment of the processes of early globalisation, or the 'great 
convergence' which saw global socio-political processes manifest 'irregularly at first 
and then with increasing force and speed...". Of the nine categories that form the 
modern global policy field of DRR according to Hannigan (2012), only 'national/local 
governments' and (arguably) 'the mass media' existed at this stage. This situation is 
seen to continue into the following (19th) century, wherein the rate of political change 
and interconnectedness would gradually begin to increase. Ferreira et al. (2016) argue 
that processes of early globalisation at the start of the 19th Century, associated with 
increased trade in food and raw materials, created the conditions by which powers in 
western Europe (particularly the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland) were 
able to undertake the transition from a predominantly subsistance-based agrarian 
economy to a manufacturing-based industrial economy - through the agricultural and 
industrial revolutions. Industrialisation would have a transformative impact on 
governance generally, including the governance of disaster risk: 
 
The terms pre-industrial and industrial were introduced by Gilbert White 
(1974, pp. 5) to describe characteristics [sic] ways in which human 
responses are related to level of economic development. In pre-industrial 
societies the emphasis is focused on responses that are, inter alia: 
predominantly locally- based, involving a wide range of actions; which 
are flexible and emphasise harmonisation with nature, action being taken 
by individuals and/or local groups. In contrast, industrial responses 
involve: the State to a much greater degree; emphasise technological 
control over nature and adopt more uniform responses (Chester et al. 
2015) 
 
4.1.3. Volcanic Risk Governance in the 19th Century  
In 1812, the House of Commons of the United Kingdom received a petition from the 
colonial government of the Caribbean island of Saint Vincent detailing the impacts of 
an eruption at the island's Soufrière volcano on 30th April that year. The eruption was 
a VEI 4 Sub-Plinian event (GVP, 2013). The affected territory was marked by 20 
plantations all of which were "completely covered with stones, sand and scoria, and 
other volcanic substances, 10 inches deep, over a surface of more than 6,000 acres" 




The report contains four letters from estate proprietors and administrators, an account 
of the eruption and two loss estimations, one calculated by estate owners, (£110,000) 
and the other by a committee authorised to investigate the losses (£79,045 and 5 
shillings). Most of the 80 fatalities occurred among the island's black slave 
population, whose 'huts' collapsed more readily than colonial homesteads (Clifford, 
2017). One of the extracts states, "If we do not get relief, I fear we must abandon our 
estates, and our poor Negroes must be divided into lots, and sold for the benefit of our 
creditors, and their families torn from one another" (House of Commons, 1812). The 
impact of power structures on social vulnerability is starkly evident, perhaps to be 
expected of a governance model where racial subjugation was an explicit feature.  
 
The report emphasises the eruption as an unprecedented event within the context of 
British colonialism. Thus, as empire-building expanded the British polity. new 
challenges, including volcanic risk, were encountered. At this stage, scientific 
understanding of volcanoes was such that volcanic landforms discovered before the 
eruption did not lead the settlers to realise the risks of their new home. Clifford (2017) 
notes that British media did show "some interest" in the eruption, but the government 
was more concerned with the forthcoming war with the USA. A House of Commons 
publication from 1814 states that £25,000 was eventually donated to the survivors of 
Saint Vincent by the British government (House of Commons, 1814). 
 
From this case, several prominent features can be identified: limited scientific 
understanding inhibiting ex ante action to avert volcanic disaster; predominantly 
reactive, relief-centred policy solutions; and prioritisation of social elites at the 
expense of others exposed to volcanic hazards. Despite other inconsistencies, these 
three themes recur throughout the 19th Century. Another of Hannigan's (2012) 'field 
constituents' can also be seen to emerge in this example: the private sector, as loss to 
businesses forms a key part of the petition. 
 
The April 1815 eruption of Mount Tambora (Sumbawa, Indonesia) was a VEI 7 ultra-
Plinian event with the highest known death toll from a single eruption - an estimated 
minimum of 60,000 fatalities (GVP, 2013; Auker et al. 2013). At the time, Sumbawa 
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was governed as part of the Dutch East Indies, briefly subject to a British takeover 
(1811-1816) under Governor Thomas Stamford Raffles (Gallop, 2014).  
 
Sumbawa was divided into six sultanates: Sumbawa, Bima, Dompo, Sanggar, Pekat 
and Tambora. It was notionally under the supervision of a colonial Resident. 
However, the sultanates, presided over by royals called rajas, remained largely self-
governing (Oppenheimer 2011; Aritonang and Steenbrink, 2008). Oppenheimer notes 
a substantial precursory explosion, sending a plume to 33 km above sea level on the 
evening of 5th April. Several sultanates were sufficiently alarmed that they requested 
aid from the Resident's office who responded by sending an official named Israel to 
investigate. D'arcy Wood (2014) states that by 10th April, Israel had arrived on the 
slopes of Tambora when the climactic phase of the eruption began, becoming one of 
the first casualties.  
 
In Yogyakarta, the British administration believed the noise to be cannon fire and 
despatched a military unit. Independently of this, two relief ships were sent to sea 
from other port towns, with the expectation that ships were under attack 
(Oppenheimer, 2011). 
 
The raja of Sanggar survived with some of his family and community. D'arcy Wood 
(2014) speculates that he may have used royal prerogative to secure the fastest horses 
and left early enough to avoid the worst of the eruption, although his daughter later 
died, drinking ash-contaminated water. The raja sought an audience with Lt. Owen 
Phillips of the British Royal Navy. D'arcy Wood states that the raja's account moved 
Phillips to grant him several tons of rice and quote him in writings to Governor 
Raffles. 
 
Most of these governance responses had very little impact in reducing human losses 
(i.e. sending troops and boats to tackle a non-existent military threat due to a 
misinterpretation of volcanic signals; or sending Israel to his death). The escape of the 
raja, his family and his court was a decision taken by a governing figure in response to 
the eruption and is an example of a successful evacuation (albeit one that prioritised 
social elites). Lt. Phillips' decision to donate rice may have been an act that alleviated 
human suffering in the wake of the eruption, but this was a personal decision, not 
  
63 
rooted in a policy framework (in any sense other than Phillips' colonial position of 
power). Phillips' donation was also significantly smaller than need created by the 
crisis. Oppenheimer (2011) notes that the eruption and the famine afterwards claimed 
between 60,000 and 120,000 lives, with victims recorded on islands, distant from 
Sumbawa (e.g. Bali). On Sumbawa, the famine apparently led to thousands selling 
their children into slavery to be able to afford a small quantity of rice, an extreme 
example of an informal policy decision taken by a community under duress. The 
eruption caused a mean global temperature drop of 3ºC, killing crops in Europe and 
North America (UCAR, 2012). With the possible exception of despatching Israel, the 
actions taken were reactive responses to events already in motion (and even Israel's 
mission was in reaction to a precursory explosion). 
 
It can be reasonably concluded that few of the actions of the incumbent regimes had a 
significant impact in reducing losses. It is also worth noting that neither the foreign 
aid precedent established in 1755 (section 4.1.2) nor the aid supplied to Saint Vincent 
appear to have influenced the governance responses to Tambora. In 1822, after the 
Dutch re-established control, a VEI 5 eruption of Gunung Galunggung on the island 
of Java killed 4,011 people. 
 
In 1822, in Abuta village, Hokkaido, Japan, an earthquake swarm at 02:00 on 10th 
March concerned Shigematsu Ban-uemon, a local samurai official. An elder resident 
suggested, based on past experience, that this could mean the nearby volcano, Usu 
was going to erupt. Ban-uemon suggested locals prepare to evacuate. 60 hours later, 
when the first explosions started, he ordered locals to flee to two more distant 
villages. After 10 days, during which ash had fallen up to 15 cm thick 22 km from the 
volcano, heavy rain drove some of the evacuees back to Abuta against the evacuation 
order. The following day, a PDC destroyed Abuta, killing 80, although a rescue did 
save some survivors. After this, the roads to the affected area of the volcano were 
closed. When ashfall contaminated water at the shelters, Ban-uemon arranged for 
evacuees to relocate further from the volcano. The eruption lasted four months 
(Tsukui, 2013). 
 
Several aspects of the Usu crisis provide interesting counterpoints to other Section 
4.1.2 examples. Firstly, although not based on quantitative volcano monitoring, 
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correctly identified precursors allowed for ex ante action and an (initially) successful 
evacuation. Secondly, the use of the elder's knowledge illustrated that lessons learned 
during prior eruptions could influence governance. Thirdly, although rooted in 
hierarchical Japanese feudalism, the officials appear to have acted to benefit all those 
exposed and been adaptable, learning from the deaths in Abuta by closing the road 
and realising the current shelters were no longer suitable when the water became 
contaminated. The 1822 Usu volcanic crisis was, however, in many respects another 
example of a 'discrete' or 'bounded' micro/meso level event, in terms of mobility of 
knowledge in space and time. No evidence has been found that lessons from this 
eruption had any influence during subsequent eruptions in Hokkaido in 1853 and 
1856.  
 
During the 1835 VEI 5 eruption of Cosiguina volcano in Nicaragua, the decision 
taken by the authorities to combat the darkness from ashfall was somewhat different:  
 
The garrison of the town at the same time kept up incessant discharges of 
cannon and musketry, which was done by the order of the government, by 
the mind of some intelligent chemists, who thought by such means, by 
letting off rockets, lighting fires, and causing all the church bells to be 
rung, the atmosphere might be cleared. (Galindo, 1835).  
 
Galindo also notes that 350 miles away in Belize, British authorities thought the noise 
of the eruption was cannon fire and launched a cannon offensive. Inconsistency 
remained a key feature of the embryonic policy field of volcanic risk. 
 
In 1841, following two petitions from the Academy of Sciences in Naples in 1806 and 
1829, King Ferdinand II of Bourbon approved the establishment of the Osservatorio 
Vesuviano. This was the world's first dedicated volcano observatory and a significant 
precedent for volcanology (INGV, 2012).  
 
Hollis (2014) argues that the 'humanitarian sensibility' began to be formally 
institutionalised in 1863 when the Geneva Society of Public Welfare convened a 
conference at which 16 national governments and four philanthropic organisations 
were represented, establishing the International Relief Committee for Injured 
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Combatants, which by 1875 had become the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, with individual committees in each country (ICRC, 1988). This was a 
significant macro-level development on the policy field of DRR. Hollis (2014) cites 
the St John Ambulance Association (1877), the Samariterverein (1882) and the Royal 
Life Saving Society (1891) as further examples of international humanitarian 
institutions coming into being around this time. 
 
In August 1883, the midst of this period, a VEI 6 eruption occurred in the Dutch East 
Indies, on the island of Krakatau, in the Sunda Strait between Java and Sumatra. In 
1883 Krakatau was uninhabited. Scarth (2001) summarises its social significance 
thus: "the Soenda Straits formed one of the most concentrated international shipping 
lanes in the world, funnelling trading vessels between Europe and the Far East. 
However, apart from the helmsmen, nobody needed to take much notice of Krakatau." 
Krakatau therefore formed an incidental backdrop to a key contemporary global site 
of mobility in goods, people, knowledge and policy.  
 
The eruption of Krakatau began on 20th May, with related seismicity felt in the 
colonial capital, Batavia (now Jakarta) 155 km away, including by the director of the 
city observatory (Simkin and Fiske, 1983; Scarth, 2001). Early on 21st May, 
explosions prompted telegrams to be sent from Batavia to Willem Beijerinck, a local 
colonial administrator, requesting that he investigate. Beijerinck had dismissed reports 
from local fishermen that part of Krakatau was on fire, but following the messages 
from the capital, he sailed to the island to discover an ash cloud covering passing 
ships (Hamblyn, 2010).  
 
The presence of a telegraph network allowed the Dutch administration in Batavia a 
demonstrably greater capacity for involvement in this volcanic crisis than the British 
authorities in Yogyakarta had during the eruption of Tambora. Indeed, it was interest 
from the capital that overrode scepticism from the local colonial authority. 
Telegraphy, combined with the constant sea traffic through the strait, meant that up-
to-date reports could be regularly provided and the chances of the volcano's activity 
being misidentified were significantly reduced. However, Hamblyn (2010) indicates 
that none seemed to anticipate the possibility of a major disaster: "...once they had 
recovered from their initial disquiet, the European residents of Bantam and Batavia 
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were delighted to have a newly active volcano within a week's reach of the capital." A 
week after the first explosions, the Netherlands-Indies Steamship Company took 86 
day-trippers from Batavia to witness the activity. The excursion was chartered by J.A. 
Schuurman, on behalf of government geologist Rogier Verbeek. Verbeek had been 
involved in volcanological investigations in the Dutch East Indies, including crater 
measurements following the VEI 4 eruption of Merapi in 1872 (Voight et al, 2000; 
Section 5.1). Schuurman spent the trip taking notes and led a small party to the rim of 
the active crater (Scarth, 2001).  
 
Activity continued through June and July (Scarth, 2001). The local division of the 
Dutch Topographic Survey sent the Chief of the Surveying Brigade in Bantam, 
Captain Ferzenaar, to the island on the 11th of August to determine the feasibility of 
conducting a full survey. In what became the last human landing on the island, 
Ferzenaar concluded that in its current state of activity, it was 'inadvisable' to attempt 
to realise a full survey (Hamblyn, 2010; Ormeling, 2013). Beijerinck, Schuurman and 
Ferzenaar's official excursions illustrate that there was interest in understanding more 
about the activity on Krakatau from the colonial authorities. However, the only way to 
learn was to send observers directly to high-risk areas, as had been the case with Israel 
in 1815. Although Ferzenaar made his assessment while activity persisted, there is no 
indication that anyone anticipated the possibility of the most intense phase of the 
eruption or the risk it represented. Colonial society continued to function as 'normal' 
with no further government reaction: "... in a district where earthquakes and volcanic 
outbursts are so frequent, this eruption of Krakatoa during the summer months of 
1883 seems to have been regarded as nothing more than a nine-days' wonder, and 
soon ceased to attract any particular attention" (Symons, 1888). 
 
On 26th August, the Plinian phase of the eruption began, marked by frequent 
explosions, significantly more powerful than those of the preceding months. 
Explosions and tsunami continued at intervals of approximately 10 minutes 
throughout the night and although many feared the collapse of their houses, the 
majority remained indoors (Thornton, 1997; Rinard Hinga, 2015). Willem Beijerinck 
did ask his wife, Johanna, and family to leave the coastal village of Katimbang. 
However, they waited to eat first, suggesting that they underestimated the immediate 
nature of the threat. The first major tsunami that evening inundated the community, 
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partly destroying the Beijerincks' house. Willem survived by clinging to a tree. The 
family made their way to another house they owned inland, accompanied by around 
3000 survivors. 16 acquaintances of the Beijerincks, were able to enter the house, 
most remained on the ground outside (Rinard Hinga, 2013). On the morning of the 
27th, four explosions between 05:30 and 10:52 constituted the climactic phase of the 
eruption, during which >60% of Krakatau was destroyed and 18 km3 of tephra was 
ejected, leaving a caldera approximately 7 km in diameter. The resulting ocean-
traversing pyroclastic surges and tsunami officially killed 36,417 inhabitants of the 
coastal communities around the Sunda Strait (Simkin and Fiske, 1983; Auker et al. 
2013). Although Morgan (2013) implies that the true death toll may have been higher, 
accounts suggest far smaller uncertainty regarding the total casualties from this 
eruption than from the Tambora event.  
 
After the strongest explosion at 10:02, PDCs reached the Beijerinck house, killing a 
third of the survivors from Katimbang, including the youngest Beijerinck child. 
(Rinard Hinga, 2013). Although seriously injured, the remaining Beijerinck family 
survived a further four days. Johanna Beijerinck sent an old native man to the beach 
to signal for help to any passing vessels and one Captain Hoen eventually landed and 
found the family. He ordered locals to construct litters. They refused, saying they 
were without food and would starve. Hoen agreed to give them rice and salt and the 
family were carried to Hoen's ship and borne to hospital in Batavia where all made a 
full recovery (Grade 7 Advanced Science, 2016).  
 
The number of fatalities illustrates that despite significant activity, including small-to-
moderate tsunami preceding the strongest phase of the eruption, there was little 
understanding of the full extent of the hazard or vulnerability among the affected 
population (indigenous or colonial), thus little to no potential to form a policy 
response that reduced its impacts. Although the evacuation of Katimbang adhered to 
the power structures of colonial governance in the sense that Willem Beijerinck 'led' 
it, it was an impulsive reaction to the tsunami with no basis in Dutch colonial law and 
under no direction from the administration in Batavia. In this sense, it can be viewed 
as a micro-level informal policy that may have saved 2000 lives (notwithstanding the 
loss of a third of the total participants) but did not prevent the losses of tens of 




At the meso level, the administration in Batavia assumed responsibility for post-
eruption relief: "The first efforts of the Dutch Indian Government were, of course, 
directed to taking measures for the safety and relief of the survivors of this terrible 
catastrophe" (Symons, 1888). A man-of-war was despatched to clear a way through 
the pumice rafts in the Sunda Strait, and a survey ship investigated the changes in 
morphology of the channel.  
 
In the aftermath of the Krakatau eruption, the Dutch government did a 
reasonably good job of providing disaster assistance, though critics 
charged that it was more concerned with providing succour to the 
tragedy's white survivors than with assisting afflicted Indonesian natives. 
Money was raised for disaster relief measures, food and blankets were 
distributed, roads were cleared and temporary shelters were reopened. 
(Reilly, 2009) 
 
There is abundant evidence that governance favoured colonial Europeans: the 
narratives are dominated by European voices. In the 1880s, Europeans constituted 
0.5% of the population of the Dutch East Indies, but accounted for 60% of the taxable 
income; 97% of the population were indigenous Indonesians, collectively accounting 
for 20% of the taxable income (Beck, 2008). Although the volcano killed and 
destroyed property without prejudice, parts of Johanna Beijerinck's account, such as 
the rescue, illustrate the privileges of the colonial elite. Of the entire death toll, 37 
were European (Symons, 1888). It can thus be understood that, although the post-
disaster response in terms of supporting survivors was considerably more advanced 
than in any prior example in this chapter, it was selectively deployed. There was 
considerable anger among the indigenous population regarding this, although it did 
not manifest into collective political action at the time (Reilly, 2009).  
 
Institutional racism aside, humanitarian aid was the keystone of the official response 
to the eruption; the centrally-authorised allocation of funds and distribution of 
resources shows a marked difference from the British regime's response to Tambora. 
There is no mention in any of the accounts examined of involvement from the 
international humanitarian institutions mentioned above; this seems to have originated 
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with the Dutch colonial administration. However, as a global policy field began to 
manifest with 'humanitarian sensibility' at its core, the Dutch Indian relief policy can 
be viewed as part of the general 'direction of travel'. 
 
At the macro level, it can be argued that Krakatau represents an event horizon. The 
telegraphic circulation of reports of the eruption "create(d) an entirely new category of 
disaster: the universal news event, a story followed, in the case of Krakatau, by more 
than half the world's population" (Hamblyn, 2010). As noted above, Tambora had 
profound global effects in 1815, but these were only attributed by later scientific 
investigations. In 1883, the accumulation and circulation of information accompanied 
the phenomena, virtually in real time (Simkin and Fiske [1983] note that 
communications travelled faster than some of the atmospheric effects, allowing their 
occurrence to be anticipated before being observed) making this a significant event in 
terms of both the international exchange of knowledge and the development of 
volcanology. By October 1883 the Dutch government established a commission to 
make a full scientific investigation; Rogier Verbeek was put in charge and the reports 
were published in Dutch and French (Morgan, 2013). It has been argued that 
Verbeek's quantitative approach represents the foundation for modern volcanology 
(Thornton, 1997). In the United Kingdom, the Royal Society established the multi-
disciplinary "Krakatoa Committee" which augmented Verbeek's work with substantial 
data of their own, collating accounts and observations from many sources worldwide 
(Symons, 1888). 
 
Consistent with Northrup's (2005) observations of the piecemeal nature of early 
globalisation, international knowledge mobility and the burgeoning science of 
volcanology did not have a consistent impact on every volcanic crisis following 
Krakatau, however, it indicated the trends to come. Despite interesting attributes, such 
as a several-day rescue effort at New Zealand's Mount Tarawera (Christchurch City 
Libraries, 2015) and the successful evacuation of six villages on the basis of 
precursory earthquakes at Tonga's Niuafo'ou (Seach, 2011), in 1886, these smaller 
eruptions did not become international news phenomena nor prompt extensive 
scientific investigation as in the case of Krakatau. The earliest encounter between 
international humanitarian aid and volcanic risk occurred during the 1888 eruption of 
Mount Bandai, Japan, with the first disaster response by the Japanese Red Cross 
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(Gorman, 2017). This eruption also saw two Japanese volcanologists publish a 
detailed study in English: (Sekiya and Kikuchi; 1890). This paper emerged in the 
wake of the Krakatau studies, illustrating a growing trend of international knowledge 
exchange regarding volcanoes. 
 
At the close of the 19th century, the global policy field of volcanic risk governance 
now comprised five distinct (if still embryonic) constituent categories: national and 
local governments, NGOs, scientific and technical communities, private industry and 
a (far better connected) mass media. These would drive further developments in the 
century to come. 
 
4.1.4. Volcanic Risk Governance in the Early 20th Century 
1902 saw three significant volcanic disasters: 7th May eruption of Soufrière, Saint 
Vincent; 8th May eruption of Mont Pelée, Martinique and 24th October eruption of 
Santa María, Guatemala. These eruptions caused death tolls of 1,500, 28,800 and 
8,700 respectively (Auker et al. 2013). 
 
Saint Vincent remained under British governance. An 1897 commission concluded 
that investment from Westminster was required to prevent the bankruptcy of the 
region. The commission's recommendation was reluctantly accepted, and a series of 
grants were approved by Parliament (Besson and Momsen, 2007). Although slavery 
was abolished in 1834, the distribution of wealth and power remained skewed along 
racial lines and suffrage was not extended to those of non-European descent until 
1951 (BBC, 2011). This was the backdrop against which the eruption of 1902 
occurred. 
 
From February through April 1902, earthquakes put the residents of northern Saint 
Vincent on alert. Two indigenous Carib communities petitioned the authorities to 
move away from the volcano. Officials were sent to reassure them that this was 
unnecessary. Anderson and Flett (1903) speculate that: "It may be that traditions 
linger among them regarding former disastrous eruptions...". Anderson and Flett 
meanwhile note that: "The white inhabitants regarded them with indifference or 
curiosity... There were some, however, who, aware of the suddenness with which the 
eruption of 1812 had broken out, could not help suspecting they foreboded another 
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outburst." In this instance, the communities relying on oral tradition appear to have 
taken the risk seriously and tried to pro-actively reduce their vulnerability, more so 
than the elites who actively discouraged the Caribs. Anderson and Flett's account 
states that, following three strong earthquakes on April 29th the Carib community, 
"fully anticipating an outburst, were preparing to evacuate their houses and flee to 
Chateaubelair and other places of safety." 
 
The eruption began on 6th May and the Carib community of Morne Ronde on the 
western side of the island immediately began evacuating. At 14:40, a loud explosion 
was heard and a plume became visible. Telecommunications allowed the authorities 
to transmit news of the eruption across the island (Anderson and Flett, 1903). By 
17:00, Morne Ronde was deserted and what Anderson and Flett describe as a "general 
stampede" was occurring from other western settlements towards Chateaubelair. 
Constant telephone communication was maintained between Chateaubelair and the 
capital, Kingstown; the Chief Constable, the district Medical Officer and the capital's 
Medical Officer were despatched, arriving at midnight. Governor Llewelyn sent a 
telegram from Kingstown to London, alerting the Colonial Office, however the 
message was delayed in transit until the following day (Great Britain Colonial Office, 
1902).  
 
On the eastern side of the island, the crater could not be seen:  
 
Telephonic messages had been sent from Kingstown to police 
headquarters at Georgetown that the people at Chateaubelair had seen 
steam arising from the crater. But a dense trade-wind cloud covered the 
mountain, the rumbling sounds were mistaken for thunder, and in the 
West Indies there is always so much untrustworthy news in circulation 
that it is not difficult to understand that this unexpected information was 
received with scepticism. (Anderson and Flett, 1903).   
 
Despite the presence of a more advanced telecommunications network than during 
previous volcanic crises, this event was not exempt from issues of misinterpretation 




The following day, the communities to the north became aware of the activity and 
evacuated. On the eastern side of the island, scepticism persisted, even after a group 
of fish sellers hiking over the volcano reached the crater at around 09:00, turned back 
and tried to report what they saw: "They were scoffed at as fools and cowards" 
(Anderson and Flett, 1903). A message arrived at ~11:00, stating that most western 
communities had evacuated. At this point, the estate managers decided that a party of 
white men should hike to the crater rim. En route, they encountered the fish sellers 
and, as they heard their story, ashfall began. The party returned to report the eruption. 
Some of the estates stopped work, evacuating to Georgetown, the largest settlement 
nearby. However, others continued working until lapilli began to fall and people 
retreated to their dwellings or the main buildings of their estates (Anderson and Flett, 
1903). 
 
At 14:00 on 7th May, the climactic phase of the eruption occurred and PDCs 
descended on all sides of the volcano, causing most of the ~1,500 deaths in the 
unevacuated eastern communities (Auker et al. 2013). Anderson and Flett conclude 
that: "had the leeward side of the hill not been free of mist, so that a view of the crater 
was obtained by those dwelling there, the loss of life would certainly have been 
greater..." The PDCs were visible from Chateaubelair. Most people evacuated by boat, 
but around 400 were left on the beach to evacuate by foot.  
 
After the eruption, most of the easterly survivors made their way to Georgetown. 
Officials, clergy and volunteers formed a group to rescue as many of the "helpless 
injured" as possible and bring them to Georgetown hospital. Most survivors were re-
housed there or in Kingstown. Anderson and Flett state that:  
 
From Trinidad, from Jamaica, Barbados, St. Lucia, in fact from all the 
British islands of the Caribbean Sea, help was sent. The American 
Government, without delay, despatched the 'Dixie' with stores and 
medical comforts. Lists of subscriptions were opened in England and 
elsewhere, and money poured in with great rapidity. Nothing was omitted 




Thus, a substantial humanitarian response, coordinated over significant global 
distance, on the part of multiple jurisdictions, territories and sovereign states was a 
noteworthy feature of the governance of this volcanic crisis. A further explosion on 
18th May prompted ad-hoc evacuations of both Chateaubelair and Georgetown. 
 
The telegraphic communications presented in the papers of the Great Britain Colonial 
Office (1902) represent the primary method by which this intercontinental response 
was orchestrated, both internally, among imperial administrations (including non-
Caribbean territories such as Mauritius, Australia and New Zealand), as well as with 
the governments of the USA, Canada and France. The eruption of Mont Pelée in the 
French Caribbean territory of Martinique (see below) on 8th May 1902, by virtue of 
spatial and temporal proximity, became inextricably incorporated into this policy 
assemblage. The actions taken were not based on 'hard law'. The discourse suggests 
all offers of assistance to be voluntary and based on the capacity of the donor (with 
amounts varying from £200 - >£25,000).  Correspondences ran between 6th and 13th 
May. By the latter, the extent of both crises was apparent. Financial aid and ships with 
supplies, press and medics were despatched to both islands on 10th and 11th. By 17th 
May, Governor Llewelyn reported "all immediate wants" satisfied and monies were 
being raised for the financial support of the 2,200 survivors over the subsequent 6 
months. The Royal Society scientific commission that produced the Anderson and 
Flett (1903) report into both eruptions was also arranged through these 
correspondences. Thus, the precedent of post-crisis scientific investigation established 
at Krakatau continued, furthering the science of volcanology and signalling the desire 
of authorities to learn from volcanic disasters with the aim of reducing their impacts 
in the future.  
 
At the micro level, the community-based decision-making that led to the evacuation 
of Morne Ronde, which has the distinction of being a rare ex ante VRR strategy in 
this era, juxtaposed with more typical reactive self-evacuations seen during the 
eruption. The former appears to have been the most successful undertaking on the 
island in terms of reducing casualties. 
 
At the meso level, the actions of the island administrators, after failing to respond to 
the precursors, involved sending officials into high-risk areas. This strategy had tragic 
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consequences in some previous cases (e.g. Tambora), although in this crisis it 
arguably expedited the evacuation of Chateaubelair. Telecoms proved more effective 
in this crisis than in any previous case. A significant amount of the post-disaster relief 
was administered at the meso level. Despite the  inequality which pervaded the 
society, all evacuees and survivors in need were fed and housed at the expense of the 
state for at least six months. 
 
At the macro level, a cross-continental, international policy response provided the 
resources and political will for post-disaster relief, recovery and study, not just at this 
volcano, but at another which was part of a separate colonial administration. Although 
the topologies and assemblages were transient, they allude to a greater global 
interconnectedness than in any prior case. As the processes of convergence 
accelerated, the themes of institutionalised humanitarianism and science, identified by 
Hollis (2014), are observed to grow alongside sovereignty as prominent features of 
the global policy field of volcanic risk.  
 
Prior to 1902, Mont Pelée, located in the north of Martinique in the Windward 
Islands, had only erupted once in recorded history, a small expulsion of ash in 1851. 
According to Anderson and Flett (1903): "The earlier stages of the eruption of this 
year, were of a precisely similar character, and this was one of the causes which lulled 
the suspicions of the inhabitants of St. Pierre and inspired in them a false sense of 
security." The Carib community of Martinique had named Mont Pelée 'fire mountain', 
suggesting awareness of its nature. However, the Caribs of Martinique were 
exterminated by settlers in 1635 (Scarth, 2002). 
 
Anderson and Flett (1903) state that emissions began more than two weeks prior to 
the 8th May eruption. Although, initially it was "so gentle that it awakened only 
curiosities", activity incremented. Governor Louis Mouttet set up a commission to 
investigate, they climbed to the crater on 27th April, reporting a growing ash cone in 
the crater lake (Reed, 2002). 
 
The political sphere on Martinique was, however, more concerned with impending 
elections on 11th May. The incumbent conservative party on the island, and mainland 
France, were concerned at the prospect of a black socialist gaining the vote of the 
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majority black and mixed-race population. Most of the conservative voters lived in 
Saint Pierre, the capital, and authorities in Paris ordered Mouttet to keep them there 
(Reed, 2002). On 5th May, a section of the crater wall collapsed, creating a lahar 
which killed 23 people; however, the commission reported that "the safety of St. 
Pierre is assured" (Camp, 2004; Siebert et al. 2010). Mouttet convinced a conservative 
daily newspaper to state there was no risk from the volcano and many people from 
surrounding villages flocked to Saint Pierre, inflating the population to >28,000 
(Camp, 2004). Camp notes that when some tried to leave, Mouttet ordered troops to 
turn them back. 
 
On the morning of 8th May at 08:00, a PDC completely razed Saint Pierre. Of the 
28,800 residents, there were three survivors (Camp, 2004). Governor Mouttet died in 
the PDC. Governance fell to one M. L'huerre, who corresponded with Governor 
Hodgson of Barbados, accepting the offer of aid (Great Britain Colonial Office, 
1902). The only survivor in the city, a prisoner trapped underground, was rescued 
after three days, suggesting that despite the survival rate, rescue efforts were thorough 
(Reed, 2002). Originally medical officers were sent from UK territories and the USA, 
however with so few injured, it became apparent that the main problem would be 
extricating and feeding isolated communities north of Saint Pierre. On 20th May, a 
second PDC killed 2,000 working in the ruins of St. Pierre and on 30th August, 
another PDC destroyed Morne Rouge village, killing ~1,500 (Bresson, 2012; Rosen, 
2015). 
 
Much has been mentioned in this chapter regarding 'lessons of past eruptions' and the 
mobilisation of knowledge in a beneficial sense. However, this example illustrates 
that, although effective VRR is frequently derived from past lessons, past lessons are 
not endemically inured to create effective VRR. Indeed, there is little doubt that the 
governance of this crisis maximised the losses. The historical record in Martinique did 
not present the worst case scenario, and focus on the election limited the political will 
to objectively evaluate the risk. The rapid manifestation and poor understanding of the 
PDC hazards put reaction beyond the technical capacity of the society, such that, on 
three separate occasions in a four month period, >1,000 people died, illustrating that 
'lessons' do not automatically emerge, mobilise, and result in affirmative action, even 




The post-disaster relief operations were one significant macro-level result of this 
crisis. Another was the continued evolution of the international community coalescing 
around volcanology. Tanguy (1994) argues that contemporary volcanology exhibited 
an over-reliance on data from the only existing observatory at Vesuvius, which had 
not witnessed PDCs. Following this eruption, Albert Lacroix, a French volcanologist 
named them 'nuées ardentes' (glowing clouds) (Rosen, 2015). Lacroix was one of a 
number of scientists who converged on Mont Pelée, furthering the trend of post-
eruption investigation and publication. Others included Anderson and Flett, Professor 
Jaggar of Harvard University, Professors Hill and Russell of the US National 
Geographic Society and Frank Perret, who operated a makeshift volcano observatory 
before Lacroix officially established the world's second observatory on the island 
(Anderson and Flett, 1903; Reed, 2002; Rosen, 2015). Auker et al. (2013) state that 
the aftermath of this eruption is most frequently cited as the true foundation of 
modern volcanology. 
 
The 24th October eruption of Santa María, in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala, was the 
largest of the 1902 events, a VEI 6 ultra-Plinian eruption with a sector collapse (GVP, 
2013). Strong earthquakes at the volcano had occurred throughout 1902 but, with no 
historical record, the eruption was unexpected (Williams and Self, 1983). The area 
affected was largely rural, and dominated by coffee plantations, but these were more 
crowded than normal as labourers had gathered for the harvest. An estimated 8,700 
were killed (Anderson, 1908; Auker et al. 2013). Guatemala was under the 
dictatorship of Manuel Estrada Cabrera who wished to revive worship of the Roman 
goddess Minerva among his people and had organised a festival to this end on 27th 
and 28th October. The eruption threatened to spoil the festivities, so Cabrera's 
administration denied its occurrence. When this was no longer tenable, they published 
a claim that the eruption was occurring in México and that Guatemala was largely 
unaffected. Finally on the 3rd of November, the government recognised that the 
eruption had happened, but claimed: "The volcano expelled a faint rain of ash to a 
distance of 14 leagues [~80km], causing only the loss of some small coffee estates" 




Pinto and Escobar state that the victims were left without aid, to death, disease and 
economic hardship; it took years for the region to recover. In this crisis, the sovereign 
government entirely neglected humanitarianism, both internally and at the macro level 
which was so prominent in the crises of La Soufrière and Mont Pelée. However, the 
scientific community once again succeeded in mobilising information regarding the 
crisis to the global level, as scientists from Germany, Sweden and the USA visited the 
volcano soon after the eruption, publishing their observations (Ball, 2011a). 
Furthermore, Tempest Anderson (of Anderson and Flett) visited Santa María in full 
co-operation with the Cabrera regime to research his 1908 publication Volcanoes of 
Guatemala.  
 
In 1912, Anderson's colleague from investigations in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Thomas A. Jaggar, who had become head of Geology at Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, founded the Hawai'i Volcano Observatory (HVO) with 
support from local businessmen. Reed (2002) states that Jaggar's effort to establish a 
permanent observatory in the US was inspired by the work on St. Vincent and 
Martinique in 1902. Watson (1997) argues that HVO pioneered putting 'modern' 
volcano monitoring techniques into practice simultaneously and continuously, 
including geological, seismological, geophysical and geochemical monitoring, a 
model adopted and "...presently employed by other observatories monitoring active 
volcanoes elsewhere, principally in Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Latin America, New 
Zealand, Lesser Antilles (Caribbean), Philippines, and Kamchatka." HVO was 
incorporated by the USA Federal Government in 1919 and placed under the 
permanent control of the US Geological Survey (USGS) in 1948 (Watson, 1997). 
 
In 1918, the government of the Dutch East Indies established a commission to study 
volcanoes in western Sumatra (Van Padang, 1960). On 19th May 1919, the VEI 4 
eruption of Gunung Kelud in East Java generated lahars which caused 5,235 deaths, 
destruction of 130 villages and a three-year economic downturn in the region of Blitar 
(GVP, 2013; Nihayatul et al. 2017). A dam had been constructed in 1905 to protect 





Nihayatul et al. (2017) detail the response to the crisis from the Council of Blitar. In 
the immediate aftermath, hospitals were overwhelmed and six emergency medical 
facilities were established. Resources and personnel were brought in from 
neighbouring regencies, paying for medicine, provisions and funerals, providing 
compensation (given to village administrators for each community),  revitalising the 
agricultural sector as rapidly as possible and replacing utilities. The costs were 
significant and government spending was supplemented by community fundraising. 
"Kelud disaster awareness committees" were spontaneously formed in regencies such 
as Yogyakarta and Surabaya, and fundraising fairs attracted donations from local 
businesses. 
 
Following the Kelud eruption, the volcanological commission was augmented to a 
"Volcanological Watching Service" and Dr. Kemmerling, the scientist in charge, was 
despatched to Kelud to continue the now-established practice of post-crisis 
investigation (Van Padang, 1960; Nihayatul et al, 2017). A week after the 1919 
eruption, lectures were held in Batavia at which Dutch volcanologist Berend George 
Escher suggested that eruptive interaction with the crater lake was the cause of the 
lahars, and that it be drained. By 1926, the crater was drained via seven tunnels. In the 
subsequent eruption of 1951, no lahars were generated, although the eruption 
damaged the tunnels and lahars occurred once more during the next eruption in 1966 
(Van Padang, 1960; GVP, 2013).  
 
According to Smith and Petley (2009), before civil defence became commonplace on 
the global policy field, ex ante policy approaches to disaster risk tended to be based 
on scientific forecasting and structural engineering solutions. This study has found ex 
post aid to be the dominant governance response to volcanic risk during this period of 
history. Following embryonic examples at Vesuvius and Mont Pelée, a more holistic 
form of scientific forecasting of volcanic risk was being pioneered in Hawai'i and was 
on the cusp of becoming formal policy in the USA. It would be some time before this 
model would achieve global prevalence. However, the Dutch Indian government 
provides an example of institutionalised volcanology at the meso scale. Structural 
engineering solutions directed at volcanic hazards have historically been relatively 
rare. The Kelud tunnels are an uncommon but nonetheless significant example - this 
decision in 1919 arguably prevented deaths more than 30 years later. However, as the 
  
79 
global policy field of DRR stood unknowingly on the cusp of a paradigm shift, these 
processes were a long way from consistently generating a meaningful reduction in 
losses from volcanic crises. 
 
4.2. Volcanic Risk Governance in the era of Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management 
The 20th Century saw transformations in the global policy field of DRR. These 
evolved over decades, however, one of the most significant drivers manifested very 
rapidly. A new category of field constituent emerged - the international governmental 
organisation (IGO). This was a shift, not just for DRR, but for global governance. 
Kennedy (1987) describes the end of the First World War as a break with the 
preceding narrative of 'international life'; and the inception of institutionalised 
practices which have perpetuated ever since. Claude (1971) names the 19th Century 
the era of preparation for international organisation, while the establishment of 
international organisation is "...a phenomenon of the 20th Century."  
 
The League of Nations (LN) was a product of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. The 
Covenant of the LN came into effect at the same time as the Treaty of Versailles on 
10th January 1920 (Scott, 1973). The LN was composed of a secretariat, an assembly, 
a council and a range of commissions (Wilson, 2011). There were 42 member states at 
the foundation of the LN, and 58 at its greatest extent in 1934-35. Although US 
President, Woodrow Wilson was an 'architect' of the LN, the US never joined 
(Blucacz-Louisfert, 2002). 
 
In 1927, the LN convened a conference, resulting in the Convention Establishing an 
International Relief Union, formalised in December 1932 (Macalister-Smith, 1981). 
The International Relief Union (IRU) was designed as a global 'mutual insurance' 
scheme whereby LN members would contribute to a 'pot' from which funds could be 
withdrawn at any time by any member in need. The IRU was consistently 
underfunded due to member states' general unwillingness to 'pay forward' for disasters 
which may or may not occur and largely ignored in favour of the Red Cross 
(Hannigan, 2012). Despite this, the Red Cross had played a significant role in the 
establishment of the IRU, having originally suggested a subdivision for disaster 




Hannigan (2012) argues that preference of the Red Cross over the IRU illustrates the 
fundamental schism in the global policy field of DRR; the divide between 'apolitical' 
humanitarianism and 'human rights'. In this era, when communism was perceived as a 
threat, a human rights approach was considered too left-wing by influential member 
states. Soft law and NGO-based humanitarianism won out, maintaining the role of 
sovereignty and restricting hard law pertaining to disaster risk to the meso and micro 
levels. The Convention Establishing an International Relief Union remains the only 
article of hard international law in disaster risk governance to the present day. 
 
...if the International Relief Union, in unexpurgated form, had somehow 
managed to beat the odds, we would have a framework for dealing with 
disasters that differs markedly from what we have today. There would be 
no need for the media-driven charity appeals that follow major 
catastrophes... Nor would there be any space for the thousands of NGOs 
and charities that currently descend on disaster-stricken regions... people 
around the world who are innocent victims of nature's wrath would have 
an unchallenged legal right to receive international assistance 
(Hannigan, 2012). 
 
In the 1930s, when Japan, Italy and Germany began breaching treaties, the LN was 
unable to agree a coherent policy response (Wilson, 2011). When the Second World 
War began as a result, the LN headquarters in Geneva were abandoned for the six 
years of conflict (Scott, 1973). These events saw the demise of both the LN and the 
IRU (Hollis, 2014). 
 
The 'institutional turn' impacted the volcanological expert community as well. In 
August 1919, the constitutive assembly of the International Research Council (now 
the International Council for Science) in Brussels, Belgium created one of the first 
NGOs not focussed on humanitarian relief (ICSU, 2017). During this assembly, the 
International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics (IUGG), with a volcanology 'section', 
was also founded (Ismael-Zadeh, 2012). An associated journal, the Bulletin 
Volcanologique entered circulation in 1922 (IAVCEI, 2008). Thus, this period saw 
volcanology become progressively institutionalised at all three (macro, meso and 
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micro) scales. The 'increasing force and speed' with which Northrup (2005) argues the 
forces of globalisation act after a slow and irregular start is evident in these 
developments. However, these processes were neither linear, nor universal. After the 
establishment of the observatory on Martinique, Mont Pelée entered a period of 
inactivity and it was decommissioned in 1925. The volcano began to erupt again in 
1929 and the observatory had to be re-established (Reed, 2002). The 1929 eruption of 
Mont Pelée saw the authorities successfully evacuate communities in the north of 
Martinique. However, in the same year, a collapse of the Santiaguito dome on Santa 
María killed a further 3,080 (Ball, 2011b; Auker et al. 2013). 
 
In 1930, the individual sections of the IUGG became semi-autonomous 'International 
Associations'. One of these was the 'International Association of Volcanology' 
(Ismael-Zadeh, 2012). By 1932, the 'Volcanological Watching Service' of the Dutch 
East Indies had become a 'Volcanological Survey', comprised of four European 
'experts' and 18 other 'assistants' and 'observers' (predominantly native Indonesians). 
The survey aimed to permanently monitor seven volcanoes. The research was 
published in Dutch and English (Van Padang, 1960). 
 
Although the 1930s saw six eruptions of VEI 4 or larger, the majority of these did not 
cause disasters (GVP, 2013). The June 1937 eruptions in Rabaul caldera, Territory of 
New Guinea, were a notable exception. The Territory was at the time under Australian 
administration, established via mandate from the LN, and  Rabaul town was the seat 
of authority (Young, 2016). On 29th May, 1937 explosions from one of the cones in 
the caldera, produced ashfall over Rabaul and at the telegraphed request of the 
government, police in Vunapope, a community further down the coast and the local 
Catholic chaplaincy arranged evacuations by boat. Vunapope became "a great army 
camp" with more than 5000 native refugees, along with 240 Chinese and 70 
Europeans. Government officials provided accommodation. After a week of free 
rations, evacuees were required to work - those who did not received nothing (Arculus 
and Johnson, 1981). 
 
According to Blong (2013), 375 of the 441 fatalities were caused by suffocation due 
to tephra fall. By 9th June, the government were already ordering people back to 
Rabaul for restoration work (Arculus and Johnson, 1981). Governor McNicoll was 
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criticised for focussing more on the restoration of the capital than aiding the worst 
affected villages, but received full support from the Australian government (Johnson 
and Threlfall, 1985).  
 
The post-eruption investigation was conducted by Charles Stehn, head of the 
Netherlands Volcanological Survey, W.G. Woolnough, geological advisor to the 
Commonwealth and Norman Fisher, government geologist of New Guinea. Stehn and 
Fisher advocated the establishment of a fully instrumented observatory, whilst 
Woolnough believed that the territory was too dangerous and should be completely 
abandoned. A growing number of observatories had been established worldwide, now 
including Vesuvius, Etna, Kilauea, Pelée, and Aso and Asama in Japan. Fisher 
received volcanological training from Stehn in the Dutch East Indies in 1939 and 
obtained funds to found an observatory at Rabaul in 1940 (Johnson, 2013). 
 
On 24th October, 1945, the United Nations (UN) came into being as the formal 
successor to the LN. The UN has since remained the most prolific and powerful IGO 
on the planet (Evers, 2012). Several organisations were transferred from the LN, 
including the International Labour Organisation, the International Court of Justice and 
the World Health Organisation (UN, 2010). A raft of new organisations also formed, 
and following the devastation of the war in Europe and beyond, several of these were 
focussed on the administration of humanitarian aid: the UN International Children's 
Emergency Fund, the International Refugee Organisation, the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation and the World Health Organisation become the "new vanguard of 
relief", with greater political clout than their predecessors (Hannigan, 2012). 
Hannigan notes that the IRU re-emerged in 1945 but was ignored by its member states 
and turned to promoting scientific research into disaster prevention until it was 
liquidated in 1968. 
 
The establishment of the UN determined the trajectory of macro-level policy 
pertaining to disaster. As IGOs emerged alongside the pre-existing NGOs, a continued 
focus on ex post humanitarianism rooted in soft law was assured. However, post-war 
culture profoundly altered meso and micro level DRR policy as well. A notable 
feature of virtually every example featured in this narrative thus far is the informal 
and reactive nature of policy decision-making, due to a dearth of pre-written policy 
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frameworks for addressing volcanic risks. However, through subsequent decades, 
disaster risk became a public policy issue.  
 
The concept of civil defence emerged in the UK in the aftermath of the First World 
War,  institutionalised in 1935 as the Civil Defence Service. During the Second World 
War in 1941, the United States followed suit (UNISDR, 2015). Governments assumed 
responsibility for defending citizens against military threats through emergency 
protocols. However, civil defence organisations also began to develop plans for 
environmental and social disasters, and over time this became their primary function 
(Alexander, 2002). Alexander uses the term 'civil protection' to distinguish the de-
militarised version of the practice. Smith and Petley (2009) name 1950 as the 
beginning of the era of 'emergency management' and the dominance of the 
Behavioural approach (Section 2.3.1).  
 
There were comparatively few volcanic crises during the early post-war period. 
Notable examples include the 1951 eruption of Mount Lamington in Australian-
governed Papua New Guinea and the 1963 eruption of Gunung Agung on Bali, in 
recently-independent Indonesia. There was no documented history of volcanic activity 
at Mount Lamington, neither among the Australian governing class, nor in native 
folklore (Taylor, 1958). On 15th January, 1951, landslides and degassing began. This 
escalated over the subsequent five days and residents of some villages self-evacuated 
(USGS, 2008). From the closest large town, Higaturu, the District Commissioner 
informed the acting Administrator, F.B. Phillips in the capital, Port Moresby, 
requesting the opinion of a volcanologist. The following day, Phillips flew to Mount 
Lamington (without state volcanologist Tony Taylor), declared there was "no 
immediate danger to human life at Higuratu" and flew back to Port Moresby. The 
decision not to evacuate was disseminated by the local police (Johnson, 2013). At 
10:40 on 21st January, Lamington produced a VEI 4 explosion. The resulting PDCs 
destroyed Higuratu and killed approximately 3,000 people (Taylor, 1958; NOAA, 
2008).  
 
During the eruption a small group of European men tried to administer the chaos on 
the roads whilst others attempted to make radio contact with Port Moresby. The extent 
of the disaster was not anticipated. Although thousands had died, there were 
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thousands of survivors. Two camps were established with medical centres, schools 
and inoculation services. Eventually, after consultation with the displaced 
communities on social, economic and agricultural issues, they were resettled in a 
manner that suited both them and the Administration. Resettlement was not permitted 
in the devastated area (Johnson 2013). Taylor produced a 215-page report, regarded as 
a 'classic' of the volcanological literature (USGS, 2008). 
 
The 1963-64 VEI 4 eruption of Gunung Agung was the largest volcanic eruption in 
20th Century Indonesia. On 18th February 1963, two days of seismicity preceded 
minor explosions and a lava flow. This activity persisted until 17th March, when 
larger explosions began and, on 20th, PDCs reached villages, causing the first 
casualties. The death toll accumulated in a piecemeal fashion. Peaks in March and 
May were attributable to PDCs whilst a large number in November were due to rain-
driven lahars. (Witham, 2005; Self and Rampino, 2012). 
 
The Volcanological Survey of Indonesia succeeded the Netherlands Volcanological 
Survey following independence, but they had no observational infrastructure in Bali. 
Teams were sent to establish temporary observatories, however, pressure was put on 
them to conduct DRR decision-making over and above this: 
 
The first aim of the Volcanological team was to consider what measures 
are to be taken, because the island of Bali is rather densely populated. 
Having no previous record concerning the character of her activity, the 
first volcanological team was put in a difficult situation in making 
predictions. Knowing that Mt. Agung has always an open crater, the 
formation of nuees ardentes to such an extend[sic] was the last expected 
thing (Zen and Hadikusumo, 1964). 
 
Van Padang (1960) notes that hazard mapping was a Survey technique employed 
during the 1930 eruption of Merapi (Chapter 5.1). This practice was also used at 
Agung. A 10 km radius from the summit was declared the 'closed zone' and beyond 
this, river valleys were named 'danger areas'. In periods of heightened activity, the 
volcanologists took it upon themselves to evacuate the areas around the temporary 
observatories. They submitted a request to the Balinese government on 13th March, 
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before the first casualties, advising a complete evacuation but this was ignored. Zen 
and Hadikusumo (1964) believe that the eruption occurring in the middle of a season 
of Hindu festivals based in temples high on Agung, combined with a lack of 
experience of prior eruptions contributed to the lack of political will. Further volcanic 
crises in 1960s Indonesia included the April 1966 eruption of Kelud where lahars 
killed ~200 and the August 1966 eruption of Awu, which killed ~90 (Witham, 2005; 
Rehnberg, 2015a). 
 
The narratives of these crises show little proof of dramatic policy transformation in 
the first volcanic crises of the post-war era. Ad-hoc policy decisions that did not 
consider the worst case scenario were evident in both cases. In Papua, the 
administrator made a decision based on no volcanological evidence and Balinese 
authorities wilfully chose to disregard the recommendations of the state 
volcanologists. Despite the emergence 'elsewhere' of new schools of thought, policy 
models and globe-spanning technocratic structures, it could be argued that the relative 
infrequency of volcanic disasters and their occurrence in sites that were (at the time) 
topographically and topologically distant from the 'core' of these developing 
international assemblages (wealthy 'western' nations) delayed the mobilisation and 
application of new ideas, practices and policy structures in sites subject to volcanic 
risk. 
 
The most prominent recurring role of volcanologists to this point in the account has 
been to perform post-mortem investigations on crises and publish investigations. 
Despite being rooted temporally and spatially in the surroundings of each volcano 
these activities were significant in terms of curating an incrementally expanding body 
of knowledge and establishing topological connections through which that knowledge 
could circulate to an increasing number of volcanic sites. The growing global expert 
community of volcanologists continued to accumulate and mobilise lessons as part of 
a broader community of Earth scientists throughout the wealthier nations at the 'core' 
of the international community (predominantly in western Europe and North 
America) that was undergoing a 'revolution' through the exchange of knowledge 
related to the emergence of influential theories such as continental drift (Hallam, 
2014). Over two meetings in 1960 and 1967 the International Association of 
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Volcanology assumed its current form, IAVCEI, and adopted the following core 
statutes; 
(1) To study scientific problems related to volcanoes and volcanic processes, past and 
present, and to the chemistry of the Earth's interior. 
(2) To encourage, initiate and coordinate research, and promote international 
cooperation in these studies. 
(3) To encourage volcanologists to alert appropriate authorities about the importance 
of adequate surveillance of active and potentially active volcanoes, and of volcanic 
risk assessment. 
(4) To arrange for the discussion and publication of the results of scientific research 
on volcanology and on the chemistry of the Earth's interior (Schmincke, 1989). 
Thus, the volcanological community consolidated its place on the global policy field. 
It was engaged in sharing insights into volcanic disasters at the macro level and 
interacting directly with them at the meso and micro levels. However, on the evidence 
presented, it is perhaps safe to describe the volcanologists of this time as 'policy 
outsiders' on all scales, although by no means apolitical, certainly limited in political 
influence. 
 
Civil defence organisations were established in 1965 in Papua and 1966 in Indonesia 
(Papua New Guinea Association of Australia, 1993; IFRC, 2005). There is no 
evidence of any specific link between the two territories' adoption of the model. Civil 
defence policies became increasingly widespread throughout the late 1960s and 1970s 
(Alexander, 2002). However, as is generally the case with mobile policy, this should 
not be viewed as the intentional handing-out of a ready-made policy solution from its 
architects in the UK and US to a collective of grateful, disaster-prone former colonies. 
Vale (1987) notes that the role of civil defence organisations varied significantly 
between nations, but that there were also still a large number of countries where it was 
not practiced. In 1970, as the Behavioural paradigm had become more prevalent in 
practice than ever before, academic thought had already begun to progress to the 




In 1971, following a series of high profile disasters in the southern hemisphere, the 
UN established the United Nations Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO) (Hannigan, 
2012). UNDRO notionally had three aims: to organise emergency relief and donations 
after a disaster, to promote pre-disaster planning and preparedness, and to promote 
preventative methods for disasters (UIA, 2017). Hannigan (2012) argues that from its 
inception, UNDRO was underfunded and had no clarity of purpose, as sovereignty 
was still seen as paramount, limiting UNDRO's remit. Hannigan and several other 
authors (e.g. Cuny, 1983; Kent, 1987) conclude that UNDRO did not reduce disaster 
losses due to a fundamental failure to understand the links between disasters and 
development. Hannigan states that the most prolific organ of the whole Office was the 
Preparation and Planning division who disseminated advice to governments. In policy 
mobility terms, therefore, UNDRO was a macro-level technocratic body with a 
specific remit for defining and mobilising 'best practices'. Thus, even as disaster risk 
science was becoming convinced that 'emergency planning' was an inadequate 
approach to disasters in developing societies, through UNDRO, this model was being 
increasingly promoted in those societies.  
 
The 1970s saw relatively few volcanic disasters. The highest death toll came from a 
VEI 1 eruption of Nyiragongo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo when lava 
flows inundated the city of Goma and killed between 60 and 500 people (Allard et al. 
2002; Witham, 2005; Papale, 2015). However, this was also the beginning of a ten 
year period in which the volcanological community was brought increasingly into the 
political realm. The UN held three regional seminars on operational volcano 
monitoring between 1974 and 1976. Following a motion at the first IAVCEI general 
assembly in Durham, England, 1977, a meeting was convened in 1978 at UNESCO 
headquarters in Paris, France, to discuss producing a handbook for volcanic risk 
governance (UNDRO, 1985). 
 
The 1975-77 episode of unrest at La Soufrière on Basse-Terre Guadeloupe, a French 
Caribbean territory, saw volcanology politicised at the meso and micro levels. A 
volcano observatory had operated on the island since 1950, under the authority of the 




Heightened seismicity was identified in June 1975, but the first eruptions did not 
manifest until July 1976 and a period characterised by volcanic tremor and phreatic 
eruptions every few days lasted until 10th November, when a quiet period of 56 days 
ensued. On 5th January 1977, further eruptions began, accompanied by minor lahars 
and landslides. This lasted until 1st March, after which seismicity diminished until the 
crisis was declared over in June (Feuillard et al. 1983). 
 
Despite the relatively minor nature of the activity, the communities on Basse-Terre 
were seriously concerned. The destruction of Saint Pierre was well remembered 
(UNDRO, 1985). In 1973, the IPGP ratified the creation of a national volcanological 
service and appointed Haroun Tazieff at its head. After the first seismicity was 
detected, the director of IPGP contacted France's Civil Defence, recommending they 
develop an 'eruption plan'. This was presented to authorities on Guadeloupe and 
approved in March 1976. The plan was presented to the population in April. After the 
first explosions, many on Basse-Terre self-evacuated. However, following an 
evaluation of the activity, Tazieff's team concluded that the risk was minimal and 
people should return to their homes. Tazieff left on a field excursion to Ecuador and 
John Tomblin and Robert Brousse assumed his responsibilities. When activity 
escalated in August, calls for evacuations were made by the government, with the 
approval of the new head of the IPGP, Claude Allègre (Beauducel, 2015). 76,031 
people were evacuated from Basse-Terre, officially for three months, but for many it 
was closer to six (Chenet et al. 2014). 
 
Tazieff returned on 29th August, made a public declaration that the evacuation had 
been excessive and called for people to return to their homes. In response, Allègre 
announced his intention to dissolve the volcanological service and assume Tazieff's 
responsibilities. A Paris newspaper ran with the headline "Tazieff against Brousse: the 
little war of volcanologists makes as much noise as the volcano" (Beauducel, 2015). 
The evacuation, initially welcomed, eventually became deeply unpopular as economic 
vulnerability and disrupted school schedules took their toll. It has left a bitter legacy 
among islanders (Chenet et al. 2014). The French government created an ad-hoc 
Comité Scientifique International sur La Soufrière of six non-French volcanologists to 
resolve the dispute. The Committee conducted a 3-day investigation into the crisis and 
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concluded that close monitoring should continue but there was no immediate danger. 
Within hours, the evacuation was brought to an end (Fiske, 1984). 
 
In this case, the French meso-level part of the global assemblage of volcanology 
became directly involved in the governance of the crisis firstly by encouraging civil 
defence policymakers to develop emergency plans for the volcano, then effectively 
making the decision to execute those plans, before having a protracted public debate 
about whether this had been appropriate. Despite being a disagreement between two 
members of a small sub-section of the community, the repercussions of this event for 
volcanology and the perception of 'best practices' in volcanic risk have been profound 
and long lasting. It has influenced policy documents (UNDRO, 1985), the IAVCEI 
code of conduct (Newhall et al. 1999) and numerous investigations into volcanic risk 
reduction (e.g. Fiske, 1984; Barclay et al. 2008; Chenet et al. 2014; Hincks et al. 
2014). In a perfect illustration of the capricious nature of mobile policy, an ad-hoc 
decision incorporating a global cross-section of the expert community ultimately 
brought the political crisis to a close.  
 
In May 1980, Mount Saint Helens in Washington State, USA produced a VEI 5 
Plinian eruption (Lipman and Mullineaux, 1981; Newhall and Self, 1982). Signs of 
volcanic activity became apparent on 20th March, when a magnitude 4.0 earthquake 
caused fracturing on the summit glacier. This was followed a week later by a small 
eruption (Lipman and Mullineaux, 1981).  
 
On 25th March, an emergency co-ordination centre was set up and US Forest Service 
(USFS) officials began collaborative meetings with USGS scientists. On 1st April, a 
volcanic hazards map was released and on 9th, the USFS issued a Mount Saint Helens 
Contingency Plan (Tilling et al. 1990). It was recommended that the areas around the 
volcano be evacuated, establishing 'red' (no public access) and 'blue' (limited public 
access) zones in late April (Ray, 1980). Some citizens felt forcibly evicted and 
economically disadvantaged: “...many people broke down the roadblock barriers or 
drove around them. Finally, local officials called in the National Guard to operate the 




1974 legislation gave the USGS the legal responsibility to provide authorities with 
data on all active volcanoes in the USA (Tilling et al. 1990). At the time, HVO was 
still the only American volcano observatory and there were no emergency funds 
available, there having been no major volcanic crises in USA history. In order to 
afford the staff and equipment required at Mount Saint Helens, the USGS would need 
to go through a time-consuming review process to acquire additional federal funds. 
The volcanologist in charge of the investigation resorted to illegally using an account 
intended for office supplies, accumulating a bill of >$1,000,000. The growth of the 
bulge reassured the volcanologists that this would be vindicated (Tilling, 2017 pers. 
comm). 
 
On the 18th of May at 08:32, the north face of the mountain collapsed and a lateral 
blast "...devastated an area nearly 30 km from west to east and more than 20 km 
northwards from the former summit of the volcano. In an inner zone extending nearly 
10 km from the summit, much of which had been densely forested, virtually no trees 
remained. The devastated area of 600 km² was blanketed by a deposit of hot debris 
carried by the blast” (Lipman and Mullineaux, 1981). 57 people were killed, mostly 
outwith the exclusion zone. Economic losses of $1.1 billion USD were sustained 
(Tilling et al. 1990; Ganeri, 2008). Congress voted for $951 million USD of relief 
funds to the Small Businesses Administration, the US Army Corps of Engineers and 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (Tilling et al. 1990).  
 
The pre-eruption phase seems to largely have been governed through a quickly-
established assemblage of the federal USGS volcanological team and the USFS. 
Executive power lay with the USFS and the State Governor, but the volcanologists 
contributed strongly to the evolution of policy. Interestingly, due to their role as 
owners of the land, the USFS appears to have fulfilled the traditional role of civil 
defence. Post-disaster relief was administered by the federal government. FEMA was 
directly descended from the Office of Civil Defense, which distanced itself from its 
military predecessor to deal predominantly with environmental disasters (US National 
Archives, 2016). This can be viewed as an example of the mutation of a mobile 
policy, which saw the function of the original UK-USA civil defence model evolve 




This eruption transformed volcanology, locally and worldwide. The Cascades 
Volcano Observatory (CVO), established on 18th May 1982, mobilsed the HVO 
model into yet another setting (Tilling et al. 1990). The volcano became the subject of 
intense study from domestic and overseas scientists (USGS, 2016). Mount Saint 
Helens is mentioned in 1,168 individual articles in the Journal of Volcanology and 
Geothermal Research alone (Science Direct, 2019). USGS volcanologist Don 
Swanson states: "Mount St Helens' eruption was important because it was so well 
observed. It provided a kind of model for jump-starting volcano monitoring around 
the world. Existing observatories got increased funding and people learned how to 
respond" (Seeker, 2010). 
 
The following year, the World Organisation of Volcano Observatories (WOVO) was 
established as a sub-committee of IAVCEI at a meeting in Guadeloupe and 
Martinique. Its goals were as follows: 
 
(1) To create or improve ties between observatories and institutions directly involved 
in volcano monitoring. 
 
(2) To facilitate exchanges of views and experiences by convening periodical, perhaps 
annual, meetings. 
 
(3) To maintain an up-to-date inventory of instrumentation and manpower that could 
be made available to any member institution when a situation arises that requires 
scientific reinforcement. 
 
(4) To promote funding from international organisations to help defray travel and 
related expenses of scientific reinforcement teams (Sigvaldsson, 1981). 
 
WOVO entered collaboration with UNESCO. It co-ordinated international scientific 
responses to volcanic crises throughout the 1980s and established a Directory of 
Volcano Observatories supported by a UN grant (Schmincke, 1989).  
 
Within the first six years of the 1980s there were several eruptions with significant 
impacts on the global policy field of volcanic risk. Mount Saint Helens was the first of 
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these. However, consistent with the trends observed by scientists who were beginning 
to question the Behavioural paradigm of DRR, volcanic disasters were generally more 
frequent and severe in less economically developed countries (Smith and Petley, 
2009). In 1981, Semeru in Indonesia and Mayon in the Philippines killed 372 and 47 
people respectively, Indonesia's Galunggung killed 37 in 1982 and a further 37 were 
killed during a 1984 limnic eruption of Lake Monoun in Cameroon (Witham, 2005). 
During the Galunggung eruption, 60,000 people were successfully evacuated, under 
the care of the Indonesian Red Cross and repopulation of the highest risk zone was 
prohibited. The Galunggung eruption also highlighted the impacts of volcanic ash on 
aviation when two commercial jets experienced engine failure after flying into the 
eruption cloud (UNDRO, 1985). The casualties sustained in these eruptions were of 
similar (or greater) magnitude to those from Mount Saint Helens. However, a basic 
Google search provides significantly fewer results for all of these events (9,930 for 
Semeru eruption, 1981; 75,700 for Mayon eruption, 1981; 27,500 for Galunggung 
eruption, 1982; 101,000 for El Chichón eruption, 1982; and 22,700 for Lake Monoun 
eruption, 1984) compared to 560,000 results for Mount Saint Helens eruption, 1980 
suggesting that their global media profile was comparatively far lower. The VEI 5 
magnitude and previously unstudied physical peculiarities of the Saint Helens event 
likely go some way towards explaining its significant impression upon the 
international discourse of VRR. However, it is equally likely that the wealth, power 
and status of the USA played a role. In the aftermath, the budget of the USGS' 
volcanic hazards programme grew from >$1 million to $12.6 million USD making it 
probably the best-funded VRR institution in the world (Fang, 2010). The influence of 
the USGS was further illustrated by the appointment of Robert I. Tilling, the senior 
volcanologist who had overseen the Mount Saint Helens eruption, as the first 
president of WOVO (Sigvaldsson, 1981). 
 
The other 'significant' volcanic events of the 1980s were the 1982 VEI 5 eruption of 
El Chichón, México, the 1985 VEI 3 eruption of Nevado del Ruiz, Colombia and the 
1986 limnic eruption of Lake Nyos, Cameroon. Substantial loss of human life was 
incurred by each; ~2,000 in México, ~23,000 in Colombia and 1,746 in Cameroon 
(Witham, 2005). WOVO President Robert Tilling has stated that Nevado del Ruiz 
"was seen as a total failure on our part" and that if Mount Saint Helens was a 
watershed for physical volcanology, Nevado del Ruiz was its equivalent for applied 
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volcanology (Tilling, pers. comm. 2017). The Lake Nyos event can be considered a 
rare example of volcanic crisis in the post-civil defence era that took place in a 'policy 
vacuum'. It occurred with no perceived warning in a rural area of Cameroon, and the 
world beyond the affected communities did not become aware until four days later 
when Swiss missionary helicopters flew over. By this point the survivors had buried 
their dead and conducted their own recovery operations (Kling et al. 1987). The 
policy field became involved at the meso and macro levels in the ex post response to 
the crisis, when the victims were taken to hospital in the capital Yaoundé and 
financial and logistical aid arrived from the USA, France, the UK, Israel and other 
European countries. Scientists from the USGS and France also arrived to investigate 
(BBC, 1986; Kling et al. 1987).  
 
During this period, interaction increased between volcanology and policy-making 
processes across multiple scales. During volcanic crises, volcanologists  were 
incorporated into the world of ad-hoc fast policy, on the borderline between research 
and decision-making, but also with further-reaching and faster access to the global 
research community to bring knowledge from 'elsewhere' to localised volcanic crises. 
'Hard science' is a prominent feature of the Behavioural/emergency management 
approach to disasters, so the increased influence of volcanology was perhaps an 
indication of the growing prevalence of this model worldwide. The now-frequent 
involvement of civil defence/protection in volcanic risk governance is also evidence 
that, even as the Behavioural paradigm began to be challenged in academic circles, 
'emergency management' was becoming increasingly common in practice. On the 
macro level, following the IAVCEI general assembly of 1977, a trend towards more 
frequent meetings was established and the organisational structures of this technical 
community became progressively more specialised, calibrated not just to research, but 
also to policy problems, e.g. the creation of WOVO and the IAVCEI Commission on 
Mitigation of Volcanic Disasters (Schmincke, 1989). This period saw connections 
established between volcanology and the IGOs which dominate the global policy 
field, such as the link between IAVCEI, WOVO and UNESCO.  
 
These trajectories converged two weeks after the eruption of Nevado del Ruiz, when 
UNDRO's Preparation and Planning division published Volcanic Emergency 
Management (UNDRO, 1985). A Spanish-language version was published in 1987 
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(UNDRO, 1987). As the two largest volcanic disasters of the decade had occurred in 
Spanish-speaking countries, the two-year translation delay perhaps illustrates the 
dominance of Anglophonic countries within the technocratic communities involved. 
The document was developed by senior personnel from IAVCEI and the UN over 
seven years. It tailors the 'emergency management' model to the specificities of 
volcanic risk. Chapters include: 
 
(1) The nature of volcanic hazards 
(2) Some examples of volcanic emergencies 
(3) Hazard assessment and prediction 
(4) Protective measures 
(5) The development of volcanic emergency plans 
(6) Perception and acceptability of risk 
(7) Communication between scientists, civil authorities, news media and the 
public 
(8) Some examples of organisation for volcanic emergency management 
 
Experience from 'elsewhere' forms a key component of the handbook. The second 
chapter cites Heimaey (Iceland) 1973, La Soufrière de Guadeloupe 1975-77, Mount 
Saint Helens 1980 and Galunggung 1982 as volcanically and socially diverse 
examples of volcanic emergencies. The eighth chapter outlines the extant policy 
frameworks for volcanic risk in Iceland, Japan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines 
and the USA.  
 
The particularities of the global politics of DRR give this document an 
unconventional status compared to many examples of mobile policy. The limited 
influence of UNDRO (indeed, the UN in general) and the respect afforded to national 
sovereignty mean that it was not conceived as a formal policy document: 
 
It is not the purpose of this handbook to discuss the details of the 
planning and organization needed to deal with volcanic emergencies, 
since these will of necessity vary from country to country according to 
political, social, legal and economic conditions and to the level of 
technological development. What has been attempted, is to distil from 
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past experience in various parts of the world some general principles of 
organization and practice which, it is hoped, may prove to be of 
universal validity (UNDRO, 1985). 
 
Despite this, Chapter 5  of the UNDRO manual contains a general blueprint for the 
structure of volcanic emergency plans, a basis for policy development. This document 
is not a policy model rooted in a specific geopolitical context, set 'in motion' through 
subsequent social discourse. It is instead an assemblage of scientific and policy 
knowledge, compiled from a geographically widespread range of sources with the 
intention of being remobilised internationally. This thesis Chapter has outlined the 
numerous ways in which mobile policy has shaped the development of VRR, 
however, the UNDRO (1985) manual is arguably the most direct example in the entire 
chronology and served to further the geographical distribution of 'emergency 
management' policy approaches to volcanic risk, cementing the dominance of the 
Behavioural model in volcanic risk governance. 
 
4.3.Volcanic Risk Governance in the era of Disaster Risk Reduction 
Processes of globalisation have provided one of the two undercurrents (along with 
volcanics) that have kept this narrative in motion. As was the case with the preceding 
two 'eras', there is no cut-off point applicable to all processes and therefore some 
degree of overlap; late-stage globalisation was underway prior to 1985, which has 
been used in this study due to the significance of that year to the development of 
VRR. Processes of global exchange and mobility in governance are now substantially 
more numerous, accelerated, complex and nuanced than in previous sections. 
Attempting to constrain all of these simultaneously at the macro level would prove 
extremely difficult, if not impossible. This section outlines significant macro-level 
developments and events since 1985. 
 
Appalled by the Nevado del Ruiz disaster, USGS volcanologists entered into 
collaboration with the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) to establish 
an initiative called the Volcano Disaster Assistance Program (VDAP). VDAP 
comprises a team of USGS volcano scientists that can provide scientific and technical 
support to local volcanologists and governments. VDAP also conducts ongoing 
training and capacity-building activities with VRR organisations in their respective 
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countries. VDAP has responded to >70 crises at 50 volcanoes worldwide and 
performed longer-term capacity strengthening in 12 countries. (USGS, 2011; Tilling, 
pers. comm, 2017).  
 
VDAP cemented the USGS as one of the most influential bodies on the global policy 
field of VRR. Over the course of more than 70 events it has interacted with the 
governance of volcanic crises around the world, mobilising many practices into 
diverse volcanic and socio-political settings, which will have further mutated in a 
myriad of unique ways, forming many assemblages and topologies with different 
lifespans. Macias and Aguirre (2006) believe that VDAP was so fundamental to 
initially mobilising the UNDRO (1985) system of volcanic emergency management 
that they refer to it several times as the UNDRO-USGS system. Pallister (2017) 
highlights that VDAP has now collated >30 years of experiences. It should therefore 
be thought of as a dynamic agent of change, a growing assemblage of knowledge and 
a consistent (although not ubiquitous) influence on the definition, promotion and 
distribution of 'best practice' VRR. 
 
The disasters of the 1980s convinced many on the global policy field of DRR that 
further work was required as the established Behavioural paradigm was failing to 
avert disaster losses. The initiative to name the 1990s the International Decade of 
Natural Hazard Reduction (IDNDR) originated at an earthquake engineering 
conference in 1984 and the natural science community (of which volcanology was a 
constituent) championed investment in hazard research, monitoring and engineering 
solutions, whilst social scientists continued to advocate reducing social vulnerability 
(Hannigan, 2012). The UN Special High Level Council responsible for the IDNDR 
ultimately settled for the 'disaster risk management' approach which augmented the 
established behavioural paradigm with limited considerations of social vulnerability 
(Section 2.3.1). By 2015, disaster risk management based on the Colombian system of 
civil protection post-Nevado del Ruiz was the most commonly practiced model of 
disaster risk governance (UNISDR, 2015).  
 
The broader community of volcanology continued to pursue 'best practice' VRR 
through WOVO and the IAVCEI Commission on the Mitigation of Volcanic 
Disasters, which by 1989 was the organisation's largest commission (Schmincke, 
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1989). Throughout the 1990s, IAVCEI held increasingly frequent assemblies, settling 
into a four-year pattern in the 2000s (Ismael-Zadeh, 2012). The 'Decade Volcano' 
project, the volcanological community's contribution to the IDNDR was also 
administrated by IAVCEI (Schmincke, 1989; Section 2.3.2). Barberi et al. (1990) 
outlined an ambitious programme of exchange. Despite the ultimately limited nature 
of the project due to struggles to secure funding, it was initially named by the UN as 
one of the 'spearhead projects' of the Decade (Verstappen, 1993). Although the project 
has never formally ended, it is in many ways functionally redundant and mainly 
endures in the connections established during its active years (Rehnberg, 2015b). 
During the 1990s, the Decade Volcano project was paralleled by the European 
Union/European Science Foundation's 'European Laboratory Volcanoes' project, 
which selected volcanoes in European-governed territories for collaborative research, 
including: Mount Etna (Italy); Furnas (São Miguel, Azores, Portugal); Piton da la 
Fournaise (Réunion, Indian Ocean, France); Teide (Tenerife, Spain), Santorini 
(Greece) and Krafla (Iceland) (Barberi et al. 1994; Chester et al. 2017). 
 
In 1987, driven by the Galunggung eruption of 1982 (and the Redoubt eruption of 
1989 which caused $80 million USD in damages to a passenger jet) the UN-based 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) created the International Airways 
Volcano Watch, charged with monitoring airborne ash and distributing warnings to air 
traffic. By 1997, it had established nine Volcanic Ash Advisory Centres (VAACs) 
which between them were notionally responsible for all global airspace (Papale, 
2015). The policy community pertaining to volcanic ash and aviation is a unique 
assemblage on the global policy field of VRR in the sense that the absolute rule of 
national sovereignty is reduced and the entire planet falls under one formal policy 
framework. 
 
Against this backdrop, the first major volcanic crisis of the post-Ruiz era occurred - 
the VEI 6 eruption of Mount Pinatubo, Luzon, Philippines (USGS, 2015d). Following 
precursory seismicity in March 1991 and phreatic explosions in early April, the 
Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS) recommended that 
civil protection evacuate approximately 5,000 people. These were predominantly 
indigenous Aeta tribespeople, living within 10 km of the volcano. PHIVOLCS 
contacted the USGS and were joined in late April by VDAP. The USA government 
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had a vested interest in preventing disaster at Pinatubo, because it had two military 
installations (Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base) close to the volcano. The 
latter became the site of the Pinatubo Volcano Observatory (PVO). The PVO team 
established monitoring systems and conducted surveys to create a hazard map. En 
route to the Philippines, the VDAP team flew over Katmai-Novarupta in Alaska, the 
site of the largest eruption of the 20th Century. During the first flyover of Pinatubo, 
USGS volcanologist John Ewert observed that the landforms were similar, stating: 
"Wow, that looks like Katmai, this is bad!" (NOVA, 1993; Newhall and 
Punongbayan, 1996).  
 
In early June a lava dome emerged on the crater floor. The volcanologists 
collaborated with authorities to design a policy response appropriate to the 
increasingly apparent risks: 
 
The PVO team used the hazard map and analysis of the volcano's unrest 
to acquaint civil-defense officials and military commanders with the 
potential eruptive hazards: extensive voluminous pyroclastic flows, 
tephra falls, and lahars that could extend far beyond the reach of the 
pyroclastic flows. A preliminary version of a videotape illustrating 
volcano hazards, produced by filmmaker-volcanologist Maurice Krafft, 
enormously helped the team explain hazards foreign to people in an area 
lacking historic eruptions" (Newhall and Punongbayan, 1996). The 
videotape had been created as part of an IAVCEI Commission on 
Mitigation of Volcanic Disasters initiative (Schmincke, 1989). 
 
By 10th June, increasing ash emission, shallow earthquakes and harmonic tremor led 
PHIVOLCS to declare the highest alert and double the exclusion zone around the 
summit evacuating a further 25,000 people, including all but a 1,500-strong military 
skeleton crew, plus the volcanologists who remained on Clark Air Base. They 
subsequently evacuated during the climactic phase of the eruption on 15th June when 
ashfall had reduced visibility to near zero (Newhall and Punongbayan, 1996). Despite 
the evacuations, between 600-1,200 were killed, predominantly by roof collapse due 
to ashfall (Witham, 2005; Rosenberg, 2017). In the aftermath, the Philippine 
government established the Mount Pinatubo Commission, a body for coordinating 
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relief and recovery activities among both governmental and non-governmental 
organisations as well as engineering solutions to the enduring lahar hazards (Newhall 
and Punongbayan, 1996). Newhall and Punongbyan (1996) note the role of global 
processes of knowledge exchange in the governance of the Pinatubo crisis: 
 
International collaboration was notable at Mount Pinatubo--first, 
between Philippine and U.S. scientists, and later, spontaneously, 
involving scientists from at least 10 countries. An event of this magnitude 
would challenge any single country, and, because volcanological 
communities are typically small, it makes good sense for volcanologists 
to help each other in times of major crisis. 
 
The response to Pinatubo provides further evidence that after Nevado del Ruiz, the 
volcanological community had become the most pro-active and organised  component 
of the global policy field of VRR, consistently working to derive and promote 'best 
practice' volcanic risk governance and creating topological links. This was conducted 
at the macro level, through IAVCEI, VDAP and numerous less formal arrangements, 
and percolated into the meso and micro levels in unique ways through the interactions 
between volcanologists and the social and Earth processes at individual volcanoes. 
Although ostensibly conducted under the umbrella of the IDNDR, the lack of tangible 
support from the UN saw the volcanological community somewhat politically 
isolated. Despite the loss of hundreds, (possibly thousands) of lives, the successful 
evacuation of ~25,000 people from the worst affected areas means that Pinatubo has 
long been cited as a 'success' story and a counterpoint to Nevado del Ruiz in 
volcanologists' narratives of VRR (e.g. Newhall and Punongbayan, 1996; Pallister, 
2017). Pinatubo is, to date, the last volcanic crisis in which >500 lives were confirmed 
lost. It is also the last time a >VEI 5 eruption occurred in a densely populated area. 
Subsequent developments and innovations in the global policy field of VRR have not 
been tested under these circumstances. 
 
1994 saw the United Nations' World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction, the 
first UN congress on disaster risk. Participants signed the Yokohama Strategy and 
Plan of Action for a Safer World, a 10-item article encouraging signatories to adopt 
strategies for disaster risk management, incorporating: prevention and preparedness, 
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mitigation, early warning, participation at all levels of government, international 
collaboration, environmental protection and the responsibility of each country for 
managing disaster risk in its own territory (United Nations, 1994). It is likely that this 
event played a significant role in the proliferation of disaster risk management. 
However, Hannigan (2012) notes that, as has continued to be the case, signatories 
were under no obligation to fulfil the commitment. As such, each signatory is free to 
act upon the document as they see fit, with the outcome being, from the perspective of 
PMS, that the policy model will spawn distinct mutations (and distinct outcomes) 
according to the interpretation of each nation.  
 
In 1995, IAVCEI convened a conference in Rome, Italy, entitled 'Volcanoes in 
Towns'. This was the antecedent to the now bi-annual Cities on Volcanoes 
conferences, scientific gatherings specifically focussed on the development of 'best 
practices' in applied volcanology. To date there have been ten - in Italy (in the cities 
of Rome/Naples corresponding to risk from the volcanoes Vesuvius and Campi 
Flegrei), New Zealand (Auckland; Auckland Volcanic Field), the USA (Hilo; Mauna 
Loa, Mauna Kea and Kilauaea), Ecuador (Quito; Guagua Pichincha) Japan 
(Shimabara; Mount Unzen), Spain (Santa Cruz de Tenerife; Pico del Teide), México 
(Colima; Volcán de Colima), Indonesia (Yogyakarta; Gunung Merapi) and Chile 
(Puerto Varas; Volcán Calbuco and Volcán Osorno) (IAVCEI, 2016). 
 
Although Pinatubo was, at the time of writing, the last major Plinian eruptive crisis, 
there have since been various smaller eruptive crises. A prominent example is the 
1995-2013 eruption of the Soufrière Hills volcano on the British Caribbean territory 
of Montserrat. A sequence of five eruptive episodes produced numerous lava domes, 
PDCs and Vulcanian explosions which cumulatively rendered the southern part of the 
island uninhabitable, destroyed the capital (Plymouth), killed 19 residents and reduced 
the island's population by two thirds (Wadge et al. 2014). From 1995 until 1997, the 
crisis was overseen by several ad-hoc assemblages of volcanologists before the UK's 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office established the Montserrat Risk Assessment, 
which was renamed the Scientific Advisory Committee in 2003. Initially, the 
scientists attempted to use the UNDRO (1985) manual but felt that it "proved 
inadequate to guide all mitigation efforts as the eruption slowly evolved" (Druitt and 
Kokelaar, 2002; Wadge et al. 2014). The British Secretary for International 
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Development encouraged evacuation (against the will of the Montserratian 
administration) and offered £10,000,000 as an aid package. As this amounted to 
<£2,500 per adult to pay for all the costs of emigration and starting a new life, it was 
met with widespread protest that forced the resignation of the Chief Minister who 
negotiated it (BBC, 1997). This example illustrates that although the orientation of the 
global policy field of DRR had begun to acknowledge the role of social vulnerability, 
even in 'developed' polities, marginalised communities (such as those in post-colonial 
territories) could still suffer disproportionately and that the lessons from previous 
volcanic crises in the British-governed Caribbean had not been effectively retained.  
 
The IDNDR ended in 1999, replaced by the UN International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (UNISDR) (Hannigan, 2012). IAVCEI was, however, continuing to 
promote and develop the Decade Volcano Project within its limited means (IAVCEI, 
1999). This constituted part of a growing suite of applied volcanology initiatives 
under the IAVCEI umbrella. Its Subcommittee on Crisis Protocols published a 
document entitled 'Professional conduct of scientists during volcanic crises' outlining 
suggested 'best practices' for crisis situations (Newhall et al. 1999). In 2003, an 
IAVCEI commission, the International Volcano Health Hazard Network (IVHHN) 
was established to investigate the impacts of volcanic activity on public health, 
incorporating epidemiology, toxicology and medicine, among other disciplines 
(IVHHN, 2017).  
 
In 2005, the Yokohama strategy of 1994 was succeeded by the Hyogo Framework for 
Action. The previous convention's 10-item agreement was replaced by the following 
'priorities for action': 
 
(1) Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority 
with a strong institutional basis for implementation. 
 
(2) Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early 
warning. 
 
(3) Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety 




(4) Reduce the underlying risk factors. 
 
(5) Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels 
(UNISDR, 2015). 
 
DRR had become the focus of the UNISDR as social vulnerability continued to 
generate disaster losses. However, national sovereignty remained paramount and 
participation was entirely voluntary (Hannigan, 2012; Hollis, 2014). Volcanic risk 
was again overlooked. 
 
The 2010 eruption of Eyjafjallajökull in southern Iceland has thus far been the most 
globally high-profile volcanic event of the 21st Century (Klemetti, 2011). The 
eruption was characterised by four stages: an effusive phase from a flank fissure 
which began on 20th March, lasting 23 days; a brief quiescence; an explosive phase 
from the summit vent from 13th April until 17th May and low-level unrest as the 
volcano gradually ceased activity (Jenkins, 2010). This was the first Icelandic 
eruption to distribute ash extensively over western Europe in the era of aviation and 
led to major airspace closures, the cancellation of 108,000 flights, 10.7 million 
passengers stranded and losses of $1.7 billion USD (Budd et al. 2011).  
 
As soon as they were made aware of the effusive phase by scientists, the Icelandic 
Department of Civil Protection and Emergency Management implemented the 
existing Eyjafjallajökull emergency plan, successfully evacuating 500 civilians over 
two hours. Other emergency measures included the delay of international flights to 
and from Reykjavík, as well as cancelling all internal flights. Around 4000 passengers 
experienced disruption. The following day, the residents of all but the 14 farms closest 
the volcano were permitted to return (Iceland Review, 2010). Subsequently, the 
effusive phase became a tourist attraction (Jenkins, 2010). 
 
The swift enactment of emergency initiatives on 20th March was repeated on 14th 
April, when the explosive phase became apparent, with around 800 people evacuated 
in anticipation of primary lahars (Gunnarsson, 2010). Ultimately, glacier-burst lahars 
caused some damage to farmland but much structural damage was avoided by 
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diverting the flows through artificial levees (Karlsdóttir et al. 2012). Livestock were 
kept in winter housing as they could not graze in the ash, with estimated losses of 5% 
of animals (Jenkins, 2010). 
 
During the explosive phase, tephra was erupted directly into the jet stream, causing 
widespread dispersal across western Europe (Karlsdottir et al. 2012).  Many countries 
chose to close airspace completely (House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee, 2010). This decision was also taken by the central EU authority (Walt, 
2010). The cancellations did not just affect the countries covered by the ash cloud. 
The closure of global air-travel hubs meant that many in other continents could not 
catch connecting flights, extending the volcano’s impacts beyond its physical sphere 
of influence (Walsh, 2010). Freight aircraft were also affected (Sammonds et al. 
2010). 
 
There was significant backlash from airlines and the public: “the closing of European 
airspace (and the ensuing travel disruption) was quickly articulated as a failure of 
government leadership or bureaucratic decision-making” (Budd, 2011). Following a 
test flight of a jet aircraft, British Airways' Chief Executive declared the closures 
unnecessary (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, 2010). 
However, when ash distribution resumed during the next explosive episode, EU 
authorities continued to err on the side of caution and close airspace again (Walsh, 
2010). Pressure from external bodies forced the UK Civil Aviation Authority to 
change its definitions of 'safe flying zones' by the end of the eruption (Sammonds et 
al. 2010). 
 
Eyjafjallajökull was a crisis like no other to date, born of the increased mobility that 
has come to underpin a globalised society. Its geographical scale and the number of 
affected people were unprecedented. It was a truly macro-level event, drawing 
attention from social scientists studying mobility as a social process (Birtchnell and 
Buscher, 2011). This situation demonstrates that as human infrastructure continues to 
evolve in spaces subject to volcanic phenomena, vulnerability may continue to evolve 
unexpectedly. This crisis illustrates that the policy infrastructure regarding volcanic 
ash hazards and aviation forms a unique part of the global policy field where 




After the Eyjafjallajökull eruption, the volcanological community seems to have 
capitalised on political will to drive forward the agenda of VRR at the macro level. 
Several international projects designed to research and promote 'best practices' in 
various aspects of VRR were established, funded by a combination of national 
governments, IGOs, international financial institutions and other partnerships. These 
included the MIA-VITA project which sought to create a successor handbook to 
UNDRO (1985); the Volcanic Unrest in Europe and Latin America (VUELCO) 
project; the Global Volcano Model (GVM); and the Strengthening Resilience in 
Volcanic Areas (STREVA) project (VUELCO, 2011; GVM, 2012; Bignami et al. 
2012; STREVA, 2012). These initiatives were operationally autonomous, but linked 
through IAVCEI and direct collaborative agreements (STREVA, 2012). They have 
collectively engaged with public, private and academic institutions in over 18 
countries. Collaboration between the GVM and the UNISDR saw volcanic risk 
incorporated into the 2015 Global Assessment Report at the launch of the Sendai 
framework for action (GVM, 2014; UNISDR, 2015). Significant volcanic crises 
during the writing of this thesis have included the 2017-2019 activity at Gunung 
Agung, Indonesia, which prompted the evacuation of approximately 70,000 people; 
the June 2018 eruption of Volcán de Fuego, Guatemala where PDCs killed at least 
190 people; and the December 2018 eruption and tsunami at Krakatau with 437 
fatalities and 31,943 injured (GVP, 2013; Echeverria, 2018). 
 
4.4. Synthesis 
This chapter shows that volcanoes have prompted formal and informal policy 
responses from political regimes for more than 2000 years. Before institutionalised 
civil defence (theoretically) gave citizens an equal right to protection, before 
consistent records and prior to the rapid circulation of knowledge facilitated by 
modern globalisation, such responses were likely to be poorly documented, 
inconsistent, arbitrary, discriminatory, ad-hoc and nearly always reactive. In this 
sense, there is comparatively little advancement between ancient Rome and the early 
20th Century. The lack of institutional frameworks for reducing disaster risks, the 
primitive-to-non-existent nature of volcanology, compounded by limited continuity in 
social memory reduced the capacity for lessons to mobilise between crises, frequently 
rendering intermittent eruptions a novel challenge for each society confronted by 
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them. There are several examples where local knowledge curated over generations 
played a crucial role in saving lives. However, this was not a ubiquitous feature of the 
policy field and seldom incorporated into 'formal' policy. In the late 19th and early 
20th Centuries, we see the gradual manifestation of the social apparatus that would 
eventually spawn modern volcanic risk governance.  
 
Although the lexicon of PMS has emerged to describe mobile policy in a connected, 
globalised 21st-Century world, rather than the decisions of emperors, slave-owners, 
samurai, dictators, Carib communities, colonial scientists etc., the processes of 
seeking 'better' solutions to policy problems through learning from the world around 
us are a defining feature of the history of governance (and humanity). Before the mid-
20th Century these processes are seen to be slow, disjointed and non-linear, but 
nonetheless significant in the lives of thousands worldwide. As globalisation gathers 
momentum, the integral role of mobilities on the governance of volcanic crises 
becomes increasingly evident. The evolution of technocracies can be argued to have a 
significant impact; on both the humanitarian relief that became a prevalent 'best 
practice' after volcanic crises, and the 'expert community' of volcanologists that began 
curating lessons and sharing them globally (albeit among a small number of 
likeminded scientists). Even at this early stage, mutations and transient assemblages 
can be identified (for example, Thomas Jaggar taking his Caribbean experiences and 
developing the HVO, and the international relief effort in 1902 that temporarily 
brought together the Caribbean colonial administrations and the governments of the 
UK, France and the USA in a co-ordinated policy response). 
 
During the 20th Century, the civil defence model emerged and mobilised to the extent 
that, by the mid-1980s, most volcanic crises were being governed through 'emergency 
management' practices, replacing the prior vacuum of ex ante VRR policy. 
Nonetheless, emphasis was placed on reactive strategies - volcanic emergencies were 
to be managed when they arose. Processes of mobilising policy/knowledge became 
far more rapid and better connected. The emergence of IGOs and the evolution of the 
volcanological community were key features of this era. Althought initially disparate, 
volcanology and governance gradually became increasingly linked. Despite these 
developments, the early-mid 1980s were marked by severe volcanic disasters, and it 
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was the failure of the now-dominant Behavioural model to prevent these (among other 
environmental disasters) that provoked the subsequent transition into the era of DRR. 
 
Throughout recent decades, the constituent parts of the technical community of 
volcanology have multiplied and diversified, engaging with a wider range of formal 
and informal policy actors on the global policy fields of VRR and DRR than ever 
before. Collaborative links and funding from the UN, the EU, the World Bank, 
various national governments and private actors have somewhat reduced 
volcanologists' status as 'policy outsiders'. The potential number of resulting 
assemblages and policy mutations can only be guessed at. However, a populous, fast-
moving, interconnected, complex, loosely-bound collection of systems, organisations 
and individuals has come to replace the once sparse, slow-moving and poorly-
interconnected landscape of the global policy field of VRR.  
 
In spite of there being more work done to mobilise VRR knowledge and practices 
than ever before, there is little evidence for homogenisation in VRR policy (as would 
be the case under a policy convergence model). Nor is there indication that macro-
level changes spread through the policy field in any predictably coherent way (as a 
policy diffusion model would suggest). Despite this being named 'the era of disaster 
risk reduction'; by the UNISDR's (2015) own admission, it has thus far failed to 
establish a functional DRR policy framework. DRR remains an influential goal to 
pursue, however the long-term lessening of social vulnerability through reduction of 
poverty and inequality required for 'true' DRR challenges some assumptions of the 
neoliberal model that has remained ascendant. The backlash during the 
Eyjafjallajökull eruption perhaps provides a snapshot of the political pressure that 
may be expected when policy decisions regarding the safety of citizens challenge 
'business as usual'.  
 
Every volcanic crisis described in this chapter has arguably been a unique assemblage 
of Earth processes and human actions. It has been demonstrated that 'best practices' 
from 'elsewhere' have, in various instances, proven the difference between life and 
death for tens of thousands of people. However, the history of mobility in VRR policy 
also suggests that there is no one 'direction of travel' applicable to policy development 
at all potentially dangerous volcanoes and illustrates what can happen when 
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governance of a volcanic crisis fails. It is impossible to quantify to what extent the 
likelihood of future volcanic disasters has been reduced by the mobility of VRR 
policy, but under the assumption that mobile policy manifests differently at each 
volcano where it 'arrives', in some instances proving effective and in others less so, 
there are undoubtedly still volcanoes around the world where a disaster on the scale of 
Mont Pelée or Nevado del Ruiz is a very real possibility. The uneven geography of 































Case Histories of Volcanic Risk Governance 
 
This chapter presents historical accounts of policy mobilities in volcanic risk 
reduction at four volcanoes in different national (meso level) governance frameworks. 
Through these, this chapter aims to elucidate the complex interactions of mobile 
knowledge with the distinct volcanological and socio-political attributes of each 
volcanic setting; affecting the conception and implementation of the perceived 'best 
practices' that have shaped VRR policy. 
 
5.1 Gunung Merapi, Java, Indonesia 
Gunung Merapi (7.54°S 110.446°E; 2910 m; Figure 5.1) is a stratovolcano on Java, 
Indonesia, approximately 30 km north of Yogyakarta (Figure 5.2). Historically 
Indonesia's most active volcano, eruptions occurred on average every 4-6 years 
throughout the 20th Century. Frequent larger eruptions have been identified from the 
7th-19th Centuries (Surono et al. 2012; Jenkins et al. 2016). In Witham's (2005) table 
of the most 'calamitous' volcanoes of the 20th Century, Merapi ranks eighth in terms 
of deaths caused (1590), sixth for injuries (932) and third for people rendered 
homeless (32,275) (Voight et al, 2000; Witham, 2005; Surono et al. 2012). 
Approximately 1.4 million people live in areas exposed to hazards from Merapi 
(Bakkour et al. 2015). This confluence of hazard and vulnerability arguably makes 








Figure 5.2. Map of the Merapi area (Voight et al. 2000a). Grey patches represent 
major towns and villages. Hut symbols represent volcanological observation posts. 
Solid lines are main roads, dashed lines are major drainage channels. Black 
triangles indicate the Merapi summit, Turgo and Plawangan hills.  
Merapi's frequent activity has attracted much scientific scrutiny (Surono et al. 2012). 
Publications have also documented developments in VRR policy at Merapi since the 
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19th Century (e.g. Van Padang, 1960; Voight et al. 2000a; Donovan, 2010a; Mei and 
Lavigne, 2012).  
 
5.1.1. Early Volcanic Risk Governance at Merapi 
Newhall et al. (2000) suggest that Merapi has impacted Java socially for millennia. A 
system of hollow drums emplaced on Merapi may count as one of the earliest 
examples of a volcanic alert system (Casadevall, 2000). Newhall et al. (2000) note six 
moderately large explosive eruptions since the colonial era began, although many 
smaller events have presented significant hazards.  
 
In October 1865, residents of the highest villages on the volcano self-evacuated, 
returning when activity diminished to find their crops destroyed. Spontaneous 
evacuations were also documented in May 1869, prompted by PDCs and ashfall 
(Voight et al. 2000a). A five-day VEI 4 eruption starting 15th April 1872 killed 130 
people (Siebert et al. 2010). Rogier Verbeek, later to be in charge of the Krakatoa 
commission, surveyed the crater of Merapi after the 1872 eruption (Section 4.1.3), a 
sign that the volcanic nature of the territory had drawn the attention of Dutch colonial 
scientists.  
 
By 1885, a colonial engineer was observing the crater monthly, and recommending 
houses in the highest villages be constructed to withstand tephra fall. In 1888, PDCs 
caused partial evacuation of two villages. One European resident stated that the 
evacuation lasted only a night, adding: "The people had received the notice to move 
but did not want to" (Voight et al. 2000a). Much of the local understanding of risk at 
Merapi has long been based on a blend of Islam and Javanese belief in spirit creatures 
from the volcano. Decisions to evacuate have traditionally been based on a 
combination of perceived activity at the volcano and spiritual interpretations that vary 
between individuals and communities (Donovan, 2010a). Dove (2008) refers to this 
acceptance of the dangers of Merapi as a 'culture of hazard'. 
 
By 1888, risk from Merapi was familiar to local people and colonial administrators 
and both had actively engaged in practices to reduce it. Indigenous responses appear 
to have been typical of historical VRR as described in Chapter 4, with spontaneous 
decisions to evacuate based on visual observation of the volcano and religious 
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understandings of volcanic phenomena. Colonial efforts were based on basic 
quantitative observation and authoritarian evacuations, this is notable given that 
institutionalised civil defence would not proliferate globally for decades to come. 
Frequent activity appears to have prompted the materialisation of an embryonic VRR 
policy field consisting of the colonial authorities, researchers and the indigenous 
Javanese communities. At this early stage, a contrast may be observed between the 
decision-making of authorities and the local communities - this is a recurring theme at 
Merapi. 
 
Early policy did not avoid casualties. In 1904 and 1920, PDCs caused 16 and 35 
deaths respectively (Siebert et al. 2010). In 1910, following an eruption at Semeru, 
another Javanese volcano, a government commission established a fund for victims of 
disasters (Van Padang, 1983). Shortly before the 1920 eruption, the Dutch Indian 
"Volcanological Watching Service" had been established (Section 4.1.4). At the time, 
this was the only government-funded volcanological organisation on Earth. In 
addition to volcano monitoring, two of its stated aims were to develop a system to 
warn/evacuate communities and to reduce the effects of eruptions (Van Padang, 
1983).  
 
Chief scientist, Georges Kemmerling, observed the 1920 eruption directly, although 
without visual precursors victims were unable to be alerted. Kemmerling made 
comparisons between the dome collapse PDC and the descriptions of explosively 
driven PDCs at Mont Pelée in 1902, concluding that they were different processes 
(Voight et al. 2000a). Thus, by 1920, experiences elsewhere in volcanology had 
begun to impact on Merapi and experiences at Merapi had begun to feed back into the 
budding volcanological community. This process continued in February 1924, when a 
seismometer purchased in Japan expanded monitoring at Merapi (Voight et al. 2000a). 
 
Following five years of quiescence, seismicity began building in January 1930, until 
November when effusion of lava began. Notice to evacuate was immediately given to 
the closest residents. Van Padang (1983) notes that this was effective and casualties 
were low in the highest altitude communities. However, the size of the PDCs 
exceeded all expectations and 1,369 people were killed at distances of 8-10 km from 
the crater. The government provided 3,000 evacuees with accommodation, clothes, 
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food and amenities (Van Padang, 1983; Voight et al. 2000a). In the post-disaster 
stage, the government and the army blocked road access to the volcano, established 
the limits of the affected zones and assisted the volcanological service in monitoring 
lahars (Van Padang, 1960). In 1933, the first hazard maps for Merapi were produced. 
These were the first such maps in the Dutch East Indies and the earliest at any volcano 
examined in this study. In 1934, seismic monitoring allowed populations to be alerted 
and evacuated within 40 minutes such that there were no casualties when PDCs 
reached populated areas (Van Padang, 1983).  
 
In 1941, new regulations were implemented establishing concentric danger zones, 
including the 'forbidden zone' where it was recommended all communities be 
permanently abandoned (although this goal has never been achieved). This survived 
the forthcoming regime changes that came with the Japanese occupation and the 
subsequent emergence of an independent Indonesian state in 1945 (Suryo, 1985; 
Voight et al. 2000a). The zones were revised in 1960, 1978, 2002 and 2011 (Donovan, 
2010a; Lavigne et al. 2017).  
 
The history of institutionalised VRR at Merapi is far longer than at any other volcano 
examined. It is likely that Merapi's frequent high-risk activity (and that of other 
volcanoes in Indonesia) as well as its location in a territory governed by an 
industrialised power were strong contributing factors. This can be seen in the contrast 
between the scientific/technical response of the Dutch Indian government and the ad-
hoc responses of the native communities, as well as the dominance of European 
scientists including Rogier Verbeek, Georges Kemmerling, Charles Stehn and George 
Escher. These scientists participated in the formation of the global scientific 
community of volcanology; Escher becoming president of the International 
Association of Volcanology (Van Padang, 1983). Features of VRR at Merapi included 
instrumented monitoring, an alarm system, hazard maps and attempts at land use 
planning with the establishment of the 'forbidden zone' as well as government-funded 
post-disaster aid. Many features of the Behavioural approach to disaster risk (Section 
2.3) including the scientific investigation of hazards, plans triggered by the occurrence 
of 'emergency' situations and post-disaster relief had emerged in the Dutch East Indies 




5.1.2. Volcanic Risk Governance at Merapi after the establishment of the Indonesian 
Republic 
Some actions under the pre-1945 framework, such as the evacuation of 1934, 
succeeded in reducing casualties. However the recurrence of deaths injuries and 
homelessness during fifteen subsequent eruptions of Merapi illustrate their limited 
scope, especially when expected to function against a backdrop of severe 
underdevelopment. Following Japanese occupation and independence in 1945, the 
Indonesian economy entered a 'catastrophic' state (Dick, 2002). The large number of 
ethnic and cultural groups that had united under the banner of Indonesian liberation 
began to split, spawning multiple armed conflicts while the Dutch continued to fight 
to reclaim the territory (Ricklefs, 1993). According to Ricklefs, the result was a 
country typified by poverty, low educational/skills levels and authoritarian traditions. 
Most European volcanologists left Indonesia, although at least two (W.A. 
Petroeschevsky and H.F. Klompé) remained (Van Padang, 1983).  
 
In 1950, a democratic constitution was established and Sukarno, the leader of the 
independence movement who had served as President since 1945, was elected to the 
position (Ricklefs, 1993). In 1954 an eruption at Merapi killed 64 and destroyed three 
villages (Voight et al. 2000a). After a turbulent period of parliamentary democracy, 
Sukarno grew disillusioned and, between 1957 and 1959, instituted an authoritarian 
system called 'guided democracy', intended to appease three dominant factions, the 
military, Islamic groups and the communist party (PKI) (Ricklefs, 1993). During this 
period, Indonesia became increasingly aligned with the USSR, worsening relations 
with the West. While Indonesia did not become a fully communist state in the Soviet 
mould, this did shape the conduits for its international exchanges (Efimova, 2011). 
 
The 'Volcano Service' was the replacement for the Netherlands Indies Volcanological 
Survey, known internationally as the Volcanological Survey of Indonesia (VSI) 
(CVGHM, 2016). In 1959-1960, a period of low activity at Merapi, a new 
seismograph was installed and I. Suryo, director of the VSI proposed an expansion of 
the 'forbidden zone' (Voight et al. 2000a). Thus, despite the challenges faced by 





The next eruption began in April 1961. Although communities had been evacuated in 
advance, some evacuees chose to return intermittently to tend farmland, 12 were 
killed and six seriously injured (Voight et al. 2000a). The continuing conflict of 
interest between the authorities and volcanologists seeking to maintain the 'forbidden 
zone', and the zone's inhabitants seeking to access their land is evident. Indeed, 
following this eruption, the Indonesian government incorporated 1,905 zone residents 
into its 'transmigration' programme. This process would recur after every subsequent 
significant eruption (Dove, 2008). The transmigration program was an initiative 
established by the Dutch and formally discontinued in 2015. It aimed to move people 
from the 'overcrowded' islands of Bali, Lombok, Madura and Java to less populous 
islands. The project later gained support from the World Bank. Transmigration has 
proven controversial domestically and internationally, as indigenous cultures have 
been threatened or subsumed by incomers, and their resources put under strain 
(Fearnside, 1997; NZ Radio, 2015). 
 
In 1965, Sukarno's 'guided democracy' regime was shattered by conflict between 
conservative military leaders and the PKI. Military Commander, General Suharto 
won, eventually using his influence to supplant Sukarno as President: 
 
Indonesia moved from being a leader of the radical left in world affairs 
to being a bastion of anti-communism. Suharto supervised Indonesia’s 
economic recovery from the neglect of the Sukarno era to unprecedented 
levels of prosperity, albeit with unprecedented levels of corruption. He 
also presided over the killing of around half a million members and 
associates of the PKI... (Cribb, 2015). 
 
Over the subsequent three decades Suharto's subsequent military dictatorship, known 
as the 'New Order' presided over significant economic growth and a reduction in 
absolute poverty, improvement in infrastructure and public services through 
collaboration with foreign economies. Despite this, the regime was corrupt and 
brutally repressive (Aspinall and Fealy, 2010). The regime change led to a 
restructuring of institutions; a civil defence organisation was established. However, a 
separate National Disaster Management Advisory Board, assumed many DRR 
responsibilities (Mei and Lavigne, 2012; BNPB, 2017). The establishment of a 
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specific body may be attributed to the frequency of disasters in Indonesia. The VSI 
was placed under the Directorate of Geology; it would alternate between departments 
of Geology and Mining in 1976, 1978 and 1992 (CVGHM, 2016). 
 
During the 1960s, Indonesia experienced several volcanic crises, including the 
eruption of Gunung Agung (Section 4.2). In 1968, Japanese scientists brought state-
of-the-art seismographs and event classification to Merapi. This collaboration was 
likely born of the New Order's courting of international investment. Enhanced 
seismological capacity aided the evacuation of several villages destroyed by PDCs in 
December 1968. Subsequent lahars destroyed 23 villages and caused three deaths 
(Voight et al. 2000a; Aspinall and Fealy, 2010). As a response, in 1969, the 
Indonesian government established 'Volcanic Disaster Prevention Projects'. These 
predominantly comprised of engineering solutions designed to limit lahars:  
 
Projects were established within the Directorate General of Water-
Resource Development (Ministry of Public Works). Co-operation with 
other Government Departments, e.g. the Volcanological Survey, with 
other countries via the Colombo Plan (Japan and New Zealand), and 
with local Universities, was also established and consultants engaged. 
(Suryo and Clarke, 1985). 
 
Through these projects, the policy field of VRR in Indonesia, and at Merapi, came 
(for a time) to host an assemblage of domestic and international organisations. 
Indonesia's engagement with the Colombo Plan, an IGO for trans-national 
development of policy and infrastructure was only possible due to the pro-Western 
leanings of the New Order (Colombo Plan, 2011). The 'Sabo' dams used were based 
on experience of controlling lahars and debris flows at Japanese volcanoes (Suryo and 
Clarke, 1985). Lahars have subsequently rarely exceeded 10 km from the crater. After 
project completion in 1987, no lahar-based fatalities have been reported (De Bélizal et 
al. 2013). In this instance, knowledge from 'elsewhere' and the conduits by which it 
was circulated played a key role in reducing one aspect of volcanic risk at Merapi, 
demonstrating that mobile policies sometimes do meet their proponents' aspirations 




Merapi was largely quiet through the early 1970s. In 1976 it re-entered a cycle of 
activity that lasted until 1979 (Voight et al. 2000a). On 25th-26th November 1976, 
lahars killed 28 and destroyed 358 houses. The Sabo dam project was still far from 
completion (Sumaronyo and Hildasan, 2010). In the late 1970s, Haroun Tazieff and a 
team of French volcanologists (Section 4.2) introduced geochemical investigations of 
fumaroles to Merapi and in 1982 the USGS installed a state-of-the-art seismograph 
network (Voight et al. 2000a). In 1985, Suryo, in collaboration with the British 
Geological Survey published a paper detailing the works of the Indonesian 
government towards reducing volcanic risk: 
 
The prevention of serious loss of life and damage to property in areas 
menaced by volcanic activity is in part the work of the Volcanological 
Survey of Indonesia whose personnel observe and monitor activity, map 
and interpret records of previous eruptions and delineate volcanic 
hazard zones... Indonesia is at present benefiting from lessons learnt as a 
result of the eruption of Mt St. Helens in that the USGS are supplying 
volcanological expertise in the form of men and equipment in order to set 
up a model Volcanological Observatory for Merapi. Expert assistance is 
also received from Japan where high technological methods of 
monitoring are routine. (Suryo and Clarke, 1985). 
 
Both before and during the 'explosion' of volcanology in the 1980s, Merapi was 
assuming its place as a prominent site for the circulation, application and production 
of volcanological knowledge, eventually encompassing collaborations with (among 
others) the USA, France, Germany, Japan and Italy, with tangible impacts on VRR 
practices (Wirakusumah, 2000). At this point, institutionalised VRR that conformed to 
the Behavioural paradigm had existed at Merapi for around half a century, and the 
mobile knowledge that shaped policy and 'best practices' after 1945 arguably 
reinforced this, augmenting the technical capacities of a hazard-focussed approach. 
However, the communities around Merapi remained vulnerable. 
 
From 1984 through 1993 there was minimal hazardous activity (Voight et al. 2000a). 
Voight et al. note that by 1994, a new dome lobe emerged, descending an established 
channel to the southwest, and rockfall deposits started to provide a ramp out of the 
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channel onto the south flank. They argue that the implications of this development 
were not fully appreciated because the south flank had remained unaffected by 
hazards for a long time. Suryo and Clarke (1985) wrote that Merapi had a 'pattern' of 
activity, suggesting that the VSI had grown comfortable with Merapi behaving in a 
certain way. Van Padang (1960) called Turgo and Kaliurang villages on the south 
flank (Figure 5.2) "quite safe". Nonetheless on 22nd November 1994, the dome 
collapsed over seven hours. PDCs affected the southwest and southern flanks, killing 
64 people. There were no identifiable precursors (Voight et al. 2000a).  
 
At 07:30 the Kailurang observation post alerted the Merapi Volcano Observatory 
(MVO) in Yogyakarta. However, by the time the message had been relayed through 
the layers of government (district, sub-district and municipality) to begin organising 
the evacuation at 10:00, victims had been dead for two hours (Mei and Lavigne, 
2012). Mei and Lavigne suggest that institutional and community unpreparedness was 
responsible for the severity of the disaster. No education had been provided by the 
Indonesian government or NGOs, and because Turgo had not been affected by the 
volcano in communal memory, local authorities were overwhelmed. Shelters and 
transport were poorly organised and provisioned, thousands self-evacuated, but were 
not provided with resources by the government to maintain livelihoods. Many 
returned on a daily basis to feed livestock. 
 
Authorities decided that 2,700 villagers in Turgo should be relocated. They were 
given the option to be part of the transmigration programme or to relocate to a 
purpose-built replacement village called Sudimoro, around 10 km from Turgo. Fewer 
than 1% of Turgo residents expressed interest in transmigration, one commenting that 
she would rather be killed by Merapi than give up her land to the state (Dove, 2008). 
Turgo was erased from official maps, and villagers were no longer recognised by the 
authorities. Despite this, and the high quality construction of houses in Sudimoro, 
60% of displaced residents chose to return to Turgo (Mei and Lavigne, 2012). 
 
In 1996, Suharto's regime came under increasing pressure from the Indonesian 
Democratic Party (PDI). Previously a puppet of the New Order regime, the PDI began 
to take on a life of its own under the leadership of Sukarno's daughter, Megawati 
Sukarnoputri. Suharto acted with the military to depose Megawati (Coghlan, 2010). 
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This sparked a wave of protest that escalated over the subsequent years, compounded 
by financial crisis in 1997. Suharto was forced to resign on 21st May 1998 (Mydans, 
1998). Indonesia's parliamentarians set about instituting a series of gradual, extensive 
reforms that, after a period of violence and uncertainty, brought about the 'full 
democratisation' of Indonesia. This became known as the period of Reformasi 
(reform) (Horowitz, 2013; Hays, 2015). 
 
5.1.3. Volcanic Risk Governance at Merapi in the era of Reformasi 
Several crises occurred at Merapi during the turn of the Reformasi period. An eruption 
on 31st October 1996 rendered 300 people homeless, a further eruption on 17th 
January 1997 killed six and affected 3,000-8,000. In July 1998, 312 were injured 
(Witham, 2005). During the 1990s, (the IDNDR) Merapi was named by IAVCEI as 
one of the Decade Volcanoes (Section 4.3). Two workshops were held on Merapi in 
1995 and 1997, with support from UNESCO (Voight et al. 2000b): 
 
The workshops included discussions on such topics as dome collapse 
mechanisms, hazard evaluation, public education concerning Merapi 
Volcano and lahar mitigation. These discussions were very important for 
scientists in Indonesia, as the knowledge gained could be applied to our 
nearly 130 active volcanoes. The international colleagues of VSI are also 
able to use their experiences at Merapi to contribute to both local 
science and hazard reduction, as well as to solve similar problems 
elsewhere in the world (Wirakusumah, 2000). 
 
One product of these was a special issue of the Journal of Volcanology and 
Geothermal Research (JVGR) dedicated to Merapi, encompassing scientific and 
governmental contributions from (among others) France, the USA, Japan, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand and Australia. This issue comprised studies of volcanic 
history; magmatic processes; monitoring; PDCs; lahars and hazard evaluation (Voight 
et al. 2000b). Also at the workshops, Merapi and Volcán de Colima in Mexico 
(another Decade Volcano) were named 'Twin Volcanoes', due to perceived 
similarities between the two (Newhall, pers. comm. 2017). Exchange visits were 
conducted between scientists of the VSI and the Universidad de Colima, although the 
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project never achieved funding to continue beyond these (Section 6.4). In July 2000, 
the IAVCEI general assembly was held in Bali (Ismail-Zadeh, 2012). 
 
Several authors in the special edition refer to Merapi as a 'laboratory volcano' for the 
global community of volcanology due to its consistent activity (Casadevall, 2000; 
Wirakusumah, 2000; Voight et al. 2000b). The exchanges of the 1990s represent 
expansion and acceleration of the global mobility of VRR knowledge to an 
unprecedented scale. Merapi can perhaps be conceived of as the focal point of a 
vortex of information drawn from all the participants' 'home volcanoes'; colliding and 
being reshaped in the Merapi context before feeding back to other volcanoes in 
Indonesia and worldwide. In this sense, Merapi had arguably come to constitute a 
classic site of policy mobility, reminiscent of the 'global cities' cited in the PMS 
literature (e.g. Clarke, 2009; McCann, 2011). However, it is once again worth noting 
that the focus of these exchanges was still predominantly hazard-based and thus 
concerned with enhancing technical capacities within the context of the Behavioural 
approach to disasters. Although theories of complexity and disaster risk reduction had 
begun to emerge elsewhere on the global disaster policy field, their percolation onto 
the field of VRR at this stage appears limited. 
 
Work continued at Merapi in terms of research, monitoring and defining the areas at 
risk. In 2001, the VSI became integrated with organisations for studying other 
geological hazards and became the Centre for Volcanology and Geological Hazard 
Mitigation (CVGHM, 2016). The Merapi hazard map was revised in 2002, although 
Donovan (2010) notes that it remained 'remarkably similar' to its predecessor from 
1978 and was still based exclusively on 20th Century activity. It was noted in the 
special edition of the JVGR that activity during the 20th Century was unusually small-
scale for Merapi and that more attention should be given to larger (VEI 4 or greater) 
scenarios (Newhall et al. 2000; Voight et al. 2000). It is worth emphasising that 
simply because knowledge arrives in a particular setting does not mean that it will 
always be rationally re-purposed as policy. 
 
On 26th December 2004, an earthquake occurred off northern Sumatra, triggering a 
series of tsunami that killed large numbers around the Indian Ocean. One of the worst 
affected areas was Aceh in Indonesia, where 170,000 were killed and 500,000 were 
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left homeless (Lubowski et al. 2009). Following this, the Indonesian government 
entered a rigorous reconfiguration of its disaster policy, enthusiastically adopting the 
Hyogo Framework for Action: "Involvement from multiple stakeholders produced 
legislation that re-evaluated the importance of preparedness, mitigation, and risk 
reduction; enabled contributions from civil society and international partners; and 
required disaster risk reduction (DRR) be built into development projects" (Brown et 
al. 2016). Brown et al. note that while significant progress has been made towards 
establishing a DRR-focussed approach since 2005, this was not achieved 
instantaneously but through a continuous process. 
 
In March 2006, a new dome began to grow and by April, an 8 km radius around 
Merapi's summit was declared an exclusion zone. The activity incremented through 
May, evacuations began on 3rd. By 16th, 22,000 had been evacuated (Donovan, 
2010a). It is notable that many self-evacuated (Wilson et al. 2007). The Red Cross 
reported that, 20,080 evacuees were sheltered between four districts (Mei and 
Lavigne, 2012). Activity continued without large PDCs. The government and 
scientists did not inform evacuees that a long-onset eruption was a possibility and by 
28th May, up to 1,800 evacuees had returned home to tend their livestock (Mei and 
Lavigne, 2012).  
 
On 27th May, a magnitude 5.9 earthquake struck Yogyakarta, killing over 5,800 
(Wilson et al. 2007). According to Wilson et al., the earthquake 'eclipsed and 
overwhelmed' the ongoing Merapi operation, with camps beginning to experience 
sanitation and supply issues. The activity continued into June and on 4th-5th, a 
remnant of the 1931 dome called the Geger Boyo which had provided a barrier to 
PDCs on the southeast flank, collapsed, creating the potential for a repeat of 1994 
where previously 'safe' communities became exposed. Despite this, the alert level was 
lowered and villagers transported home, with instructions to remain on alert. On 14th, 
at 12:00 a small PDC travelled down the gap left by the Geger Boyo, entering the 
Gendol river valley. MVO issued an immediate alert and the nearby community of 
Kaliadem evacuated before a much larger PDC buried part of the village. Two 
volunteers who had assisted with the evacuation were killed. This was the 'peak' of the 
crisis, after which the activity and alert levels decreased and evacuees gradually began 
to return home (Wilson et al. 2007; Donovan, 2010a). Wilson et al. (2007) is a report 
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from scientists sent by the government of New Zealand to learn from this crisis in 
order to reshape domestic volcanic risk governance. 
 
Shortly before the 2006 eruption, a number of DRR programmes were established 
around Merapi (Mei and Lavigne, 2012). This was likely part of the increased interest 
in DRR on the part of the Indonesian government. Mei and Lavigne argue that these 
were different to previous efforts which had lacked community participation. They 
state that the communities and the government were generally well prepared and that 
training and simulation exercises were conducted in April 2006, before the height of 
the eruption.  
 
...on 26 May 2006, a cooperative network named Forum Merapi was 
initiated; it gathered local authorities from Sleman, Klaten, Magelang 
and Boyolali, the MVO, several local and international NGOs, academic 
institutions, and representatives of local communities. The forum’s goal 
was to create a more comprehensive and participative disaster risk 
reduction programme on the Merapi Volcano. Since 2006, several 
programmes on volcano-related disaster management were conducted 
under the forum’s umbrella (Mei and Lavigne, 2012). 
 
The efforts of the Indonesian government and the assemblage that formed Forum 
Merapi therefore represented a transition from the hazard-based focus of the 
preceding decades to a DRR-based approach. However, much media attention was 
placed on those whose refusal to become involved with efforts to evacuate was still 
based on traditional beliefs. The unwitting figurehead of this movement was Mbah 
Marijan, an elder of the village of Pelemsari who had been appointed the hereditary 
'gatekeeper' of Merapi by the Sultan of Yogyakarta. In Pelemsari, Mbah Marijan was 
a respected elder, responsible for ceremonies celebrating the spirits of Merapi. 
However, the residents of many other communities afforded him a greater spiritual 
significance, including believing that he could control the volcano. When Marijan 
decided to remain during the 2006 eruption, despite his encouragement of fellow 
villagers to evacuate, it became a highly publicised story that influenced some 
evacuees' decisions to return to their homes (Donovan, 2010a). Donovan (2010b) 
argues that while traditional beliefs did have some influence on those who chose to 
  
123 
remain, their role was exaggerated by the media - economic motivations were also a 
determining factor. Donovan wrote "Although the villages in the south were spared in 
2006, the next large eruption will most likely devastate this region." 
 
The Indonesian Disaster Management law of 2007 represented the formal 
incorporation of the post-2004 DRR activity into a national legal framework, set out 
to define the role of government and stakeholders through all phases of the PPRR 
model. To this end, the current National Disaster Management Agency (Badan 
Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana, BNPB) was established with counterpart 
organisations at every level of government. The current institutional framework for 
emergency response at Merapi is depicted in Figure 5.3. 
 
 
Figure 5.3. The institutional framework for disaster risk at Merapi (Bakkour et al. 
2015). BPBD is the acronym for the local counterparts to the BNPB, these are the 
organisations that execute plans in the case of an emergency in co-ordination with a 
number of other public ministries. 
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In addition to disaster risk management, in co-ordination with the National 
Development Planning Agency, a National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction 
was established extending through all layers of government (Cribben et al., 2011). 
Cribben et al. (2011) is a report of a project to promote community-based DRR as part 
of the Hyogo Framework, noting that while significant progress had been achieved, 
several disasters, including the 2010 eruption of Merapi, "highlighted persistent 
vulnerabilities in Indonesia and underscored how disaster and poverty are 
intertwined." 
 
The VEI 4 October-November 2010 eruption of Merapi, was the largest since the 19th 
Century (Mei and Lavigne, 2012; Surono et al., 2012). Early indicators caused 
CVGHM to raise the alert level from I ('normal activity') to II ('increased activity') on 
20th September. Subsequently, the precursors intimated to the volcanologists that a 
larger volume of magma than they had experienced was accumulating. On 21st 
October, the alert level was raised to III ('high unrest, likely eruption') and on 25th, it 
was raised to level IV, calling for the evacuation of communities within a 10 km 
radius of the summit (Gertisser et al. 2011; Surono et al., 2012). As was the case in 
2006, the majority evacuated, however some remained, including Mbah Marijan and 
some members of his community who were among the 34 casualties of the first PDCs 
(Mei and Lavigne, 2012). The Gendol valley, unblocked in 2006, became the main 
outlet and, as Donovan (2010b) predicted, the villages on the south flank were 
destroyed. 
 
Jenkins et al. (2016) suggest that had the eruption been the same size as the largest of 
the 20th Century, the 2002 map and the existing evacuation plans would have been 
'appropriate'. However, as activity escalated over a period of 11 days to scales unseen 
at Merapi for more than a century, the existing VRR infrastructure "had to be 
abandoned... Evacuation zones toward the south had to be rapidly expanded, and 
displaced people in existing shelters had to relocate multiple times as shelters were 
consumed within the new, larger evacuation zones" (Jenkins et al. 2016). Authorities 
expanded the zones by 5 km three times from 3rd of November to 5th, as the eruption 




Official figures state that 396 were killed; the largest proportion (~170) were residents 
of the Gendol valley 10-15 km from the crater who failed to respond to the expansion 
of the evacuation zones in sufficient time, or did not believe that the eruption could 
reach them (Jenkins et al. 2016; Lavigne et al. 2017). More than 323,000 people were 
evacuated until 3rd December, by which point the activity had diminished. However, 
as had been the case during past eruptions, many evacuees (50-70%) returned to their 
land frequently to tend livestock and ensure that looting had not occurred (Mei and 
Lavigne, 2012; Pierson et al. 2014).  
 
A long-term spatial planning initiative spanning five government ministries was 
introduced to redesign land use in the affected areas (Hidayati et al. 2011). CVGHM 
produced the most recent hazard map, with zonation adjusted for the impacts of the 
2010 PDCs (Lavigne et al. 2017). A significant number of applied volcanology 
studies on Merapi emerged after 2010, building on the work of Dove (2008) and 
Donovan (2010a; 2010b) (e.g. Mei and Lavigne, 2012; Bakkour et al., 2015; Jumadi 
et al., 2015; Handayani et al. 2017). A further edition of the JVGR dedicated to the 
2010 (and 2006) eruptions of Merapi was published in 2013 (Jousset et al., 2013). 
CVGHM collaborated with the EU-funded MIA-VITA project, producing a risk map 
based on hazard, vulnerability, exposure and coping capacity. The process for 
producing this map was presented in the MIA-VITA Handbook for Volcanic Risk 
Management (Bignami et al. 2012). Some local authorities discouraged the residents 
of the most exposed villages from returning to their homes, attempting to incentivise 
new settlements outside the evacuated zones. However, as with Turgo in 1994, most 
residents chose to return (Hidayati et al. 2011). Hidayati et al. also note that more than 
a year after the eruption, there were still 2,000 living in temporary shelters. 14 Sabo 
dams were destroyed and De Bélizal et al (2013) state that the volume of material 
erupted once more raises the probability of hazardous lahars. Lavigne et al. (2017) 
note that the Sabo dams actually assisted the separation of mobile dilute surges from 
pyroclastic flows. 
 
Post-2010, Merapi has seen a VEI 2 explosion in November 2013, a VEI 3 explosion 
in April 2014, phreatic explosions which caused flight cancellations in May 2018 and 
dome growth from August 2018 until the time of writing (GVP, 2013). Brown et al. 
(2016) state: "With Indonesia’s focus on disaster management prevention and 
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mitigation, strategies were put in place that paid off when Mount Merapi became 
active again in 2013. Residents gathered quickly at designated assembly points and 
were evacuated successful [sic], waiting to return home until the threat had passed." 
However, they also note that maintaining this culture of preparedness may prove a 
challenge. 
 
Dynamic processes of policy mobility have shaped VRR at Merapi since the end of 
the 19th Century. Uncommonly frequent hazardous activity made Merapi a policy 
problem for Dutch colonists. As a result of their bringing a European industrial 
governance framework to the archipelago, an institutional response comprising many 
features of  'emergency management' was established at Merapi decades before it was 
a worldwide trend. The colonial VRR framework evolved over time, influenced by 
crises at the volcano and colonial scientists. However, inexperience and lack of focus 
on vulnerability saw eruptions frequently become disasters.  
 
The framework survived independence and continued to evolve. As European 
scientists were distanced from the core assemblages, for a time, it mutated in relative 
isolation, influenced by the limited resources and international relations of the 
Sukarno era, as well as the ongoing activity. Following the rise of the New Order, 
Merapi was open to international collaboration and these many exchanges profoundly 
shaped VRR therein. Merapi became a recipient of, and a conduit for the 
redistribution of 'best practices' in volcanic risk governance according to the most 
advanced understanding of the time. Nonetheless, disasters continued to happen as the 
vulnerable communities surrounding the volcano were confronted by a regime and a 
policy framework that did not incorporate their understanding of Merapi, nor their 
way of life. In addition to these social challenges, Merapi proved to be a volatile 
source of hazard, capable of lulling both laypeople and volcanologists into a false 
sense of security before devastating areas previously thought 'safe'. 
 
Institutional continuity was a key tenet of the Reformasi period. As such, the 
Behavioural paradigm continued to dominate into the early 2000s. However, evidence 
suggests that the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 provided a 'focussing event' that  
inspired the Hyogo Framework for Action of 2005 and then fed back into the 
Indonesian context. Indonesia's commitment to institutionalising the 'best practice' 
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policy strategy promoted by the UN is evident in the response to the Merapi crises of 
2006, 2010 and 2013. It could be argued that the frequent recurrence of hazardous 
events with disaster potential has kept political momentum behind the DRR agenda. 
The resistance to evacuations in 2006 and 2010, and the death toll of the latter 
eruption are indicators that even once a DRR-based approach has been adopted and 
institutionalised, its implementation is a gradual progression and will be affected by 
social, cultural, economic and volcanic processes. Indeed, the outcome of the next 
crisis remains uncertain, even if the incumbent policy framework is striving toward 
the 'best practices' of the international technocracies of VRR and DRR. However, the 
post-2007 policy framework has likely significantly reduced loss of life and 
potentially initiated a culture shift around the volcano, such that, that although in 
terms of lives lost, Merapi is currently the most 'calamitous' volcano of the 21st 
Century, it need not continue to claim that title. 
 
5.2. Nevado del Ruiz, Colombia 
Nevado del Ruiz (4.892°N 75.324°W; 5279 m; Figure 5.4) is a stratovolcano in the 
Cordillera Central of the Colombian Andes. Historically, it has been Colombia's 
second most active volcano, after Galeras. Forming the border between the 
departments of Tolima and Caldas, Nevado del Ruiz spans 250 km2 (Figure 5.5). It is 
heavily glaciated; estimates suggest 1200-1500 million m3 of ice on the summit 
(Thouret et al., 1990; Orozco-Alzate, 2006; GVP, 2013). In Witham's (2005) database 
of the most 'calamitous' volcanoes of the 20th Century, Ruiz ranks second in terms of 
deaths caused (23,080) and first in terms of injuries (4,470). Both of these figures 












Figure 5.5. Map of Nevado del Ruiz showing estimated hazard distribution, 
physical and political boundaries, settlements and transport infrastructure (UN 
World Food Program, 2011). 
5.2.1. Early Recorded Eruptions at Ruiz 
Nevado del Ruiz has produced 20 confirmed eruptions since 6660 BCE (GVP, 2013). 
Historical observations begin in 1570, since then there have been 13 confirmed 
eruptions. Nine of these have been small (<VEI 2), with three VEI 3 events (1845, 
1985 and 2012-2013) and one VEI 4 eruption (1595). The 2012-2013 event was an 
extended period of low-intensity activity (GVP, 2013). Therefore, there have been 
three significant explosive episodes at Nevado del Ruiz in recorded history, each of 
which has been "a catastrophe in human terms" (Parra and Cepeda, 1990). 
 
The 1595 eruption occurred when the territory that is now Colombia was part of the 
Spanish-controlled New Kingdom of Granada, governed from the city of Santa Fé de 
Bogotá. The land was also populated by indigenous peoples, over whom the 
conquistadores had assumed rule (Avellaneda, 1995). Reports of the eruption, 
describing four loud pulses and fall of ash and pumice, were collated by a priest 
However, the most significant outcome was that two rivers (which originated in the 
volcano's snow cap) "ran so full of ash that it looked more like a thick soup of cinders 
than like water. Both overflowed their channels leaving the land over which they 
flowed so devastated that for many years afterward it produced nothing but small 
weeds" (Voight, 1990). 636 were declared dead, predominantly indigenous residents 
of the Guali river valley (Parra and Cepeda, 1990). 
 
In 1819, following a period of conflict with the Spanish, the independent Republic of 
Gran Colombia was declared (Gobierno de Colombia, 2010; Eissa-Barroso, 2016). In 
1846, Joaquin Acosta, a Colombian explorer and scientist, attended the Academy of 
Sciences in Paris, presenting observations of a flow of mud that following 'a great 
subterranean noise' had descended the Rio Lagunillas 'from its sources in the Nevado 
del Ruiz'; approximately 1,000 people died. Acosta concluded that 'the causes of the 
catastrophe are unknown' (Parra and Cepeda, 1990; Voight, 1990). Acosta wrote: "It 
is astonishing that none of the inhabitants of these villages, built on the solidified mud 




The social infrastructure (indigenous and colonial) of the territory around Ruiz in 
1595 and 1845 had no apparent ex ante planning for the risk from the volcano 
(although the fact that death tolls were recorded, as well as allusions to rescue 
attempts by Acosta, suggest limited ex post action). It is also apparent that information 
regarding these events was collated, archived and even shared in an international 
academic forum. However, no evidence suggests the long-term retention of 'lessons', 
such that very similar volcanic processes killed significant numbers in the same way 
twice within 300 years. This is arguably to be expected of a volcano that had only 
produced eruptions of social consequence with a recurrence interval greater than a 
single human lifetime in the pre-civil defence era.  
 
5.2.2. The Development of the Polity of Colombia 
After 1845, two political parties emerged and have subsequently dominated 
Colombian politics: the Partido Conservador; and the Partido Liberal. Initially a 
Liberal-run federation, in 1886, Conservatives established a unitary republic and 
many state (now 'department') level powers returned to the central government. A 
faction of the Liberal party violently opposed this, culminating in the 'War of a 
Thousand Days' (1899-1902), which killed 100,000 (Watkins, 2004). In 1948 the 
assassination of a prominent Liberal, led to a series of riots. The resultant conflict (La 
Violencia) lasted 18 years and caused more than 200,000 deaths (Watkins, 2004; 
Coatsworth, 2003).  
 
The Colombian Red Cross (CRC) was founded in 1915 by medics who had fought in 
the War of a Thousand Days. Presidential decree established the CRC as "...a special 
non-profit institution of common utility with its own independent assets, organised 
through a Federal system, constituted in accordance with the laws of the Republic of 
Colombia." It was formally recognised by the International Red Cross in 1922 (Cruz 
Roja Colombiana, 2014). In 1948, this assemblage of personnel was formally 
constituted in law as the Socorro Nacional (National Relief). The Socorro Nacional 
was given authority for providing relief after 'calamities' with the acknowledgement 
that the Government would provide resources and personnel, whilst legally 
maintaining the Red Cross's commitment to neutrality. The Socorro Nacional became 




In 1958, as a response to the ongoing Violencia, the Frente Nacional (National Front); 
an arrangement whereby both parties would alternate in govenment for four-year 
fixed terms was established. The power to choose the President was taken out of the 
hands of the electorate. This proved contentious and, in 1964, politicised guerrilla 
organisations emerged (Watkins, 2004). As a response an internal security 
organisation, La Defensa Nacional was established; a division of which (Defensa 
Civil) was dedicated to unarmed action "to avoid, annul or diminish the effects that 
the actions of the enemy or nature may provoke against lives or social wellbeing" 
(Gobierno de Colombia, 1965).  
 
The CRC/Socorro Nacional, and Defensa Civil Colombiana have subsequently 
operated collaboratively. The Red Cross model was first implemented in Colombia as 
a response to Colombian social issues, seven years prior to the involvement of the 
International Red Cross. Thus, institutionalised disaster relief 'arrived' in Colombia, 
not through the machinations of an international NGO, but through a group of private 
individuals, having been inspired by that NGO from afar. Through the CRC, a form of 
institutionalised disaster relief came to exist in Colombia decades before the era of 
Civil Defence, in harmony with the state, but not explicitly of the state. This remained 
the case even after the establishment of the Socorro Nacional. Similarly, the civil 
defence model seems to have manifested organically in Colombia, as a response to 
Colombian issues, with no clearly evident process having brought it from 'elsewhere'. 
Thus, by the mid-point of the 'era of civil defence', Colombia possessed established 
infrastructure for disaster response, and therefore had arguably instituted the 
Behavioural paradigm of DRR. However, there was no policymaking directed at 
volcanic risk. Colombian volcanology was nonexistent, and no significant volcanic 
hazards had presented themselves in living memory to draw the attention of 
policymakers. 
 
The Frente Nacional lasted until 1974 (Watkins, 2004). The complicity of both 
parties had weakened their support bases, meaning that the transition back to 
democracy was completed peacefully. A Liberal President, Alfonso López Michelsen 
became the first directly elected leader since the 1950s. However, circumstances 
remained turbulent - the Liberals lost the presidency in 1982 and the incoming 
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Conservative, Belisario Betancur, took charge of a recession, a fiscal deficit, 
international debt and internal warfare from guerrillas and narcotics cartels (Hanratty 
and Meditz, 1988). Colombia in the early 1980s was simultaneously attempting to 
govern multiple crises and severely lacking resources. It was against this backdrop 
that Nevado del Ruiz began to show signs of unrest. 
 
5.2.3. The Eruption of November 1985 
In December 1984, the staff of a refuge on Nevado del Ruiz felt earthquakes and 
heard unusual noises. Ruiz had been subject to geological mapping and petrological 
analysis by two US doctoral projects, but was largely unstudied and unmonitored. The 
first institution to show interest was the Centro Hidro-Electrica de Caldas (CHEC), a 
private electricity provider from Manizales, capital of Caldas department (Figure 5.5), 
which had, in collaboration with Italian scientists, been investigating Ruiz for possible 
development of geothermal infrastructure since 1983 (Hall, 1990). On 6th January 
1985, CHEC scientists visited the crater and produced a report stating "the authorities 
must implement a geophysical and geochemical program for monitoring a probable 
eruption" (Voight, 1990). In late January, 'interested individuals' from businesses 
(including CHEC) and NGOs organised a committee with Manizales' mayor intending 
to monitor Ruiz and create a 'work plan' (Hall, 1990). Thus, it can be argued that 
existing institutions in Caldas (notably predominantly non-governmental institutions) 
assembled on an emerging micro-level policy field of VRR without external bodies or 
processes of policy circulation. However, the realisation of these plans quickly 
necessitated the involvement of people and organisations outwith Manizales and 
Caldas. 
 
In early February 1985, the search for experts began with Colombian universities and 
INGEOMINAS (The Colombian Bureau of Geology and Mines). INGEOMINAS 
were contacted by Defensa Civil authorities after a meeting between the Caldas and 
national-level organisations. It was quickly discovered that there were no 
volcanologists in Colombia (Bruce, 2002). Nonetheless, scientists from CHEC visited 
the crater in mid-February followed by an INGEOMINAS team. The CHEC team 
produced a report recommending that Caldas and neighbouring departments 
"undertake a survey of the volcanic and seismic risk of Nevado del Ruiz...". The full 




A request from INGEOMINAS and Defensa Civil to a team of UNDRO scientists 
(who happened to be in Colombia) connected Ruiz to the global policy field. The 
UNDRO team visited the crater and published conclusions that daily data-gathering, 
expanded instrumentation, training of Colombian scientists, the creation of a volcano 
monitoring and hazard evaluation programme by INGEOMINAS and the provision of 
logistical support, alert systems and evacuation plans by Defensa Civil were all 
necessary (Voight, 1990). A seminar on volcanic risk was held in the National 
University at Manizales and, at the end of March UNESCO, disappointed at inaction 
from INGEOMINAS/Defensa Civil, alerted the recently-established WOVO, bringing 
a further constituent of the global policy field of VRR into the frame. WOVO 
assembled a team in early April 1985, led by Minard Hall. Defensa Civil in Caldas 
produced an emergency plan for volcanic eruptions (Hall, 1990; Voight, 1990). 
 
Hall's visit included meetings with many constituents of the policy field growing 
around the volcano, predominantly in Caldas: CHEC scientists, Defensa Civil Caldas, 
the Universidad Nacional at Manizales, the Mayor of Manizales, the Governor of 
Caldas, the National Director of Defensa Civil and scientists from INGEOMINAS. 
Hall's meeting at INGEOMINAS raised the issue of funding. The WOVO report 
concluded that the activity at Ruiz was potentially hazardous and a full monitoring 
network should be established (Hall, 1990). The report also stated the Caldas 
emergency plan was "excellent and completely adequate", with the correct focus on 
lahar hazards, although it stressed the necessity for producing a hazard map (Voight, 
1990). After it became apparent that INGEOMINAS and the Universidad Nacional in 
Bogotá did not have sufficient funding, INGEOMINAS asked the USGS for 
seismometers. The USGS acquiesced, but did not provide personnel. Colombia's 
ambassador to UNESCO informed Bogotá that the UN was willing to provide 
technical support and funds, but the message 'went missing' for more than two months 
(Hall, 1990). 
 
The committee in Caldas was formalised in early July and given $1.5 million Col 
(£720,120) for monitoring and risk assessment. CHEC petitioned Italian scientists for 
assistance, while the state government and UNESCO requested assistance from 
Switzerland. The USGS' seismographs were installed by INGEOMINAS, however the 
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instruments did not work until the Swiss scientist Bruno Martinelli arrived and 
established three seismometers of his own in collaboration with CHEC, while also 
helping to make the USGS/INGEOMINAS seismographs functional. Around mid-
August, CHEC and INGEOMINAS formed separate seismology groups and did not 
share data (Hall, 1990; Voight, 1990). 
 
In early September regular volcanic tremor was registered. This concerned Martinelli, 
particularly because the seismograms were sent to Bogotá unprocessed. On 11th 
September, Nevado del Ruiz produced a continuous seven-hour phreatic explosion 
causing ashfall over Manizales and a lahar 20 km down the Rio Azufrado. Residents 
of the upper river valley were alerted, but not evacuated. Following an emergency 
meeting, the Caldas committee, Defensa Civil Caldas and the Governor recommended 
evacuations. Nonetheless, La Patria ran a front page headline claiming"Ruiz activity 
is not dangerous" in an attempt to restore calm (Voight, 1990). 
 
Following the 11th September eruption, activity on the VRR policy field surrounding 
Ruiz accelerated. The Caldas Committee met almost daily, the Governor of Caldas 
attempted to organise a work group with the governors of neighbouring departments 
(it was decided that each department would work autonomously). Multiple meetings 
were held in Bogotá, involving bodies as diverse as the Coffee Growers' Association 
of Caldas, the Ministry of Mines and the Nuclear Institute. At the national level, five 
'working groups' were formed: Budget, Public Health, Agriculture, Water and 
Scientific. Nevertheless, a two-day debate on 24th and 25th September in Congress 
was initiated when Caldas accused the government of a lack of support. The Minister 
of Mines and Energy insisted that support had been given not just to Caldas, but to the 
other departments (Tolima, Quindío and Risaralda) identified as potentially being 
affected. An educational programme about volcanic hazards began in Caldas schools 
(Hall, 1990).  
 
Until September 1985, Caldas had almost exclusively been the focal point for VRR 
policy development and mobility. From the start, Caldas developed its own micro-
level policy field with assemblages of private and civic institutions. Throughout 1985, 
this had become connected to the global policy field of VRR and shaped by a coming-
together of international technocratic bodies and existing local infrastructure. 
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However, it became apparent that communities in Tolima, on the eastern side of the 
volcano were perhaps at greater risk than any in Caldas.  
 
In mid-late September, the Mayor of the town of Armero (Figure 5.5) and the Director 
of the Red Cross in Tolima, drew attention to the potential for lahars to cause 
overspill on a dam on the Rio Lagunillas, creating a flood which would cause serious 
damage in the town. The Mayor's office suggested a drainage plan, but construction 
never began. At the end of September, a meeting was held between the scientists 
monitoring the volcano and the Secretary for the government of Tolima, at which a 
census of communities along the Tolima river valleys, and the placement of 
individuals with radios was discussed. On 1st-2nd October, a two-day seminar was 
held in Ibagué, capital of Tolima to instruct officials on volcanic emergency response. 
An emergency committee similar to that in Caldas was formed in Tolima (Hall, 1990; 
Voight, 1990).  
 
Tolima's institutions found themselves with a need to develop policy for a rapidly 
evolving situation, with substantial intrinsic uncertainty, despite no prior involvement 
in VRR developments around the volcano. Martinelli noted in a personal 
communication to Voight (1990):  
 
During the whole period of my stay there were no mutual contacts or 
cooperation between the region Caldas, where I was, and Tolima. Only 
on September 13th, i.e. after the eruption of September 11th, was a 
meeting held at the Defensa Civil in Bogotá, organized by General De La 
Cruz, with representatives of the authorities of Caldas and Tolima, of the 
Red Cross, and the Defensa Civil. As far as I could see, even after this 
meeting cooperation between the two regions was insufficient. 
 
Voight argues: “the focus on Manizales may have retarded local emergency 
management in neighbouring Tolima province, where much greater risk existed.” 
 
On 18th September, an article in La Patria claimed that the volcanic risk was 
overstated and the in-development hazard map would 'devalue' property in a form of 
'volcanic terrorism'. This was supported by statements from the USGS and other 
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foreign scientists whose opinions conflicted with Martinelli's, arguing that an eruption 
would likely only affect a 10 km radius around the vent. INGEOMINAS presented the 
first version of the map on the 7th October. Only ten copies were distributed, but it 
was stated at the meeting that, according to the map's projections, Armero would have 
two hours to evacuate after the generation of any lahar (Hall, 1990). Hall notes that 
the conflicting messages between groups of scientists and prominent local figures 
confused the population. The Mayor of Armero stated on 8th October that the 
community "...did not have the necessary information or financial resources to do 
anything in the event of a catastrophe. For this reason, the people have lost confidence 
in the veracity of the information and have commended their fate to God". 
 
In mid-October, UNDRO and UNESCO published reports, concluding that a 
hazardous eruption could occur at any time, and monitoring at the volcano was 
'almost non-existent' due to issues with the seismometers (Hall, 1990). Meanwhile, the 
Caldas risk committee and INGEOMINAS were still not sharing data; Martinelli 
wrote to Voight (1990):  
 
during the whole time of my visit I noted a pronounced rivalry between 
the emergency committee and INGEOM1NAS. I was never able to figure 
out the reason for this conflict nor to clarify what responsibilities each 
institution actually had. In any case, this rivalry had a strong influence 
on the whole phase of emergency preparation. 
 
On 6th November, many of the external scientists based in Manizales returned to their 
parent organisations (Hall, 1990). Guerrillas laid siege to the Colombian supreme 
court and President Betancur ordered an armed response in which 100 died (Hanratty 
and Meditz, 1988). The resulting political crisis forced the presentation of the 
completed hazard maps to be delayed from 12th November until 15th. The updated 
maps indicated that residents of Armero would need to travel over 1 km to escape 
inundation. Three days of continuous tremor starting on 10th November raised 
concerns but no action was taken (Voight, 1990). 
 
On 13th November, Nevado del Ruiz erupted again. Phreatic explosions began at 
15:06. However, the summit of the volcano was obscured by cloud, and the seismic 
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signals were confused for high winds by CHEC scientists. At 16:00, ash began to mix 
with rainfall in Tolima. National Defensa Civil and CRC were alerted by the co-
ordinator of Defensa Civil Tolima before 17:00, at which point he convened a regular 
meeting of the regional committee in Ibagué. The first action was to contact police 
stations and municipal CRC organisations to inform them to prepare for evacuation 'if 
necessary'. The meeting then turned to 'routine' matters such as developing emergency 
plans. At 19:30, when it was reported that ashfall had ceased, authorities in Armero 
encouraged citizens to remain indoors (Hall, 1990; Voight, 1990; Bruce; 2002). 
 
At 21:08, magmatic emission began. Explosions illuminated the clouds. CHEC 
scientists who witnessed this alerted the Caldas committee. They informed the 
Governor who issued an evacuation order for Caldas. The eruption peaked between 
21:30 and 22:00, generating glacier-burst lahars. In Caldas, the village of Chinchiná 
was the first hit, at 22:30. Although a partial evacuation had occurred, approximately 
1,100 died. In Tolima, authorities in Ibagué became aware of the eruption's climax 
between 21:45 and 22:00 and attempted to order the evacuation of Armero. However, 
the ash-laden rainstorm caused power outages and the message was not received. 
Most residents remained in their homes when the lahar surges arrived. The town was 
overwhelmed and approximately 23,000 were killed (Voight,1990). Total economic 
losses were later estimated at $218,000,000 USD (Mileti et al. 1991). 
 
One week later, survivors and victims were still being pulled from the mud in a relief 
effort co-ordinated by the CRC and Defensa Civil. A Presidential task force named 
Resurgir ('Rise Again') was created to co-ordinate all related private and public-sector 
activities, including emergency preparedness, housing, redevelopment, food 
distribution and identification of survivors. Subcommittees were created for each of 
these, each incorporating two or three survivors (Mileti et al. 1991). 
 
As the extent of the crisis became apparent through international broadcasting, large 
organisations on the global policy field of DRR began to contribute. Foreign aid 
donations totalled $50 million USD and the World Bank and the Inter-American 





In the frantic and mournful days that followed, the ranks of the Volcanic 
Risk Comité swelled with volunteer scientists from many nations... To aid 
the Comité, the USGS immediately dispatched (with OFDA support) 
about ten veteran volcanologists and mudflow specialists armed with 
sophisticated instrumentation... In addition, the U.S. Department of 
Defense sent two C-130 aircraft and 12 helicopters from the U.S. Army 
Southern Command to assist in medical evacuation, rescue and hazard 
missions... (Voight, 1990).  
 
The Caldas risk committee appealed to the USA to fund a seven-station lahar 
monitoring network, however OFDA rejected the proposal due to cost, and two 
stations were ultimately installed by Japan (Voight, 1990). Of Armero's 5,000 
survivors, 1,000-2,000 who were unable to find shelter with family were 
accommodated in refugee camps. A decision was taken not to resettle the land and 
replacement housing was constructed 13 km away (Mileti et al. 1991). 
 
The institutional response to the 1984/85 eruptive crisis of Nevado del Ruiz is laden 
with policy mobilities, assemblages and mutations. Prior to 1984, Colombia possessed 
no VRR policy infrastructure. The Ruiz crises of 1595 and 1845 had not resonated 
through the country's turbulent political history and Colombian DRR institutions had 
neither awareness nor incentive to perform ex ante planning during the volcano's 
inactivity. Although, by this point, much VRR experience existed 'elsewhere', and the 
international 'explosion' of volcanology that had followed the 1980 eruption of Mount 
Saint Helens was underway, connections to the global policy field of VRR at the start 
of the crisis were virtually nonexistent. Over the subsequent 11 months a policy field 
emerged, a confluence of existing Colombian meso and micro-level organisations and 
a variety of international actors. The result was not a cohesive policy system 
characterised by protocol and straightforward flow of information, but an uneven, 
chaotic and fragmented collection of emergent assemblages that saw profound 
differences in the rate and nature of policy development.  
 
In Caldas, a local, ad-hoc institutional response was established relatively rapidly. The 
Caldas committee sought expertise from 'elsewhere'. Although this was arguably a 
rational decision, the end product was more typical of mobile policy; a patchwork of 
  
140 
ideas and practices derived from the involvement of INGEOMINAS, Defensa Civil, 
UNDRO, UNESCO, WOVO and more besides, underpinned by Colombia's fractious 
internal politics and lack of resources. Two key examples of this are the divide 
between the Caldas committee and INGEOMINAS; and the complete lack of policy 
development in Tolima until after the 11th September eruption. Tolima appears to 
have attempted to emulate the model established in Caldas without any active 
collaboration with Caldas, nor the international connections and additional scientific 
input the Caldas committee received. It is unsurprising, given that this crisis occurred 
during the period identified in Chapter 4 as the peak of the Behavioural paradigm (not 
to mention the involvement of UNDRO) that the overall shape of the policy strategy 
employed by authorities in Caldas and Tolima conformed to the 'emergency 
management' approach, with all focus placed on responding to an eruption and little-
to-no focus on the reduction of vulnerability. The resulting policy framework failed to 
achieve its goal and contributed to the second largest volcanic disaster of the 20th 
Century. 
 
5.2.4 Volcanic Risk Governance at Nevado del Ruiz since 1985 
The November 1985 eruption of Nevado del Ruiz had a transformative impact. 
Significant policy developments stem from the Armero tragedy at the local, national 
and global levels. In Tolima, much effort was expended to understand the extent of 
the hazard, to communicate to the public and to develop policy to mitigate the risk 
(Mileti et al., 1990). The Caldas risk committee was transformed into a Colombian 
Volcanological Observatory under INGEOMINAS (ironically, given the prior 
disharmony between these two organisations). The Observatory was established by 
February 1986 with technical support from the USGS and financial support from 
OFDA (Voight, 1990). This USGS/OFDA approach would go on to become VDAP 
(Section 4.3) another product of the Ruiz eruption. 
 
The Observatory was part of a new national-level policy strategy for volcanic risk 
based on the UNDRO (1985) Volcanic Emergency Management manual, published 
weeks after the eruption. The technical aspects of the UNDRO system were ingrained 
in the approach (Mileti et al. 1991). The colour-coded alert system that the 
Observatory derived from the UNDRO manual has four levels: green (IV) 'stable'; 
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yellow (III) 'in flux'; range (II) an eruption is expected in the timescale of days to 
weeks; and red (I) an eruption is in progress (El Colombiano, 2015).  
 
Despite its origins in the Caldas committee, the Observatory was established as an 
instrument of the national government. It was required to report any eruption to the 
President's office, who would convene the National Emergency Committee (Comité 
Operativo de Emergencia - COE) established after the 1985 eruption. The COE was 
based in Bogotá and comprised the President's office, INGEOMINAS, CRC, Defensa 
Civil, Resurgir central command, the Governor of Tolima and local emergency 
services. In an emergency, the COE would inform Defensa Civil at national level, 
who would alert the Governor's office, who would alert local media and town mayors, 
who would alert the local police stations, who would alert a network of 'siren keepers' 
who would finally alert the public. An education campaign was also conducted, 
including school workshops, the distribution of flyers and hazard maps. The maps 
attracted criticism from those afraid they would cause a recession (Mileti et al. 1991). 
 
By February 1986, the new system had been employed twice: the first was a drill 
conducted without warning; the second was an actual evacuation decision by the 
COE, triggered by an eruption on 4th January, 1986 (although no hazardous lahars 
were generated). In both instances, it took more than three hours from the decision to 
the sirens, due to the complexity of the command chain. Few participated, despite the 
recentness of the Armero tragedy. An investigative team from the USA government 
visited Nevado del Ruiz in February 1986 to produce a report on the anatomy of the 
disaster. The second evacuation effort occurred during their visit and the apparent lack 
of success prompted them to write a report for Colombian policymakers 
recommending changes to the system: principally, increased instrumentation of the 
volcano; simplifying the command chain; and replacement or accompaniment of 
sirens with verbal warnings (Mileti et al. 1991). 
 
Low-moderate activity persisted at Nevado del Ruiz until July 1991. During this time, 
several increments in activity resulted in the COE calling evacuations. Six weeks of 
harmonic tremor and ash emission in June 1986 resulted in an order to permanently 
evacuate the zone within 10 km of the summit (with a population of 1,700) and a 
recommended evacuation of the 10-20 km zone as well. However, this did not occur. 
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In March 1988 the 10 km zone was once more ordered to evacuate. Several hundred 
complied, however more than 1,000 chose to remain. At 02:15 on 1st September 
1989, a phreatomagmatic explosion occurred and a lahar travelled 7 km, destroying a 
bridge. Sirens were sounded at 04:50 (again suggesting several hours between the 
identification of the eruption and the alert). This was the last crisis of 1984-91 (GVP, 
2013). Williams (1990) argues that the Observatory in Manizales had become 'world 
class', collaborating with volcanologists across the globe. The result was a special 
issue of the JVGR, notable for containing a 'policy section' (Hall [1990], Parra and 
Cepeda [1990] and Voight [1990]) wherein volcanologists reflected on the 
governance of the crisis. 
 
Between 1986 and 1990, the policy infrastructure that developed in response to the 
Nevado del Ruiz eruption was expanded into the Sistema Nacional de Prevención y 
Atención de Desastres (National System of Prevention and Attention to Disasters) or 
SNPAD (Gobierno de Colombia, 2014). This new system integrated across all levels 
of government placed Colombia at the vanguard of disaster risk policymaking and 
along with the start of the IDNDR, was one of the major global-level policy 
developments that kick-started the era of DRR at the macro level (UNISDR, 2015; 
Sections 2.3.1. and 4.3).  
 
After the 1984-91 eruptive period, Nevado del Ruiz showed no further activity and 
the attentions of the Colombian policy field of VRR were drawn to Volcán Galeras in 
the southern department of Nariño, selected as a 'Decade Volcano'. During a Decade 
Volcano workshop in January 1993, a field excursion to Galeras' crater coincided with 
an explosion that killed six volcanologists and three tourists (Baxter and Gresham, 
1997; Bruce, 2002). Although not caused directly by volcanism, in 1994, a magnitude 
6.4 earthquake triggered lahars from Nevado del Huila volcano resulting in 271 
confirmed deaths, 1,700 missing and more than 32,000 evacuees (GVP, 2013). 
 
The Nevado del Huila lahar was the last volcanic crisis of the 20th Century in 
Colombia. However, SNPAD had become occupied an increasing number of 
disasters. Between the start of the IDNDR and 2011, nearly 17,000 disasters were 
registered, predominantly caused by hydrometeorological hazards, earthquakes and 
slope failure. The Plan Nacional para la Prevención y Atención de Desastres 
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(National Plan for Disaster Prevention and Response) or PNPAD was created in 1998. 
The PNPAD endeavoured to change the focus of the DRR system to the long-term 
reduction of risk through development. However, implementation was partial and 
subject to varying interpretations. Disasters continued to increment - 9,270 were 
registered between 2000 and 2009. The fatalities from disasters dropped from 3,957 in 
the 1990s to 2,180 in the 2000s, however, the total number of people affected grew 
from 9,204,412 in the 1990s to 9,284,073 in the 2000s, predominantly through 
property damage due to population expansion in vulnerable areas (Campos et al. 
2011).  
 
Campos et al. (2011) argue that a holistic evaluation of potential volcanic risk in the 
country had not been performed. Only 12 out of 20 potentially active volcanoes were 
monitored by the three INGEOMINAS observatories (laterally the Servicio Geologico 
Colombiano - SGC) in Manizales, Popayán and Pasto. There was no database of 
communities and assets at risk. Nevado del Huila became active, producing lahars in 
April 2007 and November 2008 (CNN, 2007; BBC, 2008). Several evacuations were 
ordered. It was argued by the Pan-American Health Organisation (2007) after the first 
of these that memory of the 1994 event had contributed to a high rate of participation. 
However, in the following eruption (which did not produce lahars) the evacuation 
order was ignored by many (Colombia Reports, 2007). The November 2008 eruption 
produced the largest lahars, evacuations of 10,000 predominantly indigenous people 
were ordered <2 hours before the lahars reached settlements. These were largely 
successful, however, 10 were killed (BBC, 2008; Campos et al. 2011).  
 
After the 2010-11 La Niña that caused 510 deaths and $ 8.6 billion Col in damages, 
the Colombian government requested that the World Bank's Global Facility for 
Disaster Reduction and Recovery, a multi-actor partnership on the global policy field, 
conduct an external examination and recommend policy changes (Campos et al. 
2011). The report concluded that increasing disaster risk was predominantly 
attributable to DRR having not been incorporated into land management, leading to 
higher vulnerability. This was compounded by 'gaps' in the policy infrastructure, 
whereby municipal and department-level actors, private citizens and businesses 
frequently did not understand their roles in the system, nor the ongoing process of risk 
reduction. The GFDRR recommendations were incorporated into a new successor 
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entity. The SNGRD (Sistema Nacional de Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres) 
coordinated by the UNGRD (Unidad Nacional para la Gestión del Riesgo de 
Desastres) created in 2012. Three national committees were established for distinct 
functions: study of risk; reduction of risk and management of disasters. Councils for 
risk reduction were also established at every level of government (department, district 
and municipality) (Gobierno de Colombia, 2012).  
 
In the period 1991-2012, the observatory in Manizales had predominantly registered 
low seismicity and fumarolic activity at Nevado del Ruiz. A minor explosion in 1994 
resulted in the alert level being raised to Yellow and the emergency committee of 
Caldas temporarily declaring the summit closed to climbers. A significant earthquake 
swarm in May 2002 caused the alert level to be raised to Orange, although no eruption 
ensued. Heightened seismicity in September 2010 again caused the alert level to be 
briefly raised to Yellow (GVP, 2013). 
 
In January 2012, SO2 flux increased significantly and explosive degassing signatures 
began to appear on the seismic record. On 29th March a hundredfold increase in 
seismicity led to an Orange alert being issued. The National Park that encompasses 
the volcano closed in April 2012 over fears that the rainy season would generate 
secondary lahars. On 3rd May, the alert level was dropped to Yellow. However, on 
29th May, an increase in seismicity resulted in the alert being restored to Orange 
before explosions dispersed ash over 20 communities northwest of the volcano and 
caused the closure of three airports on advice from the Washington VAAC (GVP, 
2013). The municipal division of the SNPAD in Manizales ordered an evacuation of 
24 families deemed to be at highest risk. In a press release on 7th June, the director of 
the Municipal Office for Prevention and Attention to Disasters admitted that some had 
not evacuated and while the organisation was willing to offer evacuees a $150,000 
Col lease subsidy, there was no legal mechanism to force them to comply (El 
Espectador, 2012). 
 
Widespread ashfall continued throughout June, before a significant increase in activity 




On 30 June 2012, seismicity increased and large plumes of ash vented 
from the summit... At 1700 that day, authorities raised the alert to Level I 
(Red). Local news media reported the preventative evacuation notice 
provided by the Emergency Committee of Caldas... An estimated 300 
families were ordered to evacuate from the rural zones of districts 
Chinchiná (30 km WNW), Villamaría (28 km NW), Palestina (40 km 
WNW), and Manizales (30 km NW) due to both escalated explosions and 
also the potential for flooding along the rivers Chinchiná and Río Claro. 
In the Department of Tolima, located S of Caldas there was a 
recommendation to evacuate 1,500 families in risk zones in eight 
municipalities (GVP, 2013). 
 
Approximately 4,000 people were ordered to evacuate. However, only 43% complied, 
prompting Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos to express his frustration on 
Twitter: “They have not evacuated all who should have been evacuated. How many 
were supposed to be evacuated? 4,000 people were supposed to be evacuated and 
1,710 were evacuated. What does this say about us? That we lack education, 
collaboration and social discipline. Here we have to improve” (Colombia Reports, 
2012). This failure to engage the at-risk population is arguably comparable to other 
examples of UNDRO-based VRR systems that failed to achieve their policy goals. 
There is little evidence in the volcanic crises in Colombia since 1985 of a 
straightforward progression towards increasingly efficient evacuation procedures. 
 
President Santos' first challenge as head of government had been the La Niña crisis of 
2010-2011 and it was his administration that consulted the World Bank and ultimately 
brought about the transition from the SNPAD to the SNGRD. As the Nevado del Ruiz 
crisis of 2012 unfolded, the director of the UNGRD published objectives for the 
creation of a Contingency Plan for Eruption of Nevado del Ruiz: 
 Identify the panorama of risks in the zones influenced by Nevado del Ruiz. 
 Establish the functions and responsibilities of the different national and 
territorial entities. 
 Establish organisation and planning mechanisms for actions to attend and 
control emergency situations in an opportune manner. 
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 Determine the inventory of physical, human and logistical resources for 
attending emergencies. 
 Formulate a plan of action to face the impacts that could be generated by a 
possible eruption of Nevado del Ruiz. 
 Develop recommendations to help regional and municipal organisations to 
take the necessary precautions (Márquez, 2012). 
 
At this stage, it can be argued that the focus was still orientated towards responding to 
an emergency, as opposed to the long-term DRR goals espoused by the SNGRD 
project. However, this was the first step in reviewing the VRR system at Nevado del 
Ruiz since its reactivation and it is possible that longer-term policy goals were 
incorporated later. After the evacuations of June-July 2012, activity diminished. The 
alert was lowered to Orange on 2nd July and to Yellow in September 2012. Yellow 
alert has been maintained ever since (GVP, 2013).  
 
Since 2012, this study has not encountered official publications from the Colombian 
government regarding the development of policy pertaining specifically to Nevado del 
Ruiz. However, there have been other developments with the potential to influence 
VRR policy and practice at Ruiz. In 2015, the UNGRD produced the National Plan 
for Disaster Risk Management, the co-ordinating strategy of the SNGRD. Its goals 
are: 
 Reduce national mortality caused by disasters by 2025 and reduce the national 
mortality rate caused by disasters per 100,000 people in the decade 2015-2025, 
compared to the period 2005-2015. 
 Reduce the number of people affected in the country by 2025 and reduce the 
rate of people affected by disasters per 100,000 people in the decade 2015-
2025, compared to the 2005-2015 period. 
 Reduce the number of homes destroyed and directly affected by recurrent 
phenomena in the decade 2015-2025 with respect to the 2005-2015 period 
(UNGRD, 2015). 
 
This policy strategy aims to reduce physical and social vulnerability around Nevado 
del Ruiz (and throughout Colombia). The National Plan includes several goals 
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pertaining to volcanic risk. Under 'Study of Risk', it encourages further investigation 
of seven active volcanoes and reinforcement of monitoring networks. Under 
'Preparation for Response in Regional Risk Scenarios', there are aims for the 
"elaboration and realisation of national protocols for response to volcanic 
phenomena" such that 100% of departments located in areas affected by volcanic 
phenomena have protocols in place by 2025 (UNGRD, 2015). If these policy goals are 
to be realised then a co-ordinated VRR policy approach to risk at Nevado del Ruiz 
involving all stakeholders and levels of government should be under development. 
However, details have not been published to date. 
 
The practices of volcanologists have been more visible. Since 2015, the Manizales 
volcano observatory has published monthly reports of outreach activities, including 
internet publications, regular presentations and meetings in communities and with 
authorities (SGC, 2018). Moreover, in 2012, the SGC entered into collaboration with 
VDAP, resulting in a 'Bi-National Exchange' project between the USA and Colombia 
specifically aimed at improving VRR at Nevado del Ruiz and Mount Rainier (USGS, 
2015c; Section 5.3). Finally, Nevado del Ruiz has been one of the 'forensic volcanoes' 
of the Strengthening Resilience in Volcanic Areas (STREVA) project (Sections 2.3.2; 
4.3). STREVA involvement at Nevado del Ruiz included a workshop entitled 
"Learning from past eruptions at Nevado del Ruiz to build a more resilient future" 
(6th-11th of October 2014). This was arranged collaboratively by STREVA team 
members, SGC and UNGRD. One of the goals of the workshop was to start a long-
term programme of research and collaboration pertaining to volcanic risk and to 
contribute to the ongoing process of risk reduction in Colombia (Sword-Daniels et al. 
2014). A further result of STREVA involvement at Nevado del Ruiz has been the 
publication of an extensive investigation of multiple aspects of vulnerability (e.g. 
access to resources and public services, education, quality of life, quality of housing, 
livelihood) in three municipalities in Tolima and Caldas. This study suggests that, 
although awareness among residents that they live in an area of high volcanic risk is 
generally strong, knowledge of the hazards and the plans and actions to reduce 
vulnerability is still limited. Alhough all households examined were in a high risk 
area, only 43% of respondents were aware of this in Villa María, Caldas, and 45% 
were aware in Armero-Guayabal, Tolima. In Villa María, 80% and in Armero-
Guayabal, 62% of residents had not seen the risk maps produced by the SGC for the 
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volcano. There was a high margin of confidence among residents that they knew what 
to do in case of an eruption, however only around half of households had a personal 
emergency plan, as recommended by authorities. (Armijos and Few, 2017). This 
suggests that, in the development of the latest iteration of the Nevado del Ruiz VRR 
policy, there is still much work to be done with regard to community engagement. 
 
The aftermath of the 1985 eruption of Nevado del Ruiz saw a policy model shaped 
through an influx of mobile knowledge. The UNDRO (1985) manual formed the basis 
for this - likely its first application. Typically of mobile policy, it 'mutated' in its new 
setting, influenced by the Colombian context and inputs from 'elsewhere'. The 
resulting policy framework became the foundation for a nationwide DRR system. 
Volcanology became well established in Colombia and extensive international 
collaboration meant that mutual exchange of information drove advances in the 
science and encouraged focus on applied volcanology. Among other field 
constituents, VDAP and all of its subsequent impacts on the global policy field 
originate in the aftermath of the 1985 Ruiz eruption.  
 
The Colombian system itself went on to become a globally mobile policy model that 
fed into the IDNDR and UNISDR, becoming a crucial component in kick-starting the 
transition from 'emergency management' to 'disaster risk management' at the global 
level, recognising the importance of ex ante policymaking (even if the transition to 
full DRR is incomplete). These macro-level entities on the global policy field have 
subsequently fed back into the Colombian context through the Hyogo and Sendai 
Frameworks and the Colombian government's consultation of the World Bank in 
2011. Due to the 1991-2012 quiescence, it is arguable that these developments 
somewhat bypassed Nevado del Ruiz and thus, when the volcano awoke, 
(coincidentally, as Colombia was on the cusp of a further leap towards DRR) the 
unchanged UNDRO-based policy model proved inadequate for much the same 
reasons as at various other volcanoes. Had the 2012 eruption been larger, a second 
major disaster was entirely feasible. 
 
There are signs of work to develop an integrated DRR policy framework that 
presumably incorporates Nevado del Ruiz. However, in an ideal DRR framework, the 
details would arguably be public knowledge and every stakeholder, including the 
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general public, would be aware of their roles. As such, the true nature of the  form that 
governance of future crises at Nevado del Ruiz will take is currently uncertain, 
although there is evidence that the international volcanological community is 
maintaining the flow of knowledge from 'elsewhere' in the pursuit of 'best practices'. 
There is potential for further mobilities, mutations and assemblages to have a 
profound and unpredictable effect on volcanic risk governance at Ruiz. 
 
5.3 Mount Rainier, United States of America 
Mount Rainier (46.853°N 121.760°W; 4,392 m; Figure 5.6) is a glaciated 
stratovolcano in Washington State, USA. 1980s studies estimated ice cover at 90 km2 
and volume at 4.2 km3 (Dreidger and Kennard, 1986). In light of worldwide glacial 
retreat, a recent study has estimated the perennial snow and ice cover on Mount 
Rainier at 80.82 km2. However, an adjusted volume estimate has not yet been made 
(Beason, 2017). Magma-water interaction and sector collapses have produced lahars 
and debris avalanches that have reached Puget Sound, 48 km from the summit 
(PCDEM, 2008; Figure 5.7). The last confirmed eruption of Mount Rainier was in 
1450 (± 100 years) (GVP, 2013). Mount Rainier is, therefore, unlike the previous two 
case studies in that it has not produced significant hazardous activity in modern 
history. However, by 2009, the deposits around this volcano had come to be inhabited 
by approximately 78,000 people and USGS scientists have suggested that this makes 
Rainier potentially the most dangerous volcano in the USA (Driedger and Scott, 2008; 











Figure 5.7. United States Geological Survey hazard map of Mount Rainier 
(PCDEM, 2008) showing at-risk areas, topography, waterways, county boundaries, 
roads and settlements. 
5.3.1. The Roots of Volcanic Risk Governance at Mount Rainier 
The limited nature of VRR in the Cascades until the 1980s is detailed in Section 4.2. 
The foundation of the Cascades Volcano Observatory (CVO) in 1982 was a local 
policy consequence of the Mount Saint Helens eruption that came to encompass the 
other volcanoes in the range. The risk of lahars from glaciated stratovolcanoes had 
become apparent after the Mount Saint Helens and Nevado del Ruiz eruptions. By 
1991, scientists at CVO had identified the potential threat from Mount Rainier. A 
successful nomination bid for Mount Rainier was submitted to the IAVCEI committee 
responsible for organising the Decade Volcano project (Section 4.3) with the 
condition that the USA government provided finances, as the (unsuccessful) request 
for UN funding was to be dedicated to the 7+ volcanoes from 'developing' countries 
(Swanson et al. 1992).  
 
The Decade Volcano Demonstration Project for Mount Rainier began in September 
1992 with a workshop at the University of Washington involving 75 Earth scientists, 
disaster risk scientists and representatives of government agencies (US Geodynamics 
Committee, 1994). It was recognised that Rainier was poorly studied outwith 1960s 
geological surveys which were insufficient to constrain past activity. The 1994 US 
Geodynamics Committee report outlines a course of action including long-term 
studies in geology/petrology, geochemistry and seismology, the establishment of a 
monitoring programme encompassing seismicity, ground deformation, hydrothermal 
activity, visual observation and debris flows/lahars. Furthermore, it contains a section 
dedicated to 'mitigation' outlining recommendations for communication between 
stakeholders and a long-term strategy: 
 
Planning and implementation of risk-mitigation measures should involve 
scientists, government, business, and citizens and should be  coordinated 
and, where appropriate, integrated with other planning activities in the 
region. Several measures, including the following, should be considered 
for implementation in order to significantly reduce risk from volcanic 
hazards to people and property: 
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• analyses to identify regions and populations at risk; 
• land use planning and economic incentives to discourage inappropriate 
use of high-risk areas; and 
• engineering solutions to mitigate risks where possible, from specific 
volcanic hazards (US Geodynamics Committee, 1994). 
 
The report outlines the legal framework for implementation (the Washington State 
Growth Act of 1990 and its subsidiary legislation in Pierce County [Figure 5.7], the 
most vulnerable jurisdiction). An elected committee of resident representatives 
developed a series of recommendations and working guidelines for VRR 
policymaking in Pierce County, based on the best available information regarding the 
volcanic risk. The US Geodynamics Committee report noted: "Careful tracking of 
how that information is (or is not) translated into actual mitigative measures is needed 
to transfer successful ideas to other jurisdictions, or to spot jurisdictions for which 
more information, more aggressive application, or alternative measures are needed." 
This demonstrates some awareness the complexities of policy mobility at an early 
stage in the process. 
 
It is notable that the volcanologists at CVO initiated the entire policy development 
process at Rainier by engaging with the Decade Volcano project. They used a macro-
level initiative, driven by the global volcanological 'expert community' (a component 
of the larger IDNDR programme) to frame Mount Rainier as a policy problem and 
assemble a collective of meso-and-micro level actors with the goal of establishing a 
VRR governance framework. The involvement of citizens' groups is also noteworthy, 
as this is a policy goal of the then-new 'disaster risk reduction' paradigm not seen at 
other case study volcanoes at this stage. 
 
5.3.2. The Mount Rainier Volcanic Hazards Response Plan 
Preliminary discussions between USGS volcanologists and the Pierce County 
Department of Emergency Management (PCDEM) concluded that the policymaking 
process would require involvement from federal, state and local government and the 
other stakeholders listed above. A 'work group' comprising all of these was convened, 
co-chaired by the director of PCDEM and the Chief Ranger of Mount Rainier 
National Park, and regular quarterly meetings ensued. Initially, the idea was to create 
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an 'operational response plan' for emergencies (the 1985 UNDRO manual was cited in 
the first published version) however, it became apparent that participants' 
understanding of the risks and available courses of action was limited. It was therefore 
recommended that a public education programme be implemented in parallel. The 
authors argue that the work group has since: “…created an outstanding network of 
individuals, educated to, familiar with and most importantly concerned about what 
Mount Rainier may do… strengthened our community and fostered relationships that 
will encompass more than just issues surrounding the mountain” (PCDEM, 2008). 
 
As the policy developed and the group became more informed, it was decided that a 
long-term mitigation strategy would potentially reduce the scale of a short-term 
emergency response. A post-disaster phase was also incorporated. The first version of 
the Mount Rainier Volcanic Hazards Response Plan (MRVHRP) was published by the 
Washington Emergency Management Division in 1999 (WEMD, 1999). A second, 
expanded edition was published by PCDEM in October 2008. Despite no significant 
activity at the volcano, the work group have conducted continual 'plan maintenance', 
aiming for revisions every two years, incorporating new scientific information, 
changes in command structure, technology etc., although the 2008 document remains 
the most recent published edition (PCDEM, 2008). Both versions are available to 
download from their respective publishers. 
 
The MRVHRP encompasses multi-jurisdiction, multi-agency and multi-disciplinary 
concerns, from local (e.g. town fire departments) to national (Incident Command 
System) organisations. It has a detailed breakdown of operations in a crisis. Its 
“Command” chapter is dedicated to outlining the operational hierarchy (PCDEM, 
2008). It designates one body; the Washington Emergency Management Division 
(WEMD) as 'area command'; the lead agency responsible for coordinating operations 




Figure 5.8. The command structure of the MRVHRP (PCDEM, 2008); Washington 
Emergency Management Division Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) provides a 
hub for the numerous agencies and organisations, coordinating flow of information 
and directing operations for actors as diverse as county EOCs, police and 
environmental health agencies, volcanologists at the Cascades Volcano 
Observatory (CVO) and, notably, indigenous communities. This system is known 
as a unified command structure and is advocated by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) for all multi-jurisdiction emergency management 
scenarios in the USA, aiming for less conflict, less duplication of efforts and more 
effective utilisation of resources (FEMA, 2008). See the Glossary of Acronyms for 
further explanation. 
The MRVHRP outlines the full monitoring programme used by the USGS. The plan 
uses the same four-level alert system used by the USGS at all volcanoes in the USA 
(although in the case of communicating hazards to aviation, the international standard 
code employed by all VAACs, which differs from the USGS system, is used). Despite 
having the same number of levels as the current systems at Merapi and Nevado del 
Ruiz, there are some differences. The USGS uses categories that reflect not only the 
likelihood of activity, but of hazardous activity. The categories reflect the level of 
concern of the volcanologists, not just the state of the volcano. A colour code is not 
used in order to avoid the impression that the alert levels are sequential (PCDEM, 
2008; Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1. USGS Summary of Volcano Alert Levels (USGS, 2017). This system is 
designed to reflect the non-linear behaviour of volcanoes. The “Advisory” category 
serves not just as the step between “Normal” and “Watch” but also as an alert in the 






The MRVHRP details ongoing mitigation procedures and recovery operations. 
Mitigation encompasses improvement of evacuation routes; tax disincentives for 
moving into hazard-prone areas and public education initiatives (Table 5.2). Recovery 
procedures are planned to be initiated whilst the response is ongoing, the course of 
action taken will depend on the outcome of a damage assessment; if deemed 
inappropriate then repopulation of damaged areas may not be permitted for decades 
(PCDEM, 2008) 
Table 5.2. Summary of mitigation measures against volcanic hazards in operation 
in Pierce County, Washington, the organisations responsible and the anticipated 





The MRVHRP aims to present an integrated approach to volcanic risk governance 
with diverse components incorporated into a single policy framework. As well as 
seeking to "manage" any emergencies at the volcano, the MRVHRP aims to adjust 
social conditions around Mount Rainier in the long term to reduce the likelihood of 
future crises. Although the UCS is inevitably authoritarian, the collaborative approach 
to designing the plan aims to make the MRVHRP work for all stakeholders and the 
'work group' is presented as a harmonious platform at which all interests are 
represented fairly. However, there have been no volcanic crises at Mount Rainier to 
validate its efficacy. 
 
5.3.3. Recent Developments 
Although the plan has never been put into practice in an emergency scenario, drills 
have been conducted to test its logistical functionality. The first of these was a 
simulation exercise with no public participation in May 2001. Confusion among 
authorities led to 5,000 'residents' still being present in the inundation zone of the 
imaginary lahar at the time it was projected to arrive. The chief of PCDEM stated 
"We learned a lot. We still have a ways to go" (Doughton, 2001). Since then, some 
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parts of the plan have been practised annually, such as the evacuation of the town of 
Orting (Figure 5.7). These are participative drills conducted by school students, 
teachers and volunteers during an annual 'Volcano Preparedness Month'. Evacuation 
times have improved annually and these drills are embedded in community life 
(Pierce County Television, 2017). Furthermore, WEMD (2019) claims that a 'new 
plan for Mt. Rainier' is forthcoming. 
 
In 2012, a 'Bi-National Exchange' programme was proposed by VDAP scientists who 
had worked on Mount Rainier and Nevado del Ruiz, noting similarities between the 
two (Pallister, 2017). They entered into collaboration with the SGC and, in 2013, 
organised exchange visits between scientists, emergency management authorities, 
emergency responders, the Red Cross, OFDA (who provided the funding) and others 
from both countries (USGS, 2015c). A further visit was conducted in 2017, during 
which the Colombians participated in the Orting evacuation drill (Pierce County 
Television, 2017). This programme's status as a formal collaboration between 
government institutions of the USA and Colombia marks it as an apparently mutual 
enterprise wherein both sets of actors contribute and benefit in equal measure (USGS, 
2015c). This may stem from its origin in the close working relationships between the 
volcanologists who, although employees of different governments, are also colleagues 
in the expert community of volcanology. As the most recent iterations of VRR policy 
at Mount Rainier and Nevado del Ruiz are under development at the time of writing, 
tracking the assemblage and re-assemblage these exchanges is beyond this 
investigation. However, it is likely, given the number of individuals and institutions 
involved, that the full range of formal and informal policy consequences will be 
diffuse; sometimes overt, sometimes subtle, and thus difficult to encapsulate in full, 
supporting the premise that mobile policy is complex and unpredictable, even when 
engaged with deliberately and voluntarily. 
 
The VRR policy field at Mount Rainier differs from our other cases in that it has 
materialised and evolved without activity at the volcano. At the other case study 
volcanoes, VRR policymaking has been demonstrated to be predominantly a reactive, 
ex post process. At Mount Rainier, it has ostensibly been entirely ex ante - however, it 
can be argued that the triggering events occurred at other volcanoes. Such a scenario 
is arguably the highest aspiration of policy mobility in volcanic risk governance. 
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Circulation on the global policy field of VRR, mainly through volcanological 
assemblages, brought volcanic risk governance to Mount Rainier, and scientists 
deliberately used the Decade Volcano project to institutionalise it. Afterwards, much 
of the process of developing the MRVHRP seems to have been conducted at the 
meso/micro levels. The UNDRO (1985) model provided the core 'emergency 
response' component of the MRVHRP. However, a more expansive policy framework 
has been assembled around it, demonstrating the now-familiar principle that the 
coming together of mobile policy and the unique attributes of new settings frequently 
causes significant mutation.  
 
A prominent feature of this case is how deliberate much of the process seems, both in 
terms of the intentions of the policy actors and evidence-based decision-making. 
Everything from the proposal to the implementation suggests extensive planning. It is 
perhaps because policymaking has been conducted in 'volcanic peacetime' that the 
long timescales required for such deliberation have been possible. It could be argued 
that volcanic risk governance at Mount Rainier (theoretically at least) conforms more 
to the Complexity paradigm, due to its focus on community input and the long-term 
reduction of vulnerability. This has been the case since the first policy consultation, in 
contrast with the previous two cases where the full adoption of a DRR approach has 
only been attempted in the 2000s-2010s, driven by the UNISDR. It may be argued 
that policymakers had a 'blank canvas' with no vestigial policy infrastructure from the 
Behavioural model to accommodate, allowing a DRR-based system to develop 
'organically'. It remains to be seen, however, how this policy framework will perform 
in a real volcanic crisis. 
 
5.4. Popocatépetl, United Mexican States 
Popocatépetl (19.023ºN, 98.622ºW; 5393 m; Figure 5.9) is a stratovolcano in central 
México, 60 km southeast of the capital, México City and 40 km west of the city of 
Heroica Puebla de Zaragoza (Puebla), bordering the states of México, Puebla and 
Morelos (Figure 5.10). Since the start of the 20th Century, 10 periods of activity 
between VEI 1-3 have occurred. There have been 32 such periods in approximately 
500 years of observation. Radiocarbon dating and tephrochronology have revealed at 
least two Plinian and three sub-Plinian eruptions within the last 8,000 years (GVP, 
2013). There have been few deaths recorded at Popocatépetl. Most recently, five 
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climbers were killed during an eruption on 30th April 1996,. However, artefacts have 
been discovered in the deposits of the two most recent Plinian eruptions in Puebla, 
indicating that settlements were destroyed at some distance from the volcano (Siebe 
and Macías, 2003). Around 20 million currently live in communities that may be 
affected by Popocatépetl, De la Cruz and Tilling (2008) state that "Popocatépetl is 
arguably the most dangerous volcano in the country". The majority would likely be 
affected by ashfall in a major eruption, whilst the number exposed to flow phenomena 
is closer to 500,000 (Siebe and Macías, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 5.9. Vulcanian explosion at Popocatépetl, looking south from Volcán 





Figure 5.10 Map showing the location of Popocatépetl within central México, 
including state boundaries and population centres (González and De la Cruz, 2010). 
Distrito Federal was the administrative name for México City until 2016. 
5.4.1. Early Volcanic Risk Governance in México 
Rural México experienced two significant volcanic crises in the mid-20th Century: the 
1943-52 eruption of the monogenetic cone, Paricutín, which resulted in the relocation 
of 1,200 refugees (Nolan, 1972); and the Plinian eruption of El Chichón in April 1982 
which killed 2,000 and left 45,000 homeless (Macías and Aguirre, 2006). The 
governance of these crises was arguably reactive, ad hoc and inconsistent - at times 
laissez-faire and at times authoritarian. In the case of El Chichón, communities were 
evacuated by the military, then permitted to return (the climactic stage of the eruption 
killed most who did). Survivors were divided into camps and subsequently left as 
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environmental refugees without government assistance or compensation (Macías and 
Aguirre, 2006). These crises did not inspire the developmment of DRR policy in 
México. However, after the Chichón eruption, two geologists from the Instituto de 
Geofísica (IG) at the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de México (UNAM) who 
witnessed the climactic phase became the country's first volcanologists (De la Cruz 
and Martin del Pozzo, 2009).  
 
On 19th September 1985, an earthquake severely affected the capital, killing 4,541 
and causing over $4 billion USD in economic losses. It was this that drove the federal 
government to establish SINAPROC, the National System of Civil Protection, in 1986 
(OECD, 2013; Figure 5.11). The crises of Paricutín and El Chichón suggest that if a 
policy problem arises in a provincial location, then sometimes its 'lessons' do not even 
circulate to the more populous regions of the same country, nor into the priorities of 
central government.  
 
Figure 5.11. Structure of SINAPROC, the Mexican National System of Civil 
Protection (Campos et al. 2016). At the top tier is the executive power of the 
President and the national committees that can be convened at presidential behest. 
The administration of SINAPROC is conducted under the authority of the Secretary 
of the Interior and the Co-ordinator General of SINAPROC has direct authority 
over the three organs of the system at federal level: the general directorate; 
FONDEN, which manages the federal finances for disaster response; and 
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CENAPRED, the scientific institution that seeks to research and develop technical 
approaches to reduce disaster risk and monitor hazardous phenomena. Beyond this, 
the legal autonomy of states and municipalities requires federal institutions to liaise 
with civil protection organisations that are otherwise free to implement policy 
strategies according to their own preferences. "One of its (SINAPROC's) key 
challenges is simply to ensure the many federal, state and municipal civil protection 
services function as a flexible whole together with companies, volunteer 
organisations and research institutes from different sectors" (OECD, 2013; see also 
Chapter 6). 
5.4.2. The Reawakening of Popocatépetl and the Plan Operativo  
In 1986, climbers noted fumarolic activity inside the crater of Popocatépetl, the first 
indicator that after approximately 70 years, the volcano was becoming active. There 
were no monitoring instruments on the volcano, the first telemetered seismometer on 
Popocatépetl was set up by the IG in September 1989. Also in 1989, two 
volcanologists from Clermont Ferrand, France, published an article on the recent 
eruptive history of Popocatépetl and created a preliminary hazard map (Boudal and 
Robin, 1989). A geodetic network was established in February 1992 (De la Cruz and 
Tilling, 2008). De la Cruz and Tilling note that although precursory seismicity 
probably began in 1990, by 1993, a significant increase alerted the IG to the 
possibility of an eruption. Flyovers to measure the emission of SO2 began in February 
1994. By October of that year, unrest had 'increased markedly' and an ad hoc 
committee comprising UNAM scientists, along with researchers from CENAPRED 
was convened. The Boudal and Robin (1989) hazard map was used as the basis for 
risk assessment. CENAPRED had no previous volcanological experience. Although 
both institutions collaborated in operating this seismic network, the Director of the IG 
at the time argued that he did not want the responsibility of monitoring the volcano, so 
the signal was routed to CENAPRED which became the de facto, and later official, 
observatory for Popocatépetl (Interview 5). CENAPRED was established in 1988, in 
collaboration with the Japanese government, and can therefore itself be viewed as a 
result of mobile policy (De la Cruz and Tilling, 2008) 
 
On 21st December, 1994, at 01:54, Popocatépetl produced several phreatic 
explosions, ash was carried eastwards, reaching the city of Puebla (Martin Del Pozzo, 
2012). De la Cruz and Tilling (2008) state that "Decision making had to be done with 
scant knowledge under acutely adverse conditions." The explosions occurred without 
identifiable precursors; real time monitoring of the volcano was limited to three 
seismometers; the eruption began at the start of the Christmas holidays so, availability 
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of personnel was limited; the volcano was capped by two glaciers, so a Nevado del 
Ruiz-style lahar was a possibility; and most notably, no VRR policy framework 
existed.  
 
An emergency committee was convened by the Minister of the Interior, particular 
attention was paid to glacier-burst lahars. Communications were made to the USGS, 
who suggested, based on their experience and the volume of ice on the volcano, that 
lahars may be large enough to reach the nearest towns (De la Cruz and Tilling, 2008). 
According to Macías and Aguirre (2006), the involvement of the USGS brought the 
UNDRO (1985) system of volcanic emergency management into the Popocatépetl 
crisis and the committee 'closely followed' the manual's recommendations. Later that 
day, the decision was taken to evacuate the communities deemed to be 'high risk' 
(Siebe and Macías, 2003; De la Cruz and Tilling, 2008). Macías and Aguirre (2006) 
state that the government intended to evacuate 75,000 people, however, only 26,000 
complied and widespread social unrest accompanied the resistance. They argue that 
the evacuation did not account for local culture and traditions, including religious 
leaders known as tiemperos who supposedly act as conduits between the communities 
and the volcano: "This neglect of local customs had the unfortunate consequence of 
pitting scientists and government officials against traditional institutions" (Macías and 
Aguirre, 2006). None of the other accounts examined mention this resistance, De la 
Cruz and Tillling (2008) state only that approximately 25,000 were evacuated and that 
the evacuation was a 'prudent preventative measure'. Siebe and Macías (2003) note 
that those who were evacuated had to spend Christmas and New Year in temporary 
shelters. The activity declined after around a week, and evacuees were permitted to 
return to their homes (De la Cruz and Tilling, 2008).  
 
In January, the explosions became less frequent and the meetings likewise (Martin 
Del Pozzo, 2012). CENAPRED issued an official request for VDAP assistance and 
USGS scientists had arrived on 1st January 1995 (Manley, 1995). They set up two 
additional seismometers and two tiltmeters, assisted with hazard assessment and 
participated in committee meetings. An updated hazard map by 
CENAPRED/IG/USGS scientists was published on the 17th of February. This was in 
use until 2018 (De la Cruz and Tilling, 2008; Espinasa et al., 2018). Phreatic 
explosions continued to occur throughout 1995. In March 1996, the first magmatic 
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emission began, forming a dome on the crater floor. Subsequent activity has consisted 
of episodic growth and destruction of >20 lava domes (Siebe and Macías, 2003; 
Martin Del Pozzo, 2012; Interview 21). 
 
As the activity progressed, so did the development of VRR policy around 
Popocatépetl. De la Cruz and Tilling (2008) describe 1995 as the 'assessment' period, 
during which the committee was formalised and a working group was established, 
comprising CENAPRED, committee scientists and authorities, with the aim of 
designing protocols. De la Cruz and Tilling state that the UNDRO (1985) manual was 
used in this process, however, some departures were made, notably around the alert 
code. The code advocated by the UNDRO system is a four-level colour code similar 
to that seen at Merapi and Nevado del Ruiz. It was argued by some of the senior 
Mexican volcanologists that the alert system was primarily to drive the response of 
the population, not reflect the activity of the volcano, and reducing the number of 
levels to three would eliminate any ambiguity about the need to act. The three-level 
code was adopted by the committee, despite pressure from the participating foreign 
scientists to adopt a four-level version. However, a unique aspect of the Popocatépetl 
committee's alert system is that it simultaneously seeks to be a three-level alert system 
and a seven-level alert system, the seven levels are intended for scientists and 
authorities, meanwhile the three levels are supposedly for the population (Figure 5.12; 
De la Cruz and Tilling, 2008; Interview 21). 
 
Accompanying the alert levels were recommendations to SINAPROC authorities for 
developing their policy response to Popocatépetl. These predominantly consisted of 
creating, refining and implementing short-term emergency plans, restricting access to 
the volcano and educating communities about the hazards (De la Cruz and Tilling, 
2008). The result was the Plan Operativo Popocatépetl (POP). Macías and Aguirre 
(2006) argue that the POP fully institutionalised the UNDRO model at Popocatépetl, 
and the UNDRO model subsequently shaped SINAPROC's strategy for handling all 
emergencies, volcanic or otherwise, reshaping the organisation. For instance, the 
National Emergency Committee and National Council of Civil Protection (Figure 




Figure 5.12. Popocatépetl Volcano Traffic Light Alert System (Gobierno de 
México, 2016). The text attached to each colour code indicates the recommended 
response from the affected communities, whilst the text in the boxes for each 
subdivision explains the increase in observed activity associated with the issuing of 
each alert level.   
Although the influence of the UNDRO (1985) model is strongly evident, it is not the 
only piece of mobile policy that shaped the POP. The first Plan Operativo for a 
volcano in México was created by the Protección Civil (PC) organisation of Chiapas 
state in 1986, shortly after the establishment of SINAPROC, in response to unrest at 
Volcán Tacaná. This document was a technical guide for co-ordinating emergency 
operations in terms of communication and transport, public health, finances, security, 
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etc. It was used in 1987 by the PC organisation of the state of Colima as the basis for 
the first iteration of the Plan Operativo Volcán de Colima and also provided the initial 
template for the emergency response components of the POP (Interview 21; Section 
6.2). 
 
The first test for the embryonic POP was on 30th June, 1997, when a series of large 
explosions caused ashfall over México City. Civil aviation authorities were forced to 
close the international airport and PDCs melted part of the summit glaciers. Although 
a lahar descended to the settlement of Xalitzintla, no casualties were caused (Siebe 
and Macías, 2003). The Popocatépetl committee recommended the highest level of 
alert bringing the POP into action: 
 
All of the elements of the disorganized response system previously 
discussed occurred again. Thus, while the governor of Puebla state 
heeded SINAPROC's evacuation orders, the governors of Morelos and 
the state of Mexico interpreted it as a yellow alert, or a threat that 
merited initial preparations. The failure of the warning system was 
shown by the confusion between those who gave the warnings and those 
who were supposed to implement the responses. The responses diverged 
at the federal and state levels, with one governor adopting a significantly 
divergent set of measures. In the state of Puebla there were three 
different color schemes with different sets of meanings attached to them 
(Macías and Aguirre, 2006). 
 
De la Cruz and Tilling (2008) note that the Federal administration of SINAPROC 
decided that an evacuation was unnecessary, contrary to the advice of the committee. 
The POP was revealed to be not only ideologically outdated in terms of disaster risk 
science, but dysfunctional by its own standards. It can be argued that distinct 
mutations of the model had come to exist within the different jurisdictions and levels 
of government around Popocatépetl as the UNDRO and Plan Operativo mobile policy 
'ingredients' were circulated and reformulated against different backdrops. 
 
After this incident, an initiative launched in the state of Puebla to redevelop the POP 
into a Plan de Preparativos para la Emergencia del Volcán Popocatépetl, augmenting 
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emergency planning with a long-term strategy to improve resilience, with input from 
disaster sociologist Russell Dynes. Dynes recommended working with the existing 
social infrastructure in at-risk communities and providing them with resources to 
participate in community-based DRR strategies (Macías and Aguirre, 2006). This 
initiative was, therefore, an effort to transform the Behavioural POP into a framework 
more in line with the DRR ethos, by this point being promoted through the IDNDR 
and in the process of being institutionalised 'elsewhere' on the policy field (e.g at 
Mount Rainier). However, according to Macías and Aguirre, the effort only 
manifested on paper, as corruption, cronyism and voter suppression led to a simulated 
democracy in which a genuinely democratised VRR plan was counter-intuitive to the 
interests of those in power. The POP was never replaced by Dynes' alternative.  
 
Dome growth and destruction cycles continued throughout 1998-2000 without any 
significant crisis. Explosions increased throughout October-November 2000, and on 
12th December, 200 occurred in a single day, generating ash columns on average 6 
km above the vent. This was followed by a period of harmonic tremor during which 
the seismic energy released exceeded that of the entirety of 1997, until then the most 
volcanically active year. A forecast of a significant eruption was made, and the 
committee called an evacuation (De la Cruz and Tilling, 2008). Approximately 40,000 
were requested to evacuate, however, initially only 15% did so (Siebe and Macías 
2003). Macías and Aguirre (2006) state that much of the reluctance was because the 
tiemperos resisted the order. They argue that a near-complete evacuation was 
prompted by a hoax media campaign in which doctored footage was used to give the 
impression that a severe eruption had begun, and that this decision was only 
'vindicated' when a large eruption occurred on the 19th of December.  
 
De la Cruz and Tilling (2008) do not mention such a media event, stating that: 
"Fortunately, the eruption was not as powerful as suggested by the strength of tremor 
signals, and while no volcanic products damaged any town of [sic] infrastructure, 
thousands of evacuees could watch the striking view of showers of hot debris falling 
on the volcano flanks from the safety of their shelters." However, Macías and Aguirre 
(2006) paint a different picture of life at the shelters: "Although little was covered by 
the news, the refugees arrived at public shelters to find that, despite repeated claims to 
the contrary, the local, state and federal officials were unprepared; there was no food 
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or other necessities. The experience further evoked the perception that disaster 
planning in Mexico was of a simulated nature." De la Cruz and Tilling (2008) do note 
that once the full-scale departures began, community leaders in towns that were not 
intended to be evacuated made the decision to evacuate, thus the number at the 
shelters was larger than anticipated. 
 
5.4.3. Recent Developments 
The 2000-2001 evacuations were the most recent at Popocatépetl. Since then, the 
volcano has been in near-constant eruption. The summit glaciers have completely 
melted, and thus the threat of secondary lahars has superseded primary lahars. 
Throughout the last 18 years the public alert level has been maintained continuously 
at Yellow. Most of the time, this has been Yellow Phase II, and has not required any 
implementation of the POP. There have been several instances of heightened activity 
(April 2003; April-September 2012; May 2013; July 2013) that have raised the 
'internal' alert level to Yellow Phase III. However, it has been lowered in each of these 
instances without a subsequent red alert (Siebe and Macías, 2003; De la Cruz and 
Tilling, 2008; GVP, 2013). 
 
The volcano is monitored 24/7, 365 days per year by CENAPRED, with five seismic 
stations, gas emissions analysis, geochemical analysis of spring waters, visual 
monitoring and infrasonic monitoring for lahars. This is done in conjunction with the 
IG, where longer-term studies of the volcano are conducted in collaboration with 
many members of the global expert community of volcanology (Interview 5; 
Espinasa, 2018). Popocatépetl was also the subject of a special issue of the JVGR in 
2008, comprising studies of volcanic history, seismicity, geochemistry, glaciology, 
archaeology, and one paper on VRR (Delgado et al. 2008). A significant structural 
change was made to SINAPROC in 2012, altering the number and function of Civil 
Protection committees throughout the country (Section 6.5). However, the 
Popocatépetl committee survived the restructure and continues to preside over the 
alert system for the volcano (Interview 23). Recently, the IG has overseen the 
publication of the successor to the 1995 hazard map. This is a suite of maps based on 
probabilistic simulations. This work forms part of the Risk Atlas of México, a long-
term SINAPROC project to create a digital database of all potential disaster risk 




Although the POP has not been deployed practically since the 2000-2001 crisis, it 
remains the incumbent VRR policy framework at Popocatépetl. The structure consists 
of a 'master' version, under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior, and 
subsidiary state-level versions that can be triggered by federal order in all potentially 
affected states (México, Puebla, Morelos, México City and Tlaxcala) (Interview 5; 
Interview 23). However, only the states of México and Puebla have publicised their 
versions of the POP. México state has published updated iterations of its POP in 
2013, 2017 and 2018; Puebla in 2013, 2015 and 2018. (Espinasa, pers. comm. 2018). 
The federal level 'master' plan is not public, although, the federal government have 
published general outlines (Gobierno de México, 2013; Gobierno de México, 2015). 
These documents indicate that the UNDRO (1985) manual and the Plan Operativo 
Volcán Tacaná, still provide the backbone of this policy model. It continues to 
conform to the Behavioural paradigm of disaster management, with a focus on short-
term emergency response and an authoritarian style of governance. For example, in 
the 2015 federal plan outline, the pre-crisis planning phase consists of the following 
actions: 
 
  Maintain constant monitoring of the Volcano through surveillance 
posts and patrols, in coordination with the corresponding civil 
authorities. 
  Determine the support that may be provided by civil authorities and 
non-governmental organizations. 
  Intensify the campaign of awareness to the population regarding the 
preventive measures that must be adopted, the observance of the volcanic 
alert system and the application of civil protection family plans. 
  Conduct simulations in order to design a scenario regarding the 
possible danger to which the communities are subject. 
  Designate responsible parties for shelters and evacuation routes 
(Gobierno de México, 2015). 
 
There is no indication of community participation other than as a passive entity to be 
dictated unto. The 2018 edition of the Puebla POP notes that it seeks to incorporate 
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the most recent advances in emergency planning, establishing better links with special 
emphasis on the population. To this end, they aim to create a federal level 'Group 
Specialised in Relations with the Communities'. They argue that traditionally, apathy 
has stemmed from a lack of involvement at municipal level. They aim to establish 
groups headed by municipal presidents to help enact this version of the POP. The 
future tense used suggests that the planned roles and responsibilities will be 'handed 
down' to the communities, but gives no hint that the communities were consulted in 
the development process (Gobierno del Estado de Puebla, 2018). No such content is 
found in the 2018 plan for the state of México (Gobierno del Estado de México, 
2018).  
 
Popocatépetl has the shortest VRR policy history of any volcano examined by this 
study. The full institutionalisation of the Behavioural model began here at the point 
where the field of disaster risk science was already in the process of moving on from 
it. The fact that no VRR policy infrastructure manifested in México after the crises of 
Paricutín and El Chichón reinforces the point that under certain conditions it is 
entirely possible for 'lessons' to fail to mobilise across time and space, even within the 
same country. The small number of volcanic crises following the Mexican revolution 
and the centralisation of the Mexican state seem to have prevented these 'distant' 
events (including one of the largest volcanic disasters of the 20th Century) from 
influencing the priorities of national government. Even after the establishment of 
SINAPROC, the country's two active volcanoes (Tacaná and Colima) seemed only to 
be a micro-level concern of the governments of the adjacent states (Chapter 6). At this 
stage, the role of mobile policy on VRR in México could arguably be described as 
'limited' at best, although Mexican volcanology had begun to connect to the global 
VRR assemblages. 
 
The 1994 Popocatépetl crisis transformed volcanic risk governance in México at the 
national level. The volcano's proximity to the capital made it a political priority, and 
many of the country's largest and most powerful administrative entities shaped the 
policy field around Popocatépetl. The crisis evolved rapidly and these timescales 
meant that policymaking was inevitably ad hoc and reactive. The already-established 
connections in the volcanological community were the conduit that allowed a 
supposed best-practice policy model to arrive from 'elsewhere' to a government in 
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crisis with limited previous experience. This may provide a fresh perspective on what 
Peck and Theodore (2010) refer to as 'fast' mobile policy, where 'best practices', with 
the endorsement of a technocratic community, are circulated through quick-fire 
knowledge exchanges. The UNDRO model once again became the centrepiece of 
assemblages of institutions, personalities and existing policy producing unique 
permutations in different states. One professional who has worked within the system 
since its inception states: "I still have my main concern, we do not have a fully 
integral Plan Operativo for the whole area at the state, federal and municipal levels" 
(Interview 21).  
 
In every instance of use, the POP model has exhibited the typical features of the 
Behavioural approach. It has repeatedly failed to fully engage the communities it is 
supposed to protect. There is evidence that the POP has continued to evolve. However 
the fact that all its constituent parts are not available for analysis perhaps speaks of 
continued disjointedness. Moreover, there is little evidence of a long-term structural 
shift towards DRR. At Popocatépetl, it is arguable that one policy mobility event has 
profoundly and enduringly shaped practice from its inception to the present day. 
However, it is notable that it has proven very difficult for 'new' mobile policy 
knowledge to unseat, or substantially dilute the existing system. Perhaps the 
'community relations' strategy being incorporated by the Government of Puebla in 
their 2018 POP marks the start of a shift. However, for a process that began with the 
fastest of policy, it will be interesting to see if the current glacial rate of political 
change can accelerate without being driven by a major eruptive crisis. 
 
5.5. Synthesis 
These case histories have followed the development of volcanic risk governance at 
four volcanoes in distinct national (meso-level) contexts, highlighting the role of 
mobile policies and their mutations in building and reshaping unique policy 
assemblages at each.  
 
The history of volcanic risk governance at Merapi, is the longest of any case study. 
Dutch colonialism extended European industrial-era governance to Merapi, resulting 
in the emergence of institutionalised volcanic risk governance that arguably 
conformed to the Behavioural model, long before this became prevalent globally. 
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VRR at Merapi experienced slow mutation throughout the 20th Century, punctuated 
by political turmoil and recurring disasters. Merapi gradually became one of the best-
connected sites on the global policy field of VRR. However, short-term emergency 
management failed to reduce vulnerability. Since the mid-2000s, Indonesia's 
participation in the UNISDR has seen an attempted transition towards a DRR-based 
approach, gradually increasing community participation in the reduction of risk. It 
remains to be seen how this trend will manifest in the future.  
 
Nevado del Ruiz had arguably existed in a 'policy vacuum' for much of the 20th 
Century. Between 1984-85, volcanic unrest drove the rapid manifestation of a policy 
field (founded on the Behavioural model), divided between Caldas and Tolima, which 
systematically failed to prevent disaster in November 1985. The Colombian 
government's DRR 'revolution' in the aftermath of the 1985 eruption played a key role 
in the emergence of the Complexity paradigm on the global policy field (although still 
arguably short-term 'disaster risk management' rather than true DRR) and served to 
focus the international volcanological community on VRR as a priority. The UNDRO 
manual (1985), saw one of its first 'deployments' here, ensuring that the Behavioural 
model continued to play an influential role despite other advances. However, the 
ensuing quiescence of Nevado del Ruiz diminished the volcano's status as a priority 
and during its return to activity in 2012, problems with community engagement were 
again encountered. The Colombian government is in the process of implementing 
their interpretation of the UNISDR's DRR framework. Parallels and differences with 
Merapi will be interesting to observe. 
 
Mount Rainier has been largely inactive during the post-settlement history of the 
USA. As a result, it too existed in a 'policy vacuum' until the 1990s when USGS 
scientists, influenced by observations of eruptions at other glaciated stratovolcanoes 
recognised the risk. The scientists initiated a process of consultation with authorities 
and other participants from civil society, creating a 'work group' based approach to 
VRR policymaking that arguably reflects the DRR ideal to a greater extent than other 
examples in this study. Although the UNDRO (1985) manual was brought into the 
embryonic assemblage at Mount Rainier as a template (perhaps unsurprisingly given 
the USGS' role in its global dissemination), the Mount Rainier Volcanic Hazards 
Response Plan with its apparently harmonious policy field, incorporation of 
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community engagement and vulnerability reduction, demonstrates how the nature of 
the surrounding components can drive unique and transformative mutations. It 
nonetheless remains to be seen how this system will evolve during continued 
inactivity or perform in the event of a future crisis. 
 
The history of volcanic risk governance at Popocatépetl, is the shortest of any of this 
project's case studies. The 1994 eruption prompted the rapid assembly of a policy 
response. Proximity to the Mexican capital saw the responsibility for various VRR 
policy functions assumed by national (meso-level) institutions such as the 
CENAPRED, the Secretary of the Interior, and UNAM, - and the creation of a policy 
framework based on the UNDRO (1985) manual. Evacuations under this system have 
experienced difficulties in eliciting the participation of vulnerable communities. The 
global-level circulation of disaster risk reduction theory does not appear to have yet 
had a tangible impact on the meso and micro-level policy field around Popocatépetl. 
 
These case studies show that policy mobilities, mutations and assemblages have 
profoundly impacted volcanic risk governance in different ways and at different rates 
around the globe. The uneven circulation of information, resources and 'best practices' 
has intermeshed with the volcanic and socio-political fabric in each setting, producing 
unique and continually evolving VRR assemblages on each local policy field. These 
considerations complicate the work of those seeking to improve VRR policy and 
practice through macro-level processes of knowledge exchange. The following 
chapter will illustrate the extent of these complexities by presenting an in-depth 














Pueblo Chico, Infierno Grande 
Policy Mobility and Volcanic Risk Governance at Volcán de Colima, México 
 
Chapter 5 employed four case studies from the global policy field to illustrate the role 
that processes of policy mobility have had on the relationship between volcanoes and 
the societies around them. It has been shown that: the movement of policy (formal and 
informal); the fluctuating topologies that take policy and knowledge from one volcano 
to another; the assemblage of that mobile knowledge with the politics, culture and 
volcanic activity of the settings in which it arrives; and the resulting mutations that 
policy undergoes, have been fundamental to the unique form that VRR policy has 
taken at each volcano. The marked differences between case studies also demonstrate 
that the development of volcanic risk governance at each volcano has not run 
concurrently alongside the theoretical evolution of DRR 'best practices' - rather, that 
the timescales are offset, frequently dictated by volcanic and human systems. As such, 
an uncontested transition to an idealised VRR framework cannot be expected from 
proponents on the global policy field. Given that effective volcanic risk governance 
may prove the difference between life and death, it is crucial to consider how mobile 
VRR 'best practices' may change when assembled in a volcanic setting. 
 
This chapter presents a detailed case study to explore how micro-level interactions 
between mobile policy and volcanic environments can have enduring effects on 
volcanic risk governance. It follows on from Section 5.4 by focussing on another 
active Mexican volcano, Volcán de Colima; demonstrating that processes of policy 
mobility have the capacity to produce drastically different outcomes, not just 
internationally, but within the same polity. 
 
6.1. Volcán de Colima, Setting and Background 
Volcán de Colima (19.514ºN, 103.622ºW; 3,850 m; Figure 6.1) is a stratovolcano in 
western México, divided between the Pacific coast states of Colima and Jalisco 
(Figure 6.2). It is the youngest of three edifices that together form the N-S trending 
Colima Volcanic Complex, also known as 'Volcán de Fuego de Colima' (Volcano of 
Fire of Colima) to distinguish it from the extinct Volcán Nevado de Colima (Snowy 
Volcano of Colima) that sits to the north, separated by a southward-breached caldera 




Figure 6.1. Small Vulcanian explosion at Volcán de Colima (2014) seen from the 




Figure 6.2. Map of Volcán de Colima and surrounding major population centres. 
The edifice is intersected by the state border of Colima and Jalisco (dotted line). 
The active crater is 30 km north of the city of Colima and 26 km southwest of 
Ciudad Guzmán in southern Jalisco, linked by the interstate highway (thick black 
line) (Image courtesy of Jamie I. Farquharson). 
Volcán de Colima is one of the most active volcanoes in North America, with at least 
29 eruptive periods since 1560. These have mostly consisted of andesitic lava-dome 
growth and collapse cycles, accompanied by Vulcanian explosions. However, the 
volcano has also produced sub-Plinian or Plinian eruptions with a recurrence interval 
of approximately 100 years (in 1576, 1690, 1818 and 1913) (Bretón et al. 2002). 
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There have been 12 sector-collapse debris avalanches at Volcán de Colima during the 
last 22,000 years (Cortés et al. 2010). Activity from Volcán de Colima has not caused 
any casualties since the Plinian eruption of 1913, which killed around 8 people 
(Saucedo et al. 2010; Reyes et al. 2016). Saucedo et al. note that a similar eruption 
today would destroy 10 small towns and ranches and potentially affect up to 320,000 
people within a 30 km radius. The majority would only be affected by ashfall. 
However, at the last census in 2010 there were 17,367 inhabitants within 15 km of the 
summit who could be affected by pyroclastic density currents (PDCs) and lahars 
(Table 6.1). The geographical distribution of these populations is illustrated in Figure 
6.3. 
Table 6.1. 2010 census data for the closest population centres to the active vent at 
Volcán de Colima in the states of Colima and Jalisco, their distance from the crater 
and hazards to which they are vulnerable according to the hazard maps of Abel and 






Figure 6.3. Map of populations within a 15 km radius of the active vent 
(Hernández, 2014). The Spanish in the key reads as follows: 'Rural localities of 
more than 100 inhabitants'; 'Rural localities'; 'Radius of 15 km'; 'State border'; 
'Municipal border'; 'Urban localities'.  
 
Bretón et al. (2002) summarise historical activity of Volcán de Colima from 1519 
onwards. Eruptions intermittently covered towns, ranches and homesteads with ash, 
shaking buildings with explosion shockwaves and, on occasion, PDCs killed 
livestock. The volcano was not widely inhabited even by the early 20th Century, so 
lethal impacts were rare.  
 
In the 19th Century, international and local scientists conducted intermittent field 
studies. On 30th March, 1872, during the eruption of a parasitic dome 'el Volcancito' 
on the north-eastern flank, residents of Quesería (Figure 6.3) self-evacuated. Two 
observatories were established in Zapotlán in Jalisco and Colima city, allowing 
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activity to be recorded daily between 1893 and 1905. After 1905, volcanic activity 
gradually diminished, and a quiet period preceded the Plinian eruption of 1913.  
 
The Plinian eruption of 1913 began with a series of explosions between the 17th and 
19th January, generating PDCs that descended to distances of ~4 km and onto the 
caldera floor (el Playón) to the north (Figure 6.4). On 20th January, explosions 
increased in intensity. At 11:30, continuous explosions began and a Plinian eruption 
column rose to ~27 km a.s.l. The plume was carried northeast towards Ciudad 
Guzmán (Figure 6.2) where, by 13:00 the darkness was near-total and ash began to 
fall to a depth of 15 cm (Saucedo et al. 2010). Citizens entered the church and asked 
for the statue of San Felipe de Jesús to be toured around the city. When the statue was 
brought back to the church at 20:00-20:30 the eruption diminished and, by 22:00, the 
sky was clear (Bretón et al. 2002; Raymundo Padilla-Lozoya, Interview). The Jalisco 
community of San Marcos (Figure 6.4) self-evacuated a few hours after the Plinian 
phase began (Gavilanes, 2004). The collapse of the Plinian column generated PDCs 
that descended radially to distances of 15 km. The PDC deposits substantially altered 
the landscape and blocked water supplies to San Marcos (Figure 6.4); when villagers 





Figure 6.4. Digital elevation model of Volcán de Colima, showing in black the 
pyroclastic density current (PDC) deposits emplaced during the climactic phase of 
the 1913 Plinian eruption (adapted from Saucedo et al. 2010). These deposits are 
confined to the drainage channels or 'Barrancas' that originate on Volcán de Colima 
which have to this day provided the routes for PDCs and lahars. The caldera wall of 
the older 'Palaeofuego' edifice provides a natural barrier to the north. These 
barrancas are: El Zarco, Cordobán, San Antonio and Montegrande in the state of 
Colima; La Tuna, El Cafecito, La Arena and Beltran in the state of Jalisco. 
Barrancas La Lumbre and El Muerto form the border between the two states. The 
communities of La Yerbabuena and Juan Barragán were founded after the eruption 
of 1913. 
In 1913, risk at Volcán de Colima was relatively low due to the low vulnerable 
population. Nonetheless, the ashfall in Ciudad Guzmán (Figure 6.2) and the 
community's religious response left a lasting legacy: "Stories like that are in the 
memory of the society. Because of this, in Colima as well, when people think of the 
volcano and how they relate to the volcano, they add elements of belief, of religion, of 
what they believe, into the natural environment" (Raymundo Padilla, Interview). 
 
Between 1913 and 1961, lava gradually filled the crater left by the 1913 eruption, 
occasionally accompanied by small explosions. In 1961, a 0.006 km3 blocky lava flow 
descended approximately 1 km northwards into the Playón (Figure 6.4). This activity 
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was observed by geologists from the Universidad de San Luis Potosí and the 
Universidad Nacional Autonoma de México (UNAM) (Bretón et al. 2002). 
 
On 1st December 1975, a lava flow descended the east flank towards the Volcancito 
parasitic dome, where it split. A separate flow descended into Barranca Cafecito 
(Figure 6.4) (Bretón et al. 2002). This eruption occurred at the time when the 
international volcanological community was beginning to become more mobilised and 
structured (e.g. the first IAVCEI general assembly in Durham - Section 4.2): "From 
the activity of Volcán de Colima in 1975-1976, many researchers from México and 
further afield began to take interest in different aspects of the volcano, however there 
was no research centre to co-ordinate these efforts and this impeded the continuity of 
many projects" (University of Colima, 2015). Thorpe et al. (1977) published an article 
on the block and ash flows from this eruption. However, there was no local 
institutionalised volcanology.  
 
Small dome growth and explosions in 1981 were documented by geologists on behalf 
of the Smithsonian Institution and a small lava flow ran from late 1981 into 1982, 
reaching approximately 1 km from the crater (Bretón et al. 2002).  In 1984, the Centre 
for Research in Basic Sciences was established at the Universidad de Colima (UCol) 
in Colima city (Universidad de Colima, 2015; Gabriel Reyes-Dávila, Interview). 
However, by the mid-1980s, Volcán de Colima was still not subject to volcanic risk 
governance. 
 
6.2. Assembling Mobile Policy Around an Active Volcano: The Roots of Volcanic Risk 
Governance at Volcán de Colima 
The 19th September 1985 earthquake and its impacts on México City drove the 
establishment of SINAPROC, the Mexican national system of Civil Protection on 6th 
May 1986 (Section 5.4.1). This required each of the 31 (now 32) Mexican states and 
their municipalities (2,457) to establish civil protection organisations. The incumbent 
President, Miguel de la Madrid-Hurtado was from Colima and, according to 
employees of Protección Civil Colima (PCC), Presidential connections meant that 
Colima became the first state to create its own organisation. The Governor of Colima, 
Elias Zamora-Verduzco approached Melchor Ursua-Quiroz, the owner of a chain of 
auto garages, who had founded and headed the state's voluntary fire brigade, to ask 
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him to become director (Melchor Ursua, Interview; Javier Velasco, pers. comm.  
2017). In this, the first piece of relevant mobile policy had 'arrived', providing the 
foundation for a policy field, and had already begun to 'mutate' within the local 
environment. 
 
The earthquake also generated interest in seismology at UCol. The chief of the 
National Seismological Service asked the director of the Centre for Research in Basic 
Sciences for help in installing a seismograph. The first permanent, telemetric seismic 
station in the state of Colima was installed on 1st December 1985. Once operational, 
the chief of the National Seismological Service visited Colima accompanied by 
volcanologists and seismologists from UNAM's Instituto de Geofísica (IG) to propose 
a seismic network. The Colima researchers agreed and a joint request was submitted 
to the Colima state government. At the beginning of 1987 the request was approved 
and $300 million MXN (£66 million) was granted for 10 seismic stations (Gabriel 
Reyes-Dávila, Interview). As the visitors (initially through the pursuit of their own 
academic interests) 'nudged' scientists at UCol into engaging with volcanic processes, 
a further constituent of the embryonic policy field at Volcán de Colima began to 
emerge, again with roots 'elsewhere'. The investment of the Colima state government 
could be seen as the local administration taking ownership of this mobile idea and 
beginning to reshape it. 
 
Activity at the volcano remained low during late 1985 and 1986. On 2nd July 1987, 
however, a phreatic explosion blew a 100 m diameter, 40 m deep crater in the extant 
dome and generated a PDC (Bretón, 2002). This was the first significant activity to 
occur at Volcán de Colima after the establishment of Protección Civil (PC). The Plan 
Operativo Volcán Tacaná (Section 5.4.2) had been published in December 1986 by 
the three-person staff of the PC organisation in the state of Chiapas as a response to 
the activity of that volcano. In July 1987, an "almost identical" Plan Operativo Volcán 
de Colima was signed off by Governor Zamora. A second draft was completed in 
September 1987 (Sistema Estatal de Protección Civil Colima, 1987; Interview 21).  
 
The Plan Operativo Volcán de Colima is structured around a sequence of five phases:  
 
 A - Latent (the volcano is in a 'stationary' state) 
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 B - Can Occur (volcanic activity is manifesting with Earth movements of 
greater intensity and periodicity)  
 C - High Probability of Occurrence (volcanic activity is at the point of 
evolving, within an expected period of 13-18 hours) 
 D - Occurrence (volcanic activity is evolving, expulsion of lava, ash and gases, 
earthquakes etc.) 
 E - Elapse (volcanic activity is considered to have ended). 
 
These phases provided the antecedent to the Traffic Light alert system developed at 
Popocatépetl in 1995 (Interview 21). Following a statement from Governor Zamora, 
some 'General Considerations' and a structural outline of PCC, the Plan Operativo 
Volcán de Colima contains separate lists of instructions for state government 
departments and subdivisions (Reception Centre; Communication and Transport; 
Health; Trade and Supply; Urban Development and Ecology; Agriculture; Security 
and Public Order; and Shelters). PC have the authority to establish a 'Centre of 
Operations' and the so-called 'Co-ordination of information to the population' - the 
location and direction of evacuees. The remainder of the document consists of; 
population data for the communities (within 15 km of the summit, [Figure 6.3]); lists 
of the shelters and responsible personnel; a map of schools; medical facilities and 
personnel available; the state of the roads around each community; and two pages 
outlining the volcanological history of Volcán de Colima (Sistema Estatal de 
Protección Civil Colima, 1987).  
 
It is not stated who the author of the volcanological section was, but given that the 
nascent seismic research at the Universidad de Colima was being performed by "a 
group of electronics scientists who knew how to install and maintain the equipment, 
but knew nothing of volcanology" (Tonatiuh Domínguez, Interview), an UNAM 
volcanologist may have written this. There is little evidence of volcanological input in 
the procedural sections. The phases do not reflect a comprehensive understanding of 
the hazards presented by Volcán de Colima (PDCs and lahars are not mentioned), nor 
of the non-linear evolution of volcanic activity. The 'General Considerations' state that 
"Geophysical information obtained from the accredited researchers will be 
communicated directly and exclusively to the General Secretary of Government" 
(Sistema Estatal de Protección Civil Colima, 1987). Strict confidentiality was an 
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integral feature of the Plan Operativo Volcán de Colima. Each copy was stated only 
for the eyes of the government employee it had been given to. The plan was never 
published.  
 
The Plan Operativo Volcán de Colima arguably institutionalised the Behavioural 
model at Volcán de Colima. Features that support this claim include: the lack of 
engagement with, and view of the population as passive participants; and the plan's 
focus on a reactive response to ambiguously defined volcanic activity. Despite the 
association of the Behavioural model with a scientific/technical approach to disasters, 
it could be argued that the Plan Operativo lacked even the scientific component and 
represented an attempt to address volcanic risk purely through authoritarian 
population management. 
 
The Plan Operativo Volcán de Colima may be viewed as another piece of 'fast' mobile 
policy driven by volcanic activity. The explosion of 2nd July 1987 is explicitly noted 
as the most recent activity, and there are multiple references to the plan being 
developed in that month. The Tacaná model was the only extant policy directed at 
volcanic risk in México at the time and was deliberately 'brought' to Colima by the 
recently-created PCC. The incorporation of this mobile component into the 
assemblage made the volcano a focal point on the budding policy field. 
 
After July 1987, activity remained low (Bretón et al. 2002). Scientists from UNAM 
and the Universidad de Guadalajara (UdG) visited the volcano and reported to the 
Smithsonian Institution (GVP, 2013). UCol scientists also visited the volcano, looking 
for sites for seismometers: "They started to orient themselves, they received resources 
so that they would understand what they were doing" (Tonatiuh Domínguez, 
Interview). On 1st June 1989, the first telemetered seismometer in the Red Sismica del 
Estado de Colima/Seismic Network of the State of Colima (RESCO) was installed. 
The equipment was owned by the state government, but given to UCol to operate 
(Gabriel Reyes, Interview).  
 
In 1988 UCol held the first of a series of bi-annual Reuniones Internacionales Volcán 
de Colima that ran from 1988 until 2012 and brought together scientists from México, 
the USA, Italy, Japan, Papua New Guinea, the UK and other countries (Colima 
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Noticias, 2009; Carlos Navarro, Interview). This established lasting topological 
connections between Volcán de Colima and the international community of 
volcanology. The director of PCC was invited to the meeting: "At some point they 
had national, international level meetings here, with relation to Volcán de Colima and 
they invited us, well, me, to the meetings. So, I formed a relationship with 
volcanologists from all over the world. There was a very strong connection." 
(Melchor Ursua, Interview). Ursua says that during these meetings, USGS 
volcanologists brought the UNDRO (1985) Volcanic Emergency Management 
manual: "...They brought it with them, they brought us those documents. Here I have 
a book that was made at that time by the United Nations Organisation with regard to 
volcanoes, and that has been the basis for me to form Protección Civil here in 
Colima." This concurs with Macías and Aguirre's (2006) assessment of the USGS' 
role in mobilising the UNDRO (1985) model and suggests that, through these 
meetings, the UNDRO model became part of the assemblage of formal and informal 
policy that had coalesced around Volcán de Colima.  
 
6.3. Prueba de Fuego: The First Crises of Volcanic Risk Governance at Volcán de 
Colima 
In 1990, Volcán de Colima was selected by IAVCEI as one of the 'Decade 
Volcanoes', incorporating it into that global assemblage with (among others) case 
study volcanoes Merapi and Rainier (Universidad de Colima, 2015). The UCol 
scientists conducted volcanological field studies with visitors from USA universities. 
Scientists from UNAM continued with their long-term project to establish baseline 
values at Volcán de Colima through topographical and geological surveys, 
deformation monitoring and spring-water sampling (GVP, 2013; Interview 22). In 
January 1991, physicist-turned-seismologist Gabriel Reyes-Dávila and geologist 
Carlos Navarro-Ochoa of UCol were assisted by UNAM seismologist Jaime 
Yamamoto to attend a volcanology course in Japan, organised by the Japan 
International Co-operation Agency (Gabriel Reyes, Interview). This would be the first 
formal training of any UCol volcanologists:  
 
The course was six months, and we're talking about the 1990s, when 
volcanology was in a period of transition, with new methodologies in all 
aspects. There was a revolution in monitoring methods, for example, with 
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very strong roots in the eruption of Mount Saint Helens in the 1980s. All 
that information was still very fresh, and obviously Japan was also very 
much at the vanguard (Carlos Navarro, Interview).  
 
It was not until 14th February 1991 that RESCO started detecting volcanic 
earthquakes. Swarms and degassing registered throughout February and, in early 
March a dome grew, generating occasional rockfalls. Seismologist Francisco Nuñez-
Cornú had started working at UCol on 1st February and convened the 'first volcanic 
risk committee in México' with Juan Manuel Espindola and Servando de la Cruz-
Reyna (UNAM) and Jean-Christophe Komorowski (IPGP). Gabriel Reyes returned 
from Japan for a month to digitise the seismograms (Francisco Nuñez, pers. comm. 
2017; Gabriel Reyes, Interview; Carlos Navarro, Interview). Authorities in Colima 
and Jalisco were concerned by developments at the volcano and solicited daily reports 
from the scientists:  
 
We were able to monitor how the activity was changing, how the dome 
was growing, how the springs were changing, and that's why we had the 
relationship with the governor's office directly and the office of the 
military, so every day after doing fieldwork we'd have to go and report to 
both. We'd show them how the seismicity was growing and how the dome 
was growing, how things were changing (Ana Lillian Martin del Pozzo, 
Interview).  
 
Ana Lillian notes that authorities from both states asked the scientists if they should 
evacuate and the scientists attempted to clarify that this was not their decision to 
make. The dome continued to grow until 16th April, when it partially collapsed 
generating PDCs in Barranca Cordobán (Figure 6.4). The Plan Operativo Volcán de 
Colima was activated, Colima airport was closed and the evacuation of ~2,000 people 
was ordered. However, most did not participate (Bretón et al. 2002; GVP, 2013). 
From Japan, Carlos Navarro followed the unfolding situation through newspaper 
cuttings:  
 
In the reports that I read, there was a scandal and all that, because of 
disorganisation. It happened like the case of Guadeloupe in the 1970s 
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(Section 4.2); very few people knew about this volcano that was suddenly 
awake, there were no local scientists, they arrived from elsewhere and 
everybody believed they knew what was happening, they called a big 
evacuation, there was a lot of loss of revenue and in the end there was no 
eruption behind the emergency. A study in what not to do. 
 
After this crisis, UCol established a centre for Earth sciences. During a WOVO 
meeting in Guadalupe in 1993, it was formally recognised as a volcano observatory 
(Universidad de Colima, 2015). Francisco Nuñez left UCol in September 1991 
following a disagreement with the Co-ordinator for Scientific Research. After a spell 
in northern México, he ended up at the UdG (Francisco Nuñez, pers. comm. 2017).  
 
During this crisis of 1991... there were a lot of lessons. The first is that 
politicians have a very short memory. They soon forget things. They 
attend to the emergency, but they don't work with a vision of the long 
term. So, during this time, they installed more stations on the volcano, six 
eventually and two more that were distant from the volcano to distinguish 
between volcanic and non-volcanic signals. And, at the end of 1991, 
beginning of 92, everything stopped. No more volcanic activity, so the 
government of the state threw away the key, there was no more money 
(Gabriel Reyes, Interview). 
 
Activity at Volcán de Colima remained low, apart from a phreatic explosion on 21st 
July 1994 (Bretón et al. 2002). Following this, Gabriel Reyes states that interest from 
civil society rapidly waned "everything stopped, movement, reporters, people, 
politicians, journalists, television. That's how it was." 
 
UCol scientists started making regular trips to the crater to collect samples and 
measure temperature, gas emissions and fractures. They held the first talks in La 
Yerbabuena (Figure 6.3) using an IAVCEI-UNESCO educational video also used at 
Pinatubo (Abel Cortés, Interview; Carlos Navarro, Interview; Section 4.3). UdG 
scientists created a 'risk map' for Volcán de Colima (Suárez and Saavedra, 1993). This 
used preliminary 1980s UNAM geological surveys for its hazard projections, and 
offered a brief, qualitative breakdown of possible impacts. UNAM scientists were, at 
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the same time, producing a more hazard-focussed map (Gavilanes, 2004). Lugo et al. 
(1993) published a geomorphological study. Based on this work, the same team 
created a hazard map in collaboration with the University of New York at Buffalo 
(Martin del Pozzo et al. 1995), published in the UNAM journal Geofísica 
Internacional. UCol geologists had also submitted a proposal to the government of 
Colima and the National Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT) to 
develop a hazard map:  
 
There, we basically entered into a competition. When we started the 
work, Ana Lillian already had her map finished, practically. But we saw 
the map, I had all my ideas from Japan and I said 'no, this map lacks 
this, this and this...' she had an idea where the lava and pyroclastic flows 
were, and she only based her distribution of ash on the history of the 
eruption of 1913, that went to the northeast. We didn't just do this, we 
dedicated ourselves to a statistical revision of wind direction/velocity 
data (Carlos Navarro, Interview).  
 
Navarro states that the map was based on geological surveys of >100 sites and revised 
various times by international volcanologists participating in the Reuniones 
Internationales and Decade Volcano Project, including Robert Tilling (USGS) and 
J.C. Komorowski.  
 
It is notable that the creation of hazard/risk maps - by the early 1990s an established 
component of volcanic risk governance - was undertaken separately by the UdG in 
Jalisco, UNAM in México City, and UCol in Colima. The former two were academic 
projects with the potential to influence policy informally, whilst the UCol project 
straddled the interface between science and formal policy. Colima, Jalisco and 
México City, are arguably the three most obvious divisions (topographically and 
topologically) on the policy field around Volcán de Colima, although the further 
divisions within these entities must be acknowledged (i.e. the relative autonomy of the 
universities from state governments, and of the state governments from the federal 
government, the further autonomy of municipalities and the loose relationship 
between the federal government and UNAM). The way in which mobile policy has 
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traversed (or failed to traverse) these boundaries has profoundly shaped volcanic risk 
governance at Volcán de Colima.   
 
Volcán Popocatépetl came to the attention of the Mexican federal government upon 
erupting in December 1994 (Section 5.4.2). Subsequent developments show a marked 
difference in volcanic risk governance between Popocatépetl and Volcán de Colima, 
despite some of the same mobile policy 'ingredients'. The Scientific Advisory 
Committee at Popocatépetl also notably became a template used for other hazards 
(e.g. chemical spills, earthquakes) and therefore became a keystone of federal disaster 
risk governance (Macías and Aguirre, 2006; Carlos Valdés, Interview). 
 
In 1996, Ricardo Saucedo, a geologist at UCol's Observatorio Vulcanologico led an 
initiative to establish an educational programme about volcanic risk for communities 
in both states. Juan Carlos Gavilanes-Ruiz, a geographer at UCol, wrote to Robert 
Tilling (USGS) asking him to endorse a proposal to obtain government funding and 
Tilling obliged. The educational programme gained funding from both state and 
federal governments, formalised in late 1997 (Juan Carlos Gavilanes, Interview). 
Gavilanes notes that the existing VRR framework consisted of only mapping, 
monitoring and emergency planning:  
 
So, we saw that really, the socialisation of the information was very poor, 
or, absent, so the project initiated working with two women who had a 
bachelors' degree in communication science and I, as a geographer. So 
we decided then a strategy for each village - there were seven villages - 
in order to tell them which hazards were especially potentially pertinent 
to them (Juan Carlos Gavilanes, Interview). 
 
Gavilanes notes that at first the community participation was small, but gradually 
increased with time. Thus, in a period of 'volcanic peacetime', the interest of UCol 
scientists in the application of their research was the driving force in shaping what 
ultimately became part of the policy framework at the volcano. This was a step 
beyond the Behavioural model that had been assembled from the Plan Operativo and 
UNDRO (1985). It directly engaged the communities around the volcano and gave 




However, it can be argued that this programme only served as a slight counterweight 
to an authoritarian approach. 13 km southwest of the summit crater is a 510 hectare 
estate, the Hacienda San Antonio. Former owner, Antenor Patiño constructed a village 
called Barranca del Agua for the estate's workers and their families. In 1987, the 
Hacienda was acquired by Patiño's son-in-law Sir James Goldsmith, who began to 
convert it into a luxury hotel. In 1995, Goldsmith asked PCC to conduct a risk 
assessment for Barranca del Agua. PCC solicited the assistance of UCol 
volcanologists Carlos Navarro and Abel Cortés-Cortés (Cuevas, 2005; Melchor 
Ursua, Interview). In 1997, the Government of Colima completely and permanently 
evacuated Barranca del Agua. Most residents left without resistance, either going to 
new government-provided accommodation or accepting $35,000 MXN (£5,120) in 
state funds to relocate themselves. However, at least one resident claims to have been 
evicted at gunpoint by law enforcement (Cuevas, 2005). There are differing narratives 
regarding this event. Melchor Ursua, director of PCC states that relocation was 
conducted out of concern for the population. He claims that fifteen days after the 
relocation, a lahar struck the empty village, destroying some houses. On 23rd August, 
2003, a lahar completely buried the abandoned settlement (Gavilanes, 2004). 
However, questions have been raised regarding the motives behind the resettlement:  
 
The community was on land owned by the San Antonio ranch, but 
Mexican law states that if a property is occupied for more than 5 years 
then it is owned by whoever lives there. The owner wanted access to the 
land and being that he was friends with Melchor, he asked him if there 
was any way of moving the people. Melchor got Carlos and Abel to write 
a report recommending the relocation on the grounds that they could be 
threatened by a Plinian eruption, but this was totally irregular, La 
Becerrera is closer and noone speculated about evacuating that 
community. I know it was true that they used the volcano as the reason, I 
saw the report, but I think... I would like to think that Carlos and Abel 
took part innocently (Interview 13). 
 
The official reason recorded for the relocation was volcanic risk (Cuevas, 2005). This 
was during a period where there was no ongoing volcanic unrest and there were two 
  
192 
closer communities (La Becerrera and La Yerbabuena) not considered for relocation. 
Irrespective of the motives, it reflects an inconsistent and authoritarian approach to 
environmental risk that views the vulnerable communities as passive participants to be 
controlled and removed at the whim of those in charge with little to no input of their 
own.  
 
6.4. Behavioural Issues: Mobile Origins and Conflicting Visions of Volcanic Risk 
Governance during the 1997-2003 Eruptive Activity at Volcán de Colima  
On 12th December, 1997, RESCO detected volcanic earthquakes, continuing through 
1998 (Gabriel Reyes, Interview). By the summer UCol scientists concluded that 
magmatic eruption was probable (GVP, 2013; Juan Carlos Gavilanes, Interview). 
Meetings began informally between PCC and UCol researchers (Tonatiuh 
Domínguez, Interview). Gabriel Reyes notes that the seismicity was the only 
continuously monitored parameter.  
 
The 'twin volcanoes' exchange between Volcán de Colima and Merapi (Section 5.1) 
stemmed from the involvement of VDAP at both volcanoes. The rationale was a 
perceived similarity between the two volcanoes (Chris Newhall, pers. comm. 2018). 
Newhall states that the first visit was conducted in 1998, when an Indonesian 
delegation came to Colima.  
 
In September 1998, the government of Colima legally established the Comité Técnico 
Científico Asesor Volcán de Colima (Volcán de Colima Technical Scientific Advisory 
Committee) (Gavilanes, 2004). This formalised the relationship between scientists and 
authorities. It also represented the incorporation of a further mobile policy component 
into the assemblage at Volcán de Colima - the Scientific Advisory Committee. This 
originated in the UNDRO (1985) manual and had subsequently been adopted at 
Popocatépetl, then adapted and proliferated throughout the federal apparatus of 
Protección Civil. Carlos Navarro notes that Servando de la Cruz of UNAM, who had 
served on the Popocatépetl committee since its inception, had a strong influence on 
the Colima committee. At its largest, the Committee included 14 UCol researchers 
(geologists, seismologists, geochemists, geographers and anthropologists) two UdG 
researchers, three representatives of PCC, three representatives of PCJ, and occasional 




Although, the legislation belonged to the state of Colima, the Committee, from its 
inception, straddled the divisions around the volcano: 
 
In 1998, there was a direction, a Scientific Advisory Committee existed 
that worked, not just with Protección Civil Colima, but with Protección 
Civil Jalisco, the UdG, CENAPRED in México and UNAM. That is to 
say, there were various organisms involved in the volcano monitoring, 
the management of risk, and it was an integrated vision, everyone 
participated, everyone opined, everyone contributed information about 
the condition of the volcano. Moreover, a fund existed on the part of the 
state of Colima, to provide resources for volcano monitoring (Mauricio 
Bretón, Interview). 
 
November 1998 brought 17 days of sustained unrest (GVP, 2013). According to Juan 
Carlos Gavilanes, the Committee concluded (with guidance from Servando de la 
Cruz) that the signals were likely precursors to an effusive eruption. An evacuation of 
the closest communities was recommended. Gavilanes states that Committee 
members who had been part of the communication programme suggested including 
representatives from La Yerbabuena (Figure 6.3): "So six guys came here and they 
were in the meeting, they saw the graphs, the graphics and all the explanations given 
from different points of view and said 'yes, this is... we better evacuate.' And the 
evacuation was successful" (Juan Carlos Gavilanes, Interview). Former Committee 
members Abel Cortés and Alicia Cuevas also mention the positive impact of the 
educational programme. On 18th November, PCC evacuated La Yerbabuena (180 
residents) and PCJ did likewise with Juan Barragán (120 residents) (Figure 6.3) 
'voluntarily and in an orderly fashion' (GVP, 2013). By 21st, a lava dome had filled 
the crater (3.8 x 105 m3) and overspilled to the southwest. This marked the beginning 
of a continuous period of magmatic eruption that lasted until June 2011 (Gabriel 
Reyes, Interview). By 1st December, the furthest lava flows had advanced 800 m 
southwest and the other parameters were considered relatively stable. At that point, 




On 10th February 1999, an explosion generated PDCs with run-outs of <3 km, 
ballistic fall to distances of 4 km and ashfall over communities in southern Jalisco. 
Evacuations were again performed by both PCC (La Yerbabuena) and PCJ (Juan 
Barragán), lasting 17 days (Gavilanes, 2004; GVP, 2013). Cuevas (2005) notes that 
nine residents of La Yerbabuena initially refused to evacuate, although they were later 
convinced by PCC.  
 
On 10th May 1999, RESCO interpreted seismicity as a precursor to a significant 
explosion and two hours later, an explosion ejected an ash column to approximately 
6.5 km above the summit (>10 km a.s.l.), resulting in ballistic fallout to distances of 
4.5 km from the vent. PCJ evacuated before the explosion took place, PCC evacuated 
La Yerbabuena later that day. This third evacuation lasted 32 days (Gavilanes, 2004; 
GVP, 2013). Strain in the relationships between the evacuees and the volcanic risk 
governance system became increasingly apparent due to life in the shelters, time away 
from land/livelihoods and uncertainty. After 26 days, 22 returned home whilst the 
evacuation order was still in place (Cuevas, 2005). Another large explosion on 17th 
July 1999 generated PDCs with run-outs of 4-4.5 km to the west and southwest: "This 
was the fourth time in eight months that authorities called for evacuations. Some 
families refused to leave, electing instead to sign waivers and remain" (GVP, 2013). 
This evacuation lasted only two days (Cuevas, 2005). 
 
As the evacuations lasted longer, participation waned (Juan Carlos Gavilanes, 
Interview; Alicia Cuevas, Interview). Gavilanes claims that those involved in the 
educational programme tried to explain to evacuees that scientists were learning about 
the volcano and were unsure if the current activity was a precursor to a larger 
eruption. However, no official justification was forthcoming.  
 
A recurring theme throughout interviews with UCol volcanologists is that the 
traditional boundaries of responsibility defined in the 'emergency management' model 
whereby scientists provide scenarios and probabilities, and the authorities conduct the 
decision-making, have not applied. From the earliest evacuations, PC have asked the 
volcanologists themselves to make the evacuation decisions (Interviews 1, 5, 7, 8, 9, 




It has always been this way. Melchor says 'you are the ones who know, 
so if you tell me that this area is in danger and it's better to get people 
out of there, I'll get them out of there.'  And perhaps, in those years, in 
the 1990s, and 2000s, as a group we were very prone to making that type 
of recommendation. To say to them 'yes, evacuate them', but we were 
making big mistakes (Carlos Navarro, Interview). 
 
This period of activity exposed divergences, tensions and divisions within the policy 
assemblages at Volcán de Colima. Some of these concerned the use of certain policy 
features in different jurisdictions. Jalisco adopted a three-level traffic light alert 
system, in part similar to Popocatépetl (Figure 6.5). The Jalisco traffic light has been 
set to 'Yellow' without change since 1998 (Interview 12; Interview 26). Colima did 
not adopt a colour-coded public alert system: "In Colima, they were reluctant to adopt 
the traffic light and the main argument is that they understood, but the population at 
risk was so small that there was actually no need for a traffic light" (Interview 21).  
 
Legally, the two moderators of the Committee were the Technical Secretary of PCC 
and the Co-ordinator of Scientific Research at UCol. However, apparently, with time, 
the UCol Co-ordinator, Jesús Muñiz increasingly assumed the responsibility of 
spokesperson (Carlos Navarro, Interview; Juan Carlos Gavilanes, Interview). Muñiz 
was a biomedic with no volcanological background: "He often would give interviews 
to the press and that would upset people because there were often errors" (Nick 
Varley, Interview). According to Gavilanes, Muñiz was determined that the 
Committee would speak with one voice, to the extent that he sought to stifle debate 






Figure 6.5. Volcanic Alert Semaphore, Juan Barragán (Figure 6.3), Jalisco (2017).  
The three 'stages' described are: 'Normality' (the volcano is calm, it is our obligation 
to know the location of evacuation routes, meeting points and shelters); 'Alert' (the 
volcano is restless, stay attentive to official information. Stay prepared for a 
possible evacuation, have your important documents to hand, make sure you know 
your meeting point); 'Alarm' (There is danger, it is the moment to evacuate. Remain 
calm, head to your meeting point and follow the instructions of the authorities of 
Protección Civil). The current level is 'Yellow/Alert'. 
The principal divergence of opinion developed between those who had been involved 
in the educational programme and the remainder of the Committee. Juan Carlos 
Gavilanes states that one senior volcanologist decided to limit the information to the 
communities - for instance, insisting that the word 'explosion' be prohibited because it 
may induce panic. 
 
By then I didn't know that that was not true, but I suspected it was not 
true because I... It was really dodgy, the thing was really illogical for me 
because I was with my friends, including several geologists, in constant 
contact with people of the communities and when you do that... Your 
points of view of hard science change, and science in general change. It's 
when you see that there's a world shared by authorities and scientists 





In 1999, Jesús Manuel Macías, a Mexican specialist in disaster risk and Mary Fran 
Myers from the Natural Hazards Centre in Boulder, Colorado, visited Colima to speak 
to those involved in the community education programme, claiming that it was the 
first of its kind in México (Juan Carlos Gavilanes, Interview). Gavilanes states that the 
visitors introduced the community education group to the social science of disaster 
risk. Macías, a proponent of integrated DRR, used Volcán de Colima as a case study 
(e.g. Macías, 1999; Macías and Aguirre, 2006). Gavilanes claims that participating in 
the VRR system became increasingly challenging: "It was a breaking point in our 
academic life, that moment, the visit of Jesús Manuel Macías." 
 
This especially became the case when the discussion turned to potentially relocating 
La Yerbabuena like Barranca del Agua. Both Juan Carlos Gavilanes and Carlos 
Navarro note that the decision to relocate La Yerbabuena was taken by the governor 
of Colima, Fernando Moreno-Peña, when the crisis began in 1998. Navarro claims 
that once Moreno learned what a PDC was, and that La Yerbabuena was constructed 
on top of PDC deposits from 1913, he was convinced that the town needed to be 
moved. It took some time for this decision to be carried out, including to obtain the 
endorsement of the Committee. 
 
We told the Governor that it was not necessary, could we please agree on 
this first? We have a monitoring system, and we believe that, as has 
worked in other countries, before a strong eruption, the volcano is going 
to alert us, we're going to see changes in the composition of the gases, 
we will see it in the seismicity, it will show that magma is rising, we will 
see deformation. None of this is happening yet, so there's no need to 
relocate the people. As I said, he overreacted, although also perhaps he 
had a political vision, at state level or national level, to say 'I was the 
first governor to relocate a community because of volcanic risk' (Carlos 
Navarro, Interview). 
 
Nevertheless, according to Juan Carlos Gavilanes "most of the Earth scientists here 
recommended the resettlement". On hearing of the decision to relocate, Jesús Manuel 
Macías organised a workshop on resettlement in Colima, with invited attendees 
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including disaster and relocation expert Anthony Oliver-Smith: "The general 
conclusion of the workshop was 'be careful'. This resettlement can increase the risk 
and can be unsuccessful" (Juan Carlos Gavilanes, Interview). Gavilanes claims that 
Macías alerted the incumbent director of CENAPRED to his intention to hold the 
workshop: "...the director of the main, the top institution of risk prevention in this 
country answered: 'Don't worry, don't do it, it is not necessary, they are very poor 
people, they will receive whatever you give them, even if it is this much.'" Gavilanes 
claims that learning of this was 'shocking' and the moment at which he realised that 
social science was a 'hard route to take' in México.  
 
The second (and final) exchange visit in the Colima-Merapi 'twin volcano' initiative 
occurred as part of the 2000 IAVCEI Scientific Assembly in Bali. VDAP funds 
permitted five UCol volcanologists (including Gavilanes, Navarro and Cortés) to 
attend a conference field trip to Merapi, incorporating a visit to the village of Turgo, 
which was partially destroyed by a PDC in 1994 (Section 4.1.2) (Gavilanes, pers. 
comm. 2016). Chris Newhall (pers. comm. 2017) states that lack of funding prevented 
the exchange project from continuing in any formal sense, but he believes that at 
subsequent CoV conferences, volcanologists associated with both volcanoes have 
used the connections established to meet and exchange ideas.  
 
In late 2000, the funding for the educational programme was not renewed (Gavilanes, 
2004). "Without resources, we could not do the work. The main thing is economic 
support. The idea and the vision is one thing, but it doesn't work without support" 
(Abel Cortés, Interview). 
 
I was absolutely disappointed when it had to stop. I think it was a great 
opportunity to initiate real exchange, real communication. It was a very 
good beginning, but I think maybe the authorities thought that for some 
reason it was not good that people would have information..., Mexican 
politics is based on control of the public, and it means the big component 
is that people do not make decisions by themselves. They must obey what 




Alicia Cuevas claims that the community education project was, at the time of 
interview (2017), the only community work on risk reduction that had been done in 
the villages around the volcano at an academic level.  
 
Throughout 2000, volcanic activity did not provoke further evacuations. However, 
residents were encouraged to avoid valleys around the volcano, due to lahar hazards. 
In May 2001, a new effusive phase began (Bretón et al. 2002; GVP, 2013). According 
to English volcanologist Nick Varley, who started working at UCol in late 2000, the 
Committee convened monthly throughout this period.  
 
The Committee members from the UdG, Francisco Nuñez and Carlos Suarez-
Plasencia, published two maps in 2002. One was a map of lahar hazards from Volcán 
de Colima and Nevado de Colima, and the other was entitled Volcán de Fuego 'El 
Colima', Eruptive Process 1999-2002, Exclusion and Buffer Zone for VEI 2-3, 
February 10th-type Explosions. This latter map formed the basis of policy in Jalisco 
regarding access to the volcano, with a 'buffer zone' in which people are permitted to 
work and an absolute exclusion zone of 8 km. This exclusion zone was based on a 
calculation of the potential energy release of an explosion larger than that of 10th 
February 1999, which the Jalisco scientists believed could send ballistics to distances 
of 8 km from the crater. 
 
By 5th February 2002, the extant dome had filled the crater and began to generate 
incandescent rockfalls on the southwest flank (Gavilanes, 2004; GVP, 2013). 
Rockfalls had not been seen at the volcano since before 1998, and a committee 
meeting was called. The Committee concluded, almost unanimously, that there was 
no risk beyond 2 km from the summit and evacuation was unnecessary. However, two 
Committee members voted in favour of evacuation and took matters into their own 
hands at the conclusion of the meeting: 
 
There was a moment in which the Governor spoke on all television 
channels, at national level about the glowing lava and the rockfalls 
descending during the night. It looked very impressive, but we were 
saying 'it's not a problem, this is normal for the volcano'. But, those two 
people together with Jesús Muñiz went to the Governor and when he 
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asked 'do we evacuate the people?' they said 'yes, evacuate them' when 
on the same day in a committee meeting we had all said that it was not 
necessary. So, we woke up with news in the papers in Colima that they 
had been evacuated. This made us very angry and we asked 'why have 
you done this?' (Carlos Navarro, Interview). 
 
Several families resisted the evacuation, which lasted five days (Gavilanes, 2004). 
Once it had been concluded that the rockfalls did not represent a threat to La  
Yerbabuena, the evacuees were allowed to return. However, Nick Varley notes that, 
ironically, the rockfall activity was more frequent and of greater magnitude when the 
evacuees returned than when they left. 
 
The next evacuation occurred on 18th May 2002. The Committee recommended the 
evacuation, not because of an eruption, but because RESCO had registered 30 hours 
of continuous harmonic tremor, something never seen before at Volcán de Colima 
(Gavilanes, 2004; Nick Varley, Interview). Differing perspectives on this evacuation 
exist. Gavilanes notes that, as no significant eruptive activity manifested after this, it 
could be seen as an 'overreaction' on the part of scientists and an indication that the 
committee had not learned from 1998-1999. Varley, on the other hand states: "I think 
that was a very well-called evacuation that they did because they hadn't seen it before 
and actually haven't seen it since, it was a very interesting bit of seismicity. 
Something strange happened then." This perhaps speaks of a divergence in focus on 
hazard and vulnerability between the two scientists at this point.  
 
After the 18th May evacuation, the relocation of La Yerbabuena began: "The number 
of inhabitants who refused to evacuate increased. Those who resisted declared that the 
government acted against their human rights, upon seeing that they refused to 
evacuate, the government cut off the electricity and potable water with the aim of 
forcing them to leave the community" (Gavilanes, 2004). Cuevas (2005) notes that 
those who remained received the support of several organisations, including the 
Zapatista Army of National Liberation, an agrarian left-wing revolutionary 
organisation originating in Chiapas, southern México. La Yerbabuena declared itself a 
'community in resistance' (Alonso, 2006). Melchor Ursua emphasises the role of the 




At the beginning, they all accepted, but later, I don't know where the idea 
came from, I have an idea, but I am not sure, but they told them 'don't 
accept being moved', the Zapatista army from Chiapas came here to tell 
them 'don't accept being moved.' So five families didn't leave, and haven't 
yet. They're still there, fifty-something people. We stationed the military 
up there for some time so that if there was an emergency, we could get 
them out. 
 
Ursua argues that the relocation was conducted in the best interests of the people and 
was intended to remove them from a zone of high risk, likewise that stationing the 
military in the community was to expedite evacuation in the case of a dangerous 
eruption. Macías and Aguirre (2006) cite claims that military personnel were 
responsible for intimidation, violence and sexual assault against the residents. The 
involvement of the Zapatistas can be seen as the at-risk community establishing 
topological links of their own and creating an assemblage of knowledge and personnel 
from 'elsewhere' in order to reinforce their position on the policy field. Processes of 
policy mobility are not purely the preserve of those with 'authority', ideas from 
'elsewhere' can be brought into a local assemblage by those ostensibly without power, 
and used to influence the course of policy mutation. 
 
The relocation was contested, not just by the community, but also from within the 
volcanic risk governance apparatus. Criticism came predominantly from those who 
had been involved in the community education programme (although Carlos Navarro 
also claims that he let the governor know he felt the evacuation was unnecessary).  
 
That was a decisive thing in the perception of risk management by 
people, because people tend to see the resettlement as a failure. Our 
authorities never have accepted that, nor the geoscientists here. Most of 
the resistance were considered by authorities as rebels, inconscious [sic] 
people, people influenced by the communist people of the Zapatistas. 
They came here to support the resistance, so Alicia and I, we were 
invited. They organised a festival of the volcano, it was like a response to 
the local meetings every two years, International Meetings of Volcán de 
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Colima... So Alicia and I were considered like rebels by our colleagues 
here, by the authorities, the Co-ordinator considered that we were even 
Zapatistas. He told that to Alicia. It was a very big tension between us 
and the geoscientists, a very big tension..., I went out of the Observatory 
and was assigned to the environmental science centre in Coquimatlán. 
Ricardo Saucedo was fired, the leader of the programme, I think it was a 
personal thing between the director of the observatory who didn't like us 
(Gavilanes, 2004). 
 
Carlos Navarro confirms the split between the Committee researchers: "...all those 
crises, above all 1998-1999 and the management that was conducted, the relocation of 
the population, created a division between us too. That is to say, Juan Carlos left us to 
go and study social sciences and the same with Alicia".  
 
The 1997-2003 events at Volcán de Colima, saw a conflict develop within the 
volcanic risk governance system between the dominant (Behavioural) components of 
the policy assemblage and the increasingly marginalised vulnerability-focussed 
community education programme. As noted earlier in the chapter, processes of policy 
mobility played a key role in 'emplacing' many elements of the policy system at 
Volcán de Colima. At this stage in the global discourse (Section 4.3), the Behavioural 
model had 'come of age' and was largely accepted by practitioners of civil protection 
as 'best practice'. However, the concept of disaster risk reduction had emerged to 
challenge the shortcomings of 'emergency management' in reducing risk.  
 
Curiously, it could be argued that at Volcán de Colima, the community education 
programme did not arrive from 'elsewhere' but evolved organically from 
volcanologists taking interest in the application of their research. However, through 
the visit of external 'experts', this initiative was subsequently connected to the broader 
DRR discourse on the global policy field, and this exposure altered the convictions 
and actions of the individuals involved to the extent that co-existence within the 
system gradually became untenable. 
 
The end of this conflict saw the VRR system at Volcán de Colima revert to an 
undiluted version of the Behavioural model, based on hazard mapping, monitoring 
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and emergency planning, arguably still the case today. This serves to illustrate that, 
although this investigation has talked extensively of ideas 'arriving from elsewhere' 
and the significant impact that these have had in shaping volcanic risk governance 
systems, knowledge of DRR had 'arrived' at Volcán de Colima by 1999 (and has been 
there ever since) but has not manifested in policy or practice. The personalities and 
relationships on the policy field of VRR at Volcán de Colima have played an 
extensive role in the governance of volcanic crises. Subsequent sections will explore 
how these have continued to impact upon VRR policymaking and practice at this 
volcano. 
 
6.5. Cuanto Más Cambian las Cosas, Más Siguen Igual: Local 'Mutations' in the 
Volcanic Risk Policy System at Volcán de Colima 
In 2003, Carlos Navarro and Abel Cortés completed their Volcán de Colima hazard 
map (Carlos Navarro, Interview). Colima and Jalisco now both had separate hazard 
maps developed by their respective flagship universities. At this stage, Jalisco 
scientists were still active participants in the Scientific Advisory Committee. 
However, around 2005, a disagreement led to them permanently leaving the 
Committee. Francisco Nuñez (pers. comm. 2017) claims that the dispute originated 
from funds granted to UCol for volcano monitoring. Mauricio Bretón, scientist 
formerly in charge of volcanic risk at UCol's Observatorio Vulcanológico, states that 
during 2005, Mexican President Vicente Fox visited the Observatory and offered 
financial support. Funding was not granted reciprocally to the UdG and the fall-out 
was severe. Gabriel Reyes, then-director of the Observatorio Vulcanologico at UCol 
is candid about the quarrel:  "We fell out in 2005, and the whole relationship ended. 
The exchange, the work, everything. I don't need to deny it or lie about it. It's a reality, 
it happened." The animosity apparently extends to the whole institution: "...he 
(Francisco Nuñez) doesn't have a good relationship with anyone here" (Interview 11). 
One explosion on 5th June 2005 produced the longest PDC since 1913, with a run-out 
of 5.1 km. This prompted PCJ to evacuate Juan Barragán (Figure 6.3; GVP, 2013).  
 
In 2005, Ricardo Ursua-Moctezuma (nephew of Melchor Ursua) started work at PCC. 
Ricardo outlines PCC's official stance on the communities around the volcano post-
2002: "The community closest to the volcano that we have is La Becerrera. 
Effectively, it is La Yerbabuena, but these are dissident people. That community has 
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been relocated at the moment. They are there, but the closest community to the 
volcano is La Becerrera." Ricardo and Melchor decided it would be ideal to have a 
group of citizens in La Becerrera with basic training in emergency response. Ricardo 
claims that, after initial difficulties gaining the trust of the locals, eight people from 
La Becerrera volunteered to become part of a Brigada Comunitaria (Community 
Brigade). This could be seen as a form of community-based disaster risk reduction. 
However, there are claims that the initiative did not translate into a lasting 
arrangement: 
 
I don’t remember the year, but at some point, State Protección Civil 
(Colima) decided to create a group of people from La Becerrera to keep 
watch or act in case of an emergency. It was to be a Protección Civil 
group formed of people from the community, a group of volunteers, 
unpaid. So they made the group and gave them a few tools, they had 
waterproofs some oilskin boots and a radio for communicating. But the 
idea was more or less abandoned, they didn’t keep up much 
communication, they didn’t talk. This was the first such group that had 
existed at the time and today it's more abandoned than ever before 
(Interview 3). 
 
Ricardo Ursua states: "With the passage of time, the frequency of the exercises has 
dropped. Now we don't do them that frequently, because we have already done 
various." Here, there is evidence of another initiative (this one from within PCC) that 
might have engendered a culture of community resilience and encouraged citizens to 
participate in the system over the long term. However, this would only be possible 
with ongoing training, support and supply of resources. 
 
The late 2000s were characterised by continuous dome growth, rockfalls, small 
explosions and occasional lahars to distances of <10 km from the vent. The activity 
ended on 21st June 2011, leaving a dome that had been growing since 2007 (GVP, 
2013). At this time, Lucia Capra, an Italian lahar specialist based at UNAM began a 
project on Volcán de Colima. In exchange for logistical support, all the data are sent 
directly to UCol (Lucia Capra, Interview). Capra notes that she approached the two 
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volcanologists at the UdG to find out if they would also be interested in collaborating, 
but they were only interested in learning about how to emulate the monitoring. 
 
In 2005-2006, the funding for the Committee from the Government of Colima stopped 
and Gabriel Reyes ceased to participate as a form of protest, encouraging others to do 
the same. Some attempted to carry on, but with limited success (Rodríguez, 2018). 
Mauricio Bretón notes that by 2007-2008 the Committee had largely ceased to 
function. Juan Carlos Gavilanes recalls one of these latter meetings: 
 
I started to talk about the basic rules of warning systems by Mileti, 
Sorenson and all those people and Lindel and Perry, about 
communication management in crisis, etc. And I insisted in the point that 
there shouldn't be a single channel of communication, it is much better 
for people to trust several channels saying the same. I remember two of 
my colleagues just left. They believed that was crazy, but that moment I 
realised that it was, my road there was just... I didn't have a case to stay 
there. After that, they changed the committee and they kept a new 
committee without 'undesirable' people, I think. 
 
On 29th October 2011, the Government of Colima passed the 'Law of Civil Protection 
of the State of Colima'. This altered the structure of the state apparatus of PCC to 
more closely reflect the national system (Section 5.4.2). The law established a general 
Comité Técnico Cientifico Asesor (Technical Scientific Advisory Committee) with 
five 'subcommittees', corresponding to each of the national-level, hazard-specific 
subcommittees originally derived from the Popocatépetl Committee in 1995. The 
'Subcommittee for Geological Risk' assumed the function of the Scientific Advisory 
Committee for Volcán de Colima (Ricardo Ursua, Interview; Rodríguez, 2018). 
Carlos Navarro was approached by PCC to head the Subcommittee and to choose its 
membership (Carlos Navarro, Interview). Navarro chose a small group: fellow 
geologist Abel Cortés; seismologists Gabriel Reyes, Tonatiuh Domínguez and Raúl 
Arambula-Mendoza; and Servando de la Cruz from UNAM (Carlos Navarro, 
Interview). Ricardo Navarro (a biologist) assumed chairperson's role previously taken 
by Jesús Muñiz (Ricardo Navarro, Interview). Ten UCol researchers who were part of 




In 2012, the federal government passed a new General Civil Protection Law that 
sought to restructure SINAPROC at every level. The law aimed to establish apparatus 
for addressing disaster risk, including: 
 Financial Mechanisms (e.g. mandatory creation of funds for local civil 
protection activities from state governments). 
 Guidelines (e.g. 'National Development Plan', co-ordination between different 
PC entities, the establishment of scientific advisory committees, links to 
climate change policy). 
 Risk Assessments (e.g. the creation of a National Risk Atlas comprising 
multiple Local Risk Atlases). 
 Education and Capabilities ('the population at risk has the right to be informed 
and to participate in risk management activities'). 
 Emergency Preparedness (e.g. the establishment of a National Centre for Civil 
Protection Communication and Operation). 
 Recovery (e.g. management of aid donations post-emergency; also notes 
'improving the resilience of society is one of the objectives of the civil 
protection system') (OECD, 2013). 
 
The UNDP (2014) argues that the 2012 law represents the paradigm shift between the 
Behavioural and Complexity models of disaster risk governance in the Mexican 
context:  
 
In recent years México has shifted the focus of its National Civil 
Protection System (SINAPROC) from emergency management to DRR, 
with the overarching concept of Holistic Risk Management (GIR) 
(Gestión Integral de Riesgos) integrated into its present legal and 
institutional framework. 
 
There is a clear contrast between this rhetoric and the practical reality exposed 
throughout this case study. Until this point, risk governance at Volcán de Colima had 
resolutely revolved around short-term emergency planning. Steps towards a DRR-
focussed approach had been made anaemically (and frequently aggressively 
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contested). The adoption of a national-level framework, transitioning from emergency 
management to DRR is seen in two of this study's other case polities (Indonesia, 2007 
and Colombia, 2012 - Sections 5.1.3 and 2.4), both of which can be linked to the UN 
Hyogo Framework for Action (Section 4.3). The UNISDR's policy strategy can be 
seen as a deliberate attempt to replace the Behavioural model with DRR through 
processes of policy mobility from the macro level to the meso level (with the 
understanding that actors on the meso level will facilitate the percolation to the micro 
level). At Volcán de Colima, difficulties had been experienced by proponents of a 
DRR approach when trying to implement their ideas as bottom-up or informal policy. 
However, now it was ostensibly being mobilised with authority, from the top down. 
 
The restructuring of the Committee was the first significant manifestation of the new 
framework on the policy assemblage at Volcán de Colima. The change in law ensured 
that there was still a scientific committee fulfilling the function of its predecessor. 
However, the Subcommittee was now more exclusive. Moreover, one of the first 
consequences of the new framework was to further separate Colima and Jalisco, as the 
law necessitated that Jalisco form its own Geological Risk Subcommittee. The PCJ 
employees who had attended meetings in Colima, even after the departure of the UdG 
scientists, now joined the Jalisco committee: 
 
It's interesting because you see now, that law was obviously trying to do 
a good job but in terms of Colima, I think it's not entirely a good job 
because it's kind of re-affirmed the Colima-Jalisco problem because now 
we don't have meetings together, they have their own committee... they 
only ever have them when there's a real crisis. (Nick Varley, Interview) 
 
It could thus be argued that a national-level policy framework, based on a concept of 
'integrated DRR', driven by a global level mobile policy initiative, had actually 
contributed to the dis-integration of a significant component of risk governance when 
it 'arrived' at Volcán de Colima, rendering both states' VRR systems more 
topologically insular.  
 
For political reasons, yes, they have broken a thing to which we had been 
accustomed where we had meetings with PCC, PCJ and the Scientific 
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Advisory Committee... The situation has changed, before we would meet 
up. Now? We communicate, but we don't do meetings. When I'm going to 
evacuate, I call Trinidad (López-Rivas, Director of PCJ) and I tell him 
'I'm going to evacuate, because here the situation is very problematic' 
and he'll say to me 'Well, I'm not going to.' How do I make him? So, what 
you say is correct, and it's lamentable (Melchor Ursua, Interview). 
 
Despite this, UCol have continued to share data with PCJ. However, Carlos Navarro 
explains that UCol "...don't exactly have the responsibility to inform PCJ of 
developments at the volcano, it's more of a moral duty. It's not a strict responsibility in 
law." Gabriel Reyes-Alfaro (PCJ, son of Gabriel Reyes-Dávila of UCol) notes:  
 
PCJ have always been very close to the Universidad de Colima because 
they have the seismic network that works the best, so they've always had 
advice from them around being aware of the volcano. They have tried to 
set up a regional seismic network, but it doesn't function the way this one 
does... They listen totally, or principally to the people from Colima, from 
my point of view.  
 
This informal data sharing between UCol and PCJ may be considered the only 
surviving remnant of the post-1998 arrangement between the two states. Carlos 
Navarro, however claims that even this is largely a one-way process. Some note that, 
although in both states the day-to-day policymaking of volcanic risk governance is 
conducted separately, in periods of heightened activity, both states will collaborate: 
 
They don't fully agree with one another, they have some differences but if 
the activity grows, they immediately start communicating with each 
other, they immediately start working together. So, this situation of 
difference disappears when the activity goes above a certain level. That's 
my impression. The same happens with the scientific groups. They're 
sometimes strongly critical, Jalisco to Colima and vice versa but in the 
case of a really significant increase of activity, they come together and 
they reach joint agreements, and both PC systems try to co-ordinate as 
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much as they can... That's interesting, because you need the volcano to 
trigger the co-operation (Interview 21). 
 
Other interviewees (e.g. 1, 7, 9, 12, 23, 24, 25, 27) have also noted the tendency of the 
two states to open themselves to collaboration only when prompted by the activity of 
the volcano. This could be seen as a symptom of the reactive, emergency-focussed 
approach to volcanic risk that the UNDRO model has implanted in both states, even if 
the 'mutations' on either side of the border have diverged. Some individuals on the 
policy field at Volcán de Colima have argued that this is not necessarily problematic: 
"...each one is independent and this isn't bad, it's just that there is no integrated co-
ordination" (Mauricio Bretón, Interview). However, others believe that it could prove 
dangerous: "...if Colima decides to do one thing and Jalisco another, if each of them 
has a committee and there is no agreement over what is the expectation of the 
volcano, we are constructing the disaster" (Carlos Valdés, Interview). "It's already a 
crisis in that case, it's already too late" (Nick Varley, Interview).  
 
On the 19th-23rd November 2012, UCol hosted the 7th IAVCEI 'Cities on Volcanoes' 
conference, an event dedicated to the role of physical and social science in volcanic 
risk reduction (Section 4.3). During the conference, PCC arranged a mock evacuation 
of La Becerrera and La Yerbabuena in which delegates were invited to participate. 
However, they found it difficult to get the communities on board, as one resident of 
La Becerrera recounts:  
 
Two years ago, Civil Protection Colima left disappointed because there 
was no participation of the people. After, they told us that if we 
participate in a drill, they will give us a box with grocery supplies. Of 
course, the people said yes and everyone was in line to participate 
(López, 2016). 
 
Melchor Ursua confirms that this was PCC's approach to the drill. Ursua notes that 
PCC have used handouts as an incentive for participation more than once in simulated 
and real evacuations, for evacuees and for the families of those evacuees who choose 
to stay with relatives, with the intention to ease the economic burden on evacuees and 




They are buying participation, and if you don't have an incentive, a gift, 
they are not going to participate. They participate through the necessity 
to eat, because they are poor (Raymundo Padilla, Interview). 
 
If you have a population at high volcanic risk, who are only going to 
evacuate for a dispensation of gifts, that is dangerous. This is dangerous 
because they are not taking note of the danger of the volcano, but in 
some ways I understand why the people respond like this... they need 
food, they need to eat, but the authorities do not understand it in this way 
(Alicia Cuevas, Interview). 
 
The gulf between the authorities and social scientists was further exposed in a 
conference forum on volcanic risk, with Juan Carlos Gavilanes as moderator. Nick 
Varley recalls the event as a PR 'disaster':  
 
This is the problem Juan Carlos had at Cities on Volcanoes, trying to 
produce some sort of constructive advancement and it blew up in his 
face...  It was an open forum and someone came along and said 'Melchor 
Ursua, you should have done this, not that' and Melchor just wasn't used 
to that kind of criticism. A younger guy, perhaps a bit more educated, 
would have handled it better, but he didn't. His reaction was 'Why the 
hell has Juan Carlos subjected me to this?' I think if Juan Carlos had 
realised it would affect Melchor this badly, he could have been the 
chairman and intervened, but he didn't (Nick Varley, Interview). 
 
The events of 2012 compounded the division between those who 'belonged' to the 
volcanic risk governance system in the state of Colima (PCC/the physical scientists of 
the Subcommittee) and the 'policy outsiders' arguing for empowerment of the 
vulnerable communities. It could be argued that, in the same way the federal 
government's 'integrated risk management' model had inadvertently segregated 
Colima and Jalisco to a greater extent, it had also (if possible) further alienated 
practice in Colima from the social science of DRR (ironically the opposite of the 




Nick Varley claims that there is a difficulty experienced continually by the social 
scientists at UCol in presenting their ideas as constructive, rather than critical. When 
asked if tensions have prevented these social scientists' ideas being considered on 
merit, Varley replies: "Definitely, without a doubt. I think that's a sad reality...". These 
disagreements have resonated across the policy field at Volcán de Colima: 
"Sometimes the social researchers criticise us, sometimes very hard" (Interview 7); "I 
think it's due to the fact that in the past Juan Carlos and Alicia criticised the guys in 
PC a lot. Colima is a small place, they heard that criticism, they knew who it came 
from and they didn't like it" (Interview 11). 
 
Actually, in some instances at Colima volcano we had more issues 
discussing with social scientists than discussion among volcanologists, 
because with volcanologists you could shout or whatever but you could 
more or less understand what the other person was saying. With social 
scientists, there were times where I just could not understand what they 
were saying. Just no way (Interview 21). 
 
Alfredo Aranda, Co-ordinator of Scientific Research at UCol since 2013, who has 
since moderated the Subcommittee, notes that executive power has continued to align 
itself with physical science "...the technical part dominates. The other part is lagging 
behind and they feel separated, intentionally. So it becomes a competition rather than 
a collaboration, and that's a worry because we definitely need both sides working 
together for this subject." There is evidence that the personalities of individuals on the 
local policy field and the relationships between them can define how mobile policy 
manifests (or does not) to a significant extent. Carlos Navarro claims that the fallout 
between UCol scientists during the 2012 conference is the reason that it was the last 
such event. The bi-annual international reunions did not resume afterwards.  
 
On 6th January 2013, 1.5 years of quiescence at Volcán de Colima came to an end. 
Explosions excavated a 2.5 x 105 metre-deep crater and a new dome began to grow, 
beginning a period of activity that would last until 4th February 2017. The four largest 
explosions of 2013 all occurred in January. PDCs were generated with run-out 
distances up to 2.8 km west of the vent. Smaller explosions and rockfalls 
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accompanied slow dome growth throughout the remainder of the year (GVP, 2013). 
At this point, feeling that his data may be useful, Nick Varley approached PCC about 
joining the Subcommittee and was encouraged to submit an official request. A 
majority vote saw Varley's membership formalised, the first expansion of the 
Subcommittee (Nick Varley, Interview).  
 
The 2013 eruption was the first activity at Volcán de Colima during the Presidency of 
Enrique Peña Nieto of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, coming to power in 
December 2012. The new administration sought to expand the role of the federal 
government under the new PC law:  
 
CENAPRED, in the 1990s, and the 2000s, the first crises at the volcano, 
was an observer and trusted in what Colima did. They said 'leave them to 
do their work', but a few years ago, we could say after 2013, 
CENAPRED have stuck their hands in a bit more, the same in Jalisco. 
So, they are a new actor (Carlos Navarro, Interview). 
 
Despite its status within SINAPROC as the principal scientific/technical institution 
for the preventative element of disaster risk governance, in terms of volcanic risk, 
CENAPRED had, from 1995 onwards, mainly functioned as the local observatory for 
Popocatépetl (Section 5.4). However, CENAPRED's Director of Volcanology, Ramón 
Espinasa Pereña, claims that the January 2013 explosions of Volcán de Colima piqued 
the interest of the new Co-ordinator of SINAPROC, Luis Felipe Puente-Espinosa.  
 
The director of the national co-ordination of PC, Luis Felipe Puente, 
knows nothing about civil protection. He is a tourism intern, he has a 
degree in tourism. His son is the boyfriend of Enrique Peña Nieto's 
daughter, the President of México, and this is what put him in this 
position (Raymundo Padilla, Interview). 
 
CENAPRED volcanologists Ramón Espinasa and Amiel Nieto-Torres claim that in 
2014 when local Colima photographer Sergio Velasco installed a webcam,  
continuously streaming footage of Volcán de Colima, Puente began to drive for 




The Co-ordinator said 'We can't have this. We can't have Webcams de 
México informing the Mexicans of things that we, as Civil Protection 
should be doing.' So, that's when he started pushing, so that we could 
connect with Colima (Ramon Espinasa, Interview). 
 
Amiel Nieto suggests that the centralist vision of the Peña administration played a 
strong role:  
 
The party that is in power at this moment, has the idea of concentrating 
everything, so that's why CENAPRED go to Colima, to the Committee, 
because the Co-ordinator has more trust in CENAPRED than in other 
institutions because CENAPRED is federal (Amiel Nieto, Interview). 
 
Ricardo Navarro (Co-ordinator of Scientific Research at UCol, 2011-2012) claims 
that during his tenure on the Subcommittee, before the Peña administration, there was 
'practically no relationship' with the federal government. Likewise, Gabriel Reyes 
highlights the difference in CENAPRED post-2013: 
 
...over 30 years there have been different governments from different 
political parties... There are times of complete neglect, times when they 
give us complete support as well as the freedom to do what we need to do 
and there have been times where the federal government have arrived 
and have taken control of the whole situation, this has been in recent 
times, in the last 6 years... (Gabriel Reyes, Interview). 
 
Ramón Espinasa states that, with the webcam providing a daily window into the 
activity of the volcano for people across México and beyond, the Co-ordinator felt it 
was important to the image of the organisation that PC should be publishing daily 
activity reports, a long-established practice at Popocatépetl. However, Gabriel Reyes 
resisted the pressure: 
 
Institutionally, they have always fought for us to generate media 
information about the activity of the volcano and I've said to them all my 
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life that I can't do it, because I have very few people, I have a seismic 
network to operate and maintain, to monitor a volcano, to do many 
things as the director of the research centre for 10 years. I couldn't, I 
didn't have people to put to work on a document I couldn't put making a 
daily bulletin on top of my existing duties. I would say, 'I'll do it, give me 
the people and the money to do it' right down to the sheets that I'd need 
to print in order to send the bulletins. If I don't have the money to do it, 
how do you want me to do it? (Gabriel Reyes, Interview). 
 
Reyes also refused to share the real-time data with CENAPRED, again in protest at 
the lack of financial support, but claims that the information was accessible: "I gave 
all of the information to the authorities of PC in the PC meetings. I never hid 
anything. Moreover, the displays have always been here for everyone to see" (Gabriel 
Reyes, Interview). In the absence of an agreement with UCol, CENAPRED 
unilaterally began publishing daily reports: 
 
In the past, the role of CENAPRED has been nothing. They haven't done 
anything and then all of a sudden there was a change in personnel and 
they started producing reports, reports that the University of Colima 
often disagreed with... The first I was made aware of it was when I got an 
email with the PDF. They used Webcams de México data combined with 
a bit of seismic data they'd been sent, and satellite data, all freely 
available data, and it's like 'what's the logic of putting an extensive 
report out based on minimal data from people who've got no experience 
of Colima when we've got large amounts of data and tons of experience?' 
(Nick Varley, Interview). 
 
This study has highlighted that distinct policy assemblages and mutations have been 
constructed around Volcán de Colima and Popocatépetl, through the interaction of 
various pieces of mobile policy and the unique social and volcanological 
environments of both volcanoes. The post-2013 changes can arguably be seen as a 
product of the federal government realising (due to increasingly rapid mobility of 
information in the social media age) that it had very little presence in volcanic risk 
governance at Volcán de Colima, having focussed almost exclusively on Popocatépetl 
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which stood within sight of its central institutions. As a result, policy and practice 
around Volcán de Colima had evolved in a manner over which it had limited control. 
When the attempt to extend the practice of producing daily bulletins was rejected on 
the local policy field in Colima, the federal government adopted the task itself, to the 
chagrin of the UCol academics, a contested form of policy mobility where a 
topographically distant higher-level administration attempts to insert a component into 
a localised assemblage that is perceived as unwelcome by the existing field 
constituents. 
 
According to Ramón Espinasa, Puente also began to push for the establishment of a 
Servicio Vulcanologico Nacional (National Volcanological Service): 
 
There is also something important that, in 2013 came out the Civil 
Protection law, so the law said that CENAPRED has the responsibility of 
any volcanic eruption in the whole country, so you know, even if there is 
the observatory of Colima and Protección Civil Colima, we have the 
responsibility. Not them, but us. And it's the law...(laughs). So that's why 
Ramón told you about the Servicio Vulcanologico Nacional, that is our 
main project. The point is that we need to organise different universities 
and observatories in order that they can provide us with information 
about the situation of volcanoes (Amiel Nieto, Interview). 
 
If the decision to publish bulletins was an attempt by the federal government to start 
to influence governance at Volcán de Colima from afar, the Servicio Vulcanologico 
Nacional can perhaps be viewed as an effort to annexe policy at Volcán de Colima 
into a framework over which the federal government would have more control.  
 
Three of this project's case study volcanoes (Merapi, Nevado del Ruiz, and Mount 
Rainier) are monitored by national-level organisations that also monitor other active 
volcanoes within their countries (the CVGHM, SGC and USGS). Each of these (or 
their antecedents, e.g. the Dutch Indian Volcanological Survey) were the first 
institutions to assume that responsibility and were therefore able to establish 
themselves in this role uncontested. One notable exception was Nevado del Ruiz 
where, before the 1985 eruption, the committee in Caldas and the national apparatus 
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in Bogotá did not achieve a working relationship (although the two were quickly 
amalgamated after the disaster). These institutions embedded themselves on the local 
policy fields at each volcano, either by establishing topographically proximal 
infrastructure and practices (e.g. observatories/monitoring) or institutional topologies 
(e.g. protocols with local governments/institutions). 
 
At Volcán de Colima, the federal government had been topographically and 
topologically distant for over two decades of institutionalised volcanic risk 
governance. It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that the 2012 PC law's aim to 
establish a top-down institutional topology has not been swift or straightforward.  
 
It isn't going to happen. It's a plan that's at least 10 years old. It's a plan 
that was born halfway through the previous presidency, the government 
of Felipe Calderón, when there were other people in CENAPRED, other 
people at the head of SINAPROC. The idea came to establish the 
Mexican Volcanological Service. We had meetings in México City, we 
went to Acapulco, and nothing came of it, but the plan continues. The 
years have passed and nothing has happened. This government has 
already ended, and whatever may be in the government that comes is 
going to change the public servants, all of them. There is no continuity in 
government policy... (Gabriel Reyes, Interview). 
 
Ramón Espinasa notes that the Servicio Vulcanologico Nacional would partially be 
based on the Servicio Sismologico Nacional (the Mexican National Seismological 
Service). This organisation has operated throughout México since 1910 and, in 1929 
was placed under the control of the IG at UNAM. It is therefore autonomous from the 
Mexican government (Pérez et al. 2018). However, the Servicio Vulcanologico 
Nacional has been envisioned as a collaboration between the IG and CENAPRED, 
and would seek to draw upon the Servicio Sismologico Nacional and other examples 
of government-based volcanological surveys from around the world, particularly other 
examples in Latin America such as the Servicio Geologico Colombiano or the 
National Service for Geology and Mining in Chile (Interview 4; Interview 22). It can 
therefore be viewed as an assemblage of mobile policy ingredients from outwith, and 




Under the Peña administration, SINAPROC demonstrated a desire to establish the 
Servicio Vulcanologico Nacional, but without significant financial investment: 
 
There was a plan to do the National Volcanological Service. It was 
probably a nice idea, because like that you can join a lot of people, 
distribute different studies; gases, geochemistry etc. The project was 
presented by Ramón Espinasa two years ago in a PC meeting, an 
international meeting. The conclusion was 'we don't have the money to 
do this.' (Lucia Capra, Interview). 
 
The current strategy behind the Servicio Vulcanologico Nacional has been to convince 
the universities that study volcanoes in México to share their researchers' data with 
CENAPRED, on the understanding that the data will not be used for publications, but 
exclusively for PC (Ramón Espinasa, Interview). In this sense, the idea is to avoid 
financing new infrastructure by assembling the service from institutions that already 
exist, an approach that has raised concerns:  
 
I think the reason there's opposition is because it's not coming out well, 
that people believe they're going to expropriate their equipment or take 
the data from networks that exist currently. Better, form the service from 
nothing, buy equipment, and leave people to do their own research with 
their own networks (Tonatiuh Domínguez, Interview). 
 
Who is going to work in this service? Those of us who already have 
instrumentation, who've been working for years? We're going to give it to 
the service in exchange for what? What is your responsibility within this 
service? What are the conditions? If you become part of a service, what 
is your status? Are you an employee of the Government, are you an 
employee of the University? What is your scope? What are your 
responsibilities? You know the case of l'Aquila in Italy? At what point 
could we come to? Federal functionaries have certain obligations. This 
should remain very clear, no? Who wants to form part of a National 




The l'Aquila trial occurred in Italy between 2011 and 2012. Six scientists and a 
government official were found guilty of involuntary manslaughter for having failed 
to predict an earthquake and recommend an evacuation based on premonitory tremors 
in 2009. The earthquake killed 300 (Bretton et al. 2015). Although six defendants 
were acquitted and the seventh received a reduced sentence, the implications for 
science in disaster risk governance have been far-reaching. Following l'Aquila, UCol 
researchers began to resist the pressure to make evacuation decisions, encouraging 
PCC to take the responsibility (Interviews 1, 8, 12, 27): 
 
More recently, at least during the last five years, we have insisted to 
Melchor to try to rectify that responsibility. We have said to him, "look, 
all of this has had an evolution, also internationally, there has been an 
evolution in how to take these sorts of decisions and in many places the 
responsibility has fallen to the scientists and they have insisted on 
evacuating in order to help PC take a decision that they have not taken. 
So we have to work now to convince them that things have changed and 
that now the responsibility should not fall to us (Carlos Navarro, 
Interview). 
 
Under Gabriel Reyes, UCol did not agree to share data with CENAPRED. Ramón 
Espinasa notes that this was a problem experienced with Colima and several other 
universities:  
 
Gabriel was very closed and, in part it was because, I think, well, he 
actually told me that the reason he didn't share all his information is 
because he didn't get support in the form of money or equipment for 
monitoring, so why would he share all his data if nobody gave him any 
support? But that's the problem! His ultimate goal, as happens with 
many of the researchers in the universities, is not saving lives, it's 
studying volcanoes and publishing papers, and that's the main problem. 
In Colima they had a sort of arrangement, in the sense that Gabriel 
would give the information, already digested, to the head of Civil 
Protection in Colima, Melchor Ursua, so that Melchor would take 
  
219 
whatever measures he thought were necessary, but it was sort of 
informal.  
 
The monitoring that was carried out in Colima was basically for 
scientific purposes and that's one of the reasons that we've been 
promoting the idea of signing agreements with the different universities, 
so that they will share those data and we agree that we won't use those 
data for scientific publications. And that's been the main problem with all 
universities and all agreements, we've since tried to... with Chiapas, with 
Veracruz, with Jalisco... Well, with Jalisco, they basically said we're not 
signing any agreement if CENAPRED is not paying us at least *this* 
amount of money (Ramón Espinasa, Interview). 
 
Francisco Nuñez of the UdG claims that in addition to insufficient financial incentive 
to participate, a further stipulation of the offer that he rejected was that he would need 
to obtain permission from CENAPRED to publish his own data (Francisco Nuñez, 
pers. comm. 2017). When asked if he sees this resistance as a significant obstacle to 
the creation of the Servicio Vulcanologico Nacional, Ramón Espinasa states:  
 
Well, not really, I think that if the idea of having a national system keeps 
going forward, they will eventually have to capitulate. Especially, the day 
that we do have this entity working and we can get money for monitoring 
volcanoes, they will want... eventually I hope, that we will have money 
for equipment to put on volcanoes, and obviously we will go and put 
instruments on Ceboruco (an active volcano in Nayarit state where the 
UdG currently maintains a private monitoring network) and things like 
that, and they will, have to eventually, I hope that they will eventually see 
that it is for their own benefit. 
 
Espinasa's most commonly used word is 'eventually'. The Servicio Vulcanologico 
Nacional did not come into existence during the presidency of Enrique Peña-Nieto 
and it remains to be seen if it will under his successor, Andres Manuel López-
Obrador. It can therefore perhaps be regarded as a piece of 'latent' mobile policy - an 
idea that many actors on the policy fields of VRR at the local and national level have 
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been aware of for some time, but which has not been translated into practice and thus 
exists in 'mobile policy limbo'. This is a clear contrast with the 'fast' mobile policy 
seen elsewhere in this study. 
 
Volcán de Colima remained active throughout 2014, with ongoing dome growth, 
Vulcanian explosions, rockfalls, occasional PDCs to distances of >2 km, and 13 
lahars with typical run-out distances of approximately 12 km. No damages were 
reported (GVP, 2013). 
 
In 2014, work began on another component of the 2012 Protección Civil legal 
framework, the creation of a 'Risk Atlas' (Section 5.4.3) for the state of Colima 
incorporating digital simulations of hazard scenarios with vulnerability data, with a 
budget of $16,000,000 MXN (£655,000). Nick Varley took the job of generating the 
digital hazard simulations for the volcano (Nick Varley, pers. comm. 2018). 
 
Seismologist Dulce Vargas-Bracamontes became the latest arrival at UCol in 2015 
with a funded project from CONACYT. She was invited upon arrival to join the 
Subcommittee, but chose to defer until the project was underway, ultimately joining 
in June 2016 (Dulce Vargas, Interview). 
 
On 9th July, 2015, Volcán de Colima experienced a significant increase in rockfalls 
and degassing, marking the beginning of the most intense activity since 1913 (Reyes 
et al. 2016). As the 10th July progressed, continuous effusive activity generated 
incandescent rockfalls and PDCs (GVP, 2013). This was the first night of the school 
summer holidays, and in the communities around the volcano, residents were 
preparing a celebration. Hugo Rodríguez, a PhD candidate at the Colegio de 
Michoacán (who was in La Yerbabuena and La Becerrera on the day in question 
conducting research) states that due to the activity of the volcano, PCC held a talk in 
La Becerrera at 19:00: 
 
Most people were getting ready for the party and didn't go to the talk. 
There were practically only those from the community brigades there, 
noone from the wider population. We can say a lot about the way in 
which PC work with the people. PC believe that if they want to arrive on 
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any given day, hour etc. the people are going to be there to listen to 
them. They don't count on arriving on a day or hour that is 
inconvenient... which says a lot about the degree of communication 
between PC and the communities.  
 
I watched the talk, one of the people there was Carlos Navarro, the 
geologist. In his talk there was not a moment in which he said explicitly 
that lots of ash could fall over the next few days... there was nothing 
specifically said that indicated to me personally that there was an 
immediate danger in the days to come that would merit evacuating the 
people. It was a talk for the calm periods of the volcano. 
 
At 20:16, a partial collapse of the dome generated PDCs with run-out distances of 9.l 
km, descending the south flank of the volcano and channelled into Barrancas San 
Antonio and Montegrande (Figure 6.4). The event lasted 52 minutes and produced a 
deposit of ~2.4 × 106 m3 (Reyes et al. 2016). This completely surprised the UCol 
scientists, Protección Civil and the communities around the volcano: "The day of the 
eruption was the beginning of the vacations, and it was just like 'okay, can we go on 
holiday? because the volcano has been like that many times in the past'" (Dulce 
Vargas, Interview). 
 
First, in 2015, my colleagues said 'Right, we have another dome 
growing, we will have lava flows and then we will have explosions.' It 
was a Friday. Friday 10th of July and on this afternoon we had the lava 
dome collapse and a PDC for 9 kilometres. The people were amazed and 
surprised, they didn't know why we had a collapse like this (Raúl 
Arambula, Interview). 
 
He (Raúl Arambula) had given an interview in the morning telling people 
to expect more of the same activity from the volcano. I would have also 
been worried about that. We were lucky that nothing happened... The 
newer scientists deferred to the guys with more experience that have been 
here for 30 years, Gabriel, Carlos Navarro, and it was a mistake on our 
part not to put more pressure on them and say 'this is something that 
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really looks different, don't be overconfident.' But I think it's difficult, 
how do you tell a person that has been doing forecasting for 30 years? 
How can you change the way that they think? (Interview 11) 
 
According to Hugo Rodríguez, following the talk in La Becerrera, PCC went to the 
Hacienda San Antonio to speak about the volcano, and were at the hotel when ash 
clouds filled the sky (Figure 6.6). Ricardo Ursua received communication from 
Melchor that he had been alerted by Gabriel Reyes and was en route from Colima city 
to evacuate La Becerrera and whoever could be convinced from La Yerbabuena, 
having already alerted the Brigada Comunitaria. 
 
 
Figure 6.6. View of ash clouds from 10th July 2015 eruption from the road to La 
Yerbabuena, 8 km southwest of the crater (photo credit, Sergio Velasco, 2015). 
Even in such circumstances, some of the residents of La Yerbabuena chose not to 
participate in an evacuation officiated by PCC: 
 
We evacuated the zone. People stayed, there were about five who 
remained in La Yerbabuena, who did not want to go. Lamentably, in the 
plan we do not have the ability to force them to go, but we do have 
documents to give them the responsibility in case they lose their lives 
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which ensures that it's legally not our fault, that we gave them the 
opportunity, we were willing to help and they chose not to follow the 
recommendations that PC had made for them (Melchor Ursua, 
Interview). 
 
Hugo Rodríguez claims that those who left La Yerbabuena were brought down to La 
Becerrera (12 km from the summit, Figure 6.3). 
 
At first they gathered the people in the school at La Becerrera as a 
shelter, but then decided to take them to Comala. It was all decided in the 
moment. They started to evacuate people in the trucks, but they didn't 
have more adequate vehicles to deal with the ashfall. Supposedly in the 
plans for the Volcano there is an agreement between certain public 
transport companies and PC to send vehicles. Those vehicles arrived a 
long time afterwards and they had already evacuated a lot of people in 
the trucks... 
 
Ricardo said to Melchor that he had spoken to Gabriel Reyes and had 
confirmed that the event had already finished and that the volcano was 
much calmer than it had been... Melchor replied that the people were 
feeling very nervous and for this reason they should be evacuated. 
Ricardo insisted 'Melchor, we don't have adequate space for all these 
people and the community can't handle it.' For these reasons as well as 
economic ones he argued that the people should stay. Melchor said 'I 
don't care, the people want me to evacuate them, I want to evacuate them 
and tomorrow, if everything seems calm then we can let them return to 
their houses.' Therefore, they took Melchor's word, they didn't ask the 
opinion of volcanologists or of other authorities. Based on what he alone 
said, they evacuated the people. (Hugo Rodríguez, Interview). 
 
Despite the fact that emergency planning forms the central 'executive' component of 
volcanic risk governance at Volcán de Colima, PCC have never disclosed these 
protocols. Outwith the PCC directorate, none of this investigation's interviewees, 
including 11 current or former Committee members, the Director of CENAPRED and 
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the Director of Volcanology at CENAPRED claim to have seen the current plans, or 
to have had any input into their development. The one exception is Mauricio Bretón, 
who claims to have created plans with PCC during the first years of the Committee, 
but to have had no subsequent involvement. It is unclear how many iterations of the 
plans have existed since 1987, nor the extent of the changes. Investigations into 
volcanic risk governance at Volcán de Colima have brought to light three internal 
PCC documents pertaining to volcanic risk (including this investigation with the 1987 
plan). Gavilanes (2004) obtained a document entitled the Manual de Procedimientos 
Operativos en caso de Emergencia:  
 
State Civil Protection have written the Manual of Operational 
Procedures in Case of Emergency, which contains a part dedicated to 
volcanic risk. According to the authorities, this document is in revision 
for local authorities and it [sic] still not finished or approved by the state 
governor. This document describes the general character of volcanic 
activity, lists the routes of evacuation and highlights the function of the 
Committee and the observatory of the University of Colima, which 
consists of diagnosing the activity of the volcano and the degree of 
danger as recommendations to the respective authorities. Finally, this 
document describes the significance of the colours of the alert system and 
establishes a list of steps to follow for the public according to each 
colour. 
 
Although the traffic light alert system was never publicly adopted in Colima, PCC 
appear to have, at some point, internally followed its structures. This suggests the 
influence of the UNDRO manual, or its derivative mutation, the Popocatépetl alert 
system. Alicia Cuevas claims to have seen a mid-1990s plan for Volcán de Colima 
which was copied from the Popocatépetl plan to the extent that some place names still 
made reference to the state of Puebla. This implies that the plans that had existed 
since the late 1980s had been (wholly, or partially) reshaped by 'importing' ideas from 
the POP after 1995. There is no date attached to this document, however Gavilanes 




Rodríguez (2018) obtained a further document, the Manual de Organización y 
Operación 'Volcán de Colima'. Hugo Rodríguez claims to have first asked Ricardo 
Ursua for a copy of the current emergency plans: "I asked him in the interview if he 
could share the plans with me and he said 'no' that this information is reserved for 
'interested parties', for those from Protección Civil, municipal Protección Civil and 
some scientists but it’s certain that in 2015, Protección Civil in the municipality of 
Comala (in which La Yerbabuena and La Becerrera lie) didn’t know the plans" (Hugo 
Rodríguez, Interview). Melchor Ursua later shared this document with Rodríguez. It 
appears more recent than the 2002 manual (it cites census data from 2004). The 
contents of the 11-page document include: a 64-word summary about the volcano; 
towns at risk (from PDCs, ashfall and lahars); approximate distances (of evacuation 
routes); zones at risk (based on radii of 8, 15 and >15 km); volcano monitoring 
(seismic, visual, deformation, geochemical, volcanic ash analysis, summaries of 14-55 
words); map of impacts (listed in contents, not actually included in the document); 
map of communications infrastructure; informative bulletins (internal) and 
organisational structure; population at risk (breakdown of the demographics of La 
Becerrera and La Yerbabuena by age and sex); shelters; participating government 
dependencies and their functions (14 organisations at state, federal and municipal 
level, plus volunteer groups and the El Jabalí ranch near La Yerbabuena). 
 
None of the text from the 2002 document has been directly copied into the post-2004 
one suggesting the plan was completely rewritten. In the later document, the details of 
the UCol monitoring and the command chain are clarified in greater detail. However, 
it omits the colour-coded alert system. The responsibilities pertaining to each 
government dependency, which formed the bulk of the 1987 version of the Plan, have 
seemingly been 'outsourced' to each organisation, confirmed by Ricardo Ursua: "We 
have already assigned the responsibilities and all the different government institutions 
know what their role is and what they have to do in a conjoined manner."  
 
However, the overall strategic structure arguably remains the same. The plan is 
triggered when those monitoring the volcano (through the Committee) alert PCC of 
'dangerous activity' (although there appears to be no acknowledgement of different 
volcanic scenarios within the plans). PCC make the decision (although, in many 
instances it has been the volcanologists who do this), send vehicles and extract the 
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population to shelters. There is no mention of involving the population in any capacity 
other than as evacuees, nor of strategies for the long-term reduction of vulnerability. 
On this evidence, the policy approach is firmly rooted in the Behavioural model.  
 
Despite the limited insights afforded by these documents, this component of the VRR 
assemblage has largely been defined by opaqueness:  
 
We've discussed it many times in the committees, but I don't understand 
why they are reluctant to have a statement, a public, available statement. 
I know what we tell them they should include because I've heard our 
scientists talking to them, but the truth of the matter is, whenever 
something happens, it's not clear what they're following and there is no 
official pamphlet or set of instructions that they share with everyone, so 
it's a little obscure, even for me... My guess is... PC and many of the 
official communities that are involved and responsible for this, in many 
states, not just in Colima, have been formed in a very idiosyncratic way, 
not through professionals, not through people that are specialised in 
these areas but very enthusiastic people who try to help, eventually they 
learn stuff, they take some courses, diplomas, throughout the years, but 
the academic foundation is not there. So, I think they are a little bit 
hesitant to expose themselves (Alfredo Aranda, Interview).  
 
Various other interviewees have made similar observations: 
 
I believe that PCC lack people capable of constructing a plan, and I also 
believe that the people who work in PC do not have the humility to admit 
that to the people who could help them make a plan.  (Interview 5). 
 
Civil protection are not really given courses or anything. There's very 
little training. From the academic point of view you're slowly trying to 
get ideas across. I think they don't fully appreciate the need. I think 
Melchor's outlook is very naive, that they can cope with everything with 




The director of PCC, Melchor Ursua did not finish secondary school. 
And he is the person who takes the most important decisions in PC in the 
state of Colima. So you have two people at the head of the federal and 
state levels who don't know... technically, principally, they are not up to 
date. They don't know what to do. Ricardo is a systems engineer, he has 
been on some courses, he's participating in activities, but he doesn't have 
professional training specialised in integrated risk management, nor in 
volcanology, nor in geology. (Interview 20). 
 
It is therefore a common opinion that the plans have been developed without the input 
of experts in volcanology and disaster risk science, due to worries from PCC that they 
may be 'shown-up'. If Hugo Rodríguez is to be believed, then the evacuation of July, 
2015 was based on the personal judgement of Melchor Ursua rather than a formal 
protocol: "I think that's probably putting it quite well, arbitrary decisions based on gut 
feeling" (Nick Varley, Interview).  
 
The morning of 11th July, Hugo Rodríguez returned to La Becerrera to talk to the few 
residents who had not evacuated. A group from PCC were stationed in the village 
with a broken down truck they were using as a radio transmitter. Rodríguez describes 
an atmosphere of insecurity and uncertainty (Hugo Rodríguez, Interview).  
 
At 11:58, a second, larger collapse occurred, generating PDCs with run-out distances 
of 10.3 km, predominantly along Barranca Montegrande with overspill into Barranca 
San Antonio (Figure 6.7). This event lasted for 1 hour and 47 minutes, leaving 





Figure 6.7. Satellite image of Volcán de Colima showing the distribution of the 
July 2015 PDCs along Barrancas San Antonio and Montegrande (area in yellow) 
and nearby population centres (adapted from Reyes et al. 2016). 
Abel Cortés notes that workers from the Comisión Federal de Electricidad were 
working on power lines (Figure 6.7) when the event began:  
 
Fortunately, their car was to the side of the path of the PDC and when 
they saw the clouds, they were able to leave, but if that PDC had been in 
Barranca San Antonio or La Lumbre, there would not have been time to 
leave for people in La Becerrera or La Yerbabuena. But nobody knew in 
such a short time that material could arrive so fast. 
 
Hugo Rodríguez was en route to Colima when the second event occurred. He 
encountered a blockade and those manning it explained that the exclusion zone had 
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been expanded. They had received erroneous reports that the bridge that formed the 
only route from La Becerrera to Colima had been destroyed by a lahar and the 
remaining population were being evacuated northwards over the Nevado instead. Poor 
visibility caused by ashfall mixed with rain had caused a vehicle to crash while 
crossing the bridge and they reported the 'collapse' by radio. The evacuation was 
eventually completed using the standard route. Rodríguez notes that those in the 
shelters were much more comfortable than in past evacuations, the practice of 
dividing evacuees by gender had been abandoned and families were kept united.  
 
Ramón Espinasa claims that CENAPRED had convinced UCol to grant them limited 
access to the RESCO seismograms during the incrementing activity of July 2015 and 
were aware of the potential for a dangerous eruption: 
 
They (the UCol scientists) were surprised, but we did notice that 
something had changed and we did make a report for the Co-ordinator 
so that as soon as that started, there were people from CENAPRED who 
were sent over there and from the Dirección de Protección Civil, we had 
a helicopter for overflights and all that, because I think that's probably 
when Raúl said 'Oh, maybe Gabriel is not right, maybe it is a good idea... 
The data, because we're getting all this change' and well, back then at a 
certain point, Gabriel said 'We're losing stations!' and I made a phone 
call to VDAP and a week later we had four stations.  
 
The problem is they got stuck in the border, and that was a problem. But 
the fact is, there were the instruments, we did manage to get them, and 
I'm sure that if the crisis had still been going on when the equipment was 
stopped at the border, I'm sure the coordinator would have made a few 
phone calls and it would have been installed much earlier (Ramón 
Espinasa, Interview). 
 
The seismometers were detained at the Mexican border for nearly two years before 
being installed on 4th April 2017 in the village of Montitlán  (2.5 km southwest of the 
furthest extent of the 2015 PDC deposits) and on Nevado de Colima. The fact that the 
instruments were tied up in Mexican customs for such a long time, and Espinasa's 
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confidence that, had the crisis persisted, they would have been released sooner is 
arguably indicative of how crisis-driven the political prioritisation of Volcán de 
Colima is for the federal government: 
 
They come, they help but it's *snaps fingers* like that... They know 
Colima volcano exists, they know it's a risk, but it's not that important of 
a risk. Bottom line. They won't say it like that, but in their priorities, 
when they think of the whole country, it's completely secondary (Alfredo 
Aranda, Interview). 
 
Carlos Navarro claims that the involvement of the federal government was initially 
fraught with difficulty when they arrived to convene joint meetings of the 
Subcommittees of Colima and Jalisco: 
 
In the crises of 2015 and 2016, when CENAPRED decided to stick their 
hands in over here, the authority of SINAPROC came and he wanted to 
control the whole situation. We didn't let him. There was friction with the 
previous director we had, Gabriel Reyes, he entered into conflict with 
them because they wanted to control the whole situation and he said 'No 
sir, here you are inside the University, which is autonomous.' They came 
here to be authorities and to take control, but they came to understand 
that the situation would not be like that, that here there was experience 
and knowledge with regard to managing a volcanic situation and 
afterwards, when we had meetings with the governor, SINAPROC and 
CENAPRED, they always let us from Colima talk first, because of what 
was happening, because we could explain all of the seismic and 
geological phenomena that were occurring. So, at that point CENAPRED 
and SINAPROC gave us our place as 'those who know' and there was a 
higher level of respect, but I don't know if that's going to last for a long 
time (Carlos Navarro, Interview). 
 
The activity diminished following 11th July. Effusive activity persisted, emplacing a 
lava flow that continued to advance until 25th August, with a final length of 2.74 km 




After 8 days they (the evacuees) returned and in this time, they made the 
declaration of emergency... through this declaration they can access 
certain resources at national level for cases of disaster. They made the 
declaration and like a week or two later, resources began to arrive like 
bottled water, sleeping mats and, like ponchos or bed sheets? But here in 
Colima it's very hot, these things were useless. So it is, and anyway, these 
things were too late.  
 
...Afterwards, we could say that things returned to normal but in 
returning to normality, there was no provision for working more with the 
people, talking to the people, updating operational plans, creating risk 
maps. Once again, it was the same, the people up there, the volcano 
continued in its activity (Hugo Rodríguez, Interview). 
 
The volcano continued to produce hundreds of small Vulcanian explosions into 2016. 
A new dome was observed growing in the crater on 19th February 2016 (GVP, 2013). 
Nick Varley, however, claims that Subcommittee meetings ceased, signalling a lack 
of interest in volcanic risk governance as a continuous process - even during a period 
when the volcano was visibly active: 
 
There's not enough (ongoing volcanic risk reduction between periods of 
activity). That's my opinion. Often politics take a front seat. This 
happened last year, the meetings stopped and noone said why. I actually 
sent an email saying, 'well, aren't we gonna have a meeting of the 
committee?' and the reply was 'no'. I think at the time it was because 
there was nothing on paper - until there was an official definition of the 
members of the committee. (Nick Varley, Interview). 
 
Varley notes that the meetings restarted when heightened activity made ignoring the 
volcano untenable. On 26th September, 2016 seismicity began to increase. A lava 
flow descended the south flank, generating rockfalls and PDCs. Explosions caused 
ashfall approximately 40 km to the southwest (GVP, 2013). Carlos Navarro claims 




In the crisis of 2016, the parameters of seismic activity that Raúl 
manages, the curve began to climb very rapidly, exponentially. 
Therefore, we were indicating that soon there would be strong activity. 
So, with these data, we wrote to Melchor saying 'we recommend that you 
evacuate, because the activity is strong.' They did not take it into 
account, so next, when the activity was stronger we went to say 'What are 
you doing? Why did you not pay attention?' He said 'No, I was waiting 
for us to meet in the committee, so that you could tell us all what we 
should do.' Raúl and I, a little annoyed, said 'no, the two representatives 
of the Committee have sent you a document in which we are indicating a 
recommendation to preventatively evacuate the population, because the 
activity is very strong.' 
 
This Governor is not interested in anything. So, we tried to meet the 
Governor, until finally he could see us, we went with PC, with Melchor 
and he gave us only five minutes. We had to explain to him very rapidly 
and, there's a division of power between the Governor and the Secretary 
of Government. They have the competency of authority between them. So, 
we went to the Secretary of Government to have another meeting with 
him, the military and all of the government dependencies, so we said to 
them: 'We talked to the Governor 10 minutes ago and we have proposed 
that we carry out the evacuation of the population and the Governor has 
given us the go-ahead' and then the Secretary said 'No. I have not talked 
to him.' We said 'We talked to him a moment ago', but the Secretary 
became very serious and said 'No, until I talk to him and he gives me the 
order, this will not go ahead, there is a chain of command here.' 
 
And the military leaders did not want to perform the evacuation, because 
all of this is a cost, an economic cost. Putting up the shelters, getting the 
beds, feeding the people, taking teachers for the children, and not just 
that, you break all of the social fabric. They felt like they couldn't be 
bothered doing this. But the activity was incrementing and incrementing. 
Fortunately, they removed the population and afterwards we had a PDC 
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with a large quantity of acid rain, but fortunately nothing happened, just 
damage to plantations and livestock, but in this experience we saw that 
the authorities would put off paying attention to us several times, that this 
does not interest them. Disgracefully, in México, we still significantly 
lack good education about natural disasters. How we have to act before, 
how we should take preventative action, not to be reactionary, not to 
start doing things in the moment when something's already happening, 
when people start to die and you already have everything piling up 
(Carlos Navarro, Interview).  
 
Dulce Vargas also portrays the manner in which PCC acted during this period of 
heightened activity as lackadaisical: 
 
During the last new stage of activity in the last week of September, all the 
signals were like 'Okay, there's something coming, we need a meeting.' 
They knew that the activity was dangerous... Then that day or the next 
day we had a meeting and they were really slow, they were like 'let's have 
a coffee' and we were not that happy with that because the last year 
(2015) we had this activity in July that was quite dangerous. They 
already knew that they were supposed to be ready, the signals were 
really clear, it wasn't like July 2015 when the volcano was so active 
already that it was difficult to distinguish it from the background. This 
was like a textbook of volcano seismology (Dulce Vargas, Interview). 
 
PCC ultimately evacuated La Becerrera and La Yerbabuena, and PCJ evacuated Juan 
Barragán (Figure 6.3). Extensive PDCs like those of 2015 did not occur. However, 
acid rain fell on the southwest flank of the volcano, killing vegetation (GVP, 2013; 
Rodríguez, 2018). CENAPRED convened a meeting of PCC, PCJ and both states' 
scientific contingents, after which both states reverted to acting independently 
(Interview 1). Despite the involvement of the federal government, no action was taken 
to expedite the USGS seismometers from Customs. 
 





I think that the eruption of 2015 changed the way everyone looks at the 
volcano. Even Gabriel with more than 30 years of experience. Every time 
something new appeared in the seismicity, he was more concerned about 
that... that eruption was so different, it changed everything. Last year 
when there was this new onset of activity, everyone I saw was more... 
even, paranoid. That wasn't at all the case in 2015, even with higher 
levels of seismicity. 
 
However, Vargas believes that the volcanologists' change of perspective was not 
mirrored in the actions and attitudes of PCC, further illustrating that individual 
personalities can (deliberately or unwittingly) provide a barrier to the mobilisation of 
'lessons' and their translation into policy/practice, even between closely-linked bodies 
on the same policy field. 
 
On 1st November 2016, Gabriel Reyes retired. Raúl Arambula took over as director of 
RESCO, and as director of CUEIV on 1st February 2017 (Raúl Arambula, Interview). 
This change of personnel altered the relationship between UCol and CENAPRED: 
"Raúl Arambula, he was a student of Carlos Valdés, the present director of 
CENAPRED, so he's a little bit more open" (Ramón Espinasa, Interview). UCol 
began to share real-time seismograms with CENAPRED and to publish weekly 
bulletins, reducing federal pressure for daily activity updates: "If the volcano has 
another crisis then we will publish reports, but not every day. That's fine for 
CENAPRED, but they don't have to teach" (Dulce Vargas, Interview). Arambula is 
amenable to UCol becoming part of the Servicio Vulcanologico Nacional, should it 
come to fruition, but anticipates support and resources in exchange for participation. 
Despite establishing a more collaborative association with CENAPRED, Arambula 
feels that their role at Volcán de Colima should be limited: 
 
I think that it's much better if the people at CENAPRED only work with 
Popocatépetl because to monitor a volcano you have to stay close to the 
volcano, you can see it, you can smell it, many things... They help us, but 
sometimes we need to have the control of the situation because we have 
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the people in Colima, the people in Colima are different from the people 
of México City. The people think differently (Raúl Arambula, Interview).  
 
After agreeing to share data and release bulletin reports, there is now pressure from 
CENAPRED for UCol to undertake 24-hour monitoring. Raúl Arambula argues that 
UCol monitoring already provides sufficient coverage: 
 
 When the volcano is active, I have to look at the seismograms every two 
hours. I sleep with the seismogram in front of me and refresh and refresh 
and refresh and if I see something, I'll call PCC (Raúl Arambula, 
Interview). 
 
However, the director of CENAPRED disagrees: 
 
Everything is being monitored to see if it is stable, if something changes 
then actions are taken, that should be the idea, and to provide the 
confidence where we can say we have people 24 hours a day here 
monitoring the volcano. Colima doesn't do that and we keep telling them 
'find a way to do that', they tell us 'no, no, no, we're fine monitoring with 
the cellular phone and...' No. You need to have someone directly at the 
lab. If something happens, technology sometimes doesn't provide you 
with the information that you can get just with a very quick look at the 
images and the seismograms, you will be able to tell (Carlos Valdés, 
Interview). 
 
Although there is now a more consensual relationship between the two organisations, 
it is still arguably an informal policy arrangement based on the association between 
directors, without roles and responsibilities defined in writing: 
 
Their jobs, I don't think anyone really knows. They've obviously got an 
idea in their heads, but it's something that's never been discussed, what is 
the role of CENAPRED, and what is the role of the University? I've got 
no idea. No idea. It's ridiculous and after the last crisis I remember we 
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decided to discuss it. We haven't had the meeting, there'll be another 
crisis and we still won't know (Nick Varley, Interview). 
 
In 2015, when I started working here, Gabriel was not sharing data with 
them and they started sending reports that they were doing of the activity 
of Colima and Gabriel shared them with us. There were a lot of scientific 
mistakes in the report, for different reasons. Then we had the crisis in 
2015, then Gabriel retired and now we share everything with them... 
Maybe they are just recording events in their own way, but we don't 
know what they are doing. It could be useful, but we don't know what it is 
(Dulce Vargas, Interview). 
 
The activity between late 2016 and 3rd February 2017 was marked by strong 
explosions, frequently generating plumes to altitudes of >7 km a.s.l. Following an 
explosion (7.6 km a.s.l.) on 3rd February, activity declined. Several low-intensity 
explosions occurred in February 2017 before one final small explosion was recorded 
on 7th March (GVP, 2013). This was the last eruptive activity at Volcán de Colima at 
the time of writing apart from a small explosion on 11th May 2019.  
 
In the ensuing period of 'volcanic peacetime' processes of policy mobility have 
continued to influence risk governance at Volcán de Colima. In 2017, the 
Subcommittee undertook the task of establishing a volcanic alert protocol for Colima:  
 
I've been trying to get this done for 15 years. I've mentioned it many 
times in the past. It's incredibly slow. There's a lack of importance placed 
on it by... well, no, it's strange, when you talk to Ricardo (Ursua) I think 
he does understand what it is and the importance of it, but then why is he 
not putting it as a priority on his activities that he needs to do? (Nick 
Varley, Interview). 
 
According to Varley, UNAM volcanologist Servando de la Cruz - designer of the 
Popocatépetl traffic light system - endorsed the Popocatépetl model as the basis for 
the system at Colima. However, the Colima committee did not directly adopt this, 




We've been debating here about whether or not to have something 
similar to Popo, there's been a lot of debate where I think people have 
been concentrating too much on parameters which are fairly arbitrary in 
terms of how much seismicity there is, how much gas is coming out.  
Servando actually helped us to suggest that wasn't actually the way to go, 
and I think that's been kind of accepted now, but the last meeting we had, 
there were still arguments, people saying we need three levels of yellow, 
and Ricardo Ursua saying he doesn't want three levels of yellow and 
justifying it very clearly.. .I fully agree with him, and I told him this in 
person, I agreed I'd back him up at the next meeting. So, I've actually 
prepared a PowerPoint, which no-one really ever does, for the next 
meeting and I'll personally be trying to convince them that we don't need 
to follow Popo... what's the logic behind having three levels of yellow? 
It's confusing. Instead we should just go for the much more standard 
procedure of having four levels. (Nick Varley, Interview) 
 
Varley's presentation was based on a personal study of volcanic alert systems from 
around the world and participation in a workshop on volcanic alert levels at the CoV 9 
conference in Puerto Varas, Chile. In this sense, the creation of the Colima state alert 
system can be viewed as a rare example that aligns relatively closely with the 'classic' 
policy transfer literature. That is to say, those involved in policy development have 
voluntarily 'scanned' the global policy field and sought to 'import' ideas they believe to 
be best for their situation. This is a contrast with the less 'deliberate' forms of policy 
mobility this study has frequently identified (at Volcán de Colima and beyond). 
However, the importance of international technocratic communities in providing a 
topological conduit for some of these ideas is evident in the integral role of a 
conference workshop in this process. 
 
Both Nick Varley and Carlos Navarro note that it was the intention of the Colima 
Subcommittee to involve PCJ, to avoid having two separate systems in operation on 
the same volcano. In early 2018, meetings were held between the Subcommittees of 




It was attended by the state PC director, Mayor Trinidad, Alfredo 
Hernández, who is the boss at Guzmán, so the main centre for the 
volcano. There were a couple of other operatives... Then it was Melchor 
and Ricardo from Colima, Raúl, Carlos Navarro and myself, and that 
was it. There were no Jalisco scientists (Nick Varley, Interview) 
 
Varley claims that the meeting ended with an agreement that the two states should 
meet every two months, and to discuss the alert system. However, one week later, PCJ 
organised a helicopter flight over the volcano without inviting participation from 
Colima and published a report: 
 
When they do a flight, the helicopter has a lot of spaces and there's 
usually someone who's just going along for a pleasure ride, when it could 
have been a Colima scientist. So, the report came out and the report is 
abysmal, it's just full of mistakes, written by their scientists and it's just... 
It's loaded with errors and after that came out, Carlos Navarro and 
myself, we both made the comment that at the moment it's laughable, 
whereas in a crisis, it could be something dangerous (Nick Varley, 
Interview). 
 
We have always had this conflict in that, Carlos Suarez (UdG) might 
publish a report from a flyover, we sometimes see these reports and say 
'what the hell is this?' Things like that, of that magnitude. This is 
dangerous, because if he gives his incorrect opinions on the behaviour of 
the volcano, the actions of PC based on those are dangerous (Carlos 
Navarro, Interview). 
 
In March 2018, due to perceived inactivity of the volcano, the Colima Subcommittee 
reduced PCC's exclusion zone from a radius of 8 km from the vent to 5 km (Nick 
Varley, pers. comm. 2018). This occurred shortly before the second scheduled 
meeting between both states: 
 
We started off talking about how low the activity was and that Colima 
have dropped their exclusion zone. 'Do you intend doing it?' 'Oh no!' 
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'Why not?' and then they came out with the explanation of why not and it 
was very difficult to remain calm because they've got no idea about 
anything to do with risk... 'It's always at 7.5 km'. 'Why is it at 7.5 km?' 
Because during the explosions of '98 - they didn't even get the date right, 
there were no explosions in '98 - they found a ballistic at 7.5 km from the 
volcano. A ballistic. So that's where they've got the limit. Doesn't matter 
what the scenario is. I mentioned I've got a study of 1500 ballistics, I've 
got maps that show the density. They don't go to 7.5 km. Then Carlos 
Suarez said 'It was actually hot!'. Everyone knows that's a lie. It was just 
really sad that he had to come out with a lie to justify his data. He didn't 
go there immediately after the explosion. Nobody does that. It's 
ridiculous that he said that 
 
Raúl asked him, if the current level of activity persists for five years, 
would he lower the limit? 'No.' He didn't even think about it.... That's 
their idea, they don't want to change. Their justification is that they don't 
want people to think it's safe to start building their houses closer up, but 
that's not what the limit's for (Nick Varley, Interview). 
 
Gabriel Reyes-Alfaro of PCJ signals that it is unlikely that Jalisco will alter this in the 
foreseeable future: 
 
I understand their position and the academic aspect, the reason for 
reducing the distance but Jalisco took the decision not to do it because of 
the social problem that it implicates, or that they believe that it 
implicates. They don't want there to be much more activity in that zone, 
or that the floating population becomes much bigger. They think it's 
better to maintain it for the distribution of the population and 
agriculture.  
 
This radius was decided because of a big rock that fell in 1991, that fell 
at this distance, therefore they say that it is the minimum distance for the 
risk. The zone is calculated for this reason. With relation to the social 
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aspect, we're not going to lower it. We don't want to reduce this minimum 
exclusion zone (Gabriel Reyes-Alfaro, Interview). 
 
Moreover, the Jalisco participants apparently rejected the proposal from the Colima 
Subcommittee to engage in their development process for the alert protocols with a 
view to establishing a single system for the entire volcano: 
 
We talked about the alert system, we said we're working on it, the idea is 
that you have your input and we have a unified alert system, and again 
they were very defensive, they said 'oh, we've got our three levels, we 
think it works.' We talked about the research into different systems 
around the world and the fact that nobody uses three anywhere apart 
from Jalisco. Popo uses three but they're subdivided into seven. 
Everywhere uses four or five or more. The most common is four. 
 
And then they said that they liked just to keep it on yellow and then I 
made the point that doesn't help the perception of risk, it doesn't prove 
the authorities are active. We asked 'Did you put it up in July 2015?' 
'No.' 'Why not?'... It hasn't ever changed from yellow and they actually 
defend that. They think that's the correct way to be. We asked 'when 
would you consider putting it down to being green?' and the answer was 
'never' (Nick Varley, Interview). 
 
The result of this impasse is that there are now two separate exclusion radii in 
operation on Volcán de Colima at the same time, 5 km in Colima and 7.5 km in 
Jalisco. From 21st December 2018 when PCC published their new four-level alert 
protocol (Figure 6.8) there have also been two separate alert systems, Jalisco's set to 
'Yellow/Alert' and Colima's set to 'Green/Base level of activity or repose' (Protección 
Civil Colima, 2018). 
 
Nick Varley (pers. comm. 2019) claims that the Colima system was ultimately 
published earlier than planned due to an unforeseen complication. The Protección 
Civil organisation of the municipality of Comala, in which both La Becerrera and La 
Yerbabuena are located, announced that they were establishing their own volcanic 
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risk committee, which would include Mauricio Bretón, former member of the old 
Scientific Advisory Committee, and Raymundo Padilla, a Professor of journalism and 
anthropology at UCol. This committee have apparently stated their intention to 
establish a volcanic alert system to rival the state one. The response from the state 
government was to expedite the publication of their own system in the hopes of 









Figure 6.8. Semáforo de Alerta Volcánica Volcán de Colima (Protección Civil 
Colima, 2018). The four 'states of the volcano' described are: 'Green/Base level of 
activity or in repose'; 'Yellow/Activity of low magnitude'; 'Orange/Activity of 
moderate magnitude'; 'Red/Significant eruption or sector collapse'. With each level 
of activity, the system details the expected associated volcanic phenomena and 
recommended actions for the population. 
Various interviewees (e.g. Nick Varley, Hugo Rodríguez, Lucia Capra) claim that 
municipal PC organisations frequently experience a problematic relationship with the 
state government of Colima because, since the Mexican revolution, Colima has been 
continuously governed by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), whereas 
municipal governments have tended to belong to a range of opposition parties. 
 
According to Carlos Valdés of CENAPRED, whilst the federal and state governments 
last six years, municipal governments last three, so it is very difficult to develop 
institutional continuity in terms of policy. On 28th June, 2019, when this thesis was 
close to completion, an official federal PC twitter account posted an announcement of 
a meeting between federal PC, PCC and PCJ with the intention of 'homogenising' the 
plans for Volcán de Colima and announcing their intention to hold a drill (Congreso 
Nacional de Protección Civil, 2019). This may herald the start of a new era under the 
López-Obrador presidency, however much remains to be seen regarding how this 
process will unfold, the way in which these new policy ideas will manifest and 
whether they will truly repair the 'fractures' in the policy field, or generate 'progress' 
towards long-term DRR that empowers and involves the vulnerable communities 
around the volcano. 
 
6.6. Synthesis 
This study has shown that processes of policy mobility have been crucial in the 
development of volcanic risk governance at Volcán de Colima. However, they have 
not produced a straightforward linear progression towards 'best practice' DRR. As 
noted in Section 5.4, the creation of a legal framework for disaster risk governance in 
México is relatively recent in comparison to its emergence on the global policy field, 
and at other case studies. The establishment of SINAPROC was driven by the 
earthquake of 19th September 1985 and the subsequent ripple effect that carried 
institutionalised civil protection to every state in México is another clear example of 
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the role that Earth processes can play in driving mobile policy. However, although its 
roots lie in a policy framework exported downwards from the meso-level, it is the 
micro-level that has arguably defined the evolution of VRR at Volcán de Colima.  
 
As volcanic risk was not a priority of the federal government until the re-activation of 
Popocatépetl in 1994, assembling the volcanic risk policy framework at Volcán de 
Colima was a process that largely bypassed the federal level during its early years. 
Driven by the minor volcanic activity of the late 1980s, the Plan Operativo Volcán de 
Colima was constructed from mobile ingredients drawn directly either from other 
micro-level policy fields (e.g. the Plan Operativo Volcán Tacaná) or from 
establishing direct connections to the macro level (e.g. the UNDRO manual; the bi-
annual Reuniones Internacionales). These processes established Volcán de Colima as 
a topologically distinct site on the global policy field of VRR, further divided between 
the states of Colima and Jalisco.  
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that the emergent volcanic risk governance system at 
Volcán de Colima was based on physical science and reactive emergency planning, 
given the UNDRO manual was a keystone of the assemblage. The system was 
notionally at its most 'complete' during the activity of 1998-2003 when the Committee 
united the scientists and authorities of Colima and Jalisco and there was guaranteed 
funding. However, the early evacuations owed a significant degree of their success to 
the one component of the policy assemblage that did not conform to the Behavioural 
model, the community education programme - which had emerged locally. As 
evacuations became successively less successful, and relations worsened between the 
volcanic risk governance system and the people it was supposed to protect, a divide 
began to form between those involved in this project and the rest of the assemblage. 
The tension was compounded when connections were made between the community 
education group and the global discourse of DRR, introducing an alternative vision of 
risk governance to the local policy field.  
 
There is evidence that the established policy framework has become entrenched 
through a number of influential individuals. As such, alternative ideas circulating onto 
the policy field have frequently been strongly contested. The rupture triggered by the 
relocation of La Yerbabuena is the first example of this phenomenon, and has 
  
245 
arguably emplaced an enduring barrier to the participation of social scientists, and 
between the community and the governance system.  
 
The influence of individual field constituents is an important consideration for the role 
of policy mobility in the circulation of 'best practices'. Knowledge of an alternative to 
the Behavioural model has existed at Volcán de Colima for ~20 years. However, it 
has not translated into practice due in large part to the power of personal relationships. 
Indeed, this case study demonstrates that policy development (and mobility) is not a 
linear path towards 'more advanced' or 'better' policy. It could be argued that the VRR 
system at Volcán de Colima has regressed in various respects, even by its own 
standards (e.g. the end of the community education programme; the end of the 
working relationships between Colima and Jalisco; the loss of state funding; the end 
of the international meetings). 
 
Recent events at Volcán de Colima have illustrated that there is still much work to be 
done in developing an integrated system of volcanic risk reduction. As things stand, it 
is unclear if the new initiative from the federal government will seek to advance all 
sections of the policy field from an approach rooted short-term emergency 
management to the long-term reduction of disaster risk. The policy field is fragmented 
and collaboration across the boundaries has been limited. This has the potential to  
lead to a volcanic crisis where a poorly-co-ordinated or understood response increases 
vulnerability (there are already some in the communities around the volcano who 
would prefer to risk their lives in a hazardous eruption than to collaborate with the 
existing volcanic risk governance system). There are many contributing social factors, 
not least political will, funding and education. However given that processes of policy 
mobility have demonstrably taken Volcán de Colima from a 'policy vacuum' to the 
volcanic risk governance system it has today, the circulation of knowledge will also 
be key to the future. Understanding the individuals who occupy these divisions on the 
policy field, their perspectives and their motivations, may go some way towards 








Harnessing Processes of Policy Mobility in the Development of Volcanic Risk 
Reduction: Aspirations, Complications, Considerations 
 
7.1. General Lessons from Chapters 4-6 
The previous three chapters have presented evidence for policy mobility in the 
development of volcanic risk governance at individual volcanoes and across the 
global policy field that has grown to encompass them. The study introduces social 
responses to volcanic risk as (predominantly) isolated episodes, affecting 
communities exposed to volcanic hazards at particular moments in time, with limited 
spatial and temporal mobilisation of knowledge that might have permitted other 
vulnerable communities (at the same volcano or another) to reduce losses based on 
'lessons learned' (excluding some word-of-mouth stories surviving for generations). 
This has been the case for much of history, prior to the unprecedented acceleration of 
globalisation over the last two centuries (e.g. Northrup, 2005). The study subsequently 
outlines the development of human infrastructure for the retention, circulation and 
implementation of VRR knowledge at the macro level (influencing practice at 
volcanoes in multiple nation states). This is characterised as a 'policy field' (Hannigan, 
2012), a realm of social interaction that coalesces around a particular policy problem, 
populated by various 'field constituents' with varying connections (or absences 
thereof). 
 
This study has shown that policy is continually produced, mobilised and reshaped 
through dynamic interactions between the constituents and processes that span the 
global policy field (the macro level), those within different national contexts (the 
meso level) and those surrounding individual volcanoes (the micro level), including 
the volcanoes themselves. In this regard, VRR policies can be viewed as assemblages 
(Section 2.4). The growth of the global policy field of VRR has been inevitably bound 
to the broader global policy field of DRR as depicted by Hannigan (2012), and social 
processes of globalisation. However, the volcanic risk policy field possesses its own 
distinct history, driven by unique variables (notably the irregular intervals between 




In Chapter 4, this study chronologically outlines the growth of the global policy field 
of VRR. The timeline is divided into three sections according to the state of 
development of the policy field and wisdom of the day regarding 'best practice'  in 
volcanic risk governance. Before 1945 there was generally a dearth of policy directed 
toward volcanic risk. However, from the mid-19th Century, a growing movement to 
internationally co-ordinate disaster relief efforts laid the foundations for what became 
the global policy field of DRR. Moreover, the international expert community of 
volcanology began to coalesce around the turn of the 20th Century and (in a 
piecemeal fashion) to build a body of knowledge pertaining to volcanic processes and 
crises. Responses to volcanic risk in this period were typically arbitrary, reactive and 
of limited effectiveness, whilst the related processes of knowledge exchange were 
slow, disjointed and not conducive to consistent progression towards 'improved' 
practices. Between 1945 and the mid-1980s, the concept of 'civil defence' spread 
across the global policy field, which was becoming more populated and 
interconnected through advances in communications technology, the emergence of 
international governmental organisations and the growth of the academic community 
of volcanology. However, as Hannigan (2012) notes, the international regulation of 
disaster risk policy has been characterised by 'soft law' with emphasis on autonomy of 
the nation state allowing for highly variable interpretations between and within 
countries. Despite these differences, governments typically adopted reactive, short-
termist and authoritarian approaches to volcanic risk based on volcano monitoring, 
hazard mapping and 'emergency planning'. Several significant volcanic disasters, 
culminating in the 1985 eruption of Nevado del Ruiz illustrated the limited efficacy of 
this approach, which Smith and Petley (2009) name the 'Behavioural paradigm', in 
terms of reducing disaster losses - particularly in developing countries. Subsequently, 
the concept of Disaster Risk Reduction (the 'Complexity paradigm' according to 
Smith and Petley [2009]) has emerged. This approach advocates - amongst other 
considerations - the long-term reduction of vulnerability and the involvement of the 
exposed population. The global policy field has become more densely occupied and 
interconnected in recent decades, characterised by rapid exchanges through transient 
topologies. This study finds little evidence for consistency or predictability in terms of 
the circulation of information, or homogeneity in terms of the 'direction' of VRR 
policy development at individual volcanoes. The policy field is currently a space 
where the two paradigms and many more ideas are contested by various constituents. 
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The distribution of policy is far from uniform and mobile ideas undergo 'mutations' 
when incorporated into the unique assemblages surrounding each volcano. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 extend this study to five volcanic settings. The construction and 
evolution of policy assemblages around each volcano is chronologically 'followed', 
studies are of: Merapi (Indonesia); Nevado del Ruiz (Colombia); Mount Rainier 
(USA); Popocatépetl and Volcán de Colima (México). This thesis has shown how 
unique aggregations of circulating knowledge from across the global policy field and 
specific local circumstances have produced distinct versions of volcanic risk 
governance, some of which have developed attributes that align more closely with the 
DRR paradigm (or are in a process of transition with this goal in mind) and others 
where this is not the case.  
 
It is clear, that processes of policy mobility are embedded in the development of 
volcanic risk governance, and will be key to its future. Policy mobility studies is a 
discipline that tends to focus on analysis of policy (Section 3.1). However, because 
applied volcanology is a 'goal-orientated' discipline that occupies the frontier between 
academia and political decision-making with the aim of reducing losses of life and 
property (e.g. Calder et al. 2015; see also Section 2.3.2) it is also an aim of this 
research that its findings contribute to 'improving' volcanic risk governance. This 
chapter therefore seeks to discuss the implications of these observations across the 
global policy field and at each of the case study volcanoes, including the aspirations 
of field constituents for future policymaking, the complications of policy mobility in 
volcanic risk governance and some considerations for potentially addressing these. 
 
7.2. Aspirations 
DRR is currently an influential ideal within certain echelons of the global policy field, 
yet to become a widespread functional reality (Section 4.3). The pursuit of this goal 
features throughout Chapters 4-6 from the 1990s onwards. The roots of DRR lie in 
academic criticism (e.g. Smith and Petley, 2009; Hannigan, 2012; UNISDR, 2015) of 
the Behavioural model's failure to reduce disaster losses in developing countries 
(exemplified in Sections 4.2, 5.1.2 and 5.2.3). The 'Development' view was a critical 
response to the Behavioural model's focus on hazard over vulnerability and 
subsequently the 'Complexity' theory of disaster risk came to view disasters and their 
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governance as an intersection of the two (Smith and Petley, 2009; Section 2.3). DRR 
has subsequently been adopted by the UN (e.g. UNISDR, 2015) as its flagship policy 
goal, although it has limited power in enforcing participants to adopt its 
recommendations wholesale.  
 
The UN (predominantly through the UNISDR and its predecessor UNDRO) has been 
a key macro-level field constituent. The UNDRO (1985) Volcanic Emergency 
Management manual is a mobile policy model that has circulated onto the local policy 
fields of at least four of this project's case volcanoes (Nevado del Ruiz, Mount 
Rainier, Popocatépetl and Volcán de Colima) and others around the world. Chapters 
4-6 have documented the significance of this manual as a piece of mobile policy, 
expanding on the work of Macías and Aguirre (2006) by contextualising its role 
within the overall history of the global policy field of VRR, the evolution of the 
broader assemblages at each case study volcano and including fresh examples. With 
the exception of the Mount Rainier Volcanic Hazards Response Plan (Section 5.3.2), 
which has arguably mutated so far as to leave its 'source material' unrecognisable, the 
UNDRO (1985) manual has played a crucial role in establishing volcanic risk 
governance frameworks with a focus on short-term 'emergency management' (i.e. the 
Behavioural paradigm). Moreover, the participation of the national governments of 
Indonesia, Colombia and México in the UNISDR has (to varying extents) driven 
efforts to transition from 'emergency planning' to a DRR-based approach (Sections 
5.1.3, 5.2.4 and 6.5). In this sense, the UN has attempted to mobilise policy 
knowledge in an effort to replace a system it itself had mobilised two decades prior.  
 
Arguably the most significant macro-level field constituent in the development and 
circulation of VRR information has been the 'expert community' of volcanology. The 
case narratives (Chapters 5 and 6) are laden with examples of globe-spanning 
knowledge-exchange initiatives including IAVCEI's Decade Volcano Project and 
CoV conferences, the USGS/VDAP, the VUELCO,  STREVA, MIA-VITA and GVM 
projects, the Bi-National exchanges between Mount Rainier and Nevado del Ruiz, and 
many more at all levels of the policy field. Even the UN initiatives to mobilise policy 
and knowledge related to volcanic risk have been driven by volcanologists - the 
UNDRO (1985) manual was created after the IAVCEI general assembly approached 
the UN (Section 4.2); the Decade Volcano Project was supposed to be part of the 
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UN's International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction before it failed to attract 
UN funding (Section 4.3); and volcanic risk was only incorporated into the UNISDR's 
framework for action following the GVM submission to the 2015 GAR (GVM, 2014). 
This study has illustrated that, for many field constituents at all levels, volcanic risk is 
a low political priority during periods of volcanic quiescence. Four of the case studies 
(Merapi, Nevado del Ruiz, Popocatépetl and Volcán de Colima) have provided 
examples of 'fast policy' - the development of a local policy assemblage on a 
timescale of days to months - during periods where it is perceived that a 'crisis' may 
be imminent. In these instances, topological connections may be established in short 
order with those circulating so-called 'best practices' at the global level. However, the 
longer-term processes of defining, promoting and sharing 'best practice' VRR have 
arguably been shown throughout Chapters 4-6 to be dominated by the volcanological 
community, for whom volcanic risk is a continual priority. 
 
It is for this reason that in Section 5.3.3, this study suggests that the policy assemblage 
at Mount Rainier may (theoretically at least) represent the 'highest aspiration' of 
policy mobility in volcanic risk governance. It is a policy system that has developed 
entirely in 'volcanic peacetime', before any activity affecting modern human 
communities has occurred at the volcano. Volcanologists recognised the risk at Mount 
Rainier from their observations of the volcano and the surrounding infrastructure - 
and through comparisons with other volcanoes (most notably Mount Saint Helens and 
Nevado del Ruiz). This knowledge gave volcanologists the impetus to identify other 
field constituents and bring them together to form a policy response. The resulting 
policy framework has undoubtedly benefitted from the status of the USA as a Global 
North economy, i.e. the well-funded infrastructure across the local policy field, and 
the interconnectedness enjoyed by field constituents internally at the micro level and 
with the macro level (for example, the USGS volcanologists at Mount Rainier were 
part of the same organisation that housed VDAP). In this regard, it could be argued 
that the policy field at Mount Rainier has benefitted not just from the socioeconomic 
status of the USA, but from topological proximity to the 'core' of the expert 
communities where knowledge of 'better' practices tends to reside. 
 
The basic principle that those working at Mount Rainier were able to obtain 
information from 'elsewhere' that allowed them to pre-emptively identify a potential 
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problem and also to design a policy solution, arguably represents a goal for those 
seeking to 'harness' mobile policy in volcanic risk governance. In this vision, 
policymakers at all active volcanoes (irrespective of socioeconomic constraints) 
would be able to rationally and deliberately access the global repository of knowledge 
curated by the technocratic communities at the 'core' of the global policy field of VRR 
and to voluntarily shape policy solutions using that information during volcanic 
peacetime (or before a volcanic disaster). This view aligns well with the assumptions 
of the 'classic' policy transfer literature (Section 2.4). However, this study suggests 
that in most cases, as has been a key argument in policy mobility studies, the reality is 
far more complex and those pursuing this policy goal in relation to VRR would do 
well to be aware of the complexities of mobile policy generally and of the volcanic 
risk policy field. 
 
7.3. Complications 
This study has shown that the policy field of VRR and its assemblages are constructed 
through the transient interactions of heterogeneous constituents. It is important, 
therefore, when discussing aspirations pertaining to volcanic risk governance, to 
acknowledge that this heterogeneity can (and often does) extend to the visions, 
strategies and actions of field constituents at all levels, and complicates the pursuit of 
a single policy ideal. There are numerous such instances throughout the case 
narratives. At Merapi, after the Indonesian declaration of independence, the expulsion 
of Dutch nationals and the Sukarno regime's political leanings towards the Soviet 
Bloc meant that the Volcanological Survey of Indonesia could no longer rely on the 
experience of the Dutch scientists who had previously run the institution, and their 
ability to collaborate globally was limited (Section 5.1.2). This remained the case until 
the New Order regime's pro-Western leanings opened up the possibility of working 
with a broader cross-section of the global community of volcanology and helped turn 
Merapi into the prolific site of knowledge circulation it has subsequently become. 
This illustrates that decisions and postures from other parts of a policy assemblage 
ostensibly unrelated to volcanic risk can have knock-on effects for the access to 
topologies of knowledge exchange at certain volcanoes. 
  
During the volcanic unrest that preceded the 1985 eruption of Nevado del Ruiz 
(Section 5.2.3), the policy field that rapidly emerged around the volcano was 
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fragmented, most noticeably between the departments of Tolima and Caldas. This 
divide extended beyond the local level, as the national geological survey in Bogotá 
refused to share data with the ad-hoc Caldas committee. The division also shaped 
relations with the members of the international technocratic communities as incoming 
experts from foreign volcanological surveys and UNDRO had to choose the 'side' that 
they would be collaborating with (therefore restricting the topological circulation of 
knowledge).  
 
Chapter 6 provides examples of multiple micro and meso-level divisions on the policy 
field around Volcán de Colima, extending to personal disputes between individual 
scientists and public servants that have demonstrably had a profound effect on the 
overall assemblage. Key examples include the rupture in the Scientific Advisory 
Committee between the Protección Civil authorities and scientists who believed that 
the repeated evacuation and eventual relocation of La Yerbabuena was the correct 
course of action, and those who believed an approach requiring greater community 
engagement was required. Indeed, it could be argued that this break in relationships 
has been one of most significant barriers to the acceptance of community-based DRR, 
and demonstrates that mobile knowledge which meets resistance on a local policy 
field can exist for a long time in a 'latent' state, deepening divisions between field 
constituents.  
 
It is important to give communities an active role in the development of volcanic risk 
governance systems. Exposed populations are a ubiquitous feature of volcanic risk 
governance assemblages, and arguably the most 'important' constituents. However, 
this study has demonstrated that in many instances the public are marginalised until a 
'crisis' arises (in the perspective of more 'powerful' field constituents) and then 
expected to do as instructed. This marginalisation also frequently renders 
communities topologically distant from VRR knowledge that circulates more readily 
into other parts of the assemblage. Thus, when this knowledge is forcibly applied to a 
community in the context of a short-term volcanic event, it can clash with the 
perspectives that have emerged within that community, or as a result of their own 
processes of knowledge circulation (as in the case of La Yerbabuena and the 
Zapatistas). At times, 'technocratic' systems can fail to take into account indigenous 
understandings of volcanic phenomena which do prove effective when applied in 
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volcanic crises, such as the Carib evacuation of Morne Ronde during the 1902 
eruption on Saint Vincent, arguably the most appropriate social response on the 
island. It is therefore imperative not just to ensure that mobile knowledge pertaining 
to 'improving' volcanic risk governance 'arrives' and is accessible in vulnerable 
communities, but also to work hard to ensure that mobile knowledge interacts with 
local knowledge in a positive way, addressing any scientific misconceptions in a 
culturally sensitive way and taking on board local perspectives such that any resulting 
policy assemblage is imbued with the 'best of both worlds'. Arguably, an example of 
this can be found in the first evacuations of La Yerbabuena when the community 
education programme involved the villagers in a respectful, inclusive and informative 
manner. However, it is also evident that this is something which needs to be 
maintained over time, as the disintegration of the relationships established profoundly 
altered the overall VRR policy assemblage at Volcán de Colima, with enduring 
effects. 
 
The 2005 personal dispute between scientists at the UCol and the UdG created a 
functional rift between volcanologists in the two states spanned by the volcano, which 
was further expanded when the PC law of 2012 (ironically the Mexican  government's 
attempt to implement the Hyogo Framework for DRR) ended the participation from 
both states in the same Committee. These divisions have defined the policy field of 
VRR at Volcán de Colima and are responsible for key features of the policy system 
such as the two separate alert systems and two different-sized exclusion zones on two 
sides of the same volcano.  
 
This study shows that volcanic risk governance is subject to continual evolution as 
parts of the assemblages change over time and at varying rates. These might include 
the retirement of an individual who inhibited collaboration between two departments 
of an institution, a change in government budget that means a volcano observatory has 
to reduce its monitoring capacity or the establishment of an international collaborative 
project that brings fresh knowledge to the local level. Any one of these events could 
cause the overall policy assemblage to mutate to a greater or lesser degree. However, 
there is no guarantee that all such mutations will bring the overall framework closer to 
contemporary understandings of 'best practice' from the heart of the global policy 
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field. The gradual divergence of Colima and Jalisco is one example that not all change 
constitutes progress towards an ideal. 
 
A key part of any VRR policy assemblage, and one that distinguishes this area of 
public policy from those typically examined by policy mobility studies, is the 
volcanoes themselves. Volcanic activity does not conform to the cycles that 
frequently dictate the 'rhythm' of other forms of policymaking such as government 
terms, the financial year or the academic year. Indeed, the pattern and form is unique 
to each volcano. In many instances, it has only been when a volcano has shown signs 
of activity that it becomes a political priority - the policy fields at every case study 
volcano with the exception of Mount Rainier were formed thus. However, just as 
activity can establish a volcano's presence within a policy assemblage, inactivity can 
cause it to fall away. A prominent example is the observatory at Mont Pelée on 
Martinique, which lasted from the eruption of 1902 until it was decommissioned in 
1925, before the volcano became active again and it was re-instated (Section 4.2). 
When a volcano 're-awakens', it may be to a completely different social or political 
reality. There is no guarantee that the Mount Rainier Volcanic Hazards Response Plan 
will still exist in its current form the next time that Mount Rainier generates lahars 
sufficiently large to reach the surrounding populated floodplains. This becomes still 
more complicated at volcanoes characterised by long periods of unrest (months to 
years) with intermittent peaks in activity; the volcano's behaviour can become 
'normalised' and larger eruptions can catch the local policy field unawares, as 
happened at Merapi in 1994 and 2010 (Section 5.1) and Volcán de Colima in 2015 
(Section 6.5). Dedicating funds to maintaining VRR projects during periods of 
volcanic quiescence may be a hard sell in political settings where resources are scarce. 
 
Although this chapter has discussed the role of the international community of 
volcanology as a macro-level actor in the circulation of VRR knowledge, this too is a 
heterogeneous assemblage, made up of researchers from a multiplicity of 
backgrounds, geographically, scientifically and institutionally, most of whom do not 
just share knowledge internationally, but are themselves embedded within localised 
policy assemblages. There are diverging perspectives within this community over the 
role that volcanologists should play in VRR. Traditionally volcanologists have 
conducted studies in order to (1) learn about volcanic processes (2) understand the 
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current behaviour of particular volcanoes with a view to informing authorities and 
vulnerable populations. Multiple volcanologists cited in Chapter 6 have stated that 
this is their desired role, despite the tendency of PCC to force them into decision-
making. At the September 2018 CoV 10 conference in Naples, Italy, I attended a 
session during which the role of volcanologists was debated within the context of 
designing volcanic alert levels. One speaker (the convenor of the session) stated that 
attempting to occupy a purely scientific position was 'not best practice' and alert levels 
should be simplified to help communicate with non-specialists. This speaker was 
immediately followed by another who argued that they were a researcher, not a 
political decision-maker, and volcanologists should focus on researching and 
quantifying the hazards, rather than reducing risk. A robust debate ensued, with the 
two sides not managing to see eye-to eye. 
 
7.4. Considerations 
The findings of this investigation reinforce the point that sometimes volcanologists 
cannot avoid straddling the boundary between science and politics, or the 'science-
policy interface' (e.g. Donovan et al. 2012; Calder et al. 2015). The 'lens' of policy 
mobility studies extends this view beyond the short-term involvement of 
volcanologists during crises, and expands it to encompass the long-term processes of 
identifying, circulating and using information across the global policy field. The 
aforementioned session on alert levels, in which the debate on the 'politicisation' of 
volcanology occurred was, in fact, part of the scientific initiative that also influenced 
the state of Colima's 2019 alert semaphore (Section 6.5). The effects this has had on 
the policy field at Volcán de Colima (e.g. giving the state of Colima an alert system; 
furthering the divergence between Colima and Jalisco) exemplify the tangible 
political manifestations that can stem from scientific knowledge exchange. Thus, 
when viewed from the perspective of policy mobility studies, it is difficult to see 
science as politically neutral. This is particularly the case when, even if volcanologists 
are not generally the most politically powerful constituents at local or national level, 
they tend to be the most active globally in the circulation of VRR knowledge. If 
policies are viewed as assemblages, comprising individuals, institutions, stories and 
experiences, the act of introducing circulated information or practices into an 
assemblage arguably constitutes policymaking - as policy is not 'made' merely by the 
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conscious efforts of those writing policy documents but through the actions (overt and 
understated) of all constituents.  
 
As such, an essential goal of this research is to highlight to volcanologists who are 
reticent about involvement in political decision-making, that they are likely already 
part of assemblages which span the local, national and global levels. The positions 
they occupy within these, their actions and relationships with the other constituents, 
may play significant roles in shaping and reshaping volcanic risk governance over 
time. Ideally, awareness of the 'shape' of VRR assemblages and the policy fields they 
span would be extended to other constituents besides volcanologists to turn the 
assembly of VRR policy into a more consistently self-conscious exercise. However, 
some participants have traditionally been more topologically isolated from the macro-
level fora in which 'better' practices are defined. Instilling a culture of self-awareness 
throughout the whole assemblage may facilitate smoother circulation of ideas, the 
identification of potential points of friction, the reconciliation of differences (as it 
becomes apparent how damaging divisions can be to the whole), to give a voice to the 
marginalised, and to allow those engaged in processes of trans-boundary knowledge 
exchange to acknowledge the topography and topologies of the policy fields they 
occupy and traverse. In this way, those involved in knowledge exchange may be more 
mindful of the processes in which they are participating, the assemblages they are 
taking ideas from or into and to adjust their actions and expectations accordingly. This 
may give actors throughout the assemblages a greater degree of understanding of their 
own agency as well as when, why and how certain pieces of knowledge have 'arrived', 
the existing features of the assemblage that these will interact with, and more 
informed speculation regarding potential outcomes. 
 
As with any effort to circulate an idea, the goal of instilling a heightened sense of self-
awareness amongst field constituents on all strata of the global policy field is itself, 
unlikely to be straightforward. Whilst this project has sought to identify key field 
constituents, it is certain that there will always be less obvious actors and processes 
that influence the development of policy in unforeseen ways, particularly when linked 
to the volatility of volcanic activity and multi-scale geopolitics. However, by 
identifying and involving as many actors as possible, it is feasible that (at least) a 
partial transformation of the pursuit of 'best practice' VRR may be achieved, with a 
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grasp of the 'big picture' and the 'finer' details. In this way, it may be possible not just 
to generate closer ties between the advancement of applied volcanology and efforts to 
promote DRR through the technocratic assemblages at the macro level (i.e. the quest 
to establish 'what works'); but to allow actors on all levels to deliberately access 
knowledge that is pertinent to them and to 'harness' processes of policy mobility to 
assemble volcanic risk policies in tune with the needs of the societies around 
particular volcanoes. This may, to some extent, shift priorities in the pursuit of 'best 
practices' in VRR from 'what works' to 'what might work here' (Savage, 2019). The 
latter concept involves an adjustment in expectations from participants that 






























This project has investigated the role of global knowledge exchange in the 
development of the governance of volcanic risk. The theories and methods of policy 
mobility studies have been used in conjunction with the political science of disaster 
risk and applied volcanology to identify and explore how, why, where and with what 
effects complex interactions of social and Earth processes have shaped this area of 
public policy over time and across scales. Analyses have been performed through the 
construction of narrative histories, 'following' the formation and evolution of volcanic 
risk governance internationally, within different national contexts, and at individual 
volcanoes. These narratives detail the impact of the circulation of knowledge, policy 
and practice in producing parallels and divergences in social responses to volcanic 
risk when they 'arrive' in different volcanic environments. Here is a summary of key 
lessons from this research. 
 
 This study has presented a history of volcanic risk governance from 122 BC 
until the time of writing. It has been shown that for much of human history, 
social responses to volcanic risk have tended to be inconsistent (depending on 
time and place), arbitrary, reactive, relatively uninformed and limited in their 
capacity to reduce losses. However, within the last ~150 years, there has been 
an incremental transformation that has seen the worldwide emergence of 
societal apparatus for reducing the occurrence of volcanic disasters. This can 
be strongly linked to processes of population growth and globalisation. The 
development and proliferation of volcanic risk governance is a sub-division of 
the broader policy arena of disaster risk governance. However, this study finds 
that volcanic risk governance is distinguished by its own unique timescales, 
constituents and attributes (e.g. the spatial and temporal distribution of 
volcanic activity bringing political attention to different volcanoes at irregular 
intervals). 
 
 The realm of social interaction related to volcanic risk governance can be 
depicted as a global policy field (Hannigan, 2012). This theoretical approach 
does not rely on preconceptions of consistent organisational links or structural 
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interdependence between actors. The reduction of volcanic risk is viewed as 
the central issue around which various 'field constituents' have come to 
interact, with differing connections (or absences thereof), goals and 
understandings. These may include: national states and local governments; 
regional organisations; international financial institutions; UN disaster 
agencies; NGOs; multi-actor initiatives and partnerships; scientific 
communities; private actors; and the mass media. This study suggests the 
addition of vulnerable populations to Hannigan's (2012) original nine 
categories.  
 
 VRR policy is produced through the actions and interactions of field 
constituents. Policies are consequently viewed as assemblages: loosely-bound, 
fluctuating arrangements of heterogeneous components - policy documents, 
institutions, groups, individuals, and various actors from 'elsewhere' who, 
through topological relationships proliferate certain ideas and bring certain 
sites 'closer' to one another (potentially distancing others) irrespective of 
physical proximity. In the case of volcanic risk, this study illustrates that 
exposed communities and active volcanoes themselves are also key 
components with agency in policy assemblages. The policy mobilities 
literature (e.g. McCann and Ward, 2012; Temenos and McCann, 2013; 
Kennedy, 2015; Savage, 2019) argues that, processes of circulation and 
assemblage cause policy to mutate in transformational and unpredictable 
ways. This study demonstrates the role of policy mobilities, mutations and 
assemblages, spanning every layer of the global policy field and shaping 
volcanic risk governance in theory and practice.  
 
 The chronological development of the global policy field of VRR is roughly 
divided into three periods. Before 1945 there was little to no formal volcanic 
risk governance. Between 1945 and 1985, the concept of 'civil defence' 
emerged and proliferated. However, the resulting short-termist and 
authoritarian 'emergency planning' approaches to volcanic risk (what Smith 
and Petley [2009] name the 'Behavioural' model) were unsuccessful in 
preventing several severe volcanic disasters, notably the loss of approximately 
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23,000 lives at Nevado del Ruiz, Colombia. Subsequently, 'disaster risk 
reduction', an approach to disasters that aims to complement short-term 
emergency management with long-term community engagement and the 
reduction of vulnerability (known to Smith and Petley [2009] as the 
'Complexity' model), has come into contention. Although this is an influential 
idea and has been enthusiastically promoted at the macro level, the modern 
policy field has seen the insurgent Complexity theory resisted by the 
established Behavioural model at the national and local levels due to 
difficulties in unseating established policies and the challenges of empowering 
vulnerable communities. This study identifies the UN as the main agent 
promoting the transition to DRR (within its limited capacity to influence 
sovereign governments) and the international academic community of 
volcanology as the most active participants in the pursuit of identifying and 
sharing 'best practices' in VRR. Although separate, in recent years these goals 
and their proponents have increasingly aligned. 
 
 Historical narratives 'following' the development of volcanic risk governance 
at four case study volcanoes in distinct national (meso-level) contexts 
highlight the role of mobile policies and their mutations in building and 
reshaping policy assemblages at individual volcanoes. The case study 
volcanoes are: Gunung Merapi - Indonesia; Volcán Nevado del Ruiz - 
Colombia; Mount Rainier - United States of America; and Popocatépetl - 
México. These case studies demonstrate that: movement of policy (formal and 
informal); the transient topologies that carry knowledge between volcanoes; 
the assemblage of mobile knowledge with the evolving politics, culture and 
volcanic activity of the settings in which it arrives; and the resulting mutations, 
have been fundamental to the unique form that volcanic risk governance has 
taken at each volcano. The marked differences between case studies also 
demonstrate that the development of volcanic risk governance at each volcano 
has not run concurrently alongside the theoretical evolution of DRR 'best 
practices' - the timescales are unique to each process, frequently dictated by 
the uncertain behaviour of volcanic and human systems. These considerations 
complicate the task of those disseminating knowledge at the macro level with 




 The case study of Volcán de Colima, México is used to illustrate the 
significance of the interactions between mobile policy and individual field 
constituents at the micro level. VRR at Volcán de Colima has its origins in an 
assemblage of mobile 'ingredients' from the meso and macro levels of the 
policy field - the Mexican national system of civil protection; the emergency 
plans from another Mexican volcano; and the UNDRO (1985) manual. 
However, most policy development at Volcán de Colima has taken place 
locally, with little involvement from the federal government (in stark contrast 
to Popocatépetl) illustrating the varying approaches to volcanic risk 
governance that can be encountered within the same country and the 
topological marginalisation of certain volcanic sites in favour of others with 
more political 'capital'. By the late 1990s, a policy assemblage incorporating 
scientists and civil protection authorities from both states spanned by the 
volcano (Colima and Jalisco) had formed. Due to its roots in the UNDRO 
manual and the authoritarian nature of Mexican politics, VRR policy was 
strongly symptomatic of the Behavioural model. However, within this 
assemblage, a component emerged locally that expanded its scope marginally 
beyond this - a community education programme. As a breakdown in 
relationships between the exposed populations and the authorities progressed, 
those involved in the education programme became topologically connected to 
the global discourse of DRR and aimed to introduce it to the policy 
assemblage. This was resisted by other field constituents and, as a result, the 
Complexity approach has only existed on the policy field at Volcán de Colima 
as a form of 'latent' mobile policy - an idea that has 'arrived' but failed to 
manifest in practice. In subsequent years, the assemblage at Volcán de Colima 
has further disintegrated due to personal disagreements between individuals in 
Colima and Jalisco, inhibiting collaboration and the flow of data (illustrating 
the importance of individual perspectives). Now the policy assemblages in 
both states are, to all intents and purposes, separate entities with entirely 
different positions on parallel policy issues (e.g. exclusion zones, alert levels) 
that are occasionally briefly brought together (superficially, at least) under the 
authority of the federal government during perceived 'crises'. Risk at Volcán 
de Colima has historically been something of a non-issue for the federal 
  
262 
government, however the social media age has seen the volcano's activity 
ripple across new topologies, making it far harder to ignore. This, combined 
with the centralist vision of recent Mexican administrations has seen efforts 
from the federal government to 'annexe' the local policy field at Volcán de 
Colima or to 'insert' components into its various assemblages. However, 
evidence suggests that these efforts have had limited success due to 
intermittent funding and political will, and the  aforementioned resistence to 
change. The case of Volcán de Colima illustrates that mutations in local 
assemblages can produce drastically different VRR frameworks, even within 
the same national setting and using some of the same mobile policy 
'ingredients'; that high-profile mobile policies may encounter micro-level 
resistance that renders them largely impotent; that these ideas may lie 
'dormant' on local policy fields for decades; and that the temporal evolution of 
a VRR policy assemblage does not automatically entail 'progression' towards 
the ideals of technocracies - sometimes it arguably constitutes the opposite. 
 
 This research carries important lessons regarding the future role of policy 
mobilities in volcanic risk governance. The 'ideal' for VRR policymakers is 
arguably most strongly represented in the case of Mount Rainier, where the 
'policy problem' (volcanic risk) was identified during a period of 'volcanic 
peacetime' using experiences from 'elsewhere' (Mount Saint Helens and 
Nevado del Ruiz) and the resulting policy framework was deliberately 
constructed by accessing the 'best' available information on the global policy 
field in continuous consultation with a broad cross-section of local field 
constituents. In this idealised vision, policymakers at all active volcanoes 
would be equally able to rationally and deliberately access the global 
repository of knowledge curated by the technocratic communities at the 'core' 
of the global policy field of VRR and to voluntarily shape policy solutions by 
mobilising that knowledge into their settings, constructing a policy assemblage 
in harmony with the interests of local field constituents. Whilst it cannot be 
ignored that the VRR framework closest to the 'ideal' has emerged against the 
most affluent backdrop, in principle, this knowledge exchange would allow 
VRR practitioners in volcanic settings with limited resources and expertise to 




 Most of this study is given to demonstrating that reality is more complex than 
the ideal outlined in the previous point. As VRR policy assemblages are 
composed of diverse components, there is also heterogeneity in the visions, 
strategies and actions of those who occupy the policy field at all levels. These 
differences in perspective complicate the pursuit of a single policy ideal. This 
includes macro-level assemblages such as the international 'expert community' 
of volcanology as well as local assemblages in individual volcanic settings. 
The most important goal is arguably ensuring that the local populations are 
continuously exposed to VRR knowledge (local and mobile) and actively 
participate in generating and using that knowledge to shape policy strategies 
that reflect their needs and concerns. This is complicated where vulnerable 
communities are marginalised (politically, academically, socially or 
economically) and must take into account these communities' own inherent 
heterogeneity.  
 
 VRR policy assemblages continually evolve through changes in their 
constituent parts (both overt and 'understated'), and many of the timescales 
involved are unique to each part of the assemblage, making outcomes difficult 
to predict. Volcanic activity is a distinct problem for policymakers for 
precisely this reason. With many different components of the social-volcanic 
assemblages engaged in different processes at different rates, it can be very 
difficult to predict the confluences of hazard and vulnerability that lead to 
disaster and act accordingly. Volcanoes operate on timescales that are both 
completely independent of the societies that surround them and have no 
consistent, perceptible 'rhythm' for many field constituents (even 
volcanologists). Within this project's narratives, there are examples of 
volcanoes that have produced hazardous eruptions after being inactive for 
many human lifetimes (e.g. Nevado del Ruiz, Mount Lamington) and others 
that have existed in near-constant activity for a large part of living memory 
only to produce an eruption unexpected in scale, style or impacts (e.g. Merapi, 
Volcán de Colima). As well as impacting developments on the local policy 
field, the irregular recurrence of volcanic activity has played a crucial role in 
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directing policy mobilities at the global level - creating topological links by 
attracting international political and scientific attention or by causing those on 
a local policy field to look beyond their own borders for assistance and 
expertise. In this sense, the field of policy mobilities should consider Earth 
processes as agents in processes of policy mobility, assemblage and mutation 
(volcanoes are arguably unique among these due to their geographical 
distribution and versatility as a source of hazard - moreover, every volcano 
itself is arguably unique).  
 
 The social components of VRR assemblages are also complex and 
unpredictable. It is easier to determine the impact of 'fast policy' assembled 
during volcanic crises than changes in an assemblage (rapid or gradual) during 
periods of quiescence or low-intensity activity. However, subtle changes such 
as a replacement of personnel, or the breakdown of a working relationship can 
have far-reaching impacts - the Volcán de Colima case study illustrates how 
important positive and negative relationships between actors can be. As such, 
although this study aims to reflect reality as thoroughly as possible, it is likely 
that there will always be 'hidden' actors and processes.  
 
 Processes of policy mobility will shape the future development of volcanic 
risk governance. Despite the complications detailed above, it is entirely 
feasible that those seeking to reduce human losses from volcanic activity can 
'harness' these in their pursuit of more effective volcanic risk governance. 
Extending a greater awareness of the following considerations to as many field 
constituents as possible, across all levels of the global policy field, may 
constitute the start of progress towards this goal:  
 (1) the general structure of the policy field  
 (2) the nature of volcanic risk governance as assemblages of local and mobile 
 knowledge, people, volcanoes and practices  
 (3) the processes of mobility and topologies that carry policy between 
 particular sites  




 The international community of volcanologists is uniquely placed to facilitate 
the circulation of this information due to its status as the most consistently 
active entity on the global policy field in the identification and circulation of 
VRR knowledge; the related fact that the pursuit of 'better' volcanic risk 
governance is a continual priority in applied volcanology, whereas many field 
constituents have priorities that eclipse volcanic risk during volcanic 
quiescence; and the fact that this assemblage encompasses most countries and 
active volcanoes. There are, however, challenges to overcome in terms of 
accommodating the existing heterogeneity within volcanology and convincing 
those who consider themselves purely researchers of Earth processes to 
acknowledge and embrace the political implications of their actions. This does 
not just include providing information to authorities or being drawn into 
decision making during volcanic crises, but the long-term production, 




 There is significant scope for future investigation stemming from this study. It 
seeks to examine a world in which there are almost 1,500 known active 
volcanoes, over a time span of more than 2,000 years, using a somewhat 
whistlestop tour of the worldwide history of volcanic risk governance and a 
closer examination of just five volcanoes and the societies around them. 
Although I have endeavoured to make it as extensive, factually accurate and 
representative of the phenomena it examines as possible, it is the work of one 
individual (albeit under experienced supervision) in a post-positivist field 
where perspective is crucial. Therefore, my background, prejudices and gaps 
in my knowledge will inevitably have played a role in shaping the narratives, 
the way in which they have been analysed and the conclusions drawn from 
them. In the case of my central case study at Volcán de Colima, a substantial 
amount of my data (and my inerpretations thereof) were accumulated through 
direct interaction with my surroundings and with people whom I could 
immediately ask to clarify doubts and consult regarding my analytical 
thoughts as and when they arose. My sources for the archival research that 
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formed the bulk of Chapters 4 and 5 were considerably less interactive and 
therefore potentially subject to the flaws in my observational 'lens' to a greater 
degree. This is particularly the case when I did not have access to written 
policy documents and had to extrapolate conclusions about the nature of the  
volcanic risk governance systems based on the observable effects they had on 
the rest of the policy field (e.g. throughout the Merapi case study, or at Nevado 
del Ruiz post-1985). Were I able to undertake the study again, I should like to 
have had each case narrative examined by at least one individual from within 
the VRR policy assemblages at each volcano to provide me with first hand 
information, an additional viewpoint to my own and perhaps a direct insight 
into the content and development process of VRR policies that the narratives 
currently lack. 
 
 The global history of policy mobilities in volcanic risk governance could 
almost certainly be expanded into a complete work (perhaps several volumes) 
expanding on the existing entries in the chronology and adding a multitude of 
others. Further case studies could be conducted in different volcanic settings 
(e.g. Europe, Africa, Oceania and different sites in Asia and the Americas) to 
build upon the outline of the global policy field established in this work. This 
study has predominantly focussed on andesitic stratovolcanoes; it would be 
interesting to expand to include other forms of volcano (e.g. shield volcanoes, 
large calderas and monogenetic volcanic fields) to understand how processes 
of policy mobility have influenced the governance of their unique hazards and 
how sites that share these may benefit from more specific connections and 
exchanges. An entire policy mobility investigation could be performed on the 
global assemblages of volcanic risk governance related to ash hazards and 
aviation. In summary there is great potential to further expand our 
understanding of the role of globalised knowledge exchange on volcanic risk 
governance, and to use this to reduce the likelihood of future volcanic 
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Glossary of Acronyms 
 
B4K: Bridges for Kids (United States) 
BNPB: National Disaster Management Agency, (Indonesia) 
 
CENAPRED: National Centre for the Prevention of Disasters (México) 
CHEC: Hydro-Electric Centre of Caldas (Colombia) 
CIIV: Colima Intercambio e Investigación en Vulcanología (Universidad de Colima) 
CONACYT: National Council for Science and Technology (México)  
COE: Operative Emergency Centre (Colombia) 
CoV: Cities on Volcanoes conference (IAVCEI) 
CRC: Colombian Red Cross 
CUEIV: University Centre for Research and Studies in Volcanology (Universidad de 
Colima, México) 
CVGHM: Centre for Volcanology and Geological Hazard Mitigation (Indonesia) 
CVO: Cascades Volcano Observatory (USA)  
 
DFID: Department For International Development (United Kingdom) 
DNR: Department of Natural Resources (Washington, USA) 
DOH: Department of Health (Washington, USA) 
DOT: Department of Transportation (Washington, USA) 
DSHS: Department of Social and Health Services (Washington, USA) 
 
DRR: Disaster Risk Reduction 
 
EOC: Emergency Operations Centre (Washington, USA) 
EU: European Union  
 
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency (USA) 
FONDEN: Natural Disaster Fund (México) 
FOPREDEN: Natural Disaster Prevention Fund (México) 
 
GAR: Global Assessment Report (UNISDR) 
GFDRR: Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction (World Bank) 
GIR: Holistic Risk Management (México) 
GVM: Global Volcano Model  
GVP: Global Volcanism Program (Smithsonian Institution, USA) 
 
HFA: Hyogo Framework for Action (UNISDR) 
HTC: High-Tech Computer Corporation (Taiwan) 
HVO: Hawai'i Volcano Observatory (USA) 
 
IAVCEI: International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth's 
Interior 
ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organisation (UN) 
IDNDR: International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (UN) 
ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross 
ICSU: International Council of Scientific Unions 
IFRC: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
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IG: Institute of Geophysics (UNAM) 
IGO: International Governmental Organisation 
INGEOMINAS: National Institute of Geology and Mining (Colombia, now SGC) 
INGV: National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology (Italy) 
IPGP: Paris Institute of Earth Physics (France) 
IRU: International Relief Union (League of Nations) 
IVHHN: International Volcanic Health Hazard Network 
IUGG: International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics 
 
JVGR: Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research 
 
LN: The League of Nations 
 
MIA-VITA: Mitigate and Assess Risk from Volcanic Impact on Terrain and Human 
Activities (European Commission) 
MRVHRP: Mount Rainier Volcanic Hazards Response Plan 
MVO: Merapi Volcano Observatory (Indonesia) 
MXN: Mexican Peso 
 
NPS: National Park Service (USA) 
NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation 
 
OFDA: Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (United States)  
 
PAN: National Action Party (México) 
PC: Civil Protection (México) 
PCC: Civil Protection Colima (México) 
PCDEM: Pierce County Department of Emergency Management (United States) 
PCJ: Civil Protection Jalisco (México) 
PCPALS: Pierce County Planning and Land Services (United States) 
PCPWU: Pierce County Public Works and Utilities (United States) 
PDC: Pyroclastic Density Current 
PDI: Democratic Party (Indonesia) 
PKI: Communist Party (Indonesia) 
PMS: Policy Mobility Studies 
PNPAD: National Plan for Prevention and Attention to Disasters (Colombia) 
POP: Popocatépetl Operative Plan (México) 
PPRR: Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery 
PRI: Institutional Revolutionary Party (México) 
PRD: Party of the Democratic Revolution (México) 
PVO: Pinatubo Volcano Observatory (Indonesia)  
 
RESCO: Seismic Network of the State of Colima (México) 
 
SFA: Sendai Framework for Action (UN) 
SGC: Colombian Geological Service (Formerly INGEOMINAS) 
SINAPROC: National System of Civil Protection (México) 
SNPAD: National System of Prevention and Attention to Disasters (Colombia) 
SNGRD: National System for Disaster Risk Management (Colombia) 




TMVB: Trans-Mexican Volcanic Belt 
 
UCol: University of Colima (México) 
UdG: Universidad de Guadalajara (México) 
UK: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
UN: United Nations 
UNAM: National Autonomous University (México) 
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme 
UNDRO: United Nations Office of the Disaster Relief Co-ordinator 
UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
UNFCCC: United Nations' Framework Convention on Climate Change 
UNICEF: United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund 
UNISDR: United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
UNISDR-STAG: United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction - 
Scientific and Technical Advisory Group 
USA: United States of America 
USD: United States Dollar 
USAID: United States Agency for International Development 
USFS: United States Forest Service 
USGS: United States Geological Survey 
 
VAAC: Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre 
VDAP: Volcano Disaster Assistance Programme (USGS) 
VEI: Volcanic Explosivity Index 
VHub: Collaborative volcano research and risk mitigation tool (GVM) 
VPI: Volcano Population Index 
VRR: Volcanic Risk Reduction 
VSI: Volcanological Survey of Indonesia 
VUELCO: Volcanic Unrest in Europe and Latin America Project 
 
WEMD: Washington Emergency Management Division (United States) 
WOVO: World Organisation of Volcano Observatories (IAVCEI) 
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identifiable unless I explicitly give my consent under item 4 of this document. 
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to use my name and my organisation's name in reports, articles and presentations).    
                               
 
5. I understand that  my name/my organisation's name will not appear in any reports, articles or presentation 
without my consent.                 
                                                            
 
6. I understand that any interviews will be audio-recorded and transcribed and that data will be protected on encrypted 
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7. I understand that data will be kept according to Lancaster University, UK guidelines for 10 years after the end of the 
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8. I agree to take part in the above study "Understanding Policy Mobilities in Volcanic Risk Reduction". 
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Participant Information Sheet for Interviewees (English) 
 
 
I am a PhD student at Lancaster University, UK and I would like to invite you to take 
part in a study about the significance of knowledge exchange in the development of 
volcanic risk reduction policy. 
 
Please take time to read the following information carefully before you decide 
whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
What is this study about? 
 
Volcanoes are found throughout the world and many governments have the 
responsibility of protecting their citizens from volcanic hazards. This study aims to 
understand the manner in which different jurisdictions employ diverse approaches to 
the reduction of risk from volcanoes within their territories and how the international 
exchange of information regarding volcanic risk influences governance decisions in 
individual locations. 
 
Why have I been invited? 
 
I have approached you because I believe your knowledge and experience may provide 
my study with valuable information about one or more of the following three aspects 
of volcanic risk policy:  
 
 The international exchange of knowledge related to volcanoes and volcanic 
risk. 
 The development and implementation of volcanic risk reduction in a specific 
location. 
 The experience of volcanic risk reduction as a citizen in a volcanically active 
area. 
 
What will I be asked to do if I take part? 
 
If you decide to take part, this would involve an interview with me, at your 
convenience, in order to share your experiences of volcanic risk reduction. The 
interview will be recorded as an audio file and any additional notes will be made on 
my laptop. The interviews may last as long as you deem appropriate and may be 
conducted over multiple meetings if this is more suitable. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
If you participate in this study, your insights will contribute to understanding the 
processes by which "best practices" are developed in the reduction of risk at 
individual volcanoes and on a global level. This information may be used to 
strengthen networks of knowledge transfer and improve volcanic risk reduction 
policies and practices in the future. 
 




No, your participation is completely voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any 
time prior to the publication of data, without justifying your decision. 
 
What if I change my mind? 
 
You are free to withdraw at any point prior to the publication of data from this study. 
If you wish to withdraw, I will extract any data that you contributed to the study and 
destroy it. "Data" means the information, ideas, opinions etc. that you and other 
participants have shared with me 
 
 
What are the possible disadvantages of taking part? 
 
It is unlikely that there will be any disadvantages to taking part. However, 
participation will require a brief investment of your time. 
 
Will my data be identifiable? 
 
After the interview, only I (the researcher) will have access to the data you share with 
me, prior to publication. 
 
The consent form for this study will ask if you would prefer your participation to be 
identifiable or anonymous. If you would prefer to remain anonymous, then I will keep 
all information about you (e.g. you name and other information by which you may be 
identified) confidential, that is, I will not share it with others. I will anonymise audio 
recordings and hard copies of the data. This means that I will remove any personal 
information. 
 
If you wish to be identifiable, but make a comment that you would prefer not to be 
attributed to yourself, then you may request the information relating to that particular 
comment to be anonymised. 
 
You will be able to request for your data to be anonymised at any point prior to the 
publication of data from this study. 
 
How will my data be stored? 
 
Your data will be stored in encrypted files (no-one other than the researcher will be 
able to access them) on password-protected computers. 
 
I will store hard copies of any data securely in a locked cabinet in my office. 
 
In accordance with Lancaster University guidelines, I will keep the data securely for 
10 years, after which it will be destroyed. 
 
How will the information you have shared be used and what will happen to the 
results of the study? 
 
I will use the data you have shared with me only in the following ways: 
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I will use it for academic purposes only, this will include my written PhD thesis and 
other academic publications (e.g. published journal articles). I may also present the 
results of my study at academic conferences.  
 
When writing up findings from this study, I would like to reproduce some of the 
views and ideas you have shared with me. If you have specified that you would prefer 
to remain anonymous, I will use only anonymised quotes so that, although I will use 
your exact words, you cannot be identified in any of our publications. 
 
Who has reviewed this project? 
 
This project has been reviewed by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Science and 
Technology at Lancaster University. 
 
What if I have questions or concerns? 
 
If you have questions or are unhappy about any aspects of your participation in this 
study please contact me: 
 
Graeme Alexander William Sinclair 










Professor Nigel Clark 







Dr. Jennie Gilbert 







If you have any concerns and complaints you wish to discuss with a person who is not 











+44 (0)1524 510230 
 













































Sample Extracts of Interview Transcripts 
 
Mauricio Bretón González, 09.05.2018 
MBG: The system of volcanic risk reduction in the state of Colima functions in an 
intermittent way because the organ that does scientific research is the University of 
Colima. This implies that communication should exist between the University of 
Colima and the state unit of PCC which is charged with the issue of the management 
of risk. It's not completely satisfactory, because they don't take into consideration all 
the work that is being done to research the volcano to issue an alert or to make an 
integrated effort towards risk management.  
 
To perform integrated risk management, you need various elements, and one of those 
is the element of prevention. The state PC system has been reactive, not preventative. 
Their system that has worked during recent years has reacted to what has happened at 
the volcano, they have not worked on prevention. To work on prevention, you need to 
work on the monitoring and this has not been a priority for PC in the state. Therefore, 
it's an element that should be under consideration, because when you want to work to 
manage risk, the first problem is that you don't even put all of the monitoring work 
that should be done on the table. What does that implicate? That you have only a 
partial vision of what is happening on the volcano. So, if you have a partial vision, 
your diagnosis is not a complete diagnosis and this can incur a risk for the 
neighbouring populations.  
 
GS: Do you feel that there has been no direction since the start? 
 
MBG: In 1998, there was a direction, a Scientific Advisory Committee existed that 
worked, not just with PCC, but with PCJ, the UdG, CENAPRED in México and 
UNAM. That is to say, there were various organisms involved in the volcano 
monitoring, the management of risk, and it was an integrated vision, everyone 
participated, everyone opined, everyone contributed information about the condition 
of the volcano. Moreover, a fund existed on the part of the state of Colima, to provide 
resources for volcano monitoring. Having volcano monitoring in the reduction of risk 
is essential, you can't have appropriate risk reduction if you don't have volcano 
monitoring, and to do volcano monitoring, you need money, monthly, in order to 
update equipment, emplace instruments, change batteries, make changes, sort things.  
 
Nowadays the issue of instrumentation has improved a lot, they're much more 
efficient than they were 20 years ago. 20 years ago it was very different, but even so, 
the resources existed. Petrol for the vehicles, infrastructure... In this, therefore there 
was co-ordination, PC had an advisory body. This doesn't exist now. It disappeared 
years ago. 
 
GS: How long did this situation last? 
 
MBG: From November 1998 until 2007-2008, more or less. It had already 
disappeared by that time. It had a fund that helped us to maintain the monitoring, so in 
this sense, you had opinions of different experts, you had the opinion of the state 
systems of PC, of the municipal PC unions, and this allowed for a general panorama 
of what was happening. When you have all those actors and moreover, you have 
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people from the civil population, this allows you to have a better communication, 
better diagnosis, better management of risk.  
 
This was still part of a predominantly reactive system, however to already be invested 
in the matter of good surveillance, helped the preventative part. We gave talks to the 
populations about the activity, what could happen before, during, after. We worked on 
preventative issues that nowadays are ignored. They've lost that in Colima.  
 
GS: And for what reason do you think that's the case? 
 
MBG: The principal reason is a lack of interest. That is to say, the governments in 
turn... At some point we had a government that was more sensitive to the issues of 
volcanic risk and risk reduction and later the situation received less interest from all 
areas. 
 
GS: Therefore, perhaps the reason that this committee was created in 1998 was 
because in that year the volcano had very visible activity and it was something new 
for the government of the state, and nowadays if there is activity at the volcano, the 
state has become accustomed, so there isn't so much interest? 
 
MBG: It could have been the sensibility of the then-governor of the state, because he 
had been director of the University, so he knew the problem, a very visible problem. 
This meant that he had worked with people at the University and he was very 
sensitive to the issue.  
 
Afterwards came changes, every 6 years, the governor changes and the next governor 
also showed interest. The then-President of México, Vicente Fox also showed interest 
in what was happening in the activity of the volcano, he came to Colima, he talked to 
us and offered us money to buy equipment. This was in 2005. After 2005, that was the 
last big purchase of equipment. Afterwards, there have been separate projects for each 
of the researchers who have played their part in putting instruments on the volcano, 
but the 'great instrumentation' happened in 2005.  
 
GS: Then, the majority of the equipment that is on the volcano was bought in 2005? 
 
MBG: Well, not now. Lots of this equipment has disappeared, but nonetheless a boost 
was given to the monitoring and the reduction of risk. When you install equipment, 
you need money to maintain it.  
 
How has it been since then? Some researchers have worked on obtaining projects, 
sometimes related to the volcano, sometimes not, but related to risk reduction. We 
have obtained money with the intention of putting instruments into our line of 
research. In my case, I have focussed on visual monitoring, I have situated cameras 
with my own resources, allocated to my own projects. However, up to now there 
hasn't been a boost at national level. A short while ago they brought three seismic 
stations, but this isn't really a national effort towards risk reduction.  
 




MBG: I think so. I think the national level, despite there having been many changes in 
what have been the issues of legislation, new laws, greater interest in hazardous 
phenomena, anthropogenic climate change, the creation of the National Risk Atlas... 
Really, in the other area, the area of instrumentation. México is not just Volcán de 
Colima, there are other active volcanoes and a need to understand them. There's a big 
population around those volcanoes, so there's a need to work and integrate this. I don't 
think this is being done.  
 
GS: I've talked to various people who work in CENAPRED and UNAM and I have 
the impression that the co-ordination between the states at Popocatépetl is more 
integrated than here between Colima and Jalisco.  
 
MBG: There is no co-ordination at Volcán de Colima. We could say that the exchange 
of information isn't high. There is some co-ordination but, for example, in Jalisco, 
they use an alert semaphore, in Colima we don't, so there are certain differences in the 
management of risk. There are occasions when the volcano is active, they evacuate 
one community and in others that are very close, they don't do anything. That is to say 
that each one is independent and this isn't bad, it's just that there is no integrated co-
ordination.  
 
In the case of México, it seems to me that the same thing happens. There are various 
states that are involved in the case of Popocatépetl, and it could be that some react in 
one way and others in another. However, Popocatépetl is not instrumented the way it 
should be either, its the highest-risk volcano in the country and the instruments are not 
the best. A volcano of this magnitude with the population that it has.  
 
You can see a general co-ordination there on the part of CENAPRED, but this does 
not mean that the volcanic risk reduction is being done efficiently. It works, but I 
don't know if it will deal with stress the way they hope. 
 
GS: Do they have to reestablish the Scientific Advisory Committee in order to 
improve the division between the two states?  
 
MBG: Yes. I think it should be brought back with people and institutions from both 
states. The decision-making cannot be put in the hands of researchers, it has to stay in 
the hands of the authorities. For this, you need it so that everyone works with the 
same objective. This needs to be the volcano and the population living around the 
volcano. Not if I have more resources than you, or vice-versa, I have more 
instruments than you, etc. That is to say, that we work in a co-ordinated manner. 
That's a word that the politicians like a lot. If we work in a really co-ordinated way, 
then we will have lots of elements to achieve a better diagnosis/prognosis and much 
more efficient early warning that would benefit the management of risk.  
 
GS: Yes, and with that objective in mind, some people have talked to me about the 
possibility of a National Volcanological Service, do you think this could provide a 
solution? 
 
MBG: It could provide a solution, but it's a centralised vision, no? From the centre, 
we're going to watch everything that happens in the country. I think a Volcanological 
Service would be good in a certain sense, if they always respect and consider all the 
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areas of research that are being conducted in the country, universities, research 
centres, municipal PC. If you achieve that, then great, but the centralist vision is that 
the centre is going to control everything... Who is going to work in this service? 
Those of us who already have instrumentation, who've been working for years? We're 
going to give it to the Service in exchange for what? What is your responsibility 
within this service? What are the conditions? If you become part of a Service, what is 
your status? Are you an employee of the Government, are you an employee of the 
University? What is your scope? What are your responsibilities?  
 
You know the case of l'Aquila in Italy. At what point could we come to? Federal 
functionaries have certain obligations. This should remain very clear, no? Who wants 
to form part of a National Volcanological Service.  
 
GS: So, in place of this idea, do you believe there is another solution to improve the 
situation? 
 
MBG: I believe that, simply, they need to establish conditions between the 
governments, that is to say, who wants to work together, the conditions they want to 
work under and they can share information with the central system, in this instance 
CENAPRED can take the information and distribute it at national level but under an 
integrated scheme of co-operation of universities, research centres, municipal and 
state PC offices. 
 
It needs resources, it needs money. In large part, the problem is money because 
everything exists, there are research centres, there is monitoring, there are researchers, 
there are people from PC, there are voluntary groups, there is everything. The 
problem is the necessary co-ordination and the money for it to work. 
 
GS: But they have no problems accumulating money during periods of high activity? 
 
MBG: Sure, because here they always make a promise, if the volcano produces 
activity, there are always promises, who's going to come, what they're going to bring, 
what they're going to do... The activity ends and that all ends. It's a problem with a 
timescale, no? One day we're national-level news, everyone comes, civil servants, big 
meetings, people with lots of employees, lots of bureaucracy and politics, but this 
doesn't solve the problem at its root. The problem at its root is an integrated 
management of risk, it will be resolved little by little. We did not have a risk atlas, 
today we do.  
 
It is not possible that in the meetings about the state of the volcanic activity that those 
who are doing the monitoring are not present, haven't even been invited. So there's a 
political issue as well, they're sat there, 30 people with no idea what a volcano even is. 
That's grave. They were going to choose one, but this is not how you do integrated 
management. In the old Scientific Committee, there were meetings where there were 
discussions about what we found in each of the areas that were monitored and at the 
end we tried to arrive at a consensus and from this, to make a recommendation. Made 
by the Committee, we would recommend to PC and they would take a decision. 
 






Lucia Capra, 27.04.2018 
LC: I've been working at Colima for ten years, on volcanic hazards. Before that I 
worked on basic volcano stratigraphy for the last 10-20 years. I think in México, 
hazard and risk management has not been developed from a single institution, but for 
each volcano there are several groups that are contributing to a single aspect. In my 
case, for lahars, warning system and monitoring system, I had to provide all the funds, 
all the station and there was an agreement, actually, it was my decision, to give all the 
data to PC. I need the data from real time monitoring to study the phenomenon, but 
PC need the data to make warnings or mitigate damages. 
 
It was my individual project. It was not PC or CENAPRED asking me to do this. I 
wanted to study lahars on active volcanoes in México, so I went to build up the 
stations. I asked "Do you want the data?" "Oh yes", also because they didn't have the 
money to do this. The government isn't giving CENAPRED much funding to set up a 
monitoring system, so I think they're trying with different groups around México to 
obtain all the data they can without spending much money. They provide you the 
capacity to build up a transmission system, if you buy the station, they can build it for 
you but they don't have much funding and they get specific funds for a specific 
project.  
 
I think a weak part is that PC doesn't have enough funds to be autonomous and decide 
"we need a monitoring system at this volcano to do a better hazard assessment."  They 
need funds from universities and from people who can submit a project to CONACYT 
to build up instrumentation. I now have three projects from CONACYT for lahar 
monitoring at Colima, Popocatépetl and maybe Tacaná. All the data are free to see for 
RESCO, CENAPRED and other institutions if they want to. 
 
Now, locally, there is another problem because, for example, last year, I had problems 
with the transmission of my station in Montegrande to here, so I went to Cuauhtémoc 
to see if they have a tall tower. They were very happy, because they don't connect 
very well with PC of the state. Even inside the same state there are problems between 
the community and the central organisation. It was quite surprising, but not very 
much, maybe because Cuauhtémoc is from a different political orientation to the state 
government. They cannot be on top of the political state and this is problematic.  
 
One of the main problems about the monitoring system is the funds to build the 
system. Presently I've been working on Popocatépetl. Last year there was a very 
strong earthquake in CDMX but also on the volcano, because of the earthquake, a lot 
of landslides occurred then rain remobilised a lot of material and lots of lahars formed 
along channels that before the earthquake were not active, so people were very scared 
about it because they thought it was lava flowing down from the volcano because of 
the earthquake.  
 
They felt they didn't get any answer or any information about the phenomena from 
CENAPRED. They told me that up to 5-7 years ago CENAPRED was very active in 
those small villages, they would periodically give some information, some data, but 
now they feel like they are quite alone. So I compromised with them, in three weeks I 
will go there to explain what happened during the earthquake, what happened three 
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weeks after, what will be happening now in the new rainy season. But, I'm a 
researcher from an institution, I'm not responsible for working with the communities. 
I'm mainly responsible for studying the phenomena and making maps to let the people 
who can better do this job translate information to the community. For me, it's not 
easy because hazard and risk are quite different.  
 
I called CENAPRED and told them about the situation, I said to them "They need 
someone there to explain what's happening." I'm happy to show photos and give a 
talk, but I would like your support. They told me they could give me the sound system 
to help me do my talk, instead of giving me a person. I can't go to Popocatépetl every 
three months to give a talk, it's not my job. It's not in my academic profile and it's 
difficult for me. If I can, I'll do it because I like to be with people, but people from 
local PC told me they'd like to make a group and go to CENAPRED to get some 
information, to find out what to do in case of a lahar. They're a small organisation 
inside the village. So, they were self-organising to respond to a new crisis, but it was a 
decision from the community, not from CENAPRED.  But no-one was interested to 
do it, only one, so right now I saw people who were very scared about what could 
happen and if it could happen again because the earthquake was very strong and the 
same day the volcano produced a small eruption. Three weeks after, a very muddy 
lahar came down and they thought it was lava. When a dog crossed the river and was 
still alive, they relaxed as they realised it's just water and mud. After that event, no-
one was there from the institution to explain what to do in case of this event. 
 
I know it's difficult because there are more than 100 communities exposed to this, but 
I don't see systematic work on that.  
 
GS: With your monitoring, do they consult you about the alert systems they use? 
 
LC: We are working on a warning system. We already have a lot of years of data from 
Colima, and I think that we already have the new sensors that we just got. We already 
have the algorithm, so we can try this here with the new rain station. The alert would 
be transmitted only to PC, not to the people living there, because they should know 
what to do, not just turn on a light and that's all.  
 
Now we want to test if the warning system is detecting real events and then work out 
with PC how to set up the warning system inside the village.  
 
GS: So are you looking to implement the same warning system for PCC and PCJ? 
 
LC: I'm just working at the moment with people from Colima. This is another 
problem, I think, they are not very co-ordinated.  
 
And the same for Popo... Well, actually I think it's quite different because 
CENAPRED is really -on- Popocatépetl, so although there are four states... 
 
GS: This is the impression I've got from my interviews so far is that planning for VRR 
at Popo is much more centralised. Because Colima is in a bubble, the institutional 
attitudes and approaches are probably more divided between these two states than 




LC: Yes, sure, exactly. But also because all of the people working on Popo are at 
UNAM, there are very few people from Puebla university working on the volcano, so 
it's much easier. I know that at UdG and at Colima, there are people working that 
don't share data, that don't want to share funds and so it's much more complicated, 
even with the investigation of the phenomenon.  
 
GS: Do you think there's a better relationship between the scientists who work at 
UNAM with those who work at Colima in comparison to Jalisco? 
 
LC: Much better with Colima. I have tried to do something with Jalisco but they 
asked me only "how are you planning the monitoring station?" They just want to 
know how to do it rather than letting me build up my monitoring station in Barranca 
La Arena and we can share data. They were much more interested in, not stealing, but 
understanding what I was doing so they could duplicate it. They know I have a station 
in La Lumbre, which is the limit between Colima and Jalisco and I know they wanted 
to put another station there... Why? You can have the data, we can share... 
 
No, here in Colima, I always had support from RESCO without any problems, now 
we are improving a lot of monitoring for lahars, we are sharing data, we are sharing 
data with CENAPRED and I don't have any problems. For me, it could even be 
enough to put the sensors there and go three months after to get the data and work on 
it but because I think it's important to have data in real time I'm buying everything to 
transmit the data here.  
 
GS: So RESCO receive the data from your sensors in real time as well? 
 
LC: Yes.  
 
GS: So that means that, although you're in charge of the project, if there's a crisis, they 
get the data straight away? 
 
LC: No, the data are arriving here directly, and that means if there's something nice in 
it that I want to study, they can give me it and I can work on it, but I don't need the 
data in real time. It's nice for me to see that it's raining and I can connect to the camera 
and see what's happening, but all the data are arriving here so they can use it during 
crises.  
 
Carlos Valdés González, 24.04.2018 
CV: ...We have an emergency committee related to the volcano. We have different 
committees, but the one that started many years ago was the Subcomité Cientifico 
Asesor Volcán Popocatépetl, a scientific advisory board, composed of most of the 
volcanologists of the IG and some other authorities. 
 
GS: So, does that committee still exist? 
 
CV: Yes, it does. 
 




CV: Yes, Colima is a more complicated situation *laughs*. Here, the Committee 
started many years ago. It started probably a few weeks or months after the start of the 
activity of the volcano and it is very interesting. We, at CENAPRED share a lot of the 
information that we have, we also call them when we feel that something is changing 
and we show them why we've asked them for a meeting and if there's a sudden change 
of activity, several parameters, then we show them that and people start discussing 
what they think the problem is and what the outcome of that will be. Based on that 
deliberation, it's not easy, I will tell you that, those meetings are very interesting, we 
need to convince people. I would like in this moment to acknowledge Servando de la 
Cruz, he's probably the leader, the way he thinks, the way he takes the information 
from everyone, the way he blends that and gets a reasonable decision of what to do is 
very important. From there, there is a recommendation that goes to the authorities, 
sometimes it's "should we change the alert level of the volcano" in critical situations, 
if towns need to be evacuated, what towns and what position. These are 
recommendations, they are not responsible for the decision but the authorities in PC, 
they will be the ones that will decide to take the recommendations, and then they are 
responsible for that.  
 
It is very important, and you have the backgrounds of all these people. Sometimes we 
have called people from other countries and you've had people from the VDAP 
programme, from the USGS to give an evaluation and to see if the way we're doing 
things is okay, once you realise the population that is exposed to major activity of the 
volcano. So, the committee has been critical and very important. I believe that there 
have probably been more than 60 meetings with the committee, sometimes I 
remember we have been called -now I'm the one who has to call them, but before- on 
a Saturday at 10 o'clock at night and we have lasted deliberating and writing some 
conclusions until 4 o'clock in the morning. That is very appreciated, because of the 
time of the people there, and we try to focus them, not only on the scientific part but 
from their point of view, how to land that information so that things are done in a 
better way, and then, at least for the top level authorities, it's easier to convince them 
when you tell them "There is this committee and here is the recommendation", they 
are not going to say "I don't believe it" or "I don't agree with them and I will take 
another decision".  
 
After that committee started, other committees here formed, one for 
hydrometeorological problems, one for geological problems, mainly dealing with 
earthquakes and subsidence. There is one for chemistry, or chemical problems and 
one for social unrest. 
 
GS: So, did that happen when the PC law changed in 2012-2013, did those other 
committees form? 
 
CV: No, they started before. The first one was Popocatépetl and the outcome of the 
committee was so good that the other committees formed and then, the one that, for 
instance, has to do with the chemical risk, it meets every month. We are in the 220th 
meeting. It is very impressive. But all they do is recommendations, their only function 
is to provide a recommendation and the committees will tell you who that 
recommendation should be pushed to and we, as part of the federal government, we 
go and tell the Ministry of Transport for instance and say "there is this 
recommendation" and try to push, they are not obliged to. 
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